SOVIET REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE UNITED STATES ACTIONS ON ANTARCTICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A010900010001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 11, 1958
• Content Type: SNIE

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SNE 11-3-58
11 February 1958
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-3-58
SOVIET REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE
UNITED STATES ACTIONS ON ANTARCTICA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 11 February 1958. Concurring were The Director of Intel-
ligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the
Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representa-
tive to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their
jurisdiction. ,
. .
;
DOCUMENT NO
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SOVIET REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE UNITED STATES
ACTIONS ON ANTARCTICA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet present intentions and their reactions to:
1. The assertion of US territorial claims in Antarctica accompanied or shortly fol-
lowed by a US call for a conference of interested states to discuss and sign a treaty
establishing a multinational regime for Antarctica.
2. A US call for such a conference, without assertion of US claims.
ASSUMPTIONS
3. That the US may assert a territorial
claim to the unclaimed portions of Ant-
arctica and reserve its rights and possibly
make claims in other areas.
4. That the US may invite other states
having an interest in the Antarctic
(Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile,
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
South Africa, UK and USSR) to join in
establishing a regime in Antarctica for:
a. Encouragement and facilitation of
international cooperation in the field of
scientific activity for the maximum bene-
fit of mankind.
b. Regulated development, utilization,
and conservation of the natural resources
of the region, in the general interest.
c. Insuring through effective measures
that the region be used for peaceful pur-
poses only.
To this end, and without prejudice to any
claims asserted by claimants, the US may
propose a conference of the states listed
above to draft in treaty form a statute for
the proposed regime. Signature of this
treaty would not prejudice existing
claims, or oblige signers to transfer full
sovereignty to the regime. However, it
might be proposed to freeze the status
quo to the extent of prohibiting changes
in existing claims or the assertions of
new claims. The resulting regime would
assume jurisdiction and control in the
fields provided by the treaty, and submit
reports from time to time to appropriate
bodies of the UN. With respect to the
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regulation of economic and scientific de-
velopment, it would be provided that the
regime would treat member states and
non-member states and their nationals
on a basis of equality.
5. Public announcement of the proposed
actions would be made around the mid-
2
die of 1958, to enable interested countries
to make plans for the period following the
International Geophysical Year (IGY)
within the framework of a common pol-
icy. It is contemplated that such an an-
nouncement would be preceded by con-
sultation with non-Bloc countries and
organizations.
SUMMARY
6. The current Soviet effort in the Ant-
arctic is impressive in size. We believe
the program is serving a variety of in-
terests, political and psychological, as
well as economic and military. A major
interest, however, is scientific, and is
part of the long established and long-
range Soviet program of research in the
earth sciences. It is also specifically re-
lated to current problems in such fields
as electronic communications, weather
forecasting and control, etc. We believe
the Soviets will remain in the Antarctic
after the IGY.
7. We believe the USSR, following its
established policy, would not recognize
any US claims, whether or not coupled
with a call for a conference to establish
a multinational regime for the area. We
think it unlikely that the USSR will as-
sert a specific territorial claim, preferring
the freedom resulting from a reservation
of all rights.
8. If the US made a claim and the USSR
had not, the Soviets probably would not
accept an invitation to such a conference,
particularly if the proposal attempted to
freeze out further claims. The Soviets
might suggest a broadened conference, or,
more likely, propose UN discussion, be-
lieving they could get some support from
nonclaimants. The chances of the USSR
accepting such an invitation would be in-
creased if it too had made a claim.
9. If a conference were proposed before
claims had been made by either the US or
the USSR, we believe the USSR would
probably attend, although the working-
out of any proposals regarding military
neutralization would present difficulties.
The USSR might alternatively propose
UN discussion. The prospects of the
USSR's actually taking part in a regime
for the area would depend on the extent
to which it was satisfied in its desires for
unhampered access and for a status in
which it could fully protect its interests.
The Soviets would not make their de-
cision on attending a conference or join-
ing a regime on the basis of considera-
tions relating to the Antarctic alone, but
on the basis of much wider considerations
involving their posture and objectives in
other East-West negotiations.
10. The USSR would probably ignore a
regime established without its participa-
tion, just as it has ignored past claims,
and would continue its activities.
11. We believe that the Soviet leaders
may feel that their interests in Antarctica
would be best served by taking the initi-
ative and calling for a conference with a
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membership and agenda of their own
choosing or proposing UN consideration
of the Antarctic. Such action would be
more likely if they became aware of the
nature of discussions in the US and else-
where.
DISCUSSION
I. PROBABLE SIGNIFICANCE OF ANTARCTICA
TO THE USSR
12. Introduction. Current Soviet activities
in the Antarctic are on a larger scale than
those of any other country except the US.
They maintain five bases and are establishing
one more during this year. (See attached
map.) The Soviet program, while identified
with the International Geophysical Year
(IGY) , includes a number of scientific fields
outside the IGY program, such as geology,
mineral exploration, mapping, navigation
studies, etc. From established bases and by
ships, exploration of wide areas of the Ant-
arctic is being undertaken. The scope and
size of the Soviet effort is greater than would
be required by such traditional interests as
economic, political, and direct military needs.
We believe that a major concern is the collec-
tion of scientific data in a wide variety of
fields, including basic research.
13. Scientific Interests. The USSR has a
long established and highly developed pro-
gram for accumulating scientific data in all
the earth sciences including the geophysical
fields. Such a program requires a multitude
of observations during a long period and over
wide areas. We believe that a major cause
for the extensive Soviet Antarctic activity is
the acquisition of data for this program while
at the same time serving political and prestige
needs. The results of such scientific research
are important to a variety of fields of vital con-
cern to the USSR. For example, the Antarc-
tic may be an important factor in global
weather, including that of the Northern Hem-
isphere. Long range forecasting is of im-
portance to the Soviets as it relates to such
matters as agricultural production in margin-
al lands and the availability of the Northern
Sea Route. Antarctic activities might also
contribute to studies of weather control, in
which the Soviets are taking an active interest.
14. There are a number of other scientific
fields in which we believe the Soviets will
develop interests in the Antarctic, including
studies of the upper atmosphere, of problems
involved in electronic communications, and
observations of satellite vehicles. The Soviets
are planning to fire high altitude rockets in
the Antarctic for scientific research, includ-
ing cosmic ray observations. In connection
with all the scientific efforts, we believe that
the Soviets see major advantages in having
their own observation posts in the Southern
Hemisphere.
15. Strategic Interests. We have no evidence
of current Soviet military interest in the Ant-
arctic beyond the potential military value of
the scientific and other data obtained. We do
not know of any Soviet submarine or other
military activities in the Antarctic area either
in connection with the IGY program or in-
dependently. While it is possible that the So-
viets will develop an interest in using the Ant-
arctic for missile testing, submarine and air-
craft basing, or as part of a military communi-
cations net, we believe such possibilities to be
unlikely. There is also the possibility that the
area will be of value in monitoring earth satel-
lites and space vehicles used for reconnais-
sance and other military missions.
16. Economic Interests. The Soviets have
been whaling in Antarctic waters since 1946,
and this activity will increase as new whalers
and auxiliary ships now under construction
are completed. In addition, results of cur-
rent prospecting for minerals may possibly
lead to increased Soviet interest in Antarctica.
However, the difficulties of access, extraction
and production are great. We do not believe
that economic interests will be an important
factor in Soviet decisions affecting the area.
17. Political Interests. To date the USSR has
neither made any territorial claims nor rec-
ognized the claims of any other power. The
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official Soviet political position on Antarctica
is embodied in Soviet notes to Norway in 1939
and to the US, UK, France, Norway, Australia,
Argentina, and New Zealand in 1950, in which
the USSR refused recognition of any territo-
rial claims, reserved its rights on the conti-
nent, and asserted its right to participate in
any political settlement, based on the alleged
discovery of the continent by Admiral Bel-
lingshausen in 1820. Soviet comment has re-
ferred to these notes as evidence of their long
interest in Antarctica, and now the explora-
tion and establishment of stations in the past
two years can also be cited by them as evidence
of their right to participate in a political set-
tlement. All the Soviet stations are in the sec-
tor claimed by Australia, and exploration has
to date also been concentrated there. How-
ever, future Soviet explorations in other areas,
,....particularly on the coast of the unclaimed
sector ' are planned. The USSR has ignored
A
the Australian claim, and asserts that the
"sector" principle which it applies in the Arc-
tic is inapplicable in the Antarctic.
18. Extent of Recent Exploration. The So-
viets have engaged in widespread exploration
beginning in late 1955. Aerial mapping and
landings of small parties (94 landings in 1956-
57) have supplemented the major land ex-
peditions and the extensive sea explorations.
The Soviets are planning in the current year
to explore along the shores of the unclaimed
sector. Land expeditions in 1956-57 failed to
reach the South Geomagnetic Pole and the
"Pole of Relative Inaccessibility," but expedi-
tions have recently reached the former objec-
tive, and they are now en route to the latter,
to establish bases at each. A major part of
the current Soviet effort is the making of
oceanographic and hydrographic surveys of
the coasts of the continent.
19. Present USSR Intentions. Existing rea-
sons for the interest of the USSR in Antarc-
tica will not end with the IGY and it is pos-
sible that Soviet activities in the area will in-
crease rather than decrease after 1958. On
several occasions, including discussions of
post-IGY activities, Soviet officials have stated
that the USSR intends to remain active in
Antarctica and to maintain at least some of
its present stations. It seems clear that the
USSR at present believes that its interests
and prestige require it to maintain a position
in Antarctica at least equal to that of any
other country.
20. There is some evidence of a possible So-
viet intention to establish a permanent zone
of operations. The Soviets have laid a founda-
tion for a claim by reserving their rights, by
refusing to recognize claims of other coun-
tries, and by their recent activities in explora-
tion and settlement. Nevertheless, we be-
lieve there is little likelihood that the USSR
intends to make territorial claims under pres-
ent conditions. Soviet assertion of claims in
the areas in which they are operating, the
Australian-claimed sector, would upset the
status quo under which current operations
are proceeding harmoniously, and would cause
an immediate dispute with Australia and pos-
sibly other interested powers. Soviet asser-
tion of claims in the unclaimed areas of the
continent particularly between 90 and 150
West longitude ? would likewise probably up-
set the harmony of the present situation.
Furthermore, the USSR has as yet no his-
torical basis for claim in the unclaimed areas
through discovery, exploration, or occupation.
The USSR probably considers the most advan-
tageous position to be one of asserting no
specific claims and reserving all its rights.
Its sphere of operations would not be circum-
scribed by its own actions and it would main-
tain a flexible position from which it could
act as its own immediate needs required. It
could thus avoid and exploit disputes among
interested powers, while maintaining the pos-
ture of a major world power with considerable
interest but no territorial aspirations in the
Antarctic.
II. ESTIMATE OF PROBABLE SOVIET REAC-
TIONS TO PROPOSED US INITIATIVES
21. In the light of the above, we believe that
the Soviet reaction to any US moves on Ant-
arctica would be determined both by a con-
tinuing desire to assure their unhampered
access to the area, primarily for scientific pur-
poses, and by considerations of general Soviet
prestige, political position, and propaganda
posture. Thus their reactions could be con-
ditioned by events and situations wholly dis-
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sociated from the Antarctic. They might wish
not to appear unreasonable in this matter lest
their conduct prejudice other and more im-
portant negotiations. For example, it is pos-
sible that the Soviets would modify an initial
intransigent stand in order to heighten the
picture of willingness to go half-way toward
reducing possible East-West conflicts. In any
event, for reasons of prestige as well as manip-
ulative opportunity, the Soviets will continue
to refuse to accept anything less than equal
status in the Antarctic.
22. Soviet estimates of Western intentions
will, in any case, be weighted with suspicion,
particularly if they learn that prior consulta-
tion has been limited to Western countries.
Furthermore, we believe that the Soviets will
be alert to seize opportunities to exacerbate
Free World differences over Antarctica. The
Soviets would estimate that the reactions
of both claimant and nonclaimant countries
to any proposal would provide some oppor-
tunities for exploitation.
23. Soviet reactions to US claims accompanied
or followed by the call fbr a conference. The
Soviets would probably believe that the US
was attempting both to expand and strength-
en its position in Antarctica, and to minimize
or possibly terminate Soviet activity in the
area. The assertion of US claims would rep-
resent a reversal of US policy of non-recogni-
tion of claims and probably would be con-
sidered by the USSR as a threat to its own
freedom of action. A US claim, whether or
not accompanied by a call for a conference,
would be portrayed by the USSR as an ex-
ample of American imperialism and disregard
for the rights of others. Moreover, if the call
for the conference came some time after the
US had made its claim, the Kremlin would
try to make it appear that the US had re-
treated under Soviet pressure.
24. In either case, the USSR would almost
certainly not recognize the US claims, would
reassert its refusal to recognize all other
claims, and would at least reserve its own
rights. It is possible that the Soviets would
make a formal claim, probably not specifically
to contradict that of the US, but to demand
and establish recognition of its status as a
claimant. Any such Soviet claim would at
least embrace all areas it has explored to date
(see attached map) with reservations of rights
in all other areas. However, the advantages of
non-recognition of all claims, and consequent
lack of any recognized limits to Soviet opera-
tions, would probably lead the Soviets to con-
tinue to avoid any specific territorial claim.
25. If the US had made a claim and the USSR
had not, the Soviets would probably not agree
to participate in the conference lest they ap-
pear to acquiesce in the claims of the US and
others. Such a rejection would be almost cer-
tain if the call for a conference proposed that
there be a freeze on claims. In either case,
the USSR would probably make a counter
proposal for a greatly broadened conference or
more likely, for a UN discussion based on the
principle of the non-recognition of all claims.
The Soviets probably could marshal support
among Asian and African opinion ? particu-
larly from such neutralist countries as In-
dia ? for the view that nonclaimants were be-
ing discriminated against. In 1956, India sug-
gested that "The Question of Antarctica" be
put on the provisional agenda of the UN
General Assembly. The matter was not pressed
at that time, but India might be glad to pre-
sent such an item again to the 1958 UNGA.
26. In the unlikely event that the USSR had
made a claim prior to the call for a confer-
ence, the likelihood of Soviet participation
would be considerably greater. Nevertheless,
Soviet conduct at such a conference would
probably be obstructionist until and unless it
achieved the safeguards noted below as re-
quirements for its participation in a regime.
27. Reactions to the proposal for a conference
and international regime, without declaration
of American claims. If the conference were
proposed without US assertion of claims, and
with one of its stated objectives being the
military neutralization of the area, the USSR
might recognize the sincerity of the US pro-
posal, and conclude that the West considered
it impossible entirely to ignore the Soviet in-
terest in the area. In these circumstances,
we believe the USSR would probably agree in
principle to the proposal and attend the con-
ference in the belief that its freedom of action
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would not be impaired. The Soviets might,
however, make the alternative proposal of UN
consideration of the whole Antarctic question.
An attempt to define neutralization either in
the proposal or in the conference in terms of
the purposes for which military weapons,
equipment, or personnel could be introduced
would probably lead to protracted discussions,
particularly if presented in such a way as to
arouse Soviet suspicions of US intentions.'
However, the Soviets might accept the pro-
posal that a function of the regime would be
to determine from time to time what activi-
ties would be prohibited within the concept
of neutralization.
28. Prospects for the USSR actually joining
a regime would depend upon the extent to
which the charter met their desires, especially
those relating to sovereignty, the method of
making decisions, and rights of access. Re-
garding sovereignty, the USSR almost cer-
tainly would not agree to a regime in which it
had a status less than that of the seven coun-
tries now making claims. It would probably
seek either recognition of its status as a claim-
ant (if it had made claims) or more probably
the nullification of all claims.
1 The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State, believes that the pe-
nultimate sentence should be replaced by
the following: "Should an attempt be made,
and persisted in, to modify the principle of com-
plete military neutralization, as for example by
an exception for weapons of primarily defensive
characteristics, the USSR would undoubtedly
suspect Western intentions and believe that the
West meant to establish a basis for introducing
military forces into the Antarctic. It would so
claim in its propaganda, and would intensify its
UN or other international efforts in which it
would expect to find stronger support. It would
probably refuse to join the regime, and it is at
least possible that it might, in such a case, at-
tempt to develop military elements in its own
installations similar to those it claimed the US
intended to develop.
\r24
6
29. The Soviets would be most reluctant to
agree to majority vote of the regime members,
and would probably insist upon unanimous
decisions. However, if the Soviets considered
that their actual operations would not be sub-
ject to control by the regime, and particularly
if world public opinion strongly favored the
proposed regime, the USSR might agree to
participation even without a veto right. The
Soviets would probably have no problem re-
garding access, since the regime would pro-
vide freedom of access to all countries. In
addition, the Soviets would believe that there
was little likelihood that any regime would
attempt to eject them by force.
30. Soviet actions in the event of USSR non-
participation in the international regime.
The Soviets have ignored claims in their oper-
ations in Antarctica, and will continue to do
so after IGY. (The Australian "invitation,"
hastily offered after the Soviets expressed the
intention to establish stations in their claim
sector, was ignored by the Soviets.) If the
regime were established without Soviet par-
ticipation, it is probable that, in the absence
of effective regime sanctions, the Soviet
Union would maintain bases, continue ex-
plorations, and carry out any operations
which they thought important. They would,
however, try to conceal any activities which
might cause an adverse reaction in world
opinion.
III. POSSIBLE SOVIET INITIATIVES
31. We believe that the Soviet leaders may
feel that their interests in Antarctica would
be best served by taking the initiative and
calling for a conference with a membership
and agenda of their own choosing or propos-
ing UN consideration of the Antarctic. Such
action would be more likely if they became
aware of the nature of discussions in the US
and elsewhere.
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Soviet Stations and Exploration in the Antarctic
Area seen by Soviet explorers,
1955-57
26549
1-58
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