PROBABLE SOVIET POSITIONS AT A TECHNICAL CONFERENCE ON MEASURES TO AVERT SURPRISE ATTACK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A011000020011-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 9, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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9 September 1958
PROBABLE SOVIET l'OSITIONS AT A TECHNICAL
CONFERENCE ON ME&SURES TO AVERT SURPRISE ATTACK
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1, The Soviet approach to a technical conference on averting
possibilities of surprise attack would, of course, reflect the general
Soviet position on disarmament.* It would reflect the broad aim of
enhancing Soviet security, both by reducing the likelihood of nuclear
mar, and by moving toward limitations on the most threatening aspects
of Western military power. The negotiations at the conference of
experts on nuclear test controls have shown that the Soviets may be
willing to entertain certain military limitations for themselves and
accept some inspection controls if they judge that from an agreement
they will obtain a net gain to their security.
2. Four general Soviet diplomatic aims could be served in experts,
talks: (a) keeping alive the disarmament issue, in a forum in which
the appearance of Soviet initiative can be maximized; (b) preparing
See SNIE 11-6-58 The Soviet Attitude Toward Disarmament, 24 June 1958,
SECRET; especially arbonclusions and the Appendix, rams. 12-17
and 21-24.
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a specific issue generating pressure for a Summit meeting (perhaps
along with the nuclear test issue); (c) possible start of a "rolling
stone" effect which, again along with the nuclear test issue, may lead
to sufficient popular pressure on Western governments to make them
more pliable on some disarmament issues; and (d) a further stop to
tie "surprise attack" prevention measures ultimately to a ban on
nuclear wapons, and in the interim to lesser geographical limitations
and other inhibitions on use of nuclear weapons.
3. Measures to avert surprise attack are by their nature so
encompassing as in effect to embrace the entire disarmament field.
Inspection (observation) is insufficient to provide wholly adequate
safeguards, at least in respect to certain weapons systems; limitations
on numbers and deployment of at least some weapons almost certainly
mould become involved. The Soviets will have recognized the difficulty
of keeping these issues within a technical framework, as well as the
inherent tendency of the subject to lead to proposals for a more
comprehensive system of control than they are now prepared to contemplate.
Probably no reliable forecast of their conduct in these talks can be
inferred from their relatively businesslike approach to the nuclear test
talks. In the latter the subject was narrow and was related to an
objective they had long pursued, limitations on nuclear weapons. More-
over, there was no disclosure of military information involved, nor of
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any significant information on detection techniques not already
known to the other side. Discussion of methods of insuring against
surprise attack will open up the whole range of disarmament questions
proper, including disclosure of military information. When this
happens the Soviets will probably try to limit discussion to disarm-
ament measures they have pushed in the past. It is possible that in
anticipation of this outcome they will enter the talks with the frank
intention to give them a political turn from the outset, or will at
some stage provoke a breakdown in a propaganda context favorable to
themselves.
4. The Soviet approach will be framed within a number of
important constraints: (a) as is evident from various Soviet statements
and behavior, they do not now have confidence that any form or extent
of inspection would assure prevention of surprise attack, nor have they
decided that such a result would be in their interest; (b) the deeply
ingrained aversion to inspection activities by foreigners in the USSR,
while perhaps modified, has not boon dispelled; (c) the Soviets would
be reluctant to lose the relative advantage they now possess in terms
of military information about the potential enemy; (d) the Soviets are
not prepared to neutralize such military advantages as they might
believe they now have (e.g., in the long-range missile and satellite
vehicle field). Within these limits, the soviets retain a considerable
latitude for diplomatic and technical discussions.
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II. LIKELY SOVIET PROPOSALS AND POSITIONS
Areas of Observation and Control
S. These constraints, as well as the record of past Soviet
proposals, indicate that the Soviet delegation would be likely to stress
a zonal approach to a control system, and would try to avoid discussion
of any comprehensive system applicable to the whole of Soviet and US
territory. In particular, as already forecast in Khrushchev's note
of July 2, 1958, they will almost certainly revive their proposal for
a 1600km. zone of inspection and control in Central Europe. This
proposal will probably constitute their initial negotiating position,
to which they may add other zones and features as the needs of the
negotiation require. For example, their proposal for a zone covering
equal areas of the eastern MSR and the Western US might be advanced
again if the US presented its proposal for an Arctic zone. ,:ut they
will probably not be willing to widen zones of inspection beyond -what
they have already proposed, excent under pressure, and perhaps not
then.
6. In response to the US [:*ceition that the experts discuss zones
for "illustrative purposes only, but without prejudging in any my the
boundaries within which such measures should be applied," the Soviets
will probably argue that the requirements for various zones would be
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different and that the most convenient and suitable "illustrative"
zone would be that covered by their proposal for Central Europe. They
might calculate that if and when an inspection system covering that
area had been agreed by the experts, the Vest would be in a weak
position to refuse its acceptance at a later political negotiation.
They recall that they enjoyed some propaganda success in western
Europe in 1957 with their exploitation of the disengagement theme;
consideration of a European zone ties in readily with this.
7. To obejctions that a Central European zone would provide
no assurances against the most likely* form of surprise attack, i.e.,
the use of long-range missiles and aircraft, the Soviets would probably
argue the following advantages: (a) reduction of tensions in an area
where major combat forces of the two sides are deployed and where there
is always the possibility of accidental encounters; (b) the system
would be easiest for both sides to install in this area and that there-
fore it is the most suitable as a pilot zone to test procedures and
techniques; and, (c) other zones involve technical questions or raise
issues of confidence which cannot be resolved at this time. To sustain
this line of argument they would rely heavily on the implication that
they showing themselves willing to take the first practical steps
whereas the estern Powers insistence upon a broader and impractical
system really meant that they wanted no progress at all.
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8. Irevious Soviet proposals for a zone in Central Europe have
included provisions for a reduction of forces in the area and limit-
ations on the weapons which can be stationed there. In particular,
they will attempt to obtain a prohibition on stationing of nuclear
weapons in the area -- not only to effect a retraction of US power and
to prevent West German acquisition of such weapons, but also to support
the argument that if inspection were extended to cover the US and the
USSR it should be accompanied by a general ban on nuclear weapons.
9. In general, the Soviet approach is likely to insist that
assurance against surprise attack is inseparable from the reduction of
forces and the elimination of certain weapons. They will probably
take the view that no system can be effective if it is limited to
observation of the forces presently or prospectively in being. Xhrushchev's
letter of July 2 states that control measures should be "combined with
definite disarmament steps." But the Soviets are likely to stand on
the force reduction proposals they have previously made. They will also
again press a ban on the use of nuclear weapons as the most essential
step, and will insist on US withdrawal from overseas bases as a necessary
part of any comprehensive system.
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Objects of Inspectien
10. The point of departure for the Soviet position will probably
be their old proposals listing railway junctions, big ports, and motor
highways as the primary objects of inspection. This is consonant with
their insistence on a zone in Central :urope and with their belief,
or protended belief, that the form of surprise attack against which
assurance is needed is invasion across frontiers with large bodies of
troops.
U. The Soviets' position en the inclusion of airfields has been
contradictory. In general, in the past year, they have extzessed a
willingness to include these only at a later stage in disarmament (some-
times specified as after a ban on nuclear weapons). In his October 1957
interview with Reston Khrushchev justified the removal of airfields from
the list of observation posts because "it is useless to create control
posts to watch obsolete aircraft." This is at variance with later
proposals (and other comments by Khrushchev) which have state,' that
airfields could be inspected but only at a later stage, presumably
because they are more rather than less important than, for oxen pie,
rail junctions. The note of July 2 contains no reference to airfields.
Probably the Soviet position will be that these can be included only
after a trial system of other objects has been shown to be effective,
confidence has been established, and then only in conjunction with
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force reductions and a nuclear weapons ban. There is nothing in their
previous positions to prevent their entering a discussion of the purely
technical question of the airfield as an object of inspection, however,
and they will probably-consent to do this at some stage.
12. The Soviets doubtless assume that the US may raise the question
of control over long-range missile sites. Here again they will probably
argue that these could be included only at a final stage when confidence
in the system is fully established. They will also insist that those can
be considered only in conjunction with US overseas airbases and naval
fcrces. They argue that the nature of these weapons is such that
mere observation and inspection cannot prevent their use for surprise
attack. More importantly, they would probably counter that the crucial
problem was not the delivery system but the nuclear warheads, an thus
link the problem of missiles to their demand for the abolition of the
nuclear weapon as such.
Means and Methods of Inspection
13. It is unlikely that the Soviets will enter the talks with any
fully developed proposals regarding the techniques, means, and methods to
be employed. They probably do not yet believe that the prospects for
such a system coming into existence are very real, and have probably not
decided that the whole alteration of the military-political strategic
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picture which would result from a comprehensive and effective system would
be in their interest. With respect to technical details therefore they
will prefer to play a waiting game, seeking a maximum disclosure of US
ideas in order to obtain a clearer picture of what concessions mould be
involved in any system applied within the USSR. In pushing for cnsider-
ation of a zone in Europe, however, they may have some specific proposals
to offer with respect to objects and methods of control there.
14. By the note of July 2 they are committed tc "aerial surveys in
areas that are of major importance from the viewpoint of preventing a
surprise attack." They have also previously agreed to "some" aerial
inspection within their proposed European zone. They will probably not
initiate proposals for a wider a',..Tlication of this technique and will seek
to limit its consideration as much as possible. Insofar as their opposition
is supported by Purely technical arguments, they may argue that aerial
inspection is ineffective alone and has only a marginal usefulness as a
supplement to ground observation; (b) that processing of aerial photos
over extensive areas is too large end slow a task to be practical; and
(c) that the cost of aerial inspection would be prohibitive.
15. The Soviet position will also be concerned to minimize as much
as possible the need for mobility on the part of ground observers. They
will probably argue for the adequacy of fixed posts, but will not oppose
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the principle of mobility outright. They will seek to keep any formula
on this subject as vague and limiting as possible.
16. With respect to communications, numbers and kinds of nersunnel,
and other technical questions the Soviets are unlikely to make any
extensive proposals of their own. They will be interested primarily in
probing US thinking, and in limiting the scale of the proposals intro-
duced for discussion.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD
20 October 1958
SUBJECT: Soviet Attitude on Discussion of Various Instruments of
Surprise Attack
1. This memorandum deals with two questions: (a) What US means of
possible surprise attack are of greatest concern to the Soviet leaders?;
and (b) What Soviet means of possible surprise attack would the Soviet
delegation be most reluctant to discuss? These questions are closely
related to issues discussed in the 0/NE staff paper of September 9
"Probable Soviet Positions at a Technical Conference on Measures to Avert
Surprise Attack" and the latter should be read in connection with the
present memorandum.
2. The Soviets' willingness to discuss in detail various weapons
systems will probably-depend on how they weigh the following five consider-
ations:
(a) genuine concern over the threat from any US system
(b) extalt to which a discussion of particular weapons systems would
require Soviet discolsure of secret information or of weaknesses
(c) whether discussion of various weapons systems might give the USSR
clues as to US thinking on future weapons systems
(d) potentiality for propaganda exploitation of the US position at
the conference and subsequently, and avoidance of matters which
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(e) relation to preferred Soviet surprise attack inspection systems
i.e., an effort to stack the deck toward the kind of agreement
they really want to achieve.
On the basis of these considerations, we can estimate the Soviet attitude
toward discussion of various instruments of possible surprise attack.
3. Long-Range Ground4aunched Missiles. The Soviet leaders probably
believe that they an advantage in long-range missile development and
strength, and they therefore be cautious about giving the US any
opportunity to single out neutralization or limitation on missiles. They
may, however, take a longer term view of the probable future US capability
in intermediate and intercontinental missiles. In any case, they will
probably agree to the discussion of control over missiles only if this
subject is tied to long-range bombers and bases. They will probably expect
us to raise the subject, and will seek to leave the initiative for introduction
of technical specifications to us, so as not to disclose details of their
own program which might assist us.
4. Long-Range Aviation. The Soviets will emphasize controls and
restrictions on long-range aviation in view of the heavy US reliance on
this arm, and their relative lesser reliance upon it. They probably
stress the dangers of unintentional triggering of war by a beserk pilot,
by accidental dropping of a bomb on foreign territory, by misjudging as an
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enemy act the accidental dropping of a bomb on one's own territory, by
campelling" another power to take countermeasures to a penetration of his
airspace or mass flights "toward" his territory, etc. These arguments will
be used to focus attention on limitations governing foreign basing and
overflight of other countries, flight near or toward another power, and the
like. They will also probably have an interest in exploring purely technical
inspection-control measures to assist them in reaching a conclusion on what
these would involve; the history of their own past disarmament proposals
has reflected an evident wavering on this point, probably in part because
they are uncertain just what it would involve in terns of inspection
activities.
5. Tactical Aviation, The Soviets will probably tie controls over
tactical aviation to zonal areas of inspection and limitation of forces.
In general, as in most other cases, they will probably argue that it is not
the tactical aviation or other system, but the nuclear munitions, which
make controls so necessary. Hence they will probably stress nuclear-free
zones, especially in Central Europe, with control over tactical air (as well
as ground) forces within such zones.
6. Ground Forces. The Soviet disarmament proposals of the last three
years, insofar as they have dealt with measures to avert surprise attack,
have stressed inspection of facilities for large-scale movement of ground
forces: railway junctions, large ports, and motor highways. This
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insistence will probably be maintained, even though it is a vulnerable
propaganda position to eqphasize these to the exclusion of airfields and
missile sites. One reason is that it accords with the Soviet view that
large armies would be involved even in a general nuclear war. Also, it is
consistent with the Soviet political line on disarmament thus far, that
invasion across frontiers with large bodies of troops is a form of surprise
attack requiring controls and weapons limitations. This stand supports
their campaign for a nuclear-free, limited-forces, and inspected area in
Central Europe -- which we believe to be one of the chief objectives of the
Soviets in the forthcoming conference. The Soviets will probably be
sensitive to any revelation of their ground force strength and deployment,
and they will therefore seek to ayoid other than technical inspection
discussions.
7. Missile-launching Submarines. It is difficult to estimate the
Soviet position on this topic. They are believed to be developing a
capability in weapons of this type. While this subject may not be
introduced by them, they will presumably agree to discussions but try to
limit them to controls at naval bases, and perhaps to agreements on non-
navigation in certain areas near the other side's territory.
8. Other Naval Forces. It would be logical for the Soviets to seek
controls over aircraft carriers, since they have none and we do. Again,
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suggested controls would probably take the form of limitations on deploy-
ment, and non-carrying of nuclear weapons to prevent the same accidents
discussed in connection with long-range aviation. They might advance
the idea of similar limitations for other conventional or missile-launching
surface vessels.
9. Earth Satellite Vehicles. It is possible that the Soviets will
advance a new proposal for control over space vehicles overflying other
countries in a formulation which would not limit test or other firings
over home territory. There is no certainty of the Soviet estimate of the
value to them of reconnaissance satellites, but there is evidence of their
concern over US planned and pcssible use of such vehicles for reconnaissance
and for bombardment. Aside from the fact that such a proposal would be
good propaganda, if implemented it would deny the US a future improvement
in intelligence. On the other hand, while the Soviets would presumably
gain much less from a reconnaissance vehicle, they would probably wish
to avoid giving the US an opportunity to raise the possibility of a UN or
internationally-run disarmament inspection satellite. Moreover, at present
they are probably willing to contemplate only limited zones of inspection
in Central Europe and possibly in the Far East. While some forms of
inspection, such as aerial overflight, can be either universal or limited
to spkeial danger (or "pilot") zones, and might therefore be acceptable to
the :.:oviets for discussion, an inspection system using satalite vehicles
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covering very broad areas might be considered to place pressure on them
toward more comprehensive controls than they presently intend.
10. Other Means of Surprise Attack. As we have noted, the Soviets
are likely to attempt to place particular stress on nuclear munitions and
warheads of all kind as the principal danger in surprise attack. This
will not, however, provide a basis for real conference discussion, as the
Soviets are aware.
11. While it is not likely that the Soviets will raise the question
of intelligence and warning systems -- surely a key matter in detecting
surprise -- it cannot be excluded that they may do so. Should they raise
questions of electronic and other specialized collection techniques, they
probably have materials which would support a new popular campaign
against forms of activity previously little known to world publics. Also,
in recent internal propaganda, the Soviets have raised the issues of
alleged US interest in clandestine entry of small nuclear weapons, US use
of balloons for reconnaissance, and foreign attache contacts with the
civilian population for espionage purposes. One or more of these subjects
might be raised, the last indicated perhaps in terms of defining severe
limits on the role and movement of inspectors for any disarmament agreement.
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