THE OUTLOOK FOR PORTUGAL

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A013900010027-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: July 21, 1959
• Content Type: NIE

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CO DENTIN.
NIE 2 7.2-5 9
21 July 1959
37
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 27.2-59
THE OUTLOOK FOR PORTUGAL
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 21 July 1959. Coneurring were the Director of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assist-
ant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department
of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF;
the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the
Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of their lurisdictien.
CO 1DENTIAL
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I irti.
THE OUTLOOK FOR PORTUGAL
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the likelihood of changes in the Portuguese political scene" over the
next two years, and to assess their implications for US and Western interests.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Although Prime Minister Salaiar's
grip on Portugal, which has been main-
tained for 31 years, is showing signs of
weakening, we believe that it is still
strong enough to enable him to remain
in office for a year or so, providing his
health remains good. Among potential
contenders for his position, none seems
capable at present or in the near future
of deposing him. If he dies, or if a break-
down in health should oblige him to re-
sign, the succession would probably pass
to adherents of the present regime who
? would be disposed to maintain Portugal's
close ties with the US and NATO.'
(Paras. 5, 16-17, 25)
2. However, no successor regime, whether
headed by an individual or a junta, will
enjoy the same public prestige as has
Salazar's.' It will be under strong pres-
sures to adopt liberal economic and social
policies, and although economic liberali-
zation might in the long run be advan-
tageous, Portugal's economic stability,
which has been Salazar's chief concern,
Appendix A lists US and NATO base sites in
Portugal and the Azores.
is likely in the shortterm to suffer. The
resulting strains will offer opportunities
for the tiny, illegal, but well organized
Communist party of Portugal. (Paras.
14-15, 21)
3. A change of governmental leadership
in either Spain or Portugal would encour-
age dissident elements in the other, and
in some circumstances might precipitate
antiregime action. Furthermore, when
and if a new government in either coun-
try should lift existing restrictions on
personal freedom or loosen its economic
controls, uneasiness and dissatisfaction
would almost certainly increase in the
other. (Para. 26)
4. More worrisome to US interests is the
likelihood of trouble in Portugal's over-
seas territories.' During the period of
this estimate this appears more likely in
Africa than in Portuguese India or other
territories. These overseas possessions,
which are considered by the Portuguese
as integral parts of Portugal rather than
as colonies, represent the country's re-
Appendix C describes Portuguese overseas terri-
tories and sketches Portugal's policies toward 50X1
them.
1
?Ar. irinrk ITU A
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maining vestiges of a proud past, and the
African territories her best hope of future
prosperity. If and when Portugal's posi-
tion in these areas is challenged, virtually
all Portuguese opinion will be disillu-
2
sioned and resentful if Western support
is not forthcoming, with possible adverse
consequences for US and NATO base
rights. (Paras. 22-23, 25, Appendix C,
Para. 8)
DISCUSSION
'I. INTRODUCTION
5. Portugal's political tranquility was dis-
turbed during the past year when Premier
Salazar's firm grip on the country weakened
for the first time in 31 years. His authority
was challenged by a surprisingly heavy ad-
verse vote in the presidential elections of June
1958, and his subsequent severe illness re-
sulted in widespread speculations that the
70-year old leader would resign. He has with-
stood the rebuffs to his regime, and regained
some degree of good health. Nevertheless, the
expectation that he may within the next year
or so leave the scene either by death, retire-
ment, or incapacity has led to divisive ma-
neuvering for position within the government
and the revival of interest in national politics.
6. The Portuguese corporative state is in es-
sence a dictatorship, though it has been sus-
tained in large measure by the wide respect
enjoyed by Salazar. All effective authority
is exercised by Salazar, who is constitutionally
appointed by a figurehead president, and
who is the leader of the only legally consti-
tuted political movement in Portugal, the
mildly fascist National Union. Unlike the
Franco government in Spain, which sprang
from civil war, the Salazar government was
brought to power by nonviolent means. It
still goes through the motions of holding pop-
ular elections in which rival candidates are
permitted to run, but the outcome is carefully
controlled by the government.
7. When he came to power in 1928, the orig-
inal achievement of Salazar, a conservative
classical economist, was to bring financial
stability to a country that had been floun-
dering for several years in economic and po-
litical chaos. Under his rigid guidance eco-
nomic expansion, industrial modernization,
and social progress have to a significant ex-
tent been sacrificed to the maintenance of
financial stability and public order. As a
consequence Portugal, already poor in nat-
ural resources, has remained well behind its
neighbors in economic development; it has
the lowest per capita income in Western
Europe. There is little or no inflation, but
some unemployment and widespread seasonal
underemployment exist. Private investment
is hamstrung by government restrictions, and
foreign investment is systematically discour-
aged. In the overseas territories, whose
products are the principal Portuguese dollar
earners, foreign capital is virtually excluded.
The Salazar government is unlikely to make
any substantial changes in its economic
policies.
II. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FORCES
8. The military plays a crucial role in Portu-
gal, not only in controlling the overseas terri-
tories, but also by sharing the functions of
internal security in what is essentially a
police state. Military officers and reservists
are often assigned positions within the civilian
administration, particularly in the country's
several police forces. However, the security
police known as the PIDE,, although it con-
tains some officers of the armed forces, is
responsible to the premier through the Min-
ister of the Interior rather than the Minister
of Defense. It is significant that in March
1959 an attempted coup in which retired
military figures were prominent was quickly
bottled up by the PIDE.
Policia Internacional e de Del esa do Estado (Po-
lice for the Control of Foreigners and Defense
of the State).
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9. The majority of military officers are politi-
cal conservatives and, despite a strong cur-
rent of professional grievances, are more or
less attached to the regime, if not to all of
its policies. However, many are concerned
that, should Salazar lose control, the political
situation would quickly become unstable. A
few are lining up associates and seeking ad-
vantageous positions so that they may act
in defense of their interests if the regime's
stability and the conservative political tradi-
tion are threatened.
10. The mood of the Portuguese masses, which
have been more or less detached from politi-
cal activity for many years, is still largely
apathetic. The isolation of the predomi-
nantly rural population probably precludes
the sudden development of a broadly based
protest movement against grim economic
conditions. However, last year the feasibil-
ity of a change in the regime was brought
home to the middle class and the industrial
workers in the cities and larger towns by the
outspoken presidential campaign of opposi-
tion candidate General Delgado. Despite
careful rigging of the election by the author-
ities, the General, now in asylum in Brazil,
won nearly 25 percent of the votes cast, after
having announced that if elected he would
dismiss Salazar as premier. Although his
challenge to Salazar was short lived, he and
his supporters succeeded in ventilating for
the first time serious criticisms of Salazar's
paternalism, Portugal's essentially static
economy, and its archaic social system.
11. Some elements of all classes have now
been emboldened to criticize the regime, and
many individuals, encouraged by Salazar's
declining vitality, are now eagerly con-
templating his retirement or replacement,
although few would wish to risk a return
to governmental instability. The business
world is anxious to see an end to what it
regards as the strait jacket of government
controls. It is also concerned that Portugal
may be unable to compete in the European
Common Market unless government restric-
tions are eased. In addition, many feel that
ultraconservative government policies have
3
inhibited the development of what they con-
sider to be the substantial economic resources
of Portugal's African territories. The Catho-
lic hierarchy, which for years has been a
strong supporter of Salazar, who restored the
Church to its present primary role in Portu-
guese social and cultural life, is growing in-
creasingly alarmed over the growth of social
unrest in the country. The Church feels this
is a consequence of continued economic priva-
tion and the absence of economic opportunity
for much of the population.
12. Discontent with the regime is also appar-
ent amongst students and intellectuals who
are chafing under the tightening of censor-
ship and the restrictions on political activities
reimposed after the presidential campaign.
There is, furthermore, a sense of frustration
in academic circles over the intellectual bar-
renness of the state controlled universities.
III. THE ACTIVE OPPOSITION
13. Opposition groups are all either clandes-
tine or so loosely organized as to be ineffective.
Some old-guard Republicans, representing the
pre-Salazar government, survive and become
sporadically active when elections are held.
With the Socialists, whose popular appeal is
negligible, they supported Delgado's bid for
power, and probably would again rally to a
new opposition leader of promise. A cur-
rent of opposition sentiment also prevades lay
Catholic groups, especially in university cir-
cles, but as yet no unifying political move-
ment has emerged, nor do antiregime Catho-
lics appear agreed on a possible successor to
Salazar. In general the democratic opposi-
tion groups are weak, unorganized, harassed
by the PIDE, and for the moment, at least,
leaderless.
14. Under these circumstances, the superior
discipline of the Portuguese Communist Party
(PCP) has enabled it to achieve an impor-
tance disproportionate to its size, and remark-
able in light of the fact that there are no
Bloc diplomatic missions either in Portugal
or Spain to support it. The party probably
consists of no more than 2,000 members and
perhaps 9,000 sympathizers, and it has no
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broad popularity in Portugal. Nevertheless,
in the last year's presidential election the
Communists were able to provide an occa-
sionally effective organizational and com-
munications net between opposition elements.
Furthermore, they remain a major source of
antiregime propaganda throughout the coun-
try and are probably infiltrating members into
other opposition groups as assets which they
hope to use to their advantage in the future.
15.- The PCP's main strength is among small
groups of industrial workers in a few cities,
although some of its leaders probably come
from the intellectual and professional classes.
However, as the most persistent and tireless
critic of the regime, it has gained an audi-
ence?if only by the default of other opposi-
tionist groups. Although it certainly cannot
hope soon to become a mass party in conserva-
tive and Catholic Portugal, it can and does
contribute to the erosion of public confidence
in the Salazar regime. Furthermore, when
Salazar is replaced, the party will probably
be able to exert some pressure on his suc-
cessors.
IV. CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR THE REGIME
16. The prestige of Premier Salazar, although
weakened, is probably still high enough to per-
mit him to stay in office for a year or so. The
armed forces will probably remain loyal for the
same period, and the PIDE can be counted
on to root out dissenters and incipient plots.
The Church will probably not turn actively
against the premier because its favored posi-
tion in Portugal depends on his benevolence.
However, it seems probable that some Church
leaders, such as the Bishops of Oporto and
of Beja, will continue to press for social re-
forms. Certain laymen may continue to ad-
vocate more or less openly the establishment
of a Catholic political movement, possibly
along the lines of a Christian Democratic
party. In general, however, we do not an-
ticipate the emergence of a cohesive, organ-
ized popular opposition unless the economic
situation suddenly becomes critical?which is
unlikely?or some other unexpected con-
4
ingency arises, such as the threatened loss
of a major colonial possession.
17. None of the major potential contenders
for power now awaiting the retirement of
Salazar appears capable of hastening his de-
parture by precipitate action. The ambitious
Defense Minister, Botelho Moniz, who has
carefully screened out of the armed forces, or
neutralized, most of the officers not responsive
to his wishes, holds important trump cards,
but is aware that any overt action on his part
would be known to PIDE, and hence to Sala-
zar. Moniz' predecessor, Colonel Fernando dos
Santos Costa, is currently out of the govern-
ment, but he retains strong pockets of influ-
ence within the more conservative and
wealthy classes of Portugal, amongst hyper-
nationalist general staff officers, and with
members of the Portuguese Legion, the pa-
,
triotic organization of the National Union.
It is improbable, however, that he could rally
enough support from the military to oust
Salazar?a move he would be unlikely to make
in any event unless the internal situation had
become chaotic. Furthermore, if he at-
tempted a coup he would almost certainly be
challenged and probably eliminated by Moniz.
18. Salazar's most likely choice as a successor
would probably be a strong regime "team
man" whose selection would not set off rival-
ries amongst contenders within the military.
In this category Theotonio Pereira, who cur-
rently holds the top cabinet coordinating job
behind Salazar, that of Minister of the Presi-
dency, would appear to have the inside track.
Pereira is a capable official and if he should
succeed Salazar, there is a good chance that
he would undertake much needed programs
of economic development and expansicei.
However, Pereira could not survive without
the support of important elements of the
armed forces. Such support would probably
be initially forthcoming?especially if Pereira
were Salazar's announced choice?but its con-
tinuation would depend on his early successes
in office. Pereira's predecessor, Marcello
Caetano, is another possible candidate, al-
though he is probably not the favorite of the
military.
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19. We believe that inability, due to failing
health, to continue to bear the load of gov-
ernmental leadership may induce Salazar to
resign voluntarily some time during the next
year or so. If he does so, he will certainly
prepare the way with great care, and will
attempt to minimize the power and influence
of the other contenders before designating his
successor. If Salazar should die or become in-
capacitated before his choice is made known,
and President Thomaz foresaw a potential
struggle for power, he might seek to forestall
this by naming a junta of civilian and mili-
tary leaders. Such a junta would probably
contain Marshal Craveiro Lopes, the colorless
but respected ex-President of Portugal.
20. It is unlikely that a junta could operate
successfully for very long. It seems improb-
able that both Santos Costa and Botelho
Moniz druid be fitted into the same group, and
the exclusion of either would pose a threat to
the junta's existence. Salazar's departure
would certainly stimulate the ambitions of
oppositionists of every political color and
weaken what national unity now exists. If
the successor government began to deterio-
rate, the possibility cannot be excluded that
General Delgado would attempt a return.
21. In any case, it is certain that no successor
government will enjoy the public prestige of
Salazar's. Political and economic pressures
that he has been able to control will assert
themselves, and the new leaders of Portugal
will find it necessary to yield in some measure.
More liberal economic policies, giving greater
scope for development- and providing more
social benefits for the mass of the population,
may over a period of time bring about a better-
balanced and more durable body politic. In
the short term, however, Portugal's economic
stability, which Salazar has been at such pains
to nurture, is likely to suffer. The consequent
uncertainties and strains may result in fur-
ther governmental changes, and the regime
which immediately succeeds Salazar's may
prove to be only an interim affair. More im-
portantly, this more fluid situation will pro-
vide the small but efficient and disciplined
Communist Party with opportunities for ex-
ploitation.
5
V. EXTERNAL PROBLEMS OF PORTUGAL
22. Portugal's attachment to the Western Al-
liance has been firm under Salazar, although
50X6
for making its Atlantic islands available as
base sites. Given Portugal's traditional ties
with the UK, its geographical position, and
its strong anti-Communist orientation, it is
unlikely that the country would conduct a
foreign policy which ran counter to primary
Western interests. However, the country's
disposition to cooperate fully with the Nest
could in time diminish in the event of deep-
ening differences between Portugal and its
allies over colonial matters.
23. Portuguese Overseas Territories?Policies
and Problems. Portugal considers its territo-
rial possessions overseas as integral parts of
Portuga1.5 It regards them as a symbol of
its proud past and as essential to its interna-
tional standing. Some are also valuable
earners of foreign exchange and are poten-
tially of great economic importance. Conse-
quently, the Portuguese place top priority on
the retention of every foreign holding, no
matter how small or poor. They regard Brit-
ain's relinquishment of its Empire as a dan-
gerous folly, and the Belgian and French con-
cessions to native nationalism in their African
territories as policies of weakness. The US
is also suspected by the Portuguese because
they believe US policy reflects a national tradi-
tion of hostility to colonialism. At the same
time Portugal is not unaware that native
resentment against its rule is growing in the
territories, especially in Angola, Mozambique,
and Portuguese Guinea. Under these cir-
cumstances, Portugal tends to place the blame
for the difficulties it encounters in the terri-
tories on the policies of its Western allies.
24. Portuguese policy in its overseas posses-
sions is a curious mixture of indifference to
the lot of the native, half-hearted efforts to
elevate him from savagery, repression of all
dissident voices, and cheerful assertion that
in fact no problems exist. It is probably true
that nationalism has as yet infected very few
The Azores and Madeira are administered as
provinces of metropolitan Portugal.
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of Portugal's native subjects; the vast major-
ity have been deliberately denied even a
pri-
mary education. However, natives from the
Portuguese territories. in Africa are more and
more seeking employment in neighboring and
more advanced countries where they come in
contact with nationalist sentiment, particu-
larly in the Belgian Congo, Nyasaland, and
Guinea. It is unlikely that Portugal can
avoid serious unrest in its African territories
over the next two or three years. The effects
of such developments could seriously shake
the hold of whatever regime exists in Lis-
bon. On the other hand, if a serious out-
break should occur, the government would
use the threatened loss of one of its posses-
sions in an effort to unify the Portuguese
public.
25. Whatever *the circumstances, Portugal's
problems with its overseas territories are al-
most certainly going to increase over the next
few years. As these interests come into con-
flict with other commitments, such as the
maintenance of a division for NATO, Portu-
gal will not hesitate to act in defense of its
? African possessions at the expense of its
NATO . obligations. However, we feel that,
unless there is a head-on clash between Portu-
gal and its allies over allied failure to support.,
Portugal's colonial policies and practices,
Portugal is unlikely to restrict the use of its,
Azores bases. All the likely candidates to
succeed Salazar are disposed to a continua-
tion of Portuguese NATO obligations, and are
generally considered friendly to the US.
26. Portugal and Spain. Peninsular solidar-
ity with Spain has been a cardinal principle of
Salazar's foreign policy. Portugal will prob-
ably, continue to seek Spain's admission to
NATO, and generally to pave the way for close
collaboration between its neighbor and West-
ern Europe. Because of the intimate rela-
tionships between Portugal and Spain, and
the affinity of their political ideologies, a
change of regime in either country would en-
courage dissident elements in the other and
might under some circumstances precipitate
antiregime action. Furthermore, when and
if a new government in either country were
to lift existing restrictions on personal free-
dom or loosen economic controls, uneasiness
and dissatisfaction would almost certainly
increase in the other.
27. It is highly unlikely that even a restora-
tion of the monarchy in Spain would mate-
rially increase the number or the chances of
the few serious supporters of the Braganga
dynasty in Portugal.
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APPENDIX A
PRINCIPAL BASE FACILITIES PROVIDED BY PORTUGAL
I. U.S. AIR FORCE INSTALLATIONS
? Place - Type
Terceira Lajes Air Base: Major facility
(Azores) suitable for strategic bomber,
transport, and/or air refueling
operations.
Santa Maria
(Azores)
1. Santa Maria Air Base: Stag;
ing base for strategic bomber
operations and air refueling.
2. Vila do Porto: Principal port
and POL storage facility for
Santa Maria and Lajes.
II. U.S. NAVAL INSTALLATIONS
Place
Terceira
(Azores)
Sa.o Miguel
(Azores)
Type
Lajes Naval Air Facility: In-
cludes a port facility for sup-
port of the air base.
Ponta Delgada Naval Facility:
Status
US has bilateral agreement with Portu-
gal for use of this facility in fulfill-
ment of US NATO obligations.
Other NATO allies do not have access
rights. The agreement expires 31
December 1962.
ditto.
ditto (this facility still under construc-
tion) .
Status
US has bilateral agreement with Portu-
gal for use of both facilities in ful-
fillment of US NATO obligations.
Other NATO allies do not have access
rights. The agreement expires 350X1
December 1962.
III. NATO INSTALLATIONS
Place Type Status
Lisbon POL and Naval Ammunition Under construction for wartime avail-
? Storage Facility. ability to NATO users (presently
designated as the US and Portugal) .
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APPENDIX C
OVERSEAS PORTUGAL
1. Overseas Portugal includes all the remain-
ing holdings of what was once the formidable
Portuguese empire. Most of the overseas ter-
ritories have been under the Portuguese flag
for several centuries, although the two largest
and most important, Angola and Mozambique,
were not developed or brought under effective
colonization until the 19th century. Goa, on
the other hand, has enjoyed representation in
Lisbon since the early 19th century, and
Goans have served in responsible posts
throughout the Portuguese empire.
2. Portuguese policy towards its territories
has evolved as a mixture of enlightened theory
I and repressive practice. Individual natives
are considered the equals of continental Por-
tuguese when they have achieved a certain
level -of cultural sophistication. They are
then entitled to official status as citizens, or
assimilados. However, the administration of
the territories is generally so rigid, harsh, and
penurious that the great mass of natives has
no opportunity to escape from what the Por-
tuguese call "an uncivilized state." 6 As un-
civilized subjects of Portugal they have vir-
tually no rights, only such schooling as the
Church provides in scattered areas, and are
subject to being drafted as forced laborers for
use by the European settlers.
3. Official insistence in recent years that the
overseas territories be considered integral
parts of Portugal springs from the widespread
fear that any reduction of its holdings would
weaken Portugal's claim to be a world "civil-
Except in the Cape Verde Islands, Portuguese
India, ?and Macao where the entire native popu-
- lations are considered civilized.
izing power." To this end Lisbon also directs
almost all the affairs of the territories, and
the PIDE maintains close control over any
native or settler suspected of separatist tend-
encies. The same attitude accounts for Por-
tuguese reluctance to permit outsiders in the
territories?a fact that has inhibited foreign
investors from contributing to the economic
development of the territories. It has, also
helped to limit the development of native na-
tionalism.
4. The overseas territories are bound as closely
to Lisbon by economic ties as by political con-
trol. Metropolitan Portugal seeks to make
up its foreign trade deficits with the surplus
balances earned by the overseas territories in
selling raw materials and foodstuffs. Gen-
erally speaking, the Portuguese Government
attempts to make the territorial economies
complementary and subordinate to that of
the mother country?a policy which does not
meet with the favor of the settlers.
5. Angola is the largest of the territories and
the richest in resources. It has important
diamond deposits, now being worked, and the
Portuguese claim that other mineral deposits
exist, as well as oil. Furthermore, Angola
has more potentially exploitable agricultural
land than any other African country. How-
ever, to date efforts to populate the territory
With Portuguese settlers have not been wholly
successful. The average Portuguese peasant
is not sufficiently skilled to set up a successful
venture in virgin land. Furthermore, the
government has not developed the territory's
communications, housing, and power facili-
ties sufficiently to accommodate mass immi-
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gration. Private' investors are still hesitant,
in the absence of basic facilities and trans-
portation, to exploit Angola's natural re-
sources.
6. The most prosperous of the territories is
currently Mozambique, whose ports of Lou-
rengo Marques and Beira are heavily used by
the neighboring Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland and The Union of South Africa.
The Portuguese have slowly bought out vari-
ous British commercial and transportation
interests in Mozambique and have added im-
provements of their own. Mozambique is ac-
cordingly a prime earner of sterling for Por-
tugal. At the same time agricultural produc-
tion has been increasing and its quality im-
proving, although these advances have largely
benefited white settlers rather than the na-
tives. A recent development troubling the
Portuguese is the growth of Moslem influence
in northern ? Mozambique?a phenomenon
which officials fear will threaten their control
of the native population.
7. In the African area, the Portuguese also
?hold the Cape Verde Islands off the West
Coast, the largely jungle territory of Portu-
guese Guinea, the small islands of Sao Tome
?rincipe, in the Gulf of Guinea, and an en-
clave in the town of Ouidah in Dahomey.
10
8. Portugal's holdings in India, where the in-
digenous population appears to be satisfied
with Portuguese rule, consist of Goa and two
smaller possessions, Diu and Damao. The
two latter are landlocked enclaves of India;
portions of them were forcibly seized by In-
dian nationalists in 1954; and access has sub-
sequently been denied to the Portuguese by
the Government of India. All these posses-
sions are regarded as offensive to Indian sov-
ereignty by Prime Minister Nehru and have
been intermittently subjected to pressure by
Indian nationalists. Nehru has, however, an-
nounced that Indian control of Portuguese
India will be sought only by peaceful means,
and for the time being a recurrence of the
border violations of 1954 seems unlikely.
There appears to be no immediate threat to
Portugal's tiny settlement in China, Macao,
which survives principally on shipping reve-
nues and smuggling. Portugal holds the
eastern part of the island of Timor" in the
Indonesian archipelago and an enclave in the
western part of the island. Indonesia will
eventually almost certainly assert claims to
this territory. At present, however, Portu-
guese relations with Indonesia seem to be
good; President Sukarno was recently warmly
received in Lisbon.
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