SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A016500010007-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2014
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 17, 1960
• Content Type: NIE

Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/03/06: CIA-RDP79R01012A016500010007-3
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NIE 100-2-60 ADVCON
17 May 1960
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SINO -INDIAN RELATIONS
NOTE: This is an advance copy of thP conclusions of this estimate
as approved by the United States In lelligence Board. The com-
plete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.
? The future of Sino-Indian relations
? Repercussions of the dispute in India
? Effects on other countries
Central Intelligence Agency
c LAD
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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 17 May 1960. Concurring were the Director of In-
telligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations;
and the Director of the National Security Agency. The
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and
the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ab-
stained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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C E NAT RAL t1Y2
SUBJECT: NIE 100-2
L'ItGENCE AGENCY
ti\TOINDIAN RELATIONS
THE PROBLEM
17 May 1960
To assess Sino-Indian relations and their international
implications.
CONCLUSIONS
Sino-Indian b6i.der clashes have shattered the appear-
ance of cordiality between the two states. Early agreement on
the boundary dispute is Unlikely. However,, both sides are
probably willing to live with the present stalemate for some
time, although further border clashes May occur. In the event
of a prolonged failure to resolve the dispute, the climate
could alter significantly, particularly if Nehru leaVesthe
Scene before a settlement. Nevertheless, we are inclined to
believe that an eventual settlement could be achieved -- prob-
ably Involving Indian concessions in Ladakh in return for
Chinese recognition of India's claims in the North East Fron-
tier Agency (NEFA). However, even if the border issue is
SECRET
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k?i.1
settled, it is unlikely that the friendly relations which
existed in the past can be fully restored. ?(Paras.
16-25)
5-8,
2. Peiping's moves have sharply increased anti-Chinese
sentiment in India. They have also tended to create in India
a more sympathetic view of US policies, though India remains
dedicated to the principle of nonalignment, and will also be
influenced by interest in continued large-scale Soviet aid and
by some hope that the USSR. will restrain Communist China. The
position of the Indian Communist Party has been made more dif-
ficult, but it has not suffered a critical setback. (Paras.
11, 14-15, 27-28)
3. To date Communist China has outstripped India in econ-
omic growth. The present wide gap in growth rates is expected
to narrow, but the absolute disparity between the economies
will probably continue to widen. As a result China will be
able to maintain -- and probably increase -- its military
superiority over India. However, as long as India is making
significant economic progress, however, most Asian countries
will probably continue to derive encouragement from India's
example. (Paras. 26, 3)4)
4. Communist 'China's growing strength and its aggres-
siveness have caused a more somber assessment of Chinese
- 2
SECRET
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Communist motivations among Asian leaders.. Even if the Sino-
Indian border dispute is resolved through negotiations, the
more apprehensive Asian view of Communist China that has
recently developed probably will not be erased. Nevertheless,
it is likely that Communist China's strength and dynamism and
its ambitiOns for political hegemony will figure more promi-
nently in Asia than will India's influence. (Paras. 331 35)
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/03/06: CIA-RDP79R01012A016500010007-3