BACKGROUND ON SNIE 31-61: "SHORT-TERM INDIAN INTENTIONS TOWARD GOA," DATED 13 DECEMBER 1961.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A018400070003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2014
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 18, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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Mr. Kent, AD/NE 18 December 1961
Wom
Background on SNIE 3161: "Short-Term Indian Intentions Toward
Goa," dated 13 December 1961.
1. SNIE 31-61 was requested by General C bell in mid-
morning 12 December. The Board of National Estimates met on
a staff draft shortly after 5100 FM the same day. Agency
representatives coordinated the draft estimate the ?orning of
13 December. The paper was approved by the t)SIB tha -afternoon.
2. The final words of the six paragraph SN1E are: "...we
believe that the chances of a direct military invasion (of Goa
by India) are still about even." The process out of which
this formulation grew is outlined below. ONE,s purpose in
putting the estimate in these terms was to make, clear that the
intelligence community felt that the danger of military action
was real and that there was no reason to modify the serious
concern being manifested in the policy branches of the govern-
rent.
3. The even chance "formultion" was decided upon after
as careful aid thorough a study as time permitted because the
evidence seemed to indicate that Nehru himself had not yet
made a final decision, and because we were unable to give
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superior weight to either of the conflicting forces bearing
on his decision which were described in the paper: i.e. (a)
the strong evidence that Indian military preparations for
invasion has gone so far as to be difficult to reverse, and
(b) our belief that Nehru did not consider acquisition of
Goa to be no essential to India's national interests as to
justify its seizure by force--especiaIly in view of the ad-
verse impact such action would have on his own and India's
Image abroad.
4. The uncertainty over the precise balance of the
forces involved VAS reflected in the opinions of the various
contributors to the SNIE. DDI area specialists (onE staff
and OCI), relying mainly on Nehruls restraint in previous
crises over Goa and their judgment of his attitudes, objectives
and ability to control developments, began by rating the chances
of invasion as slightly less than even (in the context of the
SNIE)4 The State Department INR representative personally
tended to rate them as considerably less than even -- an
opinion which ONE Staff informally determined was shared by
officials in both the NE Bureau and the Policy Planning
Council of State
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5. At ther'epresentati
offered an tusendrent to the
even. The Air Force rerese
Azyrepresentative
hances less than
change to make
them greater than even (in part for the purpose of increasing
the impact of a paragraph which the Air Force wanted to add on
the threat to US Fbrtuguese relations and Azores base rights
if the Indians did take Coe). This was opposed. by all other
representativee, including ONI, J-2, and DIA, who preferred
the t'about tweet formulation which CIA had evolved.
6. ItiewozIthyof note that the quoting of odds
fluctuated
Indian
violently
invasion. On
changes his estimate
against to 60-40
the odds
in the days
11 December
of the
in favori
that high.
immediately preceding the
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chances of in
noting that thc
on 14 December
Embassy did
64.40
not believe
(zetimated that military interventionarou1d
take Once very Goon.
The same day the
D1)1 representative in
were estimatin; the
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chamois tack as high as Elo.
Also on 24 December,
reported that the Country
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be
baa doubt that military
action would be
t future unlese the
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Portuguese negotiated idthdrawals Yet on 17 December,
midnight, less than 24 hours before the action began,
expressed the belief that
action was not then treble:A,
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1
STAT 1