PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A019000010001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 24, 1961
• Content Type: NIE

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." JAN 196!
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N I E 64.2-e IN.-
24 January 1961
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 64.2-61
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
FEDERATION OF NIGERIA
TMI 7 &
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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 24 January 1961. .Concurring were The Director of In-
telligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Depart-
ment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Di-
rector of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the sub-
ject being outside of their jurisdiction.
17.)00.uNT NO .
NO CHANGE .`,1 CLASS. I
DECLASSnED
CHA.N:::.;ED TO: TS S C
NEKIREViEW
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: /0 REVIEWER:
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERATION
OF NIGERIA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable developments in the Federation of Nigeria over the next
two years or so.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Nigeria, which achieved independence
on 1 October 1960, promises to develop
into a moderate and influential African
state. Independence of this most popu-
lous African state came without bitter-
ness toward the UK, its former colonial
ruler. Nigeria has responsible leader-
ship, a substantial civil service trained
in internal administration, and security
forces able to maintain domestic order.
The general outlook for stability and
internal cohesion appears favorable.
(Paras. 6, 16-18, 21, 23)
2. However, Nigeria's population is made
up of a wide diversity of ethnic groups,
and each of its three regions is controlled
by a major tribal group and its attendant
political party. The Federal Govern-
ment is now controlled by a coalition.
There are wide social, cultural, economic
and political divergencies between the
regions and conflicting interests and as-
NOTE: The following Annexes are attached:
A. Military and Security Forces.
B. The British Trust Territory of the
Cameroons.
C. Political, Social, and Economic Back-
ground Data.
pirations contribute to tensions within
the federation. As the excitement of in-
dependence recedes, and as pressures for
economic and social progress and reform
grow, strains will be put on the federal
system. The two southern regions, in
particular, will press for a stronger cen-
tral government and more radical solu-
tions of internal problems. (Paras. 7-15,
19-20, 22)
3. Nigeria's economy is predominantly
agricultural, and its foreign exchange
earnings come principally from the export
of agricultural products whose prices are
subject to fluctuations beyond Nigerian
control. Before independence, Nigeria
had achieved a fair degree of economic
development, and there are prospects for
further progress. Domestic capital is,
however, scarce and Nigeria will look to
the UK and the West for considerable
assistance. Although the present leaders
are not anxious to turn to the Bloc for
aid, it will be difficult for them to reject
attractive offers which compete with or
supplement Western assistance. (Paras.
26-21)
.80.640Lorr
*N.
1
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-SINVIert
4. In foreign affairs Nigeria will seek a
position of leadership in Africa. In doing
so, it will attempt to play a moderating
role between differing African factions
but probably will find itself most fre-
quently aligned with the conservative
states and opposed to the radicalism of
states like Ghana and Guinea. On issues
believed to involve colonialism, however,
Nigeria VAR almost always find itself in
agreement with the majority of Afro-
Asian states. As Nigeria manifests a
growing sense of independence on inter-
national issues, British political influence
will decline. While the US now enjoys
some prestige among Nigerian leaders, US
relations with Nigeria will be plagued by
the former's close identification with
2
European colonial powers, by Nigerian
suspicions that US attitudes toward
Africa are too heavily influenced by cold
war considerations, and by Nigerian sen-
sitivity on racial issues. (Paras. 32-36,
38)
5. In accordance with its announced
policy of nonalignment, Nigeria will prob-
ably establish diplomatic relations with
the Soviet Union and some European
satellites during the next year or so. The
diplomatic and economic presence of Bloc
countries within Nigeria will give them
opportunities for increasing their influ-
ence at the expense of the West. Never-
theless, Western influence will be more
affected by Western policies and actions
on specific African issues than by Bloc
initiatives within Nigeria. (Para. 39)
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
6. Nigeria, which achieved independence on
1 October 1960, is Africa's most populous
state?with about 35 million people, or about
one-seventh of the continental total?and is
potentially one of its most important. Un-
like many African states, Nigeria had a grad-
ual and relatively thorough preparation for
independence. Its leadership has received
broad experience in internal self-government
under successive constitutional reforms since
World War II, there had been a fair amount
of economic development, and the country
has a federal constitution which represents
a compromise between national requirements
and the jealously guarded interests of Ni-
geria's regional administrations. The coun-
try also has been bequeathed the beginnings
of a modern communications network and a
relatively well trained administrative cadre.
Finally, the absence of a British white-settler
population has smoothed the transition to
independence.
7. Nevertheless, more than fifty years of Brit-
ish colonial tutelage has not eliminated the
many tribal, religious, and political divisions
which impede the formation of a nation.
Diversity is reflected at almost every level of
national life, ranging from Nigeria's three
separate regions to the many small tribal
communities within each of the latter. All in
all, Nigeria probably has between 200 and 250
different tribes or tribal groupings, speaking
mutually unintelligible languages or dialects
and varying in size from as few as 50 thousand
to as many as five million. Approximately
40 percent of the population is Moslem, con-
centrated largely in the North and the West,
and another 20 percent is Christian. There
is also a myriad of animistic cults which are
followed by virtually all others, and remain
influential even among many Moslems and
Christians. Even the economic configura-
tion of Nigeria is regional. The principal
cash crops are peanuts in the North, oil palm
products in the East, and cocoa in the West.
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Mg*Wrift
8. The tribal background of most Nigerians
and their natural inclination?at least in the
two southern regions?towards flamboyance
in political behavior, often tend to create an
impression of volatility and instability. The
exaggerated public postures and constant
maneuvering of many Nigerian politicians add
to this impression. At the core of Nigerian
politics, however, is the rivalry among the
leaders of Nigeria's three regions.
9. Each of Nigeria's three regions is domi-
nated by a distinctive ethnic group, though
in each there are substantial minorities.'
In the Western Region, the more than five
million Yoruba people have a long history of
formally organized kingdoms and urban set-
tlements. Under the continuing influence of
their ruling chiefs they have developed a
strong sense of ethnic solidarity. The five
and a half million Ibos of the Eastern Region,
in contrast, have historically lacked central-
ized leadership and major urban centers.
However, because of the high density of popu-
lation and the close proximity of their many
villages the Ibos have developed a high degree
of cultural homogeneity. Generally more in-
dividualistic and adaptable to Western ways
than the other tribal groups, the Ibos are
heavily represented in the Federal Govern-
ment, and it was among them that Nigeria's
first modern political movement arose.
10. An even more distinctive pattern exists
in the Northern Region which, unlike the
southern rain-forest belt, is for the most part
arid and sparsely populated. However, with
its large size?twice that of the two southern
regions combined?the North accounts for
slightly over half of Nigeria's total popula-
tion. The area is dominated by the Moslem
tribes of the Fulani and the Hausa who had,
by the early 19th century, established a series
of tightly controlled states (emirates) recog-
nizing the spiritual leadership of the Sultan
of Sokoto. After the British took over the
North at the beginning of the 20th century,
they administered the area by a system of in-
direct rule, using the existing pattern of gov-
ernment, and the region has remained under
'See Annex C.
3
the domination of an autocratic feudal aris-
tocracy which has systematically discouraged
modernizing influences. For this reason, and
because of the North's isolation and relative
poverty, it is economically and educationally
the most backward of the three regions.
11. The antagonisms existing between the re-
gions are deep-seated and numerous. The
Ibo and Yoruba-dominated South, which has
registered substantial educational and other
gains under British tutelage, regards the
North as backward and reactionary while at
the same time remaining fearful of its warlike
traditions. The Northerners in turn despise
the Southerners as being essentially of slave
stock and racially inferior. Political coopera-
tion between Ibo and Yoruba is impeded by
historical antagonism, aggravated by the ag-
gressive individualism and competitive nature
of the former and the cultural pride of the
latter.
II. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
12. Nigeria's developing political system has
reflected its ethnic and regional divisions.
The regional bias of Nigerian politics was
greatly encouraged by British colonial prac-
tice which, by first providing for Nigerian
participation in government only at the local
and regional levels, facilitated the develop-
ment of strong regional political machines.
13. As a result, each of the parties draws upon
a separate group for its basic strength. The
National Council of Nigeria and the Cam-
eroons (NCNC), founded by Dr. Nnamdi
Azikiwe ("Zik") , is primarily the spokesman
for the dominant Ibo group in the Eastern
Region, although it has consistently sought
to develop a following in the other regions.
Similarly, the Action Group (AG) of Chief
Obofemi Awolowo ("Awo") is associated with
Western Region Yoruba leadership, although
more recently it too has sought to extend its
influence in the other regions. The Northern
People's Congress (NPC) , with a plurality in
the national parliament, is essentially a group
controlled by the Northern Region's auto-
cratic rulers to preserve their power in the
face of intruding and competitive political in-
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fluences. Its dominant figure is Sir Ahmadu
Bello, Premier of the North.2
14. Various minor parties?mainly splinter
groups or representatives of ethnic minori-
ties?have come and gone from the Nigerian
scene. Probably the most important at pres-
ent are two rivals of the NPC: (a) the North-
ern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) , a
party of Hausa petty traders, artisans, and
students led by Aminu Kano, which entered
the 1959 elections in the North with NCNC
support, on a platform calling for more rapid
political and social progress; and (b) the
United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) , led
by J. S. Tarka, which with AG support cam-
paigned for creation of a separate "Middle
Belt" state in the southern portion of the
Northern Region.
15. The federal constitution promulgated
prior to independence represents a compro-
mise between the conflicting political aspira-
tions of the three regions and was agreed to
only with difficulty. Largely to overcome
Northern fears of a strong Southern-domi-
nated central government, the present con-
stitution allocates considerable powers to the
regions. However, the Federal Government
retains exclusive jurisdiction in such fields
as foreign affairs, defense, and monetary con-
trol, and shares responsibility with the regions
for public order and certain other functions.3
As a result of the present arrangement, the
NPC sees in the federal system the means to
safeguard its regional interests, while the re-
maining two major participant groups retain
the hope of eventually establishing Southern
hegemony.
2 He is also Sardauna of Sokoto, a traditional title
not to be confused with that of Sultan of Sokoto,
a position to which Sir Ahmadu Bello hopes to
succeed on the death of the present Sultan.
Federal power is ultimately vested in a directly
elected Federal House of Representatives appor-
tioned on the basis of population, with 167 of
the 305 seats allotted to the North, as against
73 for the East, 62 for the West, and 3 for the
Lagos Federal District. The fact that the North-
ern Region is allotted a majority of seats gives
its leaders a check on the scope of federal ac-
tivities, as long as they can control the Northern
constituencies.
4
III. POLITICAL PROSPECTS
16. Thus far the established federal system
has worked out reasonably well, and prospects
appear favorable for overcoming most threats
to Nigeria's internal stability for at least the
next year or two. The December 1959 elec-
tions evoked a high degree of popular interest
and participation. Despite some isolated dis-
turbances, notably over attempts by other
parties to gain votes in NPC territory, the
balloting went off smoothly, with the NPC
winning 142 seats, the NCNC-NEPU alliance
89, and the AG and its allies 73. Although
the two Southern parties might have formed
a majority coalition, fear of Northern seces-
sion together with AG-NCNC antagonisms
fostered cooperation between the NPC and the
NCNC. A coalition was formed in which the
NCNC accepted Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa
of the NPC as federal Prime Minister with
the understanding that Dr. Azikiwe would
become Governor General after independence
and that the NCNC would receive a generous
number of federal cabinet portfolios.
17. Hence Nigeria has started off under a gov-
ernment possessing a large parliamentary ma-
jority; among the country's major party heads,
only Chief Awolowo is relegated to the opposi-
tion. Although Balewa is a relatively little
known figure who was thrust into the Premier-
ship in 1957 only because the real leader of
the NPC, the Sardauna of Sokoto, preferred
to remain in the North, he is a responsible and
skillful statesman who has already demon-
strated real interest in making the federal
scheme work smoothly. The flamboyant Dr.
Azikiwe has long been Nigeria's best known
nationalist figure, and as Governor General
will probably be helpful in promoting the
concept of national unity. At least within
the cabinet, partisan differences between the
NPC and NCNC appear to have been mini-
mized, with both elements apparently con-
vinced that the Federal Government must
move cautiously and conservatively.
18. Another encouraging development since
independence has been the growing recogni-
tion by numerous political spokesmen of the
need for common agreement on domestic
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issues and for expanding national loyalties if
Nigeria is to play an influential role in Africa.
As a result, leaders in the Eastern and West-
ern Regions have cooperated in efforts to
enhance the public stature of Balewa as Fed-
eral Prime Minister, somewhat to the chagrin
of the Sardauna of Sokoto. In addition, a
greater willingness to compromise on major
problems is becoming apparent among the
capable and relatively conservative Premiers
of the Western and Eastern Regions?Chief
Samuel Akintola and Dr. Michael Okpara
respectively?as well as recognition that
Nigeria must rely upon the support of British
and other foreign technicians and administra-
tive personnel for some time to come.
19. Nevertheless, there remain under the sur-
face a great number of conflicting interests
and aspirations which, if pushed too far,
could seriously disturb the present delicate
balance of political forces and threaten Ni-
geria's stability and unity. Political skirmish-
ing, often bitter, between the AG and the
NCNC will probably continue in the more
closely contested constituencies, and the
NCNC as well as the AG will probably be
involved in efforts to undermine the NPC's
preponderant strength in the North. One
method of doing this would be through the
creation of new regions. There have been
many suggestions by Southerners along this
line?the most concrete involving the UMBC
proposal to carve a separate state out of the
Tiv tribal area, where its principal strength
lies, and out of the neighboring "Middle Belt"
areas of Northern Nigeria. Although the
NPC has sufficient strength to block legislation
to create additional states, the minorities in
the border areas, with strong AG support, will
probably continue to agitate the issue, some-
times violently.
20. The leaders of the NCNC and the AG are
likely to come under increasing pressure from
younger and more radical elements within
their parties to push for more vigorous policies
both at home and abroad?e.g., to adopt a
more neutralist and actively nationalist for-
eign policy, to speed "Nigerianization" of the
civil service (in which the better educated
5
Ibos and Yorubas would fare better than
their Northern competitors) , and to make
maximum use of federal power in the field of
economic and social reform. There might
even be pressure from NCNC radicals to
transform Nigeria into a republic under a
presidential system headed by Dr. Azikiwe.
Underlying most of these issues is the basic
conflict posed by the glaring disparity in
political, economic, and social development
between the backward North and the two
more advanced southern regions?the con-
flict between the desire of the Southerners
to modernize the North and the desire of
the Northern leaders to maintain their tra-
ditional institutions and ascendancy.
21. We consider it unlikely that any of these
problems will get out of hand in the next
year or so. Despite probable growing pres-
sure from radical elements, Nigeria's gov-
erning institutions will probably remain in
the hands of experienced and generally con-
servative leaders who appear convinced of the
need to work together and who probably
have, in the present parliamentary system, a
reasonably effective means of working out
their differences peacefully. Although politi-
cal, labor, and tribal disputes are likely to pro-
duce sporadic local outbreaks, the military
and other security forces appear capable of
handling all but the most widespread dis-
turbances.
22. The North may present a special problem.
Regional elections are to be held in the North
within the next few months and may be
marked by police repression of NEPU and
other rivals of the NPC. Should this occur,
NEPU might adopt extremist tactics and is
capable of fomenting some violence and dis-
order. However, we believe that such dis-
orders, if they take place, could be contained
by the Nigerian security forces. Although
NEPU has received financial aid from Ghana's
Convention People's Party and has recently
allowed some of its members to go to Bloc
countries for "training in political organiza-
tion," the party has been subject to a number
of internal dissensions and is not yet par-
ticularly strong.
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SECRET
23. Nigeria's longer range prospects for re-
maining a unified nation are reasonably good,
although there will be continuing threats to
internal political stability. The obstacles to
the continuance of the existing post-inde-
pendence atmosphere of harmony and co-
operation are formidable. The disparate
aims of the two coalition partners will make
it difficult for them to agree on positive pro-
grams. While the Northern leaders will
probably attempt to stave off radical change
in their region through piecemeal reforms,
the pressures on the old order there?and the
potential for conflict?will gradually increase.
Throughout Nigeria, traditional institutions
and relationships will be undermined by the
process of economic and social change, and
in time some realignment of political parties
and leadership groups appears likely. Popu-
lar enthusiasm over independence will almost
certainly decline, leaving an undercurrent of
disillusionment over corruption and over the
almost inevitable failure of the government
to meet the extravagant hopes generated by
independence. At least for the next few
years, such disillusionment is more likely to
be expressed in labor and political agitation
than in open revolt.
24. In the event of major outbreaks, the role
of the security forces would become more
critical. These forces are British trained and
equipped and still contain a large preponder-
ance of British officers. They appear capa-
ble of dealing with any but large-scale polit-
ical rebellion.4 Moreover, the government is
likely to go slow in "Nigerianization" of the
security forces, in order to maintain their
status as a reliable, nonpolitical arm of gov-
ernment. However, their reliability in the
event of serious internal trouble is far from
certain. The mixed ethnic composition of
the security forces, with the Nigerian officers
coming principally from the South and the
enlisted men principally from the North, could
create difficulties in the event of serious in-
ternal disturbances. And while the apolitical
tradition inculcated by the British remains
strong, some African officers could become
4 See Annex A?Military and Security Forces.
6
sufficiently disillusioned with procrastination
and corruption in the government to involve
themselves in political matters.
25. There is no known Communist party in
Nigeria, but a few Communists and pro-
Communists are active, chiefly in the small,
poorly organized labor movement. The most
effective penetration has been among the
leadership of the recently established Trades
Union Congress (NTUC) , which receives sup-
port from Ghana and the WFTU. The NTUC
is strongly critical of what it considers the
present government's overly conservative ap-
proach to social and economic problems and
the NTUC endorses the efforts of Ghana and
Guinea to form a "neutralist" all-African
trade union movement. Many unions, how-
ever, have remained loyal to the Trades Union
Congress of Nigeria (TUCN) , which is affili-
ated with the anti-Communist ICFTU. While
strikes could temporarily immobilize Nigeria's
transport and communications facilities, the
government retains a substantial capability
for retaliating against the unions.
IV. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
26. Despite substantial economic growth since
World War II, Nigeria remains an underde-
veloped country, and a large proportion of
the population supports itself by subsistence
farming. Even within the money economy,
agriculture employs more than three-quarters
of the labor force. Of the total estimated
potential Nigerian labor force of nine million,
only 40 thousand persons are employed in
medium and large-scale industry. Three com-
modities?cocoa, peanuts, and palm oil prod-
ucts?account for two-thirds of Nigeria's ex-
ports, and 85 percent of Nigeria's export earn-
ings come from agricultural products of all
kinds, also including rubber, coffee, bananas,
cotton, benniseed, hides and skins, and timber.
Nevertheless, the expansion of Nigeria's light
industry has been impressive, as has the de-
velopment of oil resources in the Eastern
Region by a Shell-British Petroleum consor-
tium. The country's coal and iron resources
and its hydroelectric potential could also pro-
vide the basis for further development.
8C RET
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27. Given the commitment of all Nigerian
parties and leaders to economic expansion and
modernization, the problem of continuing
economic growth will remain a major concern
of the new government. The gross national
product (GNP) rose from $2.4 billion in 1956
to $2.8 billion in 1960 and real per capita in-
come by about three percent annually. In
view of the weak base of Nigerian manufac-
turing and mining,5 capital formation is heav-
ily dependent upon earnings from agricultural
exports. In recent years bumper crops and
a large volume of exports have buoyed hopes
for economic growth. However, beginning in
1956, Nigeria has had a balance of payments
deficit every year due to low export prices,
heavy capital goods expenditures, and grow-
ing consumer imports.
28. Most business or industrial establish-
ments of any major importance are controlled
by foreigners. Modern commerce is domi-
nated by non-Nigerian trading companies and
Federal Government export and marketing
agencies. Substantial British private invest-
ment has secured for the UK a particularly
influential position in the Nigerian economy.
29. Current development programs are rap-
idly depleting the uncommitted portion of
the Nigerian Government's foreign exchange
holdings, largely derived from sales of agri-
cultural products abroad. During 1960 the
external debt of the Federal Government for
the first time exceeded its total sterling re-
serves, changing the Federal Government's
position to that of an international debtor.
To finance development programs the Fed-
eral Government probably will pursue three
approaches simultaneously over the next few
years: (a) continue to run current deficits
on Nigeria's balance of payments to the full
extent of its ability; (b) reduce the sterling
backing of Nigeria's currency; and (c) attract
as much foreign capital (loans, investments,
and grant aid) and technical assistance as
' Mineral production and manufacturing (includ-
ing utilities) each accounts for less than five
percent of GNP. However, Nigerian production
of columbium, approximately one-half of the
world supply, is of considerable strategic interest
to the US.
7
possible. The UK has promised to make $47
million available through 1962 for Nigeria's
1955-1962 development program, as well as
extending assurances of future loans and
technical assistance. However, these offer-
ings have fallen far short of Nigerian expec-
tations, and a financing gap of between $25
million and $50 million exists even after all
presently anticipated foreign aid is taken into
account.? Meanwhile planning is about to
get under way for a new five-year plan. As
a result the Federal Government can be ex-
pected to look for greatly expanded develop-
ment aid from various international agencies
such as the IBRD (which has already ex-
tended $28 million and is being asked for an
additional $56 million in loans) and from in-
dividual foreign countries, including the US.
30. Given the wide range of Nigeria's desires,
many of them economically justified, and the
speed with which it, in common with other
African countries, wants to develop and mod-
ernize, we believe it unlikely that the West
will meet all the country's expectations. The
Bloc will almost certainly make offers that
it will be difficult for Nigeria to reject, even
if it prefers to. These offers may cover such
items as a steel mill, meat packing facilities,
or various hydroelectric projects. Nigerian
economic ties with the Bloc may also be estab-
lished under bilateral trade agreements cover-
ing purchases of cocoa and other agricultural
commodities.
31. With substantial foreign aid, Nigeria prob-
ably will be able to make considerable eco-
nomic progress. But these gains will not be
adequate to develop a broadly based and
modern economy. The Nigerian economy will
remain vulnerable to the uncertainties of agri-
Cumulative US aid to Nigeria since 1955 up to 30
June 1960 amounted to $5.6 million, of which $4.6
million was technical cooperation, $.8 million
from the Development Loan Fund, and $.2 million
from P.L. 480. Of the technical cooperation
funds, $2.4 million were obligated in US FY
1960. A total of $13.3 million in US aid to
Nigeria has been authorized for US FY 1961;
of this amount $6.6 million is from the Special
Program for Tropical Africa, $2.4 million from
technical cooperation funds, $1.3 million from
special assistance funds, and $3 million from DLF.
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cultural production and to fluctuations in
world market prices of its few export com-
modities. It also faces possible loss of some
of its markets (e.g., for cocoa) to African states
associated with the Common Market. More-
over, the Federal Government will be subject
to pressures from each region to subordinate
measures for national economic development
to purely regional objectives and to popular
demands to meet particular local needs. All
these pressures may lead the Federal Gov-
ernment increasingly to adopt dramatic but
economically unrealistic measures, including
nationalization of certain enterprises and in-
creased controls over foreign trading com-
panies.
V. FOREIGN POLICY
General Orientation
32. Nigeria comes to the international scene
with a strong sense of its importance, its
dignity, and its potential for leadership in
Africa. A relatively moderate body of men
who achieved independence without a bitter
struggle with the colonial authorities, Ni-
gerian leaders tend to look down on the more
extreme Pan-African aspirations and maneu-
vers of men like Nkrumah and Sekou Toure
and to deplore nationalist excesses in the
Congo and elsewhere. They see their country
as one which can play an important moderat-
ing and stabilizing influence in the tangled
affairs of Africa.
33. Thus far the Nigerians have been largely
preoccupied with internal affairs and are only
beginning to take part in the regional politics
of African nationalism. In foreign affairs Ni-
geria appears likely to occupy a middle posi-
tion among the African states. On the one
hand, at least the present Nigerian leaders
will wish to preserve the cordial and useful
ties they have with the UK and other Western
countries, and will tend to oppose extreme
solutions to colonial problems elsewhere on
the continent. On the other hand, they are
very conscious of their status as Africans, and
will be impelled both by inclination and by
self-interest to identify themselves with Afri-
can aspirations in the remaining areas of
8
colonial dominance and with the concept of
African solidarity. They have already an-
nounced a position of nonalignment and will
probably pursue the general Afro-Asian line
in the UN on issues of little direct concern
to them. Nigerian desires to accept economic
and technical assistance proffered by Israel
will be tempered by unwillingness to become
involved in Arab-Israeli disputes, particularly
as this would tend to excite Moslem sensi-
tivities in the North. These divergent tend-
encies in Nigerian policy will probably cause
some strains between the two major partners
in Nigeria's ruling coalition, with the more
conservative and internally oriented NPC
favoring a cautious and pragmatic policy, and
the NCNC, spurred by AG criticism, urging a
more dynamic role and a greater identifica-
tion with nationalist aspirations elsewhere.
Though Nigerian foreign policy is likely to
be in favor of moderate and negotiated solu-
tions for the time being, pressures will grow
for them to side with radical African national-
ists should the major issues be further in-
flamed or their solution delayed.
Relations with African States
34. While African solidarity will tend to be-
come an increasingly important consideration
of its foreign policy, Nigeria's relations with
Ghana, Guinea, and Mali are not likely to
prove cordial. Rejecting Ghanaian claims to
leadership in the Pan-African movement and
reacting coolly to the idea of early African
political union, Nigeria will be more likely
to emphasize economic, educational, and other
forms of cooperation. While the UAR will
seek to capitalize upon its religious ties in
the Northern Region, the secular nature of
Nasser's regime may eventually offend North-
erners, and most Nigerians will react with
suspicion to Nasser's alignment with Ghana
and Guinea. Nigeria probably will find itself
more frequently aligned with conservative
states like Liberia and most of the former
French African possessions. Even among the
latter, however, Nigerian efforts to assert pre-
eminence will not pass uncontested, since the
former French territories retain closer ties
with one another than with Nigeria.
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'Nre"
35. Nigeria will almost always find itself in
agreement with the majority of other Afro-
Asian states on major colonial issues. Its re-
lations with the Union of South Africa and,
possibly with the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, are likely to become increasingly
strained. In general, however, we believe that
Nigeria will be a leading advocate of nonin-
tervention in the affairs of other states. In
accordance with this principle, we believe that
Nigeria will generally refrain from agitation
in areas adjacent to its own borders, despite
the close religious and ethnic affinities which
exist with neighboring peoples. The occur-
rence of serious disorders or a political vacuum
in the British Cameroons, however, might pro-
voke Nigerian action (see Annex B) .
Connections with the West
36. The UK, which retains a pre-eminent posi-
tion in Nigeria after six decades of generally
effective colonial rule, is likely to exert con-
siderable influence, particularly in the mili-
tary, economic, and cultural fields. For the
next several years the UK will remain Nigeria's
most important trading partner, will be a
source for much of the external assistance
which the latter requires, and will serve as
the major source for needed technicians, mili-
tary advisers, and other skilled personnel.
Nevertheless, we anticipate that Nigeria will
manifest a growing independence of judgment
and action on major international issues, re-
flecting declining British political influence.
Under a recently concluded defense agree-
ment, the Nigerian Government would make
certain military facilities available to the
British in time of emergency. However, this
agreement, which already has stimulated pro-
9
test, is likely to become increasingly contro-
versial in Nigeria.
37. Nigerian relations with Western Europe
will be greatly influenced by the attitude which
individual European countries adopt toward
African problems. Diplomatic relations with
France have been severed in protest against
French nuclear tests in the Sahara.
38. The US enjoys high prestige among Ni-
gerian leaders, particularly those educated in
American schools. Nigeria expects a growing
measure of private, as well as official, US
assistance. Nevertheless, we believe that US
relations with Nigeria's leaders will be plagued
by their close identification of the US with
European colonial powers, and by suspicions
that US attitudes toward Africa are too heavily
influenced by cold war considerations, and by
Nigerian sensitivity on racial issues.
Relations with the Bloc
39. In the light of Nigeria's policy of non-
alignment, diplomatic relations probably will
be established with the Soviet Union and some
of its European satellites during the next year
or so. Nigeria disapproves of the exclusion of
Communist China from the UN. Neverthe-
less, we do not anticipate that Nigeria will
recognize either Communist China or Na-
tionalist China in the near future. The diplo-
matic and economic presence of Bloc countries
in Nigeria will give them opportunities for in-
creasing their influence at the expense of the
West. However, Western influence will be
more affected by Western policies and actions
on specific African issues than by Bloc initia-
tives within Nigeria.
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ANNEX A
MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES
1. Nigeria's military and security forces con-
sist of an army of approximately 8,000; a navy
component of 492 men and six small vessels,
charged with coastal patrol; and a federal
police of approximately 12,000 men. In addi-
tion, local police or "militia" units are em-
ployed to maintain order. In the Northern
Region, each local force is recruited and main-
tained under the personal authority of the
local ruler.
2. Charged with maintenance of internal order
as well as defense, the army comprises five
infantry battalions?two of which are pres-
ently in the Congo?one engineer squadron,
one signals squadron, and a combination re-
connaissance and field artillery company size
unit. It appears to be a relatively effective
military establishment, largely because of the
continued presence of about 300 British officers
and some British NCO's on loan to the Ni-
gerian Government. Sixty-six officers, most
NCO's, and all other ranks are Nigerians.
3. While pressures for expansion and "Ni-
gerianization" of the army are mounting, the
government is proceeding cautiously because
of the problems which such programs would
engender. Only six Northern Nigerians hold
commissions and few Northerners qualified to
be officers are attracted to military careers.
Today, the overwhelming majority of Nigerian
officers are Southern Ibos, while the nontech-
nical enlisted ranks are mostly tribesmen from
the North. Considerable doubt exists con-
cerning the willingness of the latter to execute
the commands of their Ibo and Yoruba officers,
should such commands involve retaliation
against refractory Northern tribes. In addi-
tion, the Northern Region is likely to react
jealously to any program of "Nigerianization"
or expansion which increases the prepon-
derance of the Southerners in the higher army
echelons.
4. Some Nigerian Army officers may become
critical of the present political leadership.
Their experience in the Congo, knowledge of
the influential role of the military in other
underdeveloped countries, and awareness of
corruption among high government officials
are factors which may ultimately induce them
to enter the political arena. For this added
reason, Nigeria's ruling elite probably will wish
to retain the services of its apolitical British
military advisers for at least the next several
years.
CAN=LI,
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aggitif
ANNEX B
THE BRITISH TRUST TERRITORY OF THE CAMEROONS
1. After World War I, the Cameroons were
divided between British and French rule,
under supervision at first by the League of
Nations and later by the UN. The French
trust territory became independent on 1 Jan-
uary 1960, and is now known as the Republic
of Cameroun. The British trust territory is
divided into Northern and Southern Camer-
oons. Each of these latter areas is to decide,
in separate plebiscites scheduled for February
1961, whether it wishes to join the Federation
of Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroun.
2. Northern Cameroons was, prior to Nigerian
independence, administered by the British as
part of the Northern Region of Nigeria. ? The
control by the Northern Region's rulers was
widely resented by the people of Northern
Cameroons, and in a November 1959 plebiscite
they voted to postpone a decision on their fu-
ture rather than retain ties with Nigeria after
the latter's independence. This result shocked
the NPC leaders, and various reforms designed
to redress Cameroonian grievances have since
been introduced. We believe that in the Feb-
ruary 1961 plebiscite Northern Cameroons will
probably vote to join Nigeria.
3. In Southern Cameroons the outcome of the
plebiscite is more uncertain. The area has,
since 1954, been treated as a potential fourth
region of Nigeria, and has enjoyed a degree of
local self-government. The predominant po-
litical group, the Kamerun National Demo-
cratic Party (KNDP) , favors a federal tie with
the Republic of Cameroun, but it commands
only a slight popular majority. Major tribes
are arrayed against each other, and the losers
may resort to violence, especially if the margin
of decision is close. Furthermore, tribal con-
nections extend across the borders into both
Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroun, and
tribal loyalties, coupled with considerations of
national pride, could involve both the latter
countries if the results of the plebiscite are
contested.
4. Even if the plebiscite results in a clear-cut
decision for union of Southern Cameroons
with the Republic of Cameroun, the terms of
federation would remain to be worked out,
and negotiations would probably be prolonged.
During any extended period of uncertainty,
there would be an increased likelihood that
incidents of violence and terrorism would
spread into Southern Cameroons from dis-
turbed tribal areas in the Republic of Camer-
oun. Such incidents would be stimulated by
the activities of the One Kamerun Party
(OKP) , a radical Southern Cameroons group
which maintains close connections across the
border with remnants of the Communist-in-
fluenced Union des Populations Camerounaises
(UPC) in the Republic of Cameroun. Serious
disorders would pose problems not only for
the UK, whose responsibilities in Southern
Cameroons continue until that territory's
status is finally determined, but also for Ni-
geria, which would be alarmed by unrest along
its eastern boundaries. Moreover, the situa-
tion would almost certainly be brought into
the UN, where it would be exploited by the
Bloc and at least the more radical of the
African states.
5. Some of these results would be likely to
follow even were Southern Cameroons to elect
to enter the Federation of Nigeria. Such a de-
cision would run counter to both KNDP and
OKP desires, and the latter especially might
foment disorders, thus posing troublesome se-
curity problems for Nigeria.
(-01=bliu&X
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Sletio
ANNEX C
POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND DATA
1. Political Background Data
PARTIES
LEADERS
RESULTS OF DECEMBER 1959 ELECTIONS
Regionally
Percent
of total
national
vote
Parlia-
ment
seats
won
North
East
West
Lagos
Northern People's Con-
Sir Ahmadu Bello
1,900,000
20,000
3,000
200
27.01
142
gress (NPC).
votes
votes
votes
votes
Action Group (AG)
Chief Obafemi Awolowo .
600,000
votes
400,000
votes
1,100,000
votes
50,000
votes
29.77
73
National Council of Ni-
Dr. Michael Okpara a . . .
500.000
1,200,000
700.000
60,000
36.00
81
geria and the Camer-
oons (NCNC).
votes b
votes
votes
votes
Northern Elements Pro-
gressive Union (NEPU).
Aminu Kano
b
..
b
8
United Middle Belt Con-
gress (UMBC).
J. S. Tarka
2,000
votes
. .
..
..
.03
0
Others
100,000
183,814
191,641
100
7.19
8
a Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe headed the NCNC until his recent appointment as Governor General.
b The NCNC-NEPU alliance resulted in their ballots being totaled together.
2. Social and Economic Background Data
AREA
POPULATION
(MID-1959 EST.)
DENSITY
(PER SQ.
MILE)
SCHOOL
ENROLLMENTS
(1958)
PRINCIPAL AGRICULTURAL
COMMODITIES
North
18 million
67
232,600
Peanuts
Hausa } Over 50%
Cotton
Fulani
East
8 million
269
1,250,000
Oil Palm
Ibo?almost 70%
Products
West
6.9 million
Yoruba?Over 70%
148
1,110,000
Cocoa,
Some Oil Palm Products
Lagos
350,000
1,280
63,300
Largely Yoruba
a Of this enrollment, it is estimated that some 88,000 students were in secondary schools and 1,800 students were in
Nigerian universities in 1959. Approximately 5,700 Nigerians were receiving higher level education in the UK.
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