THE PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A021100040007-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2014
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 5, 1962
• Content Type: NIE

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NIE 29.2-62 ADVCON
5 January 1962
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY
NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate as
approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The complete text
will be circulated within five days of this issuance.
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? Political situation
? Economic prospects
? Military affairs
? International affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
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. .
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The
Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 5 January 1962. Concurring were the Director of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Direc-
tor, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy;
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director
for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National
Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Repre-
sentative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside
of their jurisdiction.
CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE IS OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WHEN USED SEPARATELY
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?CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
5. January 1962
SUBJECT: NIE 29.2-62: THE PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the outlook for Turkey over the next few
years, with particular reference to the prospects for political
stability and economic progress.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The prospects for political stability and economic pro-
gress in Turkey will depend to a large degree upon the influence
of the military, which will remain the ultimate source of power
in Turkey. However, the election outcome probably made the
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armed forces aware that while they have high prestige with the
Turkish people, the country has no desire to be governed by the
military. (Paragraph 14)
2. It is questionable whether Turkey's present coalition
government between the Republican People's Party and the
Justice Pa-rty, which was formed as a result of strong military
pressures, can remain in office for more than a year or so. Its
collapse would not necessarily mean the end of civilian govern-
ment. However, failure of the political leaders to provide ef-
fective goliernment -- or attempts by them to pursue policies
strongly opposed by the military -- probably would lead the
military to reassume direct control. In such an event, military
rule probably would be prolonged. (Paragraphs 11, 17, 18, 20)
3. Turkey has the natural resources necessary for sub-
stantial economic development, and progress during the postwar
period has provided Turkey with a moderate industrial base.
The new government intends to inaugurate an ambitious five-year
plan in 1963 in the hope of stimulating the economy to expand by
as much as seven percent annually. Achievement of this goal will
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? be dependent on optimum conditions, and we believe it more
likely that the Turkish economy will grow at a rate substantially
below this level. The consequent slow rise in living standards
probably will lead to growing pressure for ?more radical social
and economic policies. (Paragraphs 21, 24-26, 31-33)
4. Turkey is unlikely to alter the essentials of the
Western-oriented foreign policy it has pursued since World
War II. As time goes by, the Turks will become more con-
scious of the new threat of Soviet medium range missiles, and
this feeling may in the long run have some effect on their
policy. Nevertheless, Turkey's basic and long-standing dis-
trust of the Soviet Union will continue, although there may be
some improvement of relations in the economic sphere.
Differ-
ences between the US and Turkey are likely to arise periodically.
We estimate that the Turks will continue to insist on at
least some measure of joint operations of certain facilities,
and could go so far as to deny to the US the use of these
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facilities if they do not receive the treatment they feel they deserve
as full partners in the Western alliance. However, the Turks are
too aware of the Soviet threat and of their heavy dependence on the
US for both protection and aid to let such differences endanger
their basic relationship with the US. At the same time, Turkey
is likely to seek closer ties with Western Europe to secure new
markets and increased aid. (Paragraphs 38-41)
* The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur
in this Conclusion. Though he considers that negotiations with
Turkey on US base rights will be troublesome, he believes this
paragraph overstates the likelihood of Turkey denying the US the
use Of certain facilities. Thus, he believes the Conclusion
should-be changed to read:
Turkey is unlikely to alter the essentials of the
Western-oriented foreign policy it has pursued since
World War II. Turkey's basic and longstanding distrust
of the Soviet Union will continue, although there may be
some improvement of relations in the economic sphere.
Many Turkish military leaders are convinced that the US
regards its installations in Turkey as so important to the
US global defense posture that Turkey will be able to ex-
tract numerous concessions from the US, and periodic
differences may become more difficult to resolve. We
believe the Turks are deeply aware of the Soviet threat
and of their heavy dependence on the US for both pro-
tection and aid and will not intend to let such differences
endanger their basic relationship with the US. However,
in the course of bargaining they might impose conditions
which would be extremely difficult for the US to meet. At
the same time, Turkey is likely to seek closer ties with
Western Europe to secure new markets and increased aid.
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