REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A021400040014-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2014
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 20, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRALINTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
20 March 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIK6CTOR
SUBJECT: Reactions to Certain US Courses in Laos
1. The problem is to estimate certain reactions if the US,
in order to put pressure on General Phoumi and Premier Boun Oum
to Cooperate in a coalition government, halted aid to the Laotian
government and withdrew its NAAG teams.
2. If the US were to withdraw its training teams, military
advisers and, most importantly, its logistics backup of the
Laotian army, the Communist forces now in Laos (19,000 Pathet Lao
and 9,000 North Vietnamese) would have the capability rapidly to.
defeat the Laotian government forces and to seize the major urban
areas remaining in government hands. However, we do not believe
that the Communists would immediately attempt to take over Laos
by military means.
3. Those on the Communist side -- Moscow, Peiping, Hanoi,
and the Pathet Lao -- want a Communist Laos. They would probably
believe that their chances of success by political means were
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greatly enhanced by the US move. In these circumstances, all
four would probably seek to pursue that objective primarily
through political action rather than through military conquest.
Moreover, the Soviets would wish to maintain the appearance of
having negotiated in good faith for the creation of a coalition
government. In any event, the Communist forces in Laos will con-
tinue to maintain military pressures on the government forces,
and they will increase that pressure from time to time to im-
prove their political leverage.
4. The assumed US course of action would have an immediate
demoralizing effect upon the Laotian government and armed forces.
The government could survive at most only three or four months
without US financial support, and it is unlikely that Phoumi could
hold the armed forces together for long. The Communist side would
probably wait for the Laotian government to collapse or for Phourd
and Doun Cum to give in and accept Souvannais terms for a coali-
tion government.
5. Even if the IS were to halt aid and withdraw the WAG -
teams, we believe that the chances would be less than even that
Boun Ouu and Phoumi would agree to join a coalition government
headed by Souvanna Phouma.. They consider him to be a tool of the
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Comnunists, and they regard him with distaste and suspicion.
If they were to give in and agree to participate in a Souvanna
government we do not believe that they would do so with any
serious intent of cooperating with Souvanna. Bather they would
probably seek to undercut him and his followers as well as the
Pathet Lao.
6. There would be at least four other courses open to Phoumi
and Doun Cum, but it is impossible to estimate with confidence or
precision the odds on any of them. The most likely of the four
would appear to be to leave Laos in self-imposed exile. Both al-
most certainly have the means to do so, and they must at times
become weary and discouraged with the struggle, as does Souvanna.
7. Their pride and determination, however, may not permit
then to withdraw, and they night, unless fully convinced that the
US and Thailand would not come to their aid, either move to
Savannakhet with whatever government assets they could take with
them and seek to bring about a partition of Laos, or initiate
some desperate military action. In either of these cases thi:re
would be a sharp military reaction by the Communist forces, and
Phouni's troops would probably be defeated. It is also possible
that Phoumi and Doun Oum might go into the bills with some of
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their loyal followers and seek to carry on a guerrilla war
against any Laotian government which might be set up. How-
ever, neither would relish such a life and they probably could
not command the following of many ,of the Laotian troops for
long unless they were assured sources of maintenance and pay.
Bence we believe this to be the least likely of the four
courses.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SBERNAN KENT
Chairman
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