POST MORTEM ON SNIE 14.3-64: THE OUTLOOK FOR NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A025500040007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2014
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 8, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A025500040007-0
IIP r-4-404'
-R,E-T
? CENTRAL INTELLIGENC AGENCY
8 April 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Post Mortem on SNIE 14.3-64: THE OUTLOOK FOR NORTH VIETNAM
1. The attached post-mortem has been approved by the Board
of National Estimates pursuant to a consideration of it by the
USIB representatives.
2. You will note that this is the revision of
which USIB directed be prepared. (See USIB-M-315, 4
3. This item has been placed on the agenda of
meeting scheduled for 1030, Wednesday, 15 April.
DISTRIBUTION A
the Post Mortem
March 1964)
the USIB
Executive Officer
National Estimates
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
S- -R-E-T declassification
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A025500040007-0
! Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A025500040007-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
8 April 1964
SUBJECT: POST MORTEM on SNIE 14.3-64: TBE OUTLOOK FOR NORTH VIETNAM
1. North Vietnam is one of the areas of the Communist world
about which we know the least. The North Vietnamese press and radio
are the major -- and often the only -- sources of political and
economic intelligence about North Vietnam.
2. Our information is probably best, relatively speaking,
concerning economic affairs. Even here we depend largely on
information and statistics published by North Vietnam, although
trade statistics can be compiled largely from figures released
by other countries. We have very much less opportunity for cross-
checking economic data, however, than we do in the case of Soviet
Bloc countries.
3. In the political field, our main source, as in other
Communist countries, is overt material, but our scanty background
information makes it difficult to use overt material effectively.
It is supplemented to a limited extent by the information reports
GROUP 1
Bkoluded from automatic
S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and
declassification
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A025500040007-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03 : CIA-RDP79R01012A025500040007-0
1111
S -E -C.41 -E -T
and the open stories of the few Western journalists
permitted to visit North Vietnam. Al]. of these reflect severe
limitations on travel and access to various classes of people,
and in many cases rely on DRV information handouts. The result
is a severe deficiency in our knowledge of political developments
and prospects and of the dynamics which govern them.
4. On military matters, where North Vietnamese security
is most stringent, our intelligence is especially weak, particularly
with respect to the size, organization, and capabilities of the
military establishment.
5. We believe that the Army has 11 major infantry units
but cannot determine how many of these units are divisions and how
many are brigades. (The consensus is that five probably are
divisions, five probably are brigades, and one could be either.)
We have been aware of North Vietnamese efforts to reorganize the
ground forces but remain largely ignorant of details. As a result
of significant gaps in our information, our estimate of the personnel
strength of the Army -- between 200-2501000 men -- could be off by
as much as 100,000. We know little about the commanders of the
infantry divisions and brigades or of command structure, organizationl
- 2 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A025500040007-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A025500040007-0
S-E-C-R-E-T 1111
types and conditions of equipment, individual and unit training,
troop morale, and personnel and combat service support procedures.
Similar gaps exist in our intelligence on artillery, armor, and
air defense. Little is known of the command and staff relation-
ships among the PAVN, the regional commands and the militia.
Information is lacking on the countrTs military mobilization
potential. In the field of military logistics we have been un-
able to determine the status of North Vietnam's war reserves or the
extent of foreign military assistance.
6. For the Navy, estimates of personnel strength vary
from 2,500 to 5,000. Detailed information on naval organization,
equipment, and training is scarce. Our effort to develop a more
comprehensive determination of naval capabilities has been hindered
by lack of knowledge concerning operational and materiel readiness,
logistics, doctrine, and expansion plans.
7. Regarding the Air Force, there is a critical need for
Information on the extent of combat pilot training in North Viet-
nam and abroad, organization and strength, logistics, air-defense
capability, aircraft inventory, and plans for expansion.
8. The organization and strength of North Vietnam's militia
and internal security components are unknown, and as a result
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A025500040007-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A025500040007-0
-E -C -R -E -T
estimates on the size of the militia have varied from one hundred
thousand to two million. The figure most generally used
(500)000) is derived from a demographic calculation weighing
such uncertain factors as the proportion of physically fit and
politicAlly reliable men in the population. Our estimate that
the strength of the Armed Peoples' Security Forces (APSF) is
around 15)000 is based on the belief that since the Army's
security battalions are organized on a provincial basis) the
APSF probably is similarly organized. It is therefore estimated
that one APSF battalion of 500 men probably exists for each of
the approximately 30 provinces. There are no firm details to
support these estimates.
- 4 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A025500040007-0