ALGERIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A026100040001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 23, 1964
• Content Type: NIE

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is we 3? i3EC, NIE 62-64
CONTROLLED DISSEM 32,,z,e3 December 1964
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 62-64
Algeria
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UN ITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
23 DECEMBER 1964
4141111111e'w
CONTROLLED DISSEM
DOCt_1:T NO.
1
O CHANCIf !r CLASS. L
X a. c; TJ
C TO: TS S C "-
NL: RE-Y9- V`: DATE:
AUTit: HR 70-2
DATE: /2. -1-1 -61 REVIEWER: ? ? 7 Q .
N? 377
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SECRET
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, and NSA.
Concurring:
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director of the National Security Agency
Abstaining:
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant to the
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their
jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
SECRET
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 62-64
Algeria
.FiqePPilum*
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-FfeT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM 1
CONCLUSIONS 1
DISCUSSION 3
I. INTRODUCTION 3
II. SOCIALIST ALGERIA 3
III. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 5
TABLE 1: MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ALGERIA, 1962-1964 6
IV. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION 7
TABLE 2: ALGERIAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1963 9
Foreign Assistance 10
V. DOMESTIC OUTLOOK 10
The Economy 10
Political Prospects 11
VI. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 12
France 12
The Communist World 13
Africa 13
The US and the West 14
The Arab World 14
MAP 50768 faces 1
MAP 50769 follows 15
N94?1No.
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PORTU
=GMT
A TLA Nr/c
OCEAN
Tangie
Gibraltar
TuNisIA
Casablan
RABAT
TRIPOLI
MORO
Marrake;?:--q1-7:
:,.......-----, ....,
4rencil hT'Telriamtii.ot noof7C. /*
_c_7_ctiVity in Alger.
..... ea
?f:Taill njO lUjbn8ete ,?t ....--"
9587-.195'0.-2 ."*"' ..---
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"
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Si/ndouf
HASSI
ReMEL
Touggourt
olomb-
echar
ouiet
eggane
NIGER
NN)
ALGERIA
Railroad Oil pipeline
Major road or track Natural gas pipeline
CD Producing oilfield
tW' Producing gasfield
Nuclear test site
O 1o0 290 300 M iles
I , ' .
0 100 200 360 Kilometers
50768 12-64
V
SECRET
GROUP 1
---Artgamnr"-"
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ALGERIA
THE PROBLEM
To assess the situation in Algeria; and to estimate its prospects over
the next two years or so.
CONCLUSIONS
A. We think that Ben Bella's chances of remaining in power for
the next two years or so are good. He will probably continue to keep
a narrow but fairly solid power base, especially in the military estab-
lishment, where Vice President and Minister of Defense Boumedienne
appears loyal. We do not believe that Boumedienne would use the
army to oust Ben Bella, except under extraordinary conditions.
(Pa.ras. 13, 24-25)
B. The economy will probably continue to decline for a time, and
will probably stabilize at a lower level than at present. We do not
believe that the economic situation will deteriorate so far as to gen-
erate extreme political discontent. The majority of the people will
follow the traditional subsistence agricultural pattern, while the new
society of politically important elements, including the army, bureauc-
racy, and workers on nationalized farms, is likely to continue to fare
better than under the French. (Paras. 16, 24, 28)
C. The 60,000 man Algerian military establishment has been
largely re-equipped with Soviet weapons in the past. year or so. It
can maintain internal security and is, improving vis-a-vis its most likely
external rival, Morocco. In about a year it will probably be superior
to the Moroccans. However, while Algerian-Moroccan relations are
likely to remain uneasy, a recurrence of major hostilities is unlikely.
(Paras. 11, 14-15, 41)
D. Algeria will probably move away, albeit slowly and hap-
hazardly, from its close linkage with France, and the latter's aid will
*VINNET 1
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almost certainly decline after 1965, when the nuclear test sites will
no longer be needed. French interests, especially oil, as well as
Algeria's need for financial aid, will militate against a complete break.
The coming years are likely to be marked by continued frictions,
however, as Algeria strives to reduce its dependence without losing
the benefits of the association, but a major breach will probably be
avoided at least as long as de Gaulle lives. (Paras. 31-32)
E. Algeria's revolutionary convictions lead it to support virtually
any movement bearing the anti-colonialist label. In Africa particu-
larly, Ben Bella will provide moral support, as well as arms and train-
ing, to revolutionary movements, often in concert with Soviet and
Chinese actions. This already conflicts with US policies in sub-
Saharan Africa and would be especially serious if a rebel movement
were to develop the staying power to wage a drawn-out guerrilla
conflict. In any event, US-Algerian relations are likely to be marked
by growing frictions. (Paras. 29, 36-39)
F. Both Soviets and Chinese appear to regard the Ben Bella
regime as promoting their respective interests by its predilection for
supporting revolutionary movements. While this condition obtains
and at least as long as French assistance and presence remain strong,
the USSR and China will be content to play a background role, al-
though continuing to provide economic aid. A major breach between
France and Algeria could open the way for greatly increased Soviet
influence. However, the Soviets would be faced with problems, as
well as opportunities, especially since providing budget support would
break a precedent and also be very costly. (Paras. 34-35)
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.itarsartk
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In the two and a half years since independence, Algeria has changed almost
beyond recognition. The mass exodus of the European population has pulled
Algeria back from the impressive level of . modernization attained under the
French. Gone are virtually all the managerial and technical personnel who
operated the modern industrial sector and who consumed a significant propor-
tion of its prodncts. This industrial retrogression has left in its wake chronic
unemployment in urban areas running as high as, 50 percent of the male work
force. The agricultural sector, too, has been seriously affected. Algerian farms
.do not produce sufficient food for the urban population, and the country must
import substantial quantities of food. The traditional subsistence farming re-
gions, where more than half of Algeria's 11 million people live, are especially
hard pressed; as a result of great destruction during the rebellion. These diffi-
culties have been compounded by the intense political infighting which until
recently absorbed much of the energy of Algeria's leaders.
2. Despite all this, Algeria has managed to survive. The Algerians have taken
over the French system of administration?departments administered by prefects
controlled from Algiers?and though local administration is of uneven quality, the
governmental system has worked adequately, with the assistance of several thou-
sand French technicians. In other respects as well, Algeria has benefited from
its inheritance from the French. It has an excellent transportation network
serving the entire country. Housing, though not satisfactory, is now reasonably ?
adequate, since in the burgeoning cities squatters have moved into apartment
buildings formerly inhabited by foreigners. Essential services?post, telephone,
public utilities, transport?function fairly well., in part because they are serving
fewer customers than they were designed to handle. With the exception of a
few areas of dissidence, the countryside is peaceful. Education is improving,
at least in quantity, and more than a million children are in school this year.
3. Since independence, and particularly during the past year, authority has
been increasingly concentrated in the hands of one man; Ahmed Ben Bella.
Of the other eight "historic chiefs" who launched the rebellion in 1954, three died
in the struggle, one is in jail, and four are in exile. The second level of wartime
leaders has similarly been thrust aside by Ben Bella, who has demonstrated great
political skill and considerable ruthlessness in establishing his authority. With
the support of the military establishment, he has put in train the process of
"building socialism" in Algeria.
II. SOCIALIST ALGERIA
4. A new society has emerged in Algeria, comprising those who have assumed
the roles left vacant by the departure of more than 900,000 Europeans. Its
principal constituents are a new bureaucracy of some 30,000 persons, the National
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-VAIET
Popular Army (ANP) numbering about 60,000 men, and the Front de Liberation
Nationale (FLN), Algeria's only legal political organization. Also participating
to varying degrees in this new society are such groups as organized labor, urban
shopkeepers, and youth and student organizations. Further major beneficiaries
of the European exodus are the half million or more agricultural workers who
have moved onto abandoned European lands and who run them under self-
management committees. All these elements are better off than they were under
the French. In contrast, to these favored elements are the peasantry in the sub-
sistence agricultural sector and the large body of urban unemployed who together
comprise over two-thirds of the population.
5. This new society provides the general basis for Ben Bella's exercise of power.
In the past year, he has succeeded in consolidating his political supremacy and
in neutralizing most of his opponents. Ben Bella's principal colleagues are a
group of influential figures thrown up by the revolution, chief among them being
Minister of Defense Boumedienne, FLN organizer Hajj Ben Alla, and Minister
of Power and Industry Boumaza. The top echelons of the government are
staffed almost exclusively by youngish men who played secondary roles during
the rebellion, and who either sided with Ben Bella and Boumedienne or remained
neutral during the power struggle that followed independence. Many of them
were officers in the wartime Army of National Liberation, particularly in the
units outside Algeria's borders.
6. Political infighting and competition for power, which characterized the
early months of independence, have sharply declined as Ben Bella has gradually
eliminated his opponents. The opposition leaders are characterized by a marked
inability to cooperate among themselves and by a divergence of political phi-
losophy running from the parliamentary democracy of Ferhat Abbas to the
doctrinaire socialism of Mohamed Boudiaf, far to the left of Ben Bella. Ben Bella
has secured the election of a tame National Assembly and has purged potential
rivals from important positions in the government and FLN. Similarly the
regime has virtually wiped out "wilayism"?the efforts of local guerrilla chiefs
to retain their autonomy?by a shrewd combination of placation and repression
as necessary. Today, the regime's opponents are virtually all in jail, under
house arrest, or in exile. A handful have been executed.
7. Algeria at the close of 1964 is very much Ben Bella's Algeria, in which his
personal style, biases, and attitudes are dominant. He leads an austere life and
seems to care little for the customary trappings of the leader. He describes his
program as Islamic socialism. It is, in fact, a poorly defined ideology com-
pounded of elements of nationalism, Arabism, and a strong sense of African
mission, expressed in the vocabularies of French and Marxist revolutionary
traditions. He appears to aim at establishing a social order based on social
justice and the equitable sharing of material goods among all citizens. He has
not demonstrated that he has an orderly program for achieving this new order,
however, but seems to rely on day to day decisions to cope with problems as
4 SiirSbr
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fiasittto,
they arise. Many of these opportunistic decisions, particularly in the economic
field, are characterized by an instinctive opposition to what he had known under
French rule.
8. The government's emphasis on socialism is little appreciated by the bulk
of the population, which chiefly wants food, work, and a chance to rebuild lives
shattered by the strains of war. This war-weariness has caused many to stand
aside from the power struggles of the past two years. The initial popularity of
Ben Bela among the peasantry has dwindled considerably. Today his power
base is narrow; but it is solid in those groups which have profited from the
revolution and which have a stake in the continued existence of the regime.
9. Under Ben Bella, the regime has become progressively more authoritarian,
and dissent has been gradually stifled. A man bored by detail, he tends to use
whatever mechanism is nearest at hand to accomplish a particular task. Thus,
directives from the presidency?and most initiatives are derived from it?may be
channeled through the bureaucracy, the FLN, or the army. This practice has
tended to blur lines of command and to make the administration overly dependent
on decisions from the top. There is also a gulf between the government ap-
paratus and the populace. The FLN lacks an effective apparatus to mobilize
popular support. Its ranks contain many opportunists and few leaders of
stature; most Algerians have remained apathetic to it.
10. Although the Soviets have treated the FLN virtually as a fraternal party,
the regime's policies and practices have given the Communist movement as such
only limited scope for increasing its influence within Algeria. Individual Com-
munists have been accepted into the FLN, but they appear to have little direct
effect on the party program. The substantial numbers of students (over 300)
and military personnel (some 800 or more), studying in the Bloc are a potential
source of Soviet influence.
III. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
11. Since independence, the "interior army," a heterogenous collection of guer-
rilla bands that carried on the rebellion within Algeria, and the "exterior army,"
which had been organized in neighboring countries, have been whipped together
into a national army of some 60,000 men. The ANP is the most privileged group
in the country, well paid, well fed, well housed. Following the border troubles
with Morocco in the fall of 1963, the Algerians accelerated the buildup of their
armed forces, particularly in armor, artillery, transport, and aircraft. The army
is organized into about 70 battalions, largely stationed in garrisons around the
country. It intends to reduce its size to around 45,000, having its principal
strength in five motorized infantry divisions of about 6,000 men, with one assigned
to each military region. The ANP has planned an extensive service school
system; many training establishments are already organized, and the quality of
instruction in some at least is fairly high. There has been some training in the
Bloc, but the bulk of training is done in Algeria by officers schooled in the French
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Ver
military tradition. The air force has also been strengthened and now has some
130 aircraft of all types. Virtually all the armed forces' heavy equipment has
been obtained from the Soviet Bloc, and more is probably in the pipeline.
TABLE 1
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ALGERIA
1962-1964
EQUIPMENT
TYPE
FROM
USSR
FROM UAR
AND CUBA
TOTAL-
Aircraft
MIG-17 fighter
20
7
27
MIG-15 fighter
4
11
15
YAK-18 trainer
18
?
18
MI-4 helicopters
12+
?
12+
AN-12 transports
5-6
?
5-6
IL-28 bomber
12
?
12
Naval Vessels
P-6 motor torpedo boats
6
2
8
Tanks
T34 & T54
150-200
45
195-245
Artillery, trucks, communications equipment?quantity unknown
PERSONNEL TRAINED IN USSR, BY SERVICE
LENGTH
NUMBER OF TRAINING
Army 50 21/2 years
Navy 280 1-3 years
Air 200 1-5 years
Mixed 310
*840
* About 250 have already returned to Algeria.
12. The modernizing armed force is largely the creation of Col. Boumedienne,
who rose to become chief of staff of the ,National Liberation Army (ALN) in
the latter years of the rebellion. He appears to command the obedience of his
subordinates, although there are probably personal and ethnic rivalries still
remaining in the ANP, as well as factions which reflect the wartime division
between the interior and exterior armies. These divisions appear to be lessening;
they were not of sufficient magnitude to impede the army in its operations against
dissidents in the Kabylie and the Aures during 1964.
13. The ANP is probably the only remaining force capable of unseating the
regime. Its relationship with Ben Bella is thus crucial to the power structure
of the country. Given Boumedienne's position as Vice President and Minister
of Defense, it is almost inevitable that there have been many rumors characteriz-
ing him as a serious contender for supreme power. His actions over the past
two years suggest that he is principally interested in building a strong professional
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,Cena;
army; he personally interferes little with other operations of government.
Boumedienne shows no outward signs of aspirations to assume ultimate authority;
at present, he appears to be loyal to Ben Bella and to share generally the latter's
hopes for an authoritarian, socialist, Arab Algeria.
14. Although maintenance of routine law and order is in principle the re-
sponsibility of the police and gendarmerie, the ANP has played a major role in
suppressing disturbances and maintaining internal security in the past year,
and this has decreased its popularity. It cannot penetrate the mountain fast-
nesses and rout out every last vestige of dissidence, but it can prevent such
dissidence from being more than relatively minor harassment. Only major out-
breaks in several places at once could challenge its control.
15. The ANP, which a year ago was distinctly inferior in training and equip-
ment to Morocco's army, has improved greatly. By mid-1965, it will probably
outstrip Morocco in air power, particularly in offensive capability as a result of
the recent delivery of 12 IL-28 bombers. Within a year, Algeria's ground forces
would probably have a distinct edge on the Moroccans in any fighting in the
border areas.
IV. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION
16. Present day Algeria is a country which cannot be adequately described
by statistical tables, GNP figures, and five year development plans. Indeed,
reliable information on many aspects of the economy is not available. But it is
clear that a major change has taken place and that production has declined by
about a third. Thus, Algeria had a GNP of perhaps $2 billion in 1963, its first
full year of independence, in contrast to the peak of about $3 billion reached
in 1960, although the latter resulted in part from heavy French military expendi-
tures. However, the European tenth of the population accounted for nearly
half of pre-independence GNP. In consequence, the per capita income of the
Moslem Algerian population has gone up by a substantial amount?something
like one-fourth to one-third?although in a most uneven fashion. Workers and
managers on the nationalized farms, government employees, the military, and
certain elements in the cities and large towns are far better off than they were
tinder the French. In contrast, there has been little improvement in the tradi-
tional subsistence sector of the economy, and many urban workers -have been
thrown out of work.
17. The Algerian economy today is running at a level far below its capacity.
The great ports of Algiers and Oran handle only a small fraction of the cargo
they were built for. Many factories are idle or producing at a fraction of their
capacity. Rail and road transport, in turn, are called on for much reduced
service. This tremendous drop in the modern sector has put two to three
hundred thousand out of work, and urban unemployment has been aggravated
by a heavy influx of unskilled people from the countryside. There is also sub-
.5itrifitcP 7
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stantial under-employment in rural areas and the entire problem is complicated
by a 2.5 percent yearly population increase. There are marked deficiencies
in other fields; repair and maintenance facilities are far from adequate.
18. The brightest spot in the Algerian economy is the oil industry. Explora-
tion is continuing, and new facilities are being built, notably a third pipeline
from the Hassi Messaoud field, scheduled for completion in 1966. Under
pressure from Algiers, which is feeling the shortage of foreign exchange, the
oil companies have agreed to take no more than 50 percent of their gross earnings
out of Algeria. There is, however, considerable tension between Algiers and
Paris over oil. The companies are largely French-owned and the French Gov-
ernment has a large role in their management. The Algerians feel that foreign'
control of such a major resource runs counter to their nationalist and socialist
principles, and they are further concerned that high amortization rates are
holding down their share of the profits. In 1964, the Algerian Government
received $55 million from a production of 500,000 barrels a day; by comparison,
Libya in 1963 produced only 460,000 barrels a day, but got $65 million in
revenue. There is little doubt that Ben Bella would like to nationalize the
oil industry, but the difficulty of marketing the output makes it unlikely that
he will do so during at least the period of this estimate.
19. The regime has not devoted adequate time and energy to alleviating and
improving the many serious weak spots in the economy. It has been preoccupied
with political matters, with sporadic dissidence, and increasingly with an aggres-
sive foreign policy. The regime further appears to count heavily on increased
oil revenues to cope with economic problems. Its leaders seem to believe
that their socialist system is something of a panacea, they are unwilling to come
to grips with details, and there are some differences among them concerning
economic policy. The government's actions have been such as to discourage
private foreign investment.
20. The agricultural sector of the economy, on which some 70 percent of the
people depend for their living, has its share of problems also. The erstwhile
European-owned modern sector has seen the former workers take over the
properties and run them under "auto-gestion" ( self-management) committees.
These have generally managed to keep production fairly high, but breakdowns
in the distribution and marketing system have resulted in much wastage. In
particular, Algeria heavily overproduces wine, and France is showing increasing
disinclination to take large quantities of it, especially at the high prices formerly
paid to the colons. Other products, such as citrus fruit, are exported, but the
country is deficient in cereals and must import sizeable quantities, even in
years of average grain production. Radical changes in the modern agricultural
sector are likely to be forced on the country, but most farmers will not abandon
production of a crop, such as grapes, with which they are familiar, except under
heavy pressure.
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TABLE 2
ALGERIAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1963
By principal country, in million US$
DOLLARS
IMPORTS
PERCENT
EXPORTS
DOLLARS PERCENT
France
558.5
84.9
574.8
82.6
US
'44.0
6.7
.7
.1
.
Germany
11.6
1.8
60.9
8.7
Italy
13.1
2.0
22.0
3.2
Other Western Europe
13.2
2.0
33.7
4.8
Morocco
11.7
1.8
3.9
.5
USSR
5.1
.8
.7
.1
657.2
296.7
By composition, in million US$
EXPORTS
DOLLARS PERCENT
Crude oil 376.9 54.1
Wine 116.3 16.7
Other agricultural products 116.3 16.7
Iron ore and other minerals 28.7 4.1
Other 58.6 8.4
IMPORTS
696.7
DOLLARS PERCENT
Food 163.7 25.1
Fuel 45.9 7.0
Raw material and semi-finished products 56.6 8.7
Capital equipment 183.1 28.1
Consumer goods 125.7 19.3
657.2
'These figures are derived largely from Algeria's trading partners.
Chiefly PL-480 food.
21. The government's financial position is difficult but not desperate. In 1963,
a budget deficit of about $170 million was met by a combination of French
budgetary support amounting to $80 million, borrowing from the Central Bank,
and using funds on deposit in the Treasury, e.g., postal savings. The budget
deficit in 1964 will probably be at least as large. Algerian efforts to rebuild
the tax collection system, both the base and the mechanism of which were
shattered by the departure of the Europeans, have had little success as yet. A
potential source of revenue, which is not being adequately tapped, lies in the
relatively well-off self-managed farms. Foreign exchange deficiencies are to
some extent offset by remittances from the nearly half-million Algerians who
work in France.
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Foreign Assistance
22. In these circumstances, the role of France in the Algerian economy is of
prime importance. In 1963, France provided about $555 million of Algeria's
imports, about 85 percent of the total, and took about 80 percent of its exports.
This includes large quantities of wine and fruits as well as three quarters of
Algeria's petroleum production, and all are brought into France under preferen-
tial arrangements. About a third of France's petroleum derives from Algeria
and is paid for in francs. In the field of economic aid, France supplies money
and personnel in quantities and categories not easily replaceable from other
countries of either East or West. Under the terms of the independence accords,
France undertook to provide Algeria with substantial aid through June 1965.
This has included substantial funds to compensate Frenchmen whose property
has been seized, as well as about $160 million yearly in 1963 and 1964 for de-
velopment and for budget support. France has also furnished and paid some
20,000 teachers and technicians yearly. Without these, the school system would
scarcely function, and government administration and factory management would
be considerably less efficient than they are.
23. While France is far and away the principal source of foreign assistance,
other countries play a significant role. The US provides some technical aid and
about $35 million yearly in PL 480 food. The latter provides an important
part of the diet of over a quarter of the population. The Soviet Union has
extended some $228 million in economic credits. Most of this is tied to de-
velopment projects, and only some $10 million has been spent to date. Other
Bloc countries have provided $25 million in credits, and the Communist Chinese
have come up with $50 million, of which only about $4 million has been drawn.
In contrast to the early period of Algerian independence, the Arab states have
helped very little in the past year?a thousand or so teachers from the UAR
being the principal contribution.
V. DOMESTIC OUTLOOK
The Economy
24. The prospects for economic growth in Algeria are not bright. Algeria's
principal need is to put its idle industrial capacity to work in order to relieve
unemployment and create buying power. There is little prospect of acquiring
sufficient technical and managerial personnel, adequate raw materials, or markets
to accomplish this. The aid supplied by France and that programmed from
the USSR is not geared for such a process and there is little likelihood of
Algeria getting much aid from anywhere else. The prospect, therefore, is for
the economy to decline for a time, during which considerable deterioration of
plant and equipment is likely to take place. Oil revenues will probably rise
while external aid decreases. Together with the other factors operating in the
economy, this is likely to result in stagnation at a level lower than at present,
but not in dramatic collapse.
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wizraggiv!
25. The nature of Algeria's economic relationship with France will continue
to change. After the end of 1965, the level of French aid will probably decline
substantially. By that time, the Evian Accords will have come to an end and
the French will be able to dispense with the nuclear test sites in the Sahara.
Moreover, the high level of French preferential treatment for certain agricul-
tural products, especially wine, is likely to be reduced and Algiers will be
forced to seek other markets. Algeria's foreign economic relations will probably
move, albeit slowly and haphazardly, from the modern high production pattern
closely linked to France, which characterized pre-independence days, to a sys-
tem which exports petroleum and agricultural commodities to a broader market.
Political Prospects
26. The consolidation of power by Ben Bella's regime which has ?marked
the past year seems likely to give it a good lease on life for the next few years.
To a considerable extent, this is a consolidation by default, thanks to the
differences and incompetence of the opposition, both old guard FLN leaders
and local military chieftains. There are frictions within the ruling group,
and regionalism, particularly on the part of the Berber-speaking Kabyles who
resent the regime's emphasis on arabization, will continue to sound a divisive
note. At the same time, the new society is providing a means for creating a
sense of national unity in Algeria, which works in Ben Bella's favor. Ben
Bella probably would like to use elements of this society, particularly the FLN,
to reduce the level of reliance on the ANP. On the whole, we see little chance
of significant progress on this score. The ANP is likely to remain the chief
organization possessing the resources and cohesion necessary to establish itself
as an important power base.
, 27. Were Ben Bella to die or be assassinated, Boumedienne would probably
assume a dominant role, in association with other members of the ruling clique.
The style of such a post-Ben Bella government would be different; .but there
would probably be little basic change in methods of government or in ideology.
We do not believe that Boumedienne would move to oust Ben Bella except
under extraordinary conditions which the latter appeared unable to control.
Our knowledge of political attitudes among middle ranking ANP officers is sparse.
However, it is our judgment that Boumedienne has managed the appointment
of officers in such a fashion as to insure that the possibility of malcontents
taking matters into their own hands is reduced to a minimum.
28. Economic difficulties such as unemployment are likely to affect the politi-
cal scene, but we do not believe that the economy will deteriorate so far as to
generate extreme discontent among the politically important elements of the
population. Ben Bella will probably continue to lose popularity in the country
at large, as time passes and people find their expectations of a better life
unfulfilled. There may from time to time be manifestations of discontent, say
among unemployed in the cities. Guerrilla activity is likely to persist in Kabylie
and other remote areas, but in the absence of effective leaders is unlikely
.44414fil
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?skiser--'
to prove seriously discomforting to the government. Widespread activity would
require a high level of discontent, plus willingness on the part of the rural
population to risk heavy reprisal, and we do not believe that conditions are likely
to deteriorate to that extent in the next few years.
VI. FOREIGN AFFAIRS
29. Algeria's emergence as an independent country after a prolonged and
violent struggle with France has left the Ben Bella regime with strong con-
victions that revolution is the true path of freedom. This revolutionary Con-
viction has led the Algerian Government to support virtually any movement
or organization bearing the anti-colonialist label. Algeria professes non-align-
ment, but in practice this has frequently meant lending active support to posi-
tions espoused by Moscow or Peking. Algeria is also favorably inclined toward
the Soviets and the Chinese for the help they provided the rebel cause during
the rebellion.
30. Yet Algeria's cultural and economic ties with France remain strong, and
place it in a status which is something less than the unfettered independence
which it works for abroad. It has also led to such anomalies as Algeria being
the host for a Soviet-sponsored nuclear disarmament conference, while the
French continue nuclear tests on Algerian soil. This paradox pervades Algeria's
attitudes and external relations and imposes strains and difficult choices on
many issues, but it is our judgment that its revolutionary convictions are the
stronger. Where the regime must choose, it will probably favor revolutionary
causes, very often in collaboration with Communist efforts.
France
31. Paris and Algiers have powerful reasons for a continuing close relation-
ship, at least for the next several years. Economic interests in Algeria, espe-
'cially oil, are important to France, and the French nuclear weapons program
requires the use of the Sahara test sites at least through 1965. Paris views
the maintenance of good Franco-Algerian relations as valuable in showing the
. non-aligned countries that it can live with revolutionary regimes. There is
also a strong French desire to keep Algeria culturally oriented to the metropole,
on which de Gaulle puts considerable emphasis. Moreover, Ben Bella has
been very tactful in his relations with de Gaulle, partly in recognition of the
latter's role in bringing about Algerian independence. The French president
also seems to have a considerable degree of tolerance for Ben Bella. The
latter in turn recognizes the high level of Algerian reliance on France for aid
and for protected markets, as well as for its absorption of a half-million surplus
workers.
32. However, the coming years are likely to be marked by continued frictions
as Algeria strives to reduce its dependence and gain freedom of action without
losing the benefits of the association. Ben Bella will probably exercise con-
siderable caution not to encroach on French interests to the point. where France
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would feel they were no longer worth substantial amounts of aid. On balance,
we believe that the Franco-Algerian relationship will continue on something
like its present course, at least as long as de Gaulle rules, although aid is
likely to diminish. There is considerable opposition within France to the high
level of aid to Algeria, and it will come to the fore on de Gaulle's departure.
The Communist World
33. Algeria has demonstrated its predilection for the Soviets and the Chinese
in a number of ways. Ben Bella has made many public statements supporting
Communist positions, and Algeria has been host to a number of Communist-front
meetings. His statements, including several directed at the US, have gone well
beyond the bounds of the conventional anti-colonialism espoused by most other
nonaligned leaders. We expect this sort of action to continue.
34. The Communist powers appear to regard Algeria as a country of sub-
stantial potential. The Soviets have provided large amounts of military equip-
ment and sizable economic credits. There is an element of Moscow-Peking
rivalry in the supplying of aid to Algeria. Each party, however, probably views
the Ben Bella regime as one inherently devoted to promoting revolution and anti-
colonialism, and thus promoting its interests. While this condition obtains and
as long as French assistance and presence remain strong, the Communist powers
appear content to stay in the background.
35. A major breach between France and Algeria could open the way for
greatly increased Soviet influence, though the Soviets would be faced with
problems as well as opportunities. The Bloc would not be likely to absorb
Algeria's exports of wine, fruit, and oil, which total over half a billion dollars
yearly. It almost certainly would not be able to supply technicians in anything
like the numbers that France has. To provide budget support in amounts
adequate to replace French aid would break a precedent and also be very costly.
It seems more likely that the Communist powers would try to make an impact
by offering greatly increased credits in an effort, to appear as rescuers. The
appeal of such a move would serve to pull Ben Bella very close to the Bloc,
for his regime would see no alternative for survival.
Africa_
36. Algeria's sense of revolutionary mission is most evident in Africa, where
Ben Bella sees his country as destined to play an important role in the struggle
to eliminate all manifestations of European control. In the past two years,
Algeria has sent modest amounts of arms to Angolan and Mozambican rebels
and has trained a few score of each in Algeria. More recently, growing African
resentment over Tshombe, notably his introduction of white mercenaries, pro-
vided additional opportunities for radical African leaders to whip up strident
African nationalism, and in this campaign Ben Bella has been in the forefront.
In association with Nkrumah and Nasser, as well as the Russians, Ben Bella
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/,F?IT
has thrown support, in the form of arms as well as propaganda, to the Congo
rebels. The Soviets have facilitated Ben Bella's shipping of arms by the prompt
provision of planes and aircrews to Algeria.
37. In the years ahead, Ben Bella will persist in his efforts in favor of revolution
in Africa, a course in which his voice will probably be one of the loudest. He will
also provide arms and similar assistance, though his ability to do this may some-
times be hampered by difficulties of access to thee disturbed areas. Moreover,
Ben Bella's participation in the revolutionary effort may provide cover for ship-
ments that Communist and other suppliers might not wish to acknowledge openly.
In the interest of maintaining his French connection, Ben Bella may restrict his
interventions in those former French territories where he might see danger of
stirring up French resentment.
Th::: US and the West
38. Ben Bella's compulsion to play a major role in support of revolutionary
activities, especially in Africa, will continue to make him a trial if not a danger
to the West. In Algeria itself, few Western nations, other than France, have
significant interests; the US investment, although amounting to about $100 million,
represents less than ten percent of foreign investment in the Algerian oil business.
On the other hand, Algerian support of the Congo rebellion conflicts directly
with US policies in Central Africa. This sort of action could greatly intensify
US difficulties if a rebel movement, in the Congo or elsewhere, backed by radical
Africans and by the Communist powers, should develop real staying power and
continue to wage a drawn-out guerrilla conflict against the central government.
39. In any event, US-Algerian relations are likely to be marked by growing
frictions in the next several years at least. Ben Bella's support of Cuba will be
a continuing irritant. Such good will as the US may enjoy with the Algerian
populace is unlikely to carry much weight with Ben Bella and his associates.
In the longer term, there is scope for US technology and know-how in getting
more of the modern sector of the Algerian economy back to work, but there is
little likelihood of this happening in presently foreseeable circumstances. In-
creases in US aid are not likely to modify Ben Bella's attitude toward the US;
substantial decreases, for whatever cause, would almost certainly be regarded
by him as retaliation for Algeria's actions in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere,
and would intensify US-Algerian frictions.
The Arab World
40. In the Arab world, Algeria's most immediate problem is its relationship
with Morocco, which is marked by a mutual personal antipathy between the two
chiefs of state, by differing systems of government, and by a dispute over the
location of several hundred miles of desert boundary. We expect a tense situa-
tion to persist for the foreseeable future, leading at times to charges and counter-
charges of an inflammatory sort and possibly minor border skirmishes, but prob-
ably stopping short of major efforts at subversion. The border issue has seen
14 ASFr
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*MU
a year of quiet, following the fighting in the fall of 1963. A committee of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) is investigating the problem, but probably
will come to no specific determination of where the border lies. As a direct
consequence of the border flare-up, there is some danger that an arms race will
develop between Rabat and Algiers, and that it will tend to result in the Soviets
being the Algerians' principal supporter and the US that of the Moroccans,
thus polarizing the Ben Bella-Hasan rivalry into an East-West conflict. We be-
lieve, however, that the chances are better than even that major hostilities will be
avoided.
41. Algeria will probably assert its solidarity with the rest of the Arab world,
make appropriate gestures on such issues as hostility to Israel, and avoid entangle-
ments. Algeria will probably play only a pro forma role in the United Arab
Command, for example. Relations with Tunisia are fairly good and seem likely
to stay so, although there is a potential source of friction over an undefined
stretch of border, especially as a new oil discovery has been made in the area.
Nasser and Ben Bella share many notions of government and foreign policy,
and each looks to the other for support in foreign affairs. They are likely to re-
main on good terms as long as they do not meddle in each other's internal affairs.
Algeria's relations with the rest of the Arab world are likely to be largely formal,
although Algiers will be disposed to agitate the pro-republican and anti-mon--
archical cause.
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