ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR AND CHINESE INTERVENTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01095A000800010001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 30, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE
AT THE OLV+ REAK OF T$E KOREAN V
AND
C$11sE IIERVENTION
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A F 30 April 1951
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SUBJECT: Statement on CIA's Position on Intelligence in the Far East
1. The Director will testify if necessary before an executive session
of the appropriate Congressional committee. He will point out that his
responsibility as Director of Central Intelligence did not commence until
1 October. At that time there was not any substantial evidence upon which
to judge an estimate that the Chinese Communists would intervene in the
Korean conflict, although there was evidence of Chinese trouble concentrating
north of the Yalu river,
indications showed increased Chinese activities with the result that on
20 October a memorandum was sent to the President and the Secretaries of
State and Defense indicating the possibility that the Chinese Communists
night intervene in the Korean conflict to protect the hydro-electric dams.
2. It can be stated that the relations between the CIA and the
Far Eastern command were not everything that could be desired at the time
General Smith assumed the Directorship of the agency. As soon as possible
thereafter, together with Mr. Allen Dulles, General Smith went to Tokyo to
confer with General MacArthur and General Willoughby. Thereafter the relations
with the Far Eastern command were excellent,
3. An estimate wq? made by the CIA of the feasibility of using
I The estimate came to the conclusion that
such use would be of questionable military value.
4. The official responsibility of the CIA is to the National
Security Council. Intelligence estimates and reports producCd by the CIA
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'w'and disseminated to the appropriate executive departments including the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is the responsibility of these departments to
service each of their foreign field stations. In addition, CIA representatives
overseas hand any material they may collect directly to the State Department
and any U.S. military commands. On the other hand, the CIA does depend on the
executive departments for keeping it informed of the problems of its field
representatives. and overseas commands.
5. No statement will be made concerning the organization or methods
used by the CIA. Public Law 253 authorizes the Director to protect his sources
of information.
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1. O.N.E. Excerpts from National Intelligence Estimates
relating to=e war in Korea. TAB A is a chronological list of
such estimates. -'
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3. F.B.I.D. Foreign Broadcast Information Division
reporting on 'the Korean war.
14.. F.D.D. Foreign Documents Division reporting on the
Korean War.
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SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET
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BY (S
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I APR 55 .V USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
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Copy No.j
25 April 1951
"EYES ALONE"
MEMORANDUM FOR
SUBJECT: Statement on Korean Intelligence
REFERENCE: Memorandum from the Executive Assistant to the
Director for the AD/PEE dated 23 April.
ENCLOSURES: 1. Briefing
2. Chronological List
1. The att~.ched briefing and chronological list of estimates
relating to the war in Korea is submitted pursuant to paragraph 3
of reference.
2. Your attention is particularly invited to the abstract
of the i"lemorandum of 17 August, "Factors Affecting the Desirability
of a UN Military Conquest ofs al Korea." Copies of this memorandum
were passed by the DCI to the NSC Staff.
3. If we can assist you further, let me know.
ecu ive ecre ary
National Estimates Board
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDA, ORE's
and
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
relating to the war in Korea
25 April 1951
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19 June 1950. ORE 18-50: Current Ca abilities of the Northern
Korean Regime.
(". . . contains information available to CIA as of 15 May 1950".)
The "Democratic people's Republic" of northern Korea is a
firmly controlled Soviet Satellite that exercises no independent
initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for
existence.
The major external aim of the North Korean regime is to ex-
tend control over South Korea, and it is capable of continuing
and increasing its support of the present program of propaganda,
infiltration, sabotage, subversion and guerrilla operations against
South Korea. The program will not be sufficient to accomplish the
main objective as long as US economic and military aid to South
Korea is not substantially reduced or seriously dissipated.
The capability of the North Korean armed forces for both
short- and long-term overt military operations is being further
developed. The northern and southern Korean forces are nearly
equal in terms of combat effectives, training, and leadership, but
the North Koreans possess a superiority in armor, heavy artillery,
and aircraft. Thus, even as presently constituted, North Korea's
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armed forces have a capability for attaining limited objectives
in short-term military operations against South Korea, including
the capture of Seoul.
North Korea's capability for long-term military operations
is dependent upon increased logistical support from the USSR.
If the foreign supporters of each faction were called upon for
increased assistance, there is no reason to believe that Soviet
support would be withheld, and considerations of proximity and
availability of such assistance would greatly favor the North
Korean regime. Soviet assistance to North Korea, however, would
probably not be in the form of direct participation of regular
Soviet or Chinese Communist military units, except as a last
resort.
Despite the apparent military superiority of northern over
southern Korea, it is not certain that the northern regime, lack-
ing the active participation of Soviet and Chinese Communist mili-
tary units, would be able to gain effective control over all of
southern Korea. The key factors which would hinder Communist
attempts to extend effective control under these circumstances are:
(1) the anti-Communist attitude of the southern Koreans; (2) a
continuing will to resist on the part of southern troops; (3) the
Communist regime's lack of popular support; and (4) the regime's
lack of trained administrators and technicians.
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Current Military Situation. Trained and equipped units
of the Communist "People's Army" are being deployed southward
in the area of the 38th Parallel. "People's Army" and Border
Constabulary units there equal or surpass the strength of
southern Korean army units similarly deployed. Tanks and heavy
artillery have also been moved close to the Parallel in recent
months.
Current estimates place the strength of the "People's
Army" (PA) at 66,000 men (including 16,000 ex-Manchurian troops)
organized into at least three infantry divisions and an indepen-
dent brigade. The PA's critical arms include: (1) an armored
unit, estimated to possess 65 Soviet T-3t tanks; (2) divisional
artillery units equipped with 76 mm guns and 122 mm howitzers;
and (3) anti-aircraft units in the border regions. The 20,500-man
Border Constabulary, which is also being expanded with ex-Manchurian
levies, is nominally a paramilitary force and was previously armed
with Japanese weapons. It has been trained to infantry standards,
however, and has now been re-equipped with Soviet weapons.
According to current accepted estimates the Air Force con-
sists of an air regiment of 1,500 men, including 150 pilots,
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equipped with 35 YAK-9 and/or IL-10 fighters. . . This estimate
may be subject to an upward revision in the near future. The
North Korean navy performs mainly as a coast guard force; its
strength is estimated at 5,100 men. There is a marine unit,
of undetermined function, numbering approximately 5,400.
Morale in the armed forces is generally good. At the pre-
sent time the North Korean armed forces are probably psychologi-
cally prepared to fight wholeheartedly against South Korean troops.
The northern Korean armed forces depend almost wholly on the
USSR for logistic support. They are entirely the product of
Soviet planning, and depend heavily on the large Soviet military
mission for training at higher command levels and for tactical
advice down to the battalion level.
28 June 1950 IM-300: The USSR and the Korean Invasion
Q
The invasion of South Korea was undoubtedly undertaken at
Soviet direction and Soviet material support is unquestionably
being provided. It is estimated that the USSR will seek to lo-
calize the Korean conflict. The USSR will probably provide
support to North Korea short of open participation by Soviet
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forces in an attempt to perpetuate the civil war and maintain
North Korean positions south of the 38th Parallel. In the pro-
bable event that this attempt proves impossible, the situation
might well develop into indecisive and intermittent hostilities
stabilized at approximately the 38th Parallel. Meanwhile, the
USSR will continue to provide substantial material aid to the
North Koreans, including irregulars recruited from Chinese
Communists and Soviet forces.
8 July 1950 IM-302: Consequences of the Korean Incident
0
There are at present four major alternative courses of action
open to the USSR in connection with the Korean conflict. They are:
A. To localize the Korean fighting, permitting US forces
to drive the North Koreans back to the 38th Parallel,
and to refrain from creating similar incidents else-
where. Meanwhile, to develop the propaganda themes
of US aggression and imperialistic interference in
domestic affairs of an Asiatic Nation.
B. To localize the Korean fighting, still refrain from
creating similar incidents elsewhere, but (in order to
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prolong US involvement in Korea) to give increasing
material aid to the North Koreans, and perhaps to
employ Chinese Communist troops, either covertly or
overtly. The USSR would remain uncommitted in
Korea, and would develop the propaganda themes as
in alternative A.
C. To attempt to disperse and perhaps overstrain US
military forces-in-readiness by creating a series
of incidents similar to the Korean affair in other
parts of the world. Meanwhile the fighting in Korea
would be prolonged as in alternative B.
D. Immediately to attack the US and its allies.
It is estimated that the USSR is most likely to adopt
alternative B. If conditions appear favorable to Soviet leaders,
after pursuing this course of action for a few weeks or months,
they may well shift to alternative C.
10 July 1950 IM-303: Soviet Capabilities with Respect to Japan
in the Light of US Commitment in Korea
The USSR has the military capability of mounting, transport-
ing and logistically supporting a.waterborne attack on Japan with
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ten to eleven divisions (11,000 men per division). There is
in the Far East a sufficient bomber force for large-scale
air attack on Japan. It is uncertain, however, whether the sur-
face vessels of the Soviet naval forces in the Far East can give
adequate naval support for an amphibious operation against Japan.
No effort is made in this paper to estimate Soviet intentions.
/'This paper contains a brief estimate of Soviet
military strength in the Far East.?
10 July 1950 IM-304: Effects of a Voluntary Withdrawal of US
Forces from Korea
Voluntary withdrawal of US forces from Korea would be a
calamity, showing US commitments to be unreliable when severely
tested, casting doubt on US military capabilities, handicapping
efforts to maintain US alliances and build political influence
among nations whose cooperation is needed for the containment of
Communism, and probably encouraging Soviet initiation of limited
wars in other areas.
2 August 1950 IM-311: Northern Korea's Dependence on Outside
Supplies
LR factual review of North Korea's import requirements, and
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of the pattern of foreign trade by which they are fulfilled.]
19 July 1950 CIA 7-50: Review of the World Situation
0
Apart from the immediate strategic advantages of Communist
control of all Korea, the primary aim of the USSR in instigating
the attack probably was to discredit the US policy of general
containment of Soviet-Communism. It amounts to a laboratory
test of the advantages the USSR might gain by fighting a war of
limited objectives and limited liabilities through the medium
of puppet troops.
The efficient military performance of the invading forces
in the first three weeks of battle indicates that there is
little probability that the North Koreans can be quickly driven
back to the 38th Parallel. The USSR can supply material aid in
sufficient quantities to prolong the fighting and deeply involve
the US in Korean military operations. Chinese Communist troops
can be brought into action covertly and, if necessary, openly.
The USSR might consider that the risk of provoking a global war
was not substantial so long as no Soviet forces were openly
committed.
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It is not yet clear whether the USSR will force the
Chinese Communists to give open military support to the Korean
operations or to start a new operation elsewhere in the area,
The Peiping regime almost certainly would comply with a Soviet
request for military action.
4 August 1950 IM-315: Possible Soviet Use of Japanese Prisoners
of War
Estimate that it is not likely that the USSR will attempt
to use the Japanese prisoners of war under its control for action
against Japan.
11 August 1950 flI-3l6: North Korean Unification Propaganda
CA report concerning the current North Korean propaganda
campaign for the unification of all Korea_7
17 August 1950 Memorandum: Factors Affecting the Desirability
of a Military Conquest of all of
Korea
Although an invasion of North Korea by UN forces could, if
successful, bring several important advantages to the US, it appears
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at present that grave risks would be involved in such a course
of action. (1) It is doubtful that US allies and other non-
Soviet nations in the UN would support such a course of action.
Asian nations, particularly India, would react unfavorably, and
many Asians might be convinced that the US is, after all, an
aggressive nation pursuing a policy of self-interest in Asia.
(2) The invading forces might become involved in hostilities
with the Chinese Communists. As it became apparent that the
North Koreans were being defeated in South Korea, the Chinese
might well take up defensive positions north of the 38th Parallel.
The USSR might use Chinese Communist troops at any stage in the
fighting, but their participation would be especially useful at
the 38th Parallel where UN members could legally discthntinue
their support of the US policy. (3) Inasmuch as the USSR would
regard the invasion of North Korea as a strategic threat to the
security of the Soviet Far East, the invading forces might be-
come involved, either directly or indirectly, in hostilities with
Soviet forces, under conditions which would alienate most of Asia
from the US-UN cause in Korea.
The conquest of North Korea would not provide assurance of
peace throughout the country or of true unification. Continued
threats of aggression from Manchuria or the USSR would produce
instability, requiring the continued presence of large numbers
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of US or UN forces. Syngman Rhee and his regime are unpopu-
lar among many -- if not a majority -- of non-Communist Koreans.
To establish his government throughout all Korea would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible; even if this could be done, the regime
would be so unstable as to require continuing US or UN mili-
tary and economic support. If a UN trusteeship were established
it would be unstable. Korea once more would become the cats-
paw of international politics, and its ultimate status would
be dependent upon the comparative strength and ambitions of the
countries whose representatives supervised the trust adminis-
tration.
8 September 1950 IM-324; Probability of Direct Chinese Com-
munist Intervention in Korea
It is estimated that the major elements of Lin Piao's
4th Field Army - totalling perhaps 100,000 combat veterans --
are now in Manchuria and are probably located along or adja-
cent to the Korean border, in position for rapid commitment
in Korea. Possibly 100,000 to 125,000 of the Military District
troops in Manchuria have now been integrated into the regular
Chinese Communist army and organized as combat forces. These
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units probably are Soviet equipped. Approximately 210,000
Communist regulars under Nieh Jung-chen's command are pre-
sently deployed in the North China area; some of these troops
have been reported en route to Manchuria,
military construction is in pro-
gress near Antung and along the Yalu River. Chinese Communist
aircraft are reported to have arrived at Antung.
It is evident that the Chinese Communists or the USSR
must supply trained and equipped combat replacements if the
North Korean invasion is to achieve complete control over
South Korea before the end of the year. It is clear that
intervention in Korea is well within immediate Chinese Communist
capabilities. Moreover, recent Chinese Communist accusations
regarding US "aggression" and "violation of the Manchurian
border" may be stage-setting for an imminent overt move.
In view of the momentous repercussions from such an overt
action, however, it appears more probable that the Chinese Com-
munist participation in the Korean conflict will be more
indirect, although significant, and will be limited to inte-
grating into the North Korean forces "Manchurian volunteers",
perhaps including air units as well as ground forces.
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15 September 1950 IM-326: Military Su lies for North
re
/A summary account of the supplies required by the
North Korean army, and of the routes by which that army is
re-supplied from the USSR.?
20 September 1950 CIA 9-50: Review of the World Situation
(based on information available to CIA on 15 September)
As a result of Communist seizure of control in China,
the USSR has available in the Peiping regime a disciplined
lieutenant capable of furthering the international Communist
program of eliminating Western influence and establishing in-
digenous Communist governments throughout the Far East.
The concentration of Chinese Communist troops near the
Korean border in Manchuria constitutes a powerful secondary re-
serve for the North Korean forces, which, if Moscow and Peiping
should agree on it despite the attendant risks, could enter the
battle and materially change its course at any time.
It is doubtful that either Soviet or Chinese Communist
forces will be committed south of the 38th Parallel. Moscow and
Peiping are much more likely to aid the'Communist cause in Korea
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by releasing large numbers of trained Chinese Communist
(Manchurian "volunteer") units, perhaps including small air
units, for incorporation in the North Korean forces.
12 October 1950 ORE 58-50: Critical Situations in the Far
East
set of six estimates prepared in response to a request
from the President. Of the six, the first two refer to
Korea.?
A. Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in
Korea.
The Chinese Communist ground forces, currently lack-
ing requisite air and naval support, are capable of intervening
effectively, but not necessarily decisively, in the Korean con-
flict. There are no convincing indications of an actual Chinese
Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in
Korea. After reviewing the factors favoring, and those oppos-
ing, Chinese Communist intervention, it is concluded that "while
full4scale Chinese Communist.intervention in Korea must be re-
garded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known
factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision
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for global war, such action is not probable in 1950. During
this period, intervention will probably be confined to con-
tinued covert assistance to the North Koreans."
B. Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea
Soviet armed forces now in the Far East are capable
of intervening overwhelmingly in Korea virtually without warn-
ing. The Soviet Union to date has given no indication that it
intends to intervene directly in Korea. However, the Soviet
Government for some months has been increasingly improving its
military capabilities in the Far East as well as in other stra-
tegic areas.
After weighing the factors favoring, and those opposing,
Soviet intervention: "It is believed that the Soviet leaders
will not consider that their prospective losses in Korea warrant
direct military intervention and a consequent grave risk of war.
They will intervene in the Korean hostilities only if they have
decided, not on the basis of the Korean situation alone, but on
the basis of over-all considerations, that it is to their in-
terest to precipitate a global war at this time."
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18 October 1950 CIA 10-50: Review of the World Situation
The Soviet Korean venture has ended in failure.
The Kremlin will probably aid the North Korean Communists
to hold organized defensive positions as long as possible and
then to harass UN forces by employing guerrilla warfare.
There are certainly enough Chinese Communist forces readi-
ly available in Manchuria to permit military intervention on
a scale sufficient to alter the course of events in Korea.
Forty to sixty thousand Chinese-trained Communist troops have
in fact already been fighting in the North Korean army. It is
becoming less and less likely, however, that Chinese Communist
troop units will openly enter the battle under the flag of the
Peiping regime. Unless the USSR is ready to precipitate global
war, or unless for some reason the Peiping leaders do not think
that war with the US would result from open intervention in Korea,
the odds are that Communist China, like the USSR, will not openly
intervene against the UN troops in North Korea,
6 November 1950 NIE-2: Chinese Communist Intervention in
Korea.
Present Chinese Communist troop strength in North Korea
is estimated at 30,000 to 40,000; in Manchuria it is estimated
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at 700,000 of which at least 200,000 are regular field forces.
These troop strengths, added to the forces already in Korea
are believed to make the Chinese Communists capable of: (a) halt-
ing further UN advance northward, through piecemeal commitment
of troops; or (b) forcing UN withdrawal to defensive positions
farther south by a powerful assault.
The objective of the Chinese Communist intervention appears
to be to halt the advance of UN troops in Korea and to keep a
Communist regime in being on Korean soil. The Chinese Communists
retain full freedom of action. If they should succeed in des-
troying the effective strength of UN forces in North Korea they
would pursue their advantage as far as possible. If the mili-
tary situation is stabilized they may well consider &at, with
advantageous terrain and the onset of winter, their forces now
in Korea are sufficient to prevent a military decision favorable
to the UN, at least until spring.
A likely and logical development of the present situation
is that the opposing sides will build up their combat power in
successive increments to checkmate the other until forces of
major magnitude are involved. At any point in this development
the danger is present that the situation may get out of control
and lead to a general war. The Chinese Communists appreciate
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that they have incurred grave risks of retaliation. They would
probably ignore a UN ultimatum requiring their withdrawal. If
Chinese territory were to be attacked, they could and probably
would enter Korea in full force, with the purpose of expelling
UN forces altogether.
15 November 1950 NIE-3: Soviet Capabilities and Intentions
"With respect to the Korean situation, to date there is
insufficient evidence to indicate that the USSR intends to
commit Soviet forces overtly in Korea. However, the commitment
of Chinese Communist forces, with Soviet material aid, indicates
that the USSR considers the Korean situation of sufficient im-
portance to warrant the risk of general war. . . The probability
is that the Soviet Government has not yet made a decision directly
to launch a general war over the Korean-Chinese situation.
There is a good chance that they will not in the immediate
future take such a decision."
15 November 1950 CIA 11-50: Review of the World Situation
The intervention of Chinese Communist troops in Korea demon-
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strates that the USSR is willing to pursue the experiment in
war-by-proxy despite a considerable risk of vastly enlarging
the area of armed conflict.
By not formally announcing the objectives of their inter-
vention, the Chinese Communists have retained full freedom of
action with respect to Korea, and, depending upon UN and US
reaction, can tailor the precise nature and extent of their
intervention to developments.
24 November 1950 NIE-2/l: Chinese Communist Intervention in
Korea
The Chinese Communists will simultaneously:
a. Maintain Chinese-North Korean holding operations
in North Korea.
b. Maintain or increase their military strength in
Manchuria.
c. Seek to obtain UN withdrawal from Korea by in-
timidation and diplomatic means.
In case of failure to obtain UN withdrawal by these means,
there will be increasing Chinese intervention in Korea. At a
minimum, the Chinese will conduct, on an increasing scale,
unacknowledged operations designed to immobilize UN forces in
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Korea, to subject them to prolonged attrition, and to maintain
the semblance of a Worth Korean state in being, Available evi-
dence is not conclusive as to whether or not the Chinese
Communists are as yet committed to a full-scale offensive
effort. Eventually they may undertake operations designed to
bring about the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea. It is esti-
mated that they do not have the military capability of driving
the UN forces from the peninsula, but that they do have the capa-
bility of forcing them to withdraw to defensive positions for
prolonged and inconclusive operations, which, the Communists
might calculate, would lead to eventual UN withdrawal from Korea.
The USSR will continue to support the Chinese Communists
as long as their intervention continues.
The risk that a general war will develop already exists.
27 November 1950 NIE-2/2: Soviet Participation in the Air
Dense of Manchuria
In the event of UN air attack on targets in Manchuria, the
USSR would provide aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, and trained
personnel as necessary for the defense of Manchurian targets.
At least initially, the most likely form of Soviet participation
in the defense a Manchurian targets would be actual participation
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without identification. The open participation of Soviet
units would be unlikely unless general war should develop.
UN air attacks on Manchuria, alone, probably would not cause
the Soviet rulers to decide to launch a general war.
5 December 1950 NIE-11; Soviet Intentions in the Current
Situation
Developments in Korea and Manchuria indicate that the pur-
pose of the Chinese Communist intervention is to render the UN
position in Korea untenable. The Chinese Communists have accpted
the risk of general war with the US; it is highly improbable that
they would have done so without explicit assurance of effective
Soviet support.
The Soviet Union will probably (1) continue to support the
Chinese operations in Korea with materiel, technical personnel,
and even ttvolunteer" units, as necessary; (2) provide aircraft
and anti-aircraft artillery with trained personnel, as necessary
for the defense of targets in China against UN air attack; (3)
come openly to the support of Communist China under the terms of
the Sino-Soviet Treaty, in the event of major US (UN) operations
against Chinese territory.
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The Soviet rulers must have felt ready to accept the in-
creased risk of global war involved in the Chinese Communist
intervention in Korea. They roust estimate that a broadening
of the Korean war into a general war between the United States
and China would be advantageous to the USSR. Whether or not a
global war were to ensue, the USSR could reasonably hope to de-
rive advantages from the development of a general war between
the United States and Communist China.
11 December 1950 NIE-15: Probable Soviet Moves to Exploit the
Present Situation
"It can be anticipated that irrespective of any Western
moves looking toward negotiation, assuming virtual. Western
surrender is not involved, the Kremlin plans a continuation of
Chinese Communist pressure in Korea until the military defeat of
the UN is complete. A determined and successful stand by UN
forces in Korea would, of course, require a Soviet re-estimate of
the situation."
27 December 1950 NIE-12; Conse ences of the Earl Employment
of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea
LThis report weighs the various factors involved in
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immediately using Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea, and
concludes that the reasons against such use outweigh those
in its favor. The Director of Intelligence, USAF, publishes
a dissent.]
11 January 1951 SE-1: International Implications of Maintain-
ing a Beachhead in South ores
this paper estimates and enumerates the advantages and
disadvantages of holding a UN beachhead in South Korea.]
17 January 1951 NIE-10: Communist China
A general paper on Communist China, with the following re-
marks relevant to the Korean situation:
"The scale of the Chinese Communist operations in Korea
and the unwillingness of the Chinese Communists to dis-
cuss a diplomatic settlement except on their on terms
indicate that they intend to drive UN forces out of Korea;
they have already committed a large proportion of their
best troops for this purpose, and are prepared to commit
additional forces."
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"The continued maintenance of UN military opera-
tions in Korea would result in a significant drain
on the Chinese Communists, would pin down a large
portion of their crack troops and reduce their war-
making capabilities elsewhere. . .t-
24
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8 July 1950
10 July 1950
10 July 1950
19 July 1950
2 August 1950
4 August 1950
11 August 1950
17 August 1950
8 September 1950
L4 September 1950
15 September 1950
20 September 1950
ORE 18-50: Current Capabilities of the
Northern Korean Regime
IM-300: The USSR and the Korean Invasion
Il''I 302: / Consequences of the Korean
Incident
D-1-303: Soviet Capabilities with Respect
to Japan in the Light of US
Commitment in Korea
D-1-304: Effects of a Voluntary With-
drawal of US Forces from Korea
CIA 7-50: Review of the World Situation
E?-311:
D,1-315:
11-316:
IN]?10-
RANDtTiyI :
Northern Korea's De endance on
Outside Supplies I
0
Possible Soviet Use of Japanese
Prisoners of War M
sck-p_t 4 cc handed by DCI to
NSC Staff)
North Korean Unification Propa-
anda
'Factors Affecting the Desirability
of a UN Military Conquest of all of
111-324: Probability of Direct Chinese
Communist Intervention in Korea
ORE-45-50: Estimate Possible Soviet Courses of
(Cancelled) Action in Korea in the Face of an
Approaching Military Stalemat2e
11-326: Military Supplies for North Korea
CIA 9-50: Review of the World Situation
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ORE 58-50: Critical Situations in the Far
East Prepared for the 25X1
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18 October 1950
CIA 10-50: Review of the World Situation.
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/
NIE-2: Chinese Communist Intervention in
.
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NIE-3: Soviet Capabilities and Intentions
15 November 1950
CIA 11-50: Review of the World Situation
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NIE-2/1: Chinese Communist Intervention in
Korea 25X1
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v
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Defense of Manchuria
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Situation I 25X1
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the Present Situation 25X1
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v
NIE-12: Consequences of the Early Employment
of Chinese Nationalist Forces in
Korea
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SE-l: International Inplicationsof
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v
NIE-10: Communist China
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FBI]) REPORTING ON THE KOREAN WAR
FBI]) reported:
3 August, USSR Survey
10 August, USSR Survey
In late July -there was a revival of pre-
Korean war charges that the U.S. harbored
hostile intentions toward all of Asia.
Moscow emphatically claims that American
intervention in Korea constitutes aggression
since the hostilities are a "civil war."
17 August, USSR Survey Peking does not exploit the 'civil war argument."
31 August, USSR Survey There is a declining volume of attention to
the Korean war but increasing attention to
America's aggressive intentions -toward all of
Asia. Moscow insists that the Korean War is
but a stepping stone to further aggression
while Peking notes that America wants to
widen the sphere of aggression.
g September, USSR Survey American efforts to keep China out of the
Korean war are ignored by both Pekin, and
Mdoscow. The 27 August raid on Antung; is said
to be a premeditated, provocative act.
14 September, USSR Survey The shooting down of the Soviet plane receives
only moderate propaganda treatment but there
are continuing and frequent hints concerning
the American intention to enlarge the sphere
of aggression to include all the people of
Asia.
21 September, USSR Survey There is little attention to U.N. consideration
of Peking's charges of American aggression
against China and there is continuing and
concentrated denunciation of American aggression
from Peking. Moscow reiterates that the U.S.
is starting a third world war in Korea.
10 October, Special Report Radio Moscow has been unwilling at any time to
on Soviet commit its propaganda to a North Korean victory.
broadcasts on It has not predicted a Korean victory in specific
the war terms or -talked about Korean strength in a way
which would involve a serious loss of face or
a committment of Soviet material support.
18 October, USSR Survey Chou En-lai's bitter rejection of American
aggression and his claim that China will not
"supinely tolerate" such aggression is publi-
cized without any indication from either Peking
or Moscow of what steps will be -taken.
a
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23 October, Special Report PRAVDA ignores President Truman's appeal to the
for the Chinese people and Peking speaks of "euphem-
President isms" about American friendship for China.
1 November, USSR Survey
Moscow continues to document charges that
America is the "worst enemy" of the Chinese
people.
8 November, Far East Survey In the week 31 October to 6 November Chinese
broadcasts increase their denunciations of
American aggression in a ratio of five to one.
There is an unprecedented attempt to convince
the Chinese people that "the blood debt" to
Korea must be paid and that the U.S. can be
defeated.
15 November, USSR Survey
Moscow justifies Chinese participation by
elaborating on the closeness to China's borders
of America's aggressive actions and by dwelling
on -the charge that U.S. aggression in Korea is
really directed at China.
22 November, Trends and Moscow avoids military events and gives little
Highlights attention to the Chinese delegation at the U.N.
It does not commit itself or that delegation to
any particular course of action nor indicate that
there is a threat of general war.
6 December, Trends and PRAVDA's exploitation of President Truman's
Highlights threat to China and general attacks on American
aggression in Korea bring attention to the war
to a record breaking 51 percent of all comment.
7 December, Far East Survey Peking gives little heed to President Truman's
"saber rattling" statement of 30 November and
continues its attacks on American aggression.
There is no departure from the claim that only
volunteers are fighting in Korea.
14 December, USSR Survey Moscow ignores the possibility of a negotiated
settlement and continues to talk of expanded
American aggression.
20 December, Trends and U.N. mediation efforts are ignored and atrocity
Highlights propaganda is emphasized in Soviet broadcasts.
21 December, Far East Survey Peking says mediation efforts are an American
directed maneuver and widely publicizes Delegate
Wu's denunciation of American hostility.
5 January, Far East Survey Peking continues to endorse Chou En-lai's re-
jection of U.N. negotiation efforts. There is
no attempt to exploit a victory situation.
11 January, USSR Survey Moscow vehemently rejects the U.N. resolution
branding China an aggressor and contrasts U.S.
hostility toward China with Soviet friendliness.
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8 February, USSR Survey Chou's caustic rejection of the U.N. resolution
is hailed but PRAVDA is less categoric in its
rejection.
14 February, Trends and U.N. negotiation efforts continue to be ignored.
Highlights
21 February, USSR Survey The Sino-Soviet treaty is commemorated in
elaborations on its economic and political
significance. Moscow goes to great lengths to
identify the U.S. as the enemy of China.
21 February, USSR Survey Despite the large volume of broadcast time de-
voted to underscoring Stalin's interview there
is little stress on his temperately-worded
references to American fighting ability and the
references to a settlement in Korea are not
mentioned. Moscow continues to charge the U.S.
with slandering China and to ignore the
mediation committees.
28 February, Trends and Two indicators of possible Sino-Korean tension
Highlights appear in Moscow broadcasts for the first time
since November; Pyongyang also suggests such
tension in stressing the cordiality of Sino-
Korean relations.
7 March, Trends and Highlights Moscow's attention veers away from military
events but the certainty of a Korean victory is
reiterated.
8 March, USSR Survey Moscow's attention to the Korean war continues
to be low in volume and defensive in tone.
Soviet broadcasts make conventional references to
the ultimate victory of the Korean cause but do
not elaborate on the predictions.
14 March, Trends and Highlights Moscow gives minimal attention to the military
situation and ignores the possibility of a
negotiated settlement.
15 March, Far East Survey Peking overlooks the actual hostilities and
attempts instead to make propaganda capital out
of Stalin's declaration concerning a settlement.
American atrocities are highlighted.
22 March, USSR Survey There is marked attention to Soviet-Korean friend-
ship in its economic and cultural manifestations
and to the propriety of the USSR's support of the
Korean cause; but there is no attempt to commit
the Soviet Union to any specific course of action.
American hostility toward the CPR continues to
be documented.
28 March, Trends and Highlights General MacArthur's 23 March bid for a field truce
is ignored. Moscow's continued declarations that
the Korean cause will be victorious remain de-
tached and there is no committment to concrete
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29 March, Far East Survey Peking makes a definite attempt to establish
the high degree of fraternal love, unity, and
mutual assistancel' between the Chinese and
Korean fighters.
4 April, Trends and Highlights Moscow ignores the question of a field truce or
a negotiated settlement and makes frequent
reference to Stalin's pronouncement that the West
must accept Peking's terms.
5 April, USSR Survey Moscow ignores the military situation, claiming
that American military strength is a myth, and
concentrates on convincing the Koreans that
their cause is receiving wide support. But it
scrupulously avoids the question of more than
spiritual support from the USSR.
19 April, USSR Survey Moscow's current concentration on American
responsibility for the war seems intended to
capitalize on the reportedly growing American
opposition to the war. The theme has recurred
throughout the nine months of the war but now
receives marked publicity. Moscow continues to
remind the Koreans that other countries are
also engaged in liberating themselves from
capitalist exploitation.
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THE COOYflvLANDING GENERAL
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 925
19 August 1950
SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation
THR(J
TO
1. Your action in conjunction with the Far East Air Forces
Intelligence Team operating in Korea during the period 30 June -
18 July 1950, have been brought to my attention.
2. Your ingenuity and tireless effort in the collection
and transmission of intelligence vital to the Far East Air Forces,
was a contributing factor which enabled the Far East Air Forces to
intelligently plan and execute devastating air strikes against the
enemy.
3. On several occasions you carried out extensive reconnai-
ssance missions with utter disregard for your own personal safety.
These missions resulted in the clarification of friendly troop dis-
positions and in locating enemy positions that soon became the targets
of air attack.
4. The excellent cooperation and team work that existed be-
tween your group and the Far East Air Force group enabled the ac-
complishment of a mission well done, and was made possible, to a
large extent, through your efforts.
5. In view of the above achievements, I would like to take
this opportunity to commend you for your splendid performance.
Your actions stand as a tribute to our country and a credit to
your service.
C
0
P
Y
GEORGE E. S TRAMEY R
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force
Commanding
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TFIE COMMANDING GENERAL
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 925
19 August 1950
SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation
THRU
TO
1. Your commendable actions in conjunction with the Far
East Air Forces Intelligence Team in Korea during the period
29 June - 18 July 1950 has been brought to my attention.
2. The skillful application of your knowledge of radio
plus your tireless effort, often requiring that you work, round
the clock, enabled the team to make available to Far East Air
Forces a large volume of information amounting to as much as
9000 groups per 2b. hour period. This information had a very
direct bearing upon Far East Air Forces air operations during
the first two weeks of the conflict.
3. In spite of enemy activity that required that your
station be moved several times under conditions of extreme dif-
ficulty, and required that you destroy most of your equipment,
you succeeded in maintaining radio contact with the outside when
all others failed. For a period of several weeks you were the
only secure means of communication. This was accomplished largely
through the efforts of yourself and one other man. A great res-
ponsibility was placed upon your shoulders, and you rose nobly
to the occasion.
). In view of the above achievements, I would like to take
this opportunity to commend your actions. Your actions are a
tribute to our country and a credit to your service.
GEORGE E. STRATEAEYER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Forces
Commanding
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THE CO. stANDING GENERAL
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 925
19 August 1950
THRU :
TO :
1. Your commendable actions in conjunction with the Far East
Air Forces Intelligence Team in Korea during the period 29 June -
18 July 1950 has been brought to my attention.
2. The skillful application of your knowledge of radio
plus your tireless effort, often requiring that you work round
the clock, enabled the team to make available to Far East Air
Forces a large volume of information amounting to as much as
9000 groups per 2L. hour period. This information had a very
direct bearing upon Far East Air Forces air operations during
the first two weeks of the conflict.
3. In spite of enemy activity that required that your
station be moved several times under conditions of extreme dif-
ficulty, and required that you destroy most of your equipment,
you succeeded in maintaining radio contact with the outside when
all others failed. For a period of several weeks you were the
only secure means of communication. This was accomplished largely
through the efforts of yourself and one other man. A great res-
ponsibility was placed upon your shoulders, and you rose nobly to
the occasion.
Ii.. In view of the above achievements, I would like to take
this opportunity to commend your actions. Your actions are a
tribute to our country and a credit to your service.
GEORGE E. STRAMYER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Forces
Commanding
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THE C(IDJANDING GENERAL
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 925
19 August 1950
SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation
THRU
TO
1. Your commendable actions in conjunction with the Far East
Air Forces Intelligence Team in Korea during the period 29 June -
18 July 1950 has been brought to my attention.
2. Your ingenuity and tireless effort in the collection,
organization and transmission of intelligence vital to the Far East
Air Forces was a contributing factor which enabled Far East Air
Forces to intelligently plan and execute devastating air strikes
against the enemy.
3. The fact that you often worked around the clock to the
detriment of your own health and well being, eventually resulting
in your collapse from sheer exhaustion, is an act of devotion of
the highest order.
Lj. The excellent cooperation and team work that existed
between your group and the Far East Air Forces group enabled the
accomplishment of a mission well done, and was made possible to
a large extent through your efforts.
5. In view of the above achievements, I would like to take
this opportunity to commend you for your splendid performances.
Your actions stand as a tribute to our country and a credit to
your service.
GEORGE E. STRAT yJ R
Lieutenant General, U, S. Air Forces
Commanding
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