GREECE UNDER IOANNIDIS:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A001100080004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 18, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Greece Under Ioannidis:
Implications for US-Greek Relations
Secret
18 April 1974
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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April 18, 1974
INTERAGENCY MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Greece Under Ioannidis: Implications for US-Greek
Relations*
Page
MAJOR JUDGMENTS ....................................... 1
I. PROSPECTS FOR THE REGIME ........................
3
Civil ian Sentiment... ........................
3
Factionalism in the Military ...................
.
4
What Kind of Successors? .......................
.
6
Cyprus and Turkey ..............................
.
7
Relations with the US ..........................
.
8
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of
National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe,
the
It
was
principally drafted by CIA with the participation of repre-
sentatives of DIA, INR, and the intelligence components of
the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
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SUBJECT: Greece Under Ioannidis: Implications for US-Greek
Relations
The Ioannidis regime has not attracted support outside
the military establishment and has not shown decisive or
talented leadership. Nonetheless, it can withstand chal-
lenges from civilian politicians, youth, and labor as long
as it retains the loyalty of the military.
Although Ioannidis has a far-flung network of informers
and. the support of strategically placed junior and middle-
grade officers, his position is not secure. Even among his
own backers there are alternative leaders, such as Armed
Forces Chief Bonanos. Some followers of deposed President
Papadopoulos remain; there is also a hard core of tough
nationalists who would like Greece to adopt a more inde-
pendent posture toward the US and NATO. And the silent
majority of the armed forces would probably favor military
disengagement from politics.
Yet all military factions are united in rejecting re-
turn to an entirely free political scene. And if the Ioannidis
regime were ousted -- something that could happen soon, but
might not come for a few years -- it would probably be re-
placed by another group of military officers.
Some factions might allow civilians more latitude than
others would. Some senior officers might be inclined to turn
to former Prime MinisterKaramanlis, who would not return unless
given a free hand -- something that would be difficult for
the military to accord. Hard line younger officers would
probably dispense with even a facade of civilian rule.
The Ioannidis regime is more adventurous than its prede-
cessor in regard to Cyprus and Turkey, and is more narrowly
nationalistic in dealing with the US. The mixture of these
elements poses even more problems for the US than were raised_
by the Papadopoulos regime.
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While the present government views cooperation with the
US as the base of its foreign policy, it will not shift do-
mestic: policies to repair what it considers unsatisfactory
relations with Washington. Moreover, Athens, in its quest
to extract more aid, is likely to become even stickier in
dealings in regard to US facilities in Greece. It may seek
to renegotiate the broad range of security arrangements to
gain greater control of US military activities as well.
Continuing routine dealings by the US with the Greek
Government alienates critics of the regime without fully
satisfying,Ioannidis. While civilian politicians would prefer
the US to distance itself from the military rulers, a
Karamanlis regime would not be likely to display dissatis-
faction over past US policies by severing major ties with
Washington. There is some risk that a more representative
regime would feel under popular pressure to retaliate against
the US, but any likely successor would be very reluctant
to destroy this connection.
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I. PROSPECTS FOR THE REGIME
1. Since it took power in November 1973, the clique of
military officers led by strongman Ioannidis and its puppet
government in Greece have not managed to attract support out-
side of the military establishment. Those political forces
that hoped that the ouster of Papadopoulos would speed the
return to parliamentary government were rapidly disappointed.
Military force remains the only important prop of the govern-
ment. And sharply deteriorating economic conditions -- run-
away inflation -- and the absence of decisive leadership are
further eroding the position of the rulers. From the begin-
ning they have been unable to attract qualified administrative
talent, and there is increasing factionalism and politiciza-
tion in the army.
Civilian Sentiment
2. Figures from the pre-Papadopoulos days have shown
little disposition to risk the consequences of speaking out
against the regime. Though disenchanted with the current gov-
ernment, they do not seem to have attempted to organize op-
position to it. None of the prominent personalities of the
old political scene is likely to emerge as a center of re-
sistance to the present rulers. Ex-Prime Minister Constantine
Karamanlis remains the choice of many within Greece as an
alternative to the military regime, but perhaps because he
feels the military rulers may turn to him for help, he has
yet publicly to attack the regime from his self-imposed exile
in Paris.
3. Youth and workers have the potential to challenge the
regime -- but it's still only a potential. Their open agita-
tion played a significant part in Papadopoulos' downfall.
Yet thus far they have made only half-hearted efforts to chal-
lenge the new government and seem cowed by its no-nonsense
approach to,law and order. Government determination to act
decisively against dissidence was illustrated by the recent
arrest of some 45 members of the outlawed Communist party ac-
cused of publishing pamphlets urging youth to boycott classes.
4. For the students to rally significant overt support
from labor and other elements of society would require either
(a) signs of weakness or indecisiveness on the part of the
government in acting against dissidence, or (b) an issue,
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such as overt army or police brutality, which would bring the
people out in the street. Public outrage over such incidents
during the riots last November has cooled somewhat, but could
be rekindled by another violent confrontation. Also, economic
distress is clearly working in the dissidents' favor as it did
in November. And students and labor would enjoy popular
sympathy, if not overt support, should they again openly defy
the government.
5. No combination of civilian forces, however, could
topple the regime without the support of important elements
in the military. The growing number of civilian dissidents
recognizes this fact. Yet action by students and workers
could have reverberations within the military establishment.
If the government failed to cope satisfactorily with this
challenge, factions within the military could be provoked
to move against Ioannidis.
Factionalism in the Military
6. The officer corps is not solidly united in its
loyalty to Ioannidis. Through his control of the military
police and security forces, Ioannidis has a far-flung network
of informers which makes it hard to catch him unawares. He
has thus far maintained himself behind the scenes, where he
has the greater flexibility in dealing with opposition. Yet
it is clear that Ioannidis' performance has not satisfied all
segments of the officer corps. Already some officers are
voicing their dissatisfaction to the tentative, ad hoc approach
to policies that has characterized his puppet government.
7. Though the situation has not yet jelled and our evi-
dence remains scanty, it is possible to identify various long-
existing factional tendencies among the officers:
a. A group presently loyal to Ioannidis. These
officers themselves are not completely unified in view
and include other possible leaders, such as Armed
Forces Chief Bonanos, who might eventually make their
own bid for power. This group is united in distrust
of democratic processes and is intensely and narrowly
nationalistic. It wants the army to hold power indefi-
nitely, because it fears that any form of democratic
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government would lead to political turmoil and eventual
Communist takeover. It is the best organized of all
military groups and is supported by the entire mili-
tary police organization as well as some strategically
placed junior and middle-grade officers in all the
services. These officers are determined to purge
pro-Papadopoulos elements from the army and punish
those involved in corruption under the previous gov-
ernment. It was pressure from within this group that
overcame Ioannidis' reluctance to move against offi-
cials involved in corruption under the Papadopoulos
government. And similar pressure would tend to inhibit
Ioannidis from giving in to popular demands to liberalize
the regime.
b. Other proponents of continued military rule.
While differing little with Ioannidis in their views of
the proper military role, there are other more or less
amorphous groupings which aspire to power. The purges
undertaken by Ioannidis have not removed all the former
supporters of Papadopoulos. It is hard to tell how many
would fall in this category, but, though the most promi-
nent and dangerous of these were removed in the November
coup, Ioannidis still believes they pose a significant
threat to his regime. Another fringe group of younger
officers is commonly referred to as the "Qadhafiites."
They are a hard core of tough nationalists who would
like to see Greece adopt a more independent posture
toward the US and NATO, particularly in negotiations
for use of facilities. But most of them supported
Ioannidis in November because they believed he would
impose a more nationalistic regime.
c. Moderates, who comprise the silent majority of
the officer corps. They are distressed by the politi-
cization of the military establishment and favor the
armed forces' disengagement from politics. At the same
time, they fear that return to an entirely free political
scene would lead to political anarchy. They would thus
support a restricted form of political freedom to prevent
the type of political free-for-all which preceded the
army takeover in 1967. Many of the professional younger
officers sympathize with these views and would prefer
to stick to military duties without becoming involved
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in political activity. A number of senior officers
are also in this category. This group is directly
influenced by family and friends outside the mili-
tary who are disenchanted with the regime.
8. Ioannidis has launched a program ranging from purges
to pep rallies to counter dissidence within the army. He has
taken care to place his own supporters in key military posts.
Continuing purges of the military establishment are dangerous,
however, and even newly rewarded generals may switch sides if
they feel threatened.
What Kind of Successors?
9. For the present, Ioannidis and his supporters hold
sway. But theirs is an uneasy rule. As grievances accumulate,
the government will become increasingly vulnerable to another
military coup by those who are either impatient with the re-
gime's lack of progress or fearful that they will be purged
because of real or imagined anti-government plotting on their
part.
10. It is not yet possible to set a timetable for this
development nor to specify what group of officers would emerge
in control. Some US observers believe that the regime's lack
of talent, public hostility, and military factionalism will
lead to Ioannidis' downfall rather soon; they would be surprised
if he lasted much more than a year. Others, stressing his
ability to cow opposition, give him a fair chance to survive
somewhat longer. But most agree that the present regime is
unlikely to remain as long as the six-year term that Papadopoulos
enjoyed. And when it goes, it is most likely to be replaced
by a new clique of military conspirators, similarly adept
at plotting but unskilled in administration. There could even
be a succession of military coups.
11. Yet while any military successors would probably be
unwilling to allow civilian politicians to run the whole show,
some military factions might allow civilians more latitude
than others would. For example, the senior officers from
the "silent majority" might be inclined to delegate greater
responsibility to civilian government. To form such a govern-
ment they might seek younger civilians not tainted by involve-
ment in the older political scene, or turn to former Prime
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Minister Karamanlis. But Karamanlis would not return without
guarantees of a free hand in governing -- something that would
be difficult for the military to accord him. Even the moderate
officers would no doubt be prepared to intervene if the civilians
threatened the military's autonomy or appeared to be failing
to provide stable and effective government. The hard line
younger military, on the other hand, would probably dispense
with even a facade of civilian rule and would talk more of a
lengthy process of basic social reform as necessary before
permitting any movement toward return of parliamentary gov-
ernment.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US
12. The Ioannidis regime has yet to develop its own
distinctive and well-articulated foreign policy: it is
continuing along the general lines followed by Papadopoulos.
The officers who control the government are strongly committed
to the West and are intensely anti-Communist in outlook. At
the same time, they are even more nationalistic and parochial
in their views than their predecessors. They are more ad-
venturous than Papadopoulos in their approach to the Cyprus
problem and worried about a military confrontation with Turkey.
The mixture of these elements poses even more problems for
the US than were raised by the Papadopoulos regime.
Cyprus and Turkey
13. Like many Greek officers who have served on Cyprus,
Ioannidis has a special interest in the island's fate. But
his interest is combined with deep distrust of Makarios and
an exaggerated view of the Communist threat on Cyprus. The
danger that Greece. will increase its activity in Cyprus is
probably not imminent because Ioannidis seems now to be de-
voting his primary energy to consolidating his position
internally in the Greek army. If he succeeds in this effort,
however, he might at some stage try to unseat Makarios. Such
a move would introduce great strains into Greek relations with
Turkey and would face the United States with the difficult task
of dampening conflict between NATO allies.
14. At least as ominous for the US is Ioannidis'
approach to relations with Turkey. The Greeks and Turks have
long had differences about the territorial waters of the
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Aegean. The recent discovery of oil in an undisputedly
Greek area off the island of Thassos, indicating that the
Aegean may overlay rich deposits, has made this dispute more
potentially explosive. The Greeks and Turks are in dispute
over claims to the right to drill elsewhere in offshore areas
in the Aegean. Thus far the Ioannidis regime has been unwilling
to negotiate with the Turks over this thorny issue on the
grounds that even to agree to talks would compromise the Greek
position on the disputed area. Ioannidis' inflexibility on
this point may stem partially also from a calculation that
confrontation with Turkey would help solidify his internal
military support as well as distract popular discontent with
his government. The Greek military has begun to take certain
precautionary measures for possible conflict with Turkey. While
the Turkish government has sought to dampen tensions, already
a cycle of action and reaction seems underway which eventually
could embroil Greece and Turkey in confrontation.
15. Like its predecessor, the Ioannidis regime views co-
operative relations with the US as the base of its foreign
policy. Moreover, the reservoir of pro-US sentiment among the
ruling military circles appears stronger and more pervasive than
any minority tendency that would wish to loosen these ties. At
the same time, the government is unwilling to shift domestic
policies to repair what it considers the unsatisfactory present
state of relations with the US. While the Greek rulers would
like US endorsement of their regime and open-handed assistance,
they do not expect Washington to be that forthcoming. What they
fear particularly is difficulty in acquiring the weapons they
believe they need to modernize their armed forces to cope with
"local war situations." And they are sensitive to overt signs
of US displeasure with their regime. They will especially watch
to see how the US treats them now that both sides have had some
months to assess the November coup.
16. In this context, the new rulers are currently reviewing
the conditions under which military facilities are made avail-
able to the US. They regard US facilities in Greece to be worth
more in terms of aid than the US is presently providing under
Foreign Military Sales, and they are more avid than their prede-
cessors in desiring the US to up the ante. For example, they
are raising difficulties and causing delays in present negotia-
tions over the use of facilities at Souda Bay. Thus far, they
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are still feeling their way along, and are unsure how much the
traffic will bear. The Greeks are considering turning to
other Western arms suppliers if the US will not allow them
to purchase the quantities they believe they require.
17. There has also been a growing ambivalence toward the
US among the Greek civilian body politic. On the one hand,
underlying pro-US sentiment still remains strong among the
public as well as one can judge. The emotional and family ties
binding Greeks in general to the US are too profound to be
sundered by surface disagreements. On the other hand, be-
cause the US is widely regarded as the moving force behind
this -- and any other -- regime in Greece, there is a well
of popular suspicion of US motives that can be exploited to
promote anti-Americanism if the opportunity arises. And popular
resentment of the US seems sure to grow. This could impel the
regime to become even stickier in its dealings with the US.
18. Dealing at a routine level with the Greek regime
and avoiding identification with it as far as possible can
create a growing irritation in relations. But it does not
threaten an abrupt crisis. Pained as the present rulers may
be with the lack of US enthusiasm for their regime, they seem
ready to accept this posture with resignation. They recog-
nize that the US urged Papadopoulos to restore parliamentary
rule and they would impute no special motives to continuation
of this pressure on them as well. Yet they will remain resis-
tant to liberalizing the political system to satisfy their
foreign allies.
19. Even with deferral of the second phase of the home-
porting agreement, Ioannidis and his colleagues may seek to
renegotiate the broad range of mutual security arrangements
between the two countries. The Greek military, which would
dictate the Greek stance on these matters, views American fa-
cilities as hostage to extract concessions on the acquisition
of American military equipment. Though the Greeks will base
their appeal for weapons on NATO force requirements, the under-
lying aim would be to acquire the capability to handle potential
hostilities with Turkey and Bulgaria and also to meet the ex-
pectations of the Greek officer corps. Ioannidis probably
sees his ability to secure weapons from the US or elsewhere as
critical to his own survival.
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20. In addition to assurance that the US would supply
modern weapons in some quantities, the Greeks will press
for changes to give them greater control of US military activities
and to limit the privileges and immunities of American personnel
in Greece. We regard this as essentially a bargaining ploy, but
it may nonetheless lead to significant alteration of the US
position in Greece. During the October war, the Papadopoulos
regime, while adopting a policy publicly at variance with that
of the US, was nonetheless covertly helpful in various ways.
For example, it provided useful data on Soviet resupply flights
and allowed more extensive use of US facilities in Greece than
is provided by bilateral agreements. In the future, we could
not expect this type of cooperation from the Ioannidis regime,
unless the US were prepared to be more forthcoming in a variety
of military matters.
21. US willingness to continue to deal with the military
rulers would not be popular with civilian politicians within
Greece. In the unlikely event that Andreas Papandreou (or
some one of his political stripe) were to return to head a new
Greek regime, he probably would use alleged US support for the
Ioannidis government as a pretext for action against the US.
It seems unlikely, however, that popular resentment against
the US would impel Karamanlis, if he should be recalled by
a military regime, for example, to sever major ties with
Washington. There is some risk that a more representative
regime would feel under popular pressure to retaliate against
the US for its alleged identification with military dictator-
ship, but the US and NATO's role'in Greece's security system
is substantial; a likely successor regime would be very re-
luctant to destroy this connection.
22. Efforts by the US to distance itself from the present
rulers would complicate bilateral working arrangements. Given
the sensitivity of the Ioannidis regime, it would probably react
by pressing the US on the use of facilities. How far the gov-
ernment would go in restricting US activities in Greece would
depend on how much open displeasure the US expressed. Merely
urging the Greeks to permit an early return to parliamentary
procedures would not appear to the Athens regime nor to its
opposition to be much of a change in the policy the US pursued
toward Papadopoulos. Public characterization of the present
regime as repressive -- thus encouraging additional opprobrium
from other NATO allies -- would be seen by Ioannidis as unneces-
sarily irritating and would provoke him to retaliate, without,
however, convincing most critics of the regime that the US had
abandoned Ioannidis. It is likely that under these circumstances
the Greek attitude toward military relations with the US would
become much less cooperative across a broad range of issues.
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