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Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
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April 6, 2005
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December 13, 1974
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- PQ r_ T A d F 1 2005/041T-1A RD079R010 01 0 0 pprove os ease r ~ mac, + 1 rOU r' I- I ~ SUBJECT Importance of the Chilean Solidarity Movement in Europe 25X1 25X1 1. You recently asked that we look into the importance f the Chilean Solidarity Movement (CSM) in Europe I The question arose when suggeste that it constituted a serious vulnerability for the US which should be countered by US moves to cut off aid to Chile and otherwise clearly disavow the junta. The Congress may have already ameliorated the problem by the House move this week to cut off aid to Chile, but the problem will not thereby disappear. 2. In response to your request: a. I asked u to prepare a wrapup of the facts about the CSM in rope (copy attached). convened a session of DDI analysts, together with I lof DDO, to discuss the problem in the light of the paper. 3. The discussion led to the following conclusions: a. The Chile question is popular journalistic stuff all over Europe and it is true enough to say that it has replaced Vietnam as a convenient means of focusing anti-US sentiment. It offers a common ground for communists, socialists and left- to-moderate Christians and liberals to come together on an issue -- when they can agree on little else. b. It is also an embarrassment to our friends in public and official quarters, and there is no respectable voice, public or official, actively willing to defend. c. Whether measured as a rallying point for disparate groups, or as a public impact issue, it is most significant in Portugal, Greece, Italy and Sweden; least so in Britain and West Germany; France is in between. Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CJQ-DP79R01099A001500040001-7 Approved Fo_ Release 2005/04/1 f- 79R01099 01500040001-7 NWOO d. But measurements of impact are very imprecise. It should be noted that: -- Except for Sweden, no European government has shown itself actively exercised about US policy toward Chile,-and certainly none has exerted any strong or recurrent pressure on the US to do anything. -- In all cases, it is local considerations that determine whethr the communists, socialists and others come together or stay apart. Con- sidered as a platform for building a broad anti-US coalition, the Chile issue is unique and marginal in that it does not have impact much beyond the issue itself. -- Offsetting the near-universal disapproval of US policy toward Chile, but much less publi- cised, is the lesson drawn in some quarters that Chile shows the folly of communists pushing too far or too fast for control. The Chilean lesson is central to the PCI's current "historic com- promise" and "soft opposition" strategy, and is no doubt reflected in the USSR's general line of advising European communists to go slow and avoid risks. -- In Greece and especially in Portugal, fears that Chile shows what the US might do to them are no doubt sharpened by the CSM's activities, but would also no doubt be there if the CSM did not exist. They are the result of circumstances having nothing to do with Chile, and will grow or diminish for reasons having nothing to do with Chile. 4. These caveats should not be read as arguments against the US doing what it can to limit damage in Europe over Chile. Congres- sional action this week will help, though the credit will not go to the Administration. Apart from the aid question, there seems no reason why the US should not come on strop er in deploring any bru ttalities of which the junta is guilty. 25X1 5. But one should not hold out hope that the CSM would cease anti-US attacks or go away. The historical record -- including Approved For Release 2005/@4113? :, CIA~RDP79R01099AO01500040001-7 Approved Foelease 2005.7 : RDP79R010$01500040001-7 distortions and exaggerations -- is there, and an ostentatious switch on this issue, given what has been publicly said by the Pres- ident and the Secretary, would probably not persuade those disposed to believe the worst. It would certainly not end the CSM's propa- ganda efforts. It would, however, help our friends to defend us better in public and private, and would remove an irritant with the neutrals, most notably the Swedes. 6. It would be marginal in its impact, case by cas.e, compared to what the US can do on far more critical issues with key countries. al, Thus an ounce of help to Greece o4.-Cyprus, or of aid to Portug 01 would no doubt be worth a pound of gestures over the Chile issue in the country concerned. 25X1 8. If you agree with the argument herein, it would be easy to adapt this memorandum to become a note to HAK from you. I suggest that nothing short of that level would do any good. 25X1 National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe Approved For Release 200510411'3 ;CIA-RDP79R01099A001500040001-7 J'; L Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500040001-7 BEST COPY A VAILIBLE Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500040001-7 Approved Fo fleas 2005/04/13 CIA- ,DP79R010901500040001-7 25X1 U,;,R1 1_ SUBJECT: Ramifications of Chilean Solidarity Movement in Western Europe SS ar The Chilean solidarity question-has replaced the Vietnamese solidarity question as the principle rallying poin_ i `.Western Europe for leftist forces bent denigrating the United States and reducing its influence in Europe. In the "cur,-a_-n. months since the September 1973 coup d'etat, an extensive or:ar_iz at onal network. has been built up in Europe, supported and cc loth by the CoF-T-,yni cr rn;.n_r i?^ the ' SS . Eas Qr'' any an,i a the major supporters) and by Western organizations. z_-Jo. centers of exile activity are in Paris and Rome with support _ elements in Helsinki and London. Because of the strong emotional under- currents connected with the Chilean issue and the extensive and intensive propaganda campaign which has been mounted to capitalize on them, there is practically no voice raised in Europe in defense of the Chilean Junta or in defense of the role the United States is said to have played in Chile in the recent past. The Chilean "example" is being cited to create a climate in Portugal, for instance, in which. U.S. initiatives are immediately suspect. The Chilean. 'ca-_Da' Is also being used as the ne es c- through :tihich European non-communists are being brought into continuing cooperation. with, communist parties and fret cganizations in efforts which are basically anti-American and are intended to cast doubts on the United States' reliability,-probity, and dedi cation to democratic principles. End Summary The Socialist and Social Democratic parties in Western Europe rallied immediately to the cause of the Chilean exiles in late 1973. Early initiatives were taken in several European countries to ensure :virtually free entry of Chilean refugees and 25X1 rtu, tia. 6-4 --- ~c Cr. anion ' sr Germany, and :1an1- U,1 1_1 ` w ' io 1n c 17 - Gam) .L L Europe have subsequently moved to Western Europe. Christian Demo- crats -- while not as initially vociferous as their Social Demo- ? it co::ntr' acts we_e also i rcu t a first In attempts at poi- t a ctions cn beha?f of :the Chileans. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500040001-7 Approved Fo'Fe4se 20054. R-RDP79RO1 OOtOOO4OOO1-7 25X1 Another very ear_y e_:- .:Y le o= such co- operation occurred in Austria, where a "CHile So! i..1arity Front" was for--ed in 'November 1973 by sore 12 local groups, ranging fro= the communist youth, through the Socialist ;:out^_, to the Catholic workers Youth and the "Tr:orT fing Group Criz:-cai Christianity. if Financial assistance to the Chilean solidarity =ove=eat.has been s: Lstantial to the new nove_eat. Western European funds were not far behind 1 Early in 1974, when Beatriz Allende visited Sweden, for e -an.ple, Prize Minister =alme presented her with $110,000 to be used for the Chilean "resistance no 'ement . T' was be - =ado available to the Chilean resistance.) In September The Uruguan Tupa- meros announced that $3 zillion obtained from a kidnap rar!som Several European governments have been pressured by their political parties to cut off aid and support to Chile, and the West Cer-an and Belgium governments have announced t ?at they 25;X1 1i were doing so. Labor union calls for boycotts of shipping to Chile have thus far had less effect. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500040001-7 Approved F e 2005/0 Ir- zDP79RO10 9 f 4-00040001-7 251 25X1 in shor` } the Chilean ? SSUC has struck a responsive chord -c-Cam. -the- ^r_cf-renter. :; ~,~.c?eans have es ~. +.. ~- `1 ... } p ec -. G ~ Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500040001-7 SEU 1L e 2005/04113: C1A-RDP79R010 015UU040001-7 4 - responded strongly in terms of financial and material support. For a number of reasons, not the least of which is publicity from 1:.S. media sources :which is replayed. and distorted ex- tensively throughout =:urope, the United States (and the Central 1n telligence Agency) has been coupled in European thinking with the overthrow of the Allende government and continued support of the Junta, including its most repressive undemocratic measures. The Eurcpean Com^unists and the Soviet bloc have seized upon this issue to replace Vietnam in themr_dual campaign to reduce U.S. influence, prestige, and creditability in Europe and to encourage and facilitate broad non-Communist - Communist collaboration. Despite s -e sett cks ari si_rg from of r rarn'layirsr the Corar.unis= hand in some forums and from fractionalization within-the, Chilea-a exile movement itself, the campaign appears to have bean quite su_cess- ful to date; certainly it is well funded and highly o _ ganiz _d . The "Chilean exa=ple" is being used with success by Communists and leftists to undermine the U.S position in such places as Portugal, where an unstable internal situation lends itself to drawing parallels, however inexact, with Chile. Approved For Release 2005/04/13 CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500040001-7