Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 14, 2006
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 12, 1974
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3.pdf1.21 MB
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Secret No Foreign Dissem Controlled Dissem Intelligence Memorandum Anti Junta Activity Outside of Chile MORI/CDF review(s) completed. Secret DCI/NIO 1766-74 12 August 1974 Copy Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Classified by 014522 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category: ? 5B(1), (2), and (3) Automatically declassified on: Date Impossible to Determine Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 2007M REfg-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO 1 ORvION DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM SUMMARY .............................................. 1 I. STRONG INITIAL INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE ............................. 2 II. EFFORTS OF THE SOVIETS AND THEIR LEFTIST ALLIES TO ORGANIZE AN INTERNATIONAL OFFENSIVE. .............. 4 The World Peace Council .... .. ................... 4 Other Soviet-Controlled organizations 5 Can Effort .................................... 6 The Role of the French Left ..................... 7 Activities in Other Western European Countries .. 8 III. EFFORTS OF EUROPEAN TROTSKYIST AND OTHER GROUPS OF THE RADICAL LEFT .............................. 9 Arab Terrorist Support of the Chilean Cause ..... 10 IV. CHILEAN EXILE GROUPS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA 11 V. CHILEAN RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA ..... 13 Argentina ....................................... 13 Peru .. .. ............................... 14 ..... ........................ 15 Activity sew ere in Latin America ............. 15 The Communist Party 16 The Socialist Party ............................. 17 The MIR ......................................... 18 General Problems ................................ 18 NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 2007/6WRDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO 1?OREiGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM 12 August 1974 ANTI-JUNTA ACTIVITY OUTSIDE OF CHILE*. A variety of elements opposed to the Chilean military regime have found wide sympathy and support abroad. This support has been the most extensive in Western Europe, where the fervor of popular reaction to the violent overthrow of Allende's government was particularly strong. Refugees from Chile were welcomed by a number of European and Western Hemisphere countries, and solidarity committees sprang up, deriving maximum publicity value from stories, many exaggerated, of tortures and executions by the military government. The whole spectrum of the Left joined in sponsoring rallies and fund-raising activities to support this new-found popular cause. The orthodox Communist parties were joined by various Trotskyist groups in urging resistance to the Chilean Government. Moscow and Havana have played both direct and indirect roles in encouraging such activity, and official support has been forthcoming from such governments as the Swedish, Finnish, and British. The efforts of the various groups have caused problems for Chile in international forums. Deliveries and servicing of military equipment from Britain have been suspended, and Chile has had serious difficulty in securing arms. The resistance groups have the capacity to cause the Chilean government considerable diffi- culty and embarrassment, but until they develop an internal capa- bility in Chile, they will pose no real threat to the stability of the regime. This memorandum was prepared by and coordinated within CIA. SECRET Approved For Release 60Ii0 t 4 P'9R01099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 2007A&& &i-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM I. STRONG INITIAL INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE 1. The coup d'etat in Chile on 11 September 1973 came as a shock to the Left throughout the world, particularly in Europe. The Marxist and social democratic camps believed, or wanted to believe, that the Allende government provided proof that there was a peaceful road to socialism. To the European Socialists and Communists in power or nudging toward it, the leftist government in Chile was confirmation that their course was cor- rect and that violent revolution was unnecessary. They chose to ignore the economic mismanagement and the resulting political polarization that was tearing Chile apart. Three years of Allende's propaganda had left them unprepared for his sudden downfall and the paucity of resistance by his supporters. 2. A wave of anger and indignation swept over the continent, nourished by factual and exaggerated reports of brutal treatment and executions by the military. Tales of thousands killed and more thousands imprisoned gained wide acceptance. Although the Military Junta gradually began to exert control over too zealous troop commanders, a drum beat campaign had already begun in favor of Allende supporters who had fled the country, been taken prisoner, or were being sought by the new government. Three days after the coup the first solidarity committee was meeting in Liege, Belgium, and before the end of the month the World Peace Council (WPC) held a conference in Helsinki, Finland. Chile replaced Vietnam as the burning issue for leftist idealists and propagandists. There were demonstrations in Paris and Vienna, Chilean diplomatic mis- sions were attacked in Paris and Bonn, and solidarity committees sprang up all over Europe. Swedish organizations of all kinds became involved in whipping up sentiment and raising money for Chilean resistance, and the doors were opened for refugees from Chile. 3. The coup also produced internal repercussions within the organized Left in Europe. In Italy it shook delicate political balances and relations among the Italian political parties, forcing some to examine basic premises, raising doubts about long-range plans, and arousing fears of internal divisions. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) found itself caught between its political NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 200TH-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM commitment to the center-left government and its ideological com- mitment to the extreme Left, which accused the PCI of being soft on the Chilean military. 4. The Soviets and Cubans were extremely disappointed and perturbed by Allende's overthrow. the Russians had felt a clash was inevitable, but they were disa- greeably surprised that only isolated groups and individuals ac- tually fought against the military coup. The Soviets criticized the Chilean Communists for failing to meet violence with violence. They had expected a leftist uprising of major proportions to re- sist a military takeover. The USSR immediately embarked on the task of harnessing the forces under its control throughout the world in order to oust the Junta and restore the Left to power. The Cubans also reacted vigorously to the coup, which they saw as closing opportunities for them in South America. Cuba wel- comed refugees, started organizing a resistance movement, and centered a propaganda campaign on appearances of Allende's widow and daughter. NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 Approved For Release 200IV:TIA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM II. EFFORTS OF THE SOVIETS AND THEIR LEFTIST AI,.LIES TO ORGANIZE AN INTERNATIONAL OFFENSIVE 5. The Soviet-controlled international organizations in the fields of peace, labor, youth, students, women, and others have been in the vanguard of the effort by the Soviet Bloc countries to make Chile a central issue and keep it indefinitely before world attention. The objectives are to turn public opinion against the Junta, isolate it in world forums, and eventually bring about its overthrow. Corollary objectives are to create vehicles for unified action around a "just cause" by which diverse national and international organizations and individuals work under Communist aegis, and to promote the Communist cause at the expense of the West in general. The October war in the Mideast put a temporary brake on activity, but after the first of the year full focus was again turned toward Chile. The World Peace Council 6. Foremost of the Soviet-managed international organizations engaged in the Chile campaign is the WPC. Less than three weeks after the coup the WPC sponsored the International Conference of Solidarity with Chile in Helsinki which set the tone for subsequent efforts throughout the world. Plans were made to organize a Popular Unity (UP) apparatus with headquarters in Rome under the control of the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh). The Soviets wanted Helsinki, not Rome, but were outvoted. They had control of finances, however, and insisted on retaining Helsinki as the source of funds. The Finnish CP was named fund custodian, with the WPC acting as intermediary.* The Soviets, who provide the bulk of WPC funds, have not been profligate. They withhold funds when they are displeased at the efficiency of the Finnish coordina- ting committee, which was established at the Helsinki conference. The Soviets want a liaison committee with a broader international 25X1 base, but so far they have been unsuccessful in achieving this goal. - 4 - NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 7D7'/031'dfTCIA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM 7. The Helsinki conference was followed in October by a conference in Moscow, completely dominated by the CPSU, which con- trolled the list of speakers. The organizers expressed satis- faction with the results at the meeting, and felt that the mili- tary coup, while dealing a setback in Chile itself, had provided the Communist camp with a slogan, "Solidarity with Chile" around which Social Democratic and Christian parties could be rallied. 8. In December the WPC was seeking prominent world figures to serve as joint sponsors of a Black Book on Chile, and in February a meeting was called to set up solidarity conferences in the Western Hemisphere and Europe for 1974. The WPC also began plan- ning for an International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes of the Chilean Military Junta. The Soviets hoped that the Com- mission and the Black Book would help focus world attention on Chile and generate support for an International Liaison Com- mittee for International Solidarity with Chile. Once these ob- jectives were attained, the WPC expected the Soviets to begin funding resistance activities in Europe. 9. The preparatory meeting for the Commission of Inquiry held in Helsinki in late March, was completely dominated by the Soviets. Taking a detente line, they insisted that Chile was a strictly internal matter, not like Vietnam, and refused to allow the proceedings to take an anti-US tone. Nikolay Voschinin, WPC secretary, was pessimistic over prospects for aiding the resistance because the Junta appeared to be entrenched. Never- theless, they said aid to the WPC and the opposition movement would continue. The conference was a disappointment to WPC offi- cials and the Soviets alike because little was accomplished. The Commission of Inquiry itself met in East Berlin in April. A secretariat was set up and a committee established in Buenos Aires to provide for contact with Chile. Other Soviet-Controlled organizations 10. The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the Wom- en`s International Democratic Federation (WIDF), and the Inter- national Union of Students (IUS), sent investigators to Chile NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 2007/6 AURDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM in the months following Allende's overthrow to report on the human rights issue and arranged programs throughout the world to call attention to the Chile story. The WIDF arranged for the appearance of Allende's widow at the UN early in 1974. At the World Trade Union Congress in Bulgaria in October, the Soviets proposed and achieved the formation of a broadly based trade union committee of solidarity with Chile. The WFDY was charged with keeping the issue alive during the first part of 1974 until other international events could be organized. Cuban Effort 11. Perhaps surpassing the Soviets in zeal and in the inter- national scope of their activities against the Chilean Government are the Cubans, who consider the Chilean Government a prime target. The coup was a severe setback for the Cubans and closed off oppor- tunities that had opened up for them in South America. The Cuban propaganda machine went into high gear immediately after the coup. On 14 September Cuba was taking soundings at the UN on a possible Security Council condemnation of the Chilean military, and later that month the beginnings of a resistance movement were taking shape in Havana. Refugees arriving in Cuba formed the nucleus of a solidarity committee, and the Cubans began to sponsor appearances of the widow and daughters of Allende at events all over the worlcrX1 12. Cuban intelligence officers play a leadin role in the various support activities for Chilean resistance Genera u ans work closely with the Soviets in organizing and carrying out international conferences and organizing propaganda work. Propaganda specialists from both countries met in Havana in may 1974, to map out a year-round campaign against Chile. The Cubans, like the Soviets, feel they must keep the "abuses" of the Chilean Junta before world opinion. NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 200-YkfOA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM 13. Despite this cooperation, there are considerable dif- ferences of view between the Cubans and the Soviets on the means of returning Marxists to power in Chile. The Soviets believe in relatively peaceful means -- political manipulation, control of labor and other economic forces, infiltration of security forces, and pressure tactics in international organizations, while the Cubans are more action-minded and feel force will be needed to unseat the Junta. Cuban officials give the definite impression that they favor revolution, but they are cautious about the time and place. They feel the Chilean people must first tire of the Junta and its policies. The Cubans are not sanguine about the prospects of converting the Chilean exiles into guerrilla fighters, but they have tried to induce a combative spirit in them. Some exiles have been provided training for eventual infiltration into Chile. 14. In recent months, the upwards of 1,000 Chilean refugees in Cuba have caused problems for the government. They are divided along party and ideological lines much as they were in Chile, with the Communists disputing with the moderate'Socialists and neither talking to the extremist elements. Most are generally unhappy about their lot in Cuba. Although they are provided with housing and some have work, they feel isolated and cut off from meaningful political activity. (Something similar has occurred in the large Chilean contingent in East Germany.) The Role of the French Left 15. In the spring of 1974, the French Communist Party (PCF), at the urging of the CPSU, took charge of accelerating joint Com- munist-Socialist actions in solidarity with the Chilean leftists. The PCF convoked a meeting of seven French leftist organizations in March 1974, and about the same time learned from the French Socialist Party (PSF) that nearly all the European Social Demo- cratic parties were prepared to participate with the Communists in a unified campaign to promote resistance to the Junta. The PCF leaders recognized at once that this meant a single, joint front could be organized which in their view would have great historical significance. It would not only damage the Chilean Junta, but promote Communist-Socialist cooperation in Europe. - 7 - NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 200$8 TA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM 16. The PCF, the PSF, and the other French leftistorganizations called a European Solidarity Conference in Paris for 6 and 7 July with an agenda limited to four issues: illegality of the Junta, an end to the state, of war, an end to oppression, and restoration of full civil rights in Chile. The strict agenda reflected a decision to avoid contentious debate. Three hundred delegates from East European Communist Parties and Western European Communist, Socialist, and Social Democratic parties attended the meeting. Francois Mitterand of the PSF was the principal driving force be- hind the meeting and probably the one most responsible for over- coming Socialist and Social Democratic resistance to meeting with the Communists. Italian Social Democrats and the British Labour Party were represented, along with Socialist parties from Belgium, 25X1 Denmark, Spain, Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Df-1-1-f-lie-Inl- The German and ri n Socialists had adamantly opposed The PC was, owe , ====J pleased with the results of the conference and soon afterward be- gan searching for ways to rally the Left around another issue and thus solidify the broad front that had been brought together on the popular Chile theme. 17. The speed with which the leftwing organizations in Europe reacted to the Chile coup is exemplified by the Paris based Curiel Apparatus, a support group for national liberation move- ments, with suspected Soviet backing, with headquarters in Paris. Before the end'of September Henri Curiel had begun to formulate a clandestine program to oppose the Military Junta. Curiel is involved in collecting funds, setting up support committees, dispatching agents to Chile, and training a few selected individuals in guerrilla warfare. The Curiel program calls for recruiting activists for training in France, providing exiled activists living near Chile's borders with the major portion of their funds, and organizing an international committee to plan clandestine actions. Some of the funds Curiel has collected came from the World Council of Churches. Activities in Other Western European Countries 18. In June 1974 the peace forces in Belgium were engaged in making preparations for a week of solidarity with Chile scheduled for September. In Portugal, plans were being formed during July for a world solidarity conference of workers to be held in Lisbon in September. - 8 - NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 20 M.#IA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM III. EFFORTS OF EUROPEAN TROTSKYIST AND OTHER GROUPS OF THE RADICAL LEFT 19., The various groups making up the radical European Left have their own Chile solidarity programs which both complement and compete with the Soviet and Cuban-sponsored programs. The most important and active groups are the Trotskyist Fourth Inter- national (FI) and the Continuous Struggle (Lotta Continua -- LC) of Italy. 20. The Trotskyist movement is involved with Chilean re- sistance in several countries. Trotskyist organizations, like the Communist League, dominate the French Committee of Support for the Revolutionary Struggle of the Chilean People, formed shortly after 11 September. The League's objectives are to de- velop and popularize aid to the resistance and prolong the debate on the Allende experience. It organizes material and financial support, arranges pamphleteering, and conduct rallies. There are two funds, one for aiding refugees, the other for the pur- chase of arms and supplies. The committee has Cuban support and is partial to the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). It has clashed with the Democratic Chile Committee in Rome over the latter's preference for dividing funds according to the Chilean parties' importance -- i.e., their electoral showing. 21. The FI, headquartered in Brussels, sent an agent to Argentina in February 1974 with the ambitious mission of or- ganizing "support commandos" for the Chilean resistance and coordinating the efforts of the Peronist and Marxist left. The FI has connections with the Argentine Trotskyist terrorist groups but is enmeshed in intrigues against one of them, the Santucho faction of the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP). The Chilean section of the FI apparently suffered heavy losses during the military coup, but other Trotskyists, not affiliated with the FT, are free inside Chile and cooperating with the MIR. 22. The Trotskyist effort in Italy is aided by the LC and is centered in the Committee for Support of Chilean Resistance, with offices in Rome and Milan. Danilo Trelles Fernandez, an NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 20*)E:TGIA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM Uruguayan motion picture producer, is the Rome coordinator. The principal objective is to raise support for the MIR, under the slogan of "Arms for the MIR." The LC collected $115,000 after the coup and sent it to Cuba. The Cubans act as distributing agents. The LC helped organize a conference of Chilean support committees in Frankfurt from 24 to 27 April, under the auspices of the Trotskyist. controlled European Coordinating Committee for Com- mittees of Support for the Struggle of the Chilean People. Chilean, Italian, Spanish, Irish, Danish and German groups par- ticipated. A good many groups, but not. all, were in favor of col- lecting money to buy weapons for the MIR. Some 3,000 people demonstrated at the close of the conference. The Spanish dele- gates represented Trotskyist-controlled committees in Madrid and Barcelona. .Arab Terrorist Support of The Chilean Cause 23. In July the Chilean Ambassador to Lebanon, General Al- fredo Canales, was gunned down in his Beirut apartment house in an attempted assassination by Lebanese terrorists sympathetic to the exile cause. The perpetrators announced that the objective of the attack was to emphasize the struggle of the third world against American "imperialism." NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 Approved For Release 2005)6JA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM IV. CHILEAN EXILE GROUPS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA 24. The Popular Unity forces in exile have been in agree- ment from the beginning that their primary objective is to over- throw the Military Junta and return to power. Their ideas on how to achieve this objective and on the kind of society and government they want vary, but they have no disagreement on the primary task. To this end they have set up centers for resist- ance in several world capitals. 25. Rome is the headquarters for UP activities in Europe and Havana handles North and South America. The Rome office, or Rome Committee, as it is sometimes called, combines two organizations, Democratic Chile (DC) and the Salvador Allende Association (SAA). The DC, a so-called information and press agency, represents the UP in Europe and has the backing of the Soviets, the Cubans, the major Italian leftist parties, includ- ing the PCI and the PSI, and most Chilean refugees. It promotes resistance to the Chilean government, raises funds, aids refugees, and pressures the Italian Government to withhold recognition of the Chilean Government. It has also attempted to form an international brigade to fight in Chile, but without success. The DC is headed by Jorge Arrate, the former head of the Chilean Copper Corporation. Arrate spent several months in Argentina before going to Italy. The Cuban Embassy takes a close interest in the DC and has almost daily contact with it. 26. The SAA, located at the same address, is composed of Italian leftists and run principally by the PCI. It has the task of coordinating Chilean-oriented activities of the Italian left and aiding refugees. The PCI and the PSI are satisfied with the work of the Association, which they believe is the best of its kind in Europe. However, the PCI feels the PSI should contri- bute more. The Italian Government, the Christian Democratic Party, and Olivetti enterprises have provided support to the Association. 27. The Chilean Communist leaders in Moscow, led by Volodia Teitelboim and Manuel Cantero, head the Moscow office of the UP which is supported by the Soviet Solidarity Committee under Stepan Shalayev, secretary of the Soviet Central Council of NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 20&'IA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM Trade Unions. Ljttle is known of the activities of this group, but they did receive a pledge of support from CPSU leaders in March. 28. The Algiers Committee has an office with close to two dozen people, and enjoys the support of"the Algerian Govern- ment. It is chiefly interested in promoting revolution in Chile and is engaged in the procurement of automatic weapons in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The committee, however, consists primarily of intellectuals and is not fit for guerrilla war- fare. The Algerians donated at least (US) $50,000 to this group and may have donated $50,000 more. The head of the committee is Eduardo Salum, former Chilean Ambassador to Algeria, who is responsible for all of North Africa, and he maintains contact with the Rome Committee. Salum has claimed that there was a shipment of small arms in Naples (source unknown and probably destined for the MIR or Socialist extremists), but storage and transport pre- sented problems and the exiles were looking to the Cubans and Soviets for help. - 12 - NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 20 /63+W :TCIA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN D I SEM CONTROLLED V. CHILEAN RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA 29. With the exception of Argentina, and possibly Mexico, Chilean resistance activity throughout the Western Hemisphere has been scattered and ineffective. The prevalence of military and strongman regimes throughout Latin America contributes markedly to the difficulties of the resistance movement in developing support activity and operational momentum in the Hemisphere. Efforts to organize a hemisphere-wide solidarity conference have sputtered, and the Soviets decided in June to settle for regional conferences. They are also pushing for a meeting of Latin American Communist Parties in Havana at the end of 1974 to deal with Chile and other topics, but the Cubans have some misgivings about the idea. Argentina 30. Argentina's geographic proximity and until recently, political receptivity have provided a good base for exile operations. Although the Andes present a formidable barrier to communication, there are many isolated passes which can be used successfully by couriers and infiltrators along the,long international boundary between Argentina and Chile. Probably the most favorable factor for the Chilean exiles has been the success. of the Argentine extremist organizations in carrying out kidnap-ransom operations, which have yielded experience, skill, and large amounts of money. 31. There are thousands of Chileans in Argentina, some estimates put the number as high as 14,000. They are grouped principally in Buenos Aires, Mendoza, Salta, and around Bariloche. In the weeks following the coup they organized themselves into two rival groups, one moderate, one radical. They are the Patriotic Front of Chilean Resistance (FPRC), composed of Communists, moderate Socialists, Radicals, and members of the moderate faction of the United Popular Action Movement (MAPU); and the Chilean Revolutionary Resistance (RRC), composed of the MIR and the radical wings of the Socialist Party and MAPU. (It is not surprising that the UP in exile has continued the traditional division between moderates and extremists that existed in Chile.) 32. In late 1973, the FPRC was reported to possess some 50 rifles, plenty of money, and contacts with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies. The RRC has received money and arms from the Argentine extremist organizations. The Santucho faction of the ERP is allied NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 2007/"-`RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM with the MIR and recently provided it with US $3 million from the ransom of a US oil company official. It has furnished other support services, such as documentation for MIR personnel, and has agreed to turn over its weapons caches in Chile. 33. The ERP is the anchor organization of the fledgling but potentially dangerous Latin. American Revolutionary Coordinating Group, which includes the Chilean MIR, the Uruguayan Tupamaros (MLN), the Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN), and possibly one or more Peruvian groups. The Cubans are behind this inter- national effort, and in Mario Santucho, they have a guerrilla fighter of intelligence and energy, who probably envisions himself as the successor to Che Guevara. 34. The PCCh decided about the beginning of 1974 that much of the work of reorganizing its commissions and military apparatus could be done more efficiently and securely outside the country. It therefore began sending selected members to Argentina and Peru to meet and make plans, and then return home to implement them. One of the largest concentrations of PCCh members is in Mendoza, where 300 young party members are living and working. There are MIR and Socialist exiles in Mendoza also, but they are largely inactive. 35. The turbulent political conditions in Argentina have probably served to distract government attention away from the Chilean exiles, but this situation may not last too long. Refugees in Buenos Aires, who number about 1,800, recently protested a Ministry of Interior order designed to force them out of the capital into the provinces. Many plan to leave Ar- gentina. Although the order was issued prior to Peron's death, there is no evidence to date that the new regime plans to reverse the trend toward tightening restrictions on Chilean exiles. 36. Owing to its proximity to Chile, Peru presents a natural haven for resistance fighters. However, tension be- tween the two governments has actually prevented the Left from exploiting Peru's geographical position and leftist leanings. NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 2007/OPACTRDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM Because of Peru's concern over Chilean intentions, the govern- ment watches the Chileans in its midst closely and has taken steps to severely limit the number of refugees permitted to stay. Thus, exiles must operate clandestinely to avoid embar- rassing and antagonizing the Peruvian authorities. There are indications that they have begun to do this although on a limited scale. Peru is the site of the International SolidaritY25X1 Commission, through which financial aid to the PCCh is funneled. Activity Elsewhere in Latin America 38. There have been attacks on Chilean diplomatic missions in El Salvador and Peru. The Communist Youth of Colombia is planning a pro-Chile rally for September in Bogota. The rally will follow a solidarity meeting in Caracas, at which delegates from all over the world are expected. (Details on these activities are not yet available.) The MIR is reported also to have support structures in Venezuela and Panama. NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 200196` &-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM 39. There are serious differences among the Exile Groups. At first, a certain degree of unity was achieved, and toward the end of 1973, representatives of the UP parties and the MIR reached agreement on the basic principles'of the resistance move- ment, such as the need to isolate the Junta. This unity carried over into January and was acclaimed by the Socialist Party secre- tary general Carlos Altamirano, shortly after his escape from Chile. Thereafter, the individual proclivities of the various groups began to assert themselves and jell into hard positions. Continued calls for unity showed that necessary concessions on disputed ideological and tactical points were not forthcoming. The differences revolve around emphasis and timing, as well as methods. The Communist Party 40. The Communists favor a careful, slow reorganization of the leftist forces, with focus on the labor movement as the vehicle of expression. The PCCh program is based on the assumption that economic difficulties and interservice rivalries will eventually bring down the government. It is counting on an alliance of the PDC and certain military elements to spearhead the opposition. A cornerstone of their policy is to entice the Christian Democrats into a broad, leftist, anti-fascist front. Violence is to be shunned, and patience, pragmatism, and reconstruction are the watchwords. A recent PCCh statement hedges somewhat on this point and allows for violence by the masses. The MIR agrees with the PCCh on the need to cultivate labor, but this will mean compe- tition, not cooperation, between these two groups. 41. Signs of internal divisions have begun to appear in the once-monolithic PCCh. The stresses of recent months have taken their toll, however, and there are factions of moderates (Provisional Political Commission), conservatives (who favor dealing with the military for safety sake), and extremists (who want to begin attacks on the government). There is ill feeling between the Political Commission, led by Jorge Insunza, and exile leaders like Manuel Contero, who want a more dynamic opposition. Insunza is recognized by the PCCh exiles in Argentina. In May, the PCCh informed these - 16 - NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 200~*'3t0 FcTA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM exiles and those in Italy that it opposed raising funds for arms and favored a peaceful, deliberate process of reorganizing the shattered UP forces. The Political Commission has criticized decisions by exiles, the Cubans, and the Soviets which show a loss of faith in PCCh policies. The Party is unhappy with Castro, who has been mocking its policies, and with the CPSU, which says the PCCh?s position is weak. The Socialist Party 42. The Socialists are badly fragmented, with several fac- tions vying for rank and file support. The moderates are talking of abandoning Marxism altogether and returning to social demo- cratic principles. They reject cooperation with the Communists and blame them and-the Soviets for Allende's downfall. The PS radicals favor organizing the masses for revolutionary violence. They are led by their firebrand secretary-general, Carlos Altamirano. Altamirano, variously reported as having been smug- gled out of Chile by the MIR, the Cubans, and the Soviets, has been occupied in issuing propaganda statements throughout Europe, North Africa, and Communist Asia. 43. Shortly after his escape, Altamirano appeared in Havana and Moscow, where he lauded the Soviets and criticized the Chi- nese for maintaining relations with the Junta. Later, his in- creasingly hard line seemed to draw him closer to the Cubans. His 25 February statement in Belgrade was studded with such terms as "illicit actions," "clandestinity," and "uprising following strug- gle" and with exhortations to revolutionary violence. In March he spoke of the guerrilla struggle taking shape in Chile on an in- creasing scale and the possibility of his returning. Then an April report said Altamirano had been named political leader of the Rome committee, on condition that he moderate his views to accommodate to the social democratic parties of Europe, whose support was being sought. 44. By May Altamirano was speaking in much milder terms. He called upon revolutionary forces that remained outside the UP during Allende's regime, to join the struggle, and he stated that the - 17 - NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 Approved For Release 200 0 1 ' -RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM broadest unity possible should be established including the Christian Democrats. This was a reversal of his earlier posi- tion against accepting non-Marxist forces. At the time of his more moderate turn, Altamirano may have had a falling out with Fidel Castro. The Cubans, the MIR, the ERP, and Beatriz Allende now back another set of PS radicals, led by Ezequiel Ponce. Adonis Sepulveda heads the so-called "Trotskyist" faction of the party. All factions still communicate with each other and gen- erally agree that violent action now is out of the question. The MIR 45. The MIR is viewed by the Chilean military as its most dangerous adversary. It too has had internal problems. Many lower and middle ranking members blame the leaders for the fail- ure of the organization to stand up to the armed forces during the coup and criticize them for their overcautious behavior since. This has resulted in factionalism. The MIR does retain a rela- tively efficient underground organization in Chile which has been built up over the years. In January, the MIR estimated it had 500 "fighters" available. Funds from abroad, principally Argen- tina, continue to support in-country MIR activities, but lack of a broad support base and the effectiveness of the security forces has prevented development of the MIR's "revolutionary army." General Problems 46. Other issues hampering the resistance movement are communications problems and frictions between exiles and home forces over direction of the movement. The efficiency and alert- ness of the Chilean security forces have made communications be- tween comrades at home and those in exile very difficult and dangerous. Some groups have only occasional contact across bor- ders. Depite lip service given to the concept that those in Chile have the final. say on strategy and tactics, the exiles seem to make their own decisions, frequently to the disgust of those at home. While this problem may create serious diffi- culties for some organizations, those that succeed in keeping the vital funds flowing to their comrades in Chile should be able to overcome it. - 18 - NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 2007%CG&k'i -RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM 47. In the months since the coup, money has flowed to the exiles and their political organizations in ample amounts to support activists by providing for safehouses, weapons, explosives, air fares, vehicles, food, and lodging. Western Europe has been the principal source of funds. Indirect support has been available too in the form of jobs and subsidies. The Swedish Prime Minister publicly presented Beatriz Allende with a check for 25X1 $110,000. in early 1974, the FPRC in Argentina received ~50,000 from Wes the UK and $30,000 from other sources 48. The Algerian Government provided US'$50,000 to the local solidarity committee in May for arms, and the committee is expecting another donation in an equal amount from the same source. Finnish members of the International Commission of Inquiry esti- mated in February the cost of the coming Commission meeting to be about US $45,000 and they requested $30,000 from the Foreign Ministry. The Argentine ERP announced during June that it was donating US $3 million of the ransom obtained in the Samuelson kidnaping to the Chilean MIR. During early 1974 two-thirds of the funds collected by the French solidarity committee were turned over to Rome and the other one-third was used in France for resistance work, including refugee support. Some US $60 million in French francs was in the hands of the Paris solidarity committee in the Spring. The Rome committee received US $100,000 from the Iraqi Ba'ath Party in early 1974. 49. At the beginning of 1974 all Rome Committee funds were being divided among six Chilean organizations on a prorated basis, according to the results of the last political and trade union elections. Thus the PCCh was allotted 30 percent, the PS 30 percent, the Radical Party 10 percent, and the MIR and the two NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3 Approved For Release 20079)W.. bIIA RDP79R01099AO01500070002-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM factions of the United Popular Action Movement (MA,PU) shared the remainder. The allocation idea came from the PCCh and the Cubans. According to Trotskyists in France, the MIR strongly resented this arrangement and boycotted a conference called by the Cubans in February to organize a united front. The dispute strained relations between the MIR and Cuba for a while, and the Cubans were influential in denying the MIR funds held in Buenos Aires. During this period MIR leaders expressed skepticism that any funds collected in Europe and sent to the Cubans would ever arrive in Chile. The Trotskyists in France and Italy took the MIR side, as did the Swedish Social Democrats and the French trade unions and began providing money directly. By April the allotment system was changed to give the MIR 30 percent; 10 percent was allotted to the Radicals and the other small parties. NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R01099A001506070002-3 Secret Secret hi, NY 9e it r E/Ofly J3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 MEMORANDUM FOR: LA/NIO I _J called me today to request permission to show "Anti-Junta Activity Outside of Chile" to a Senate Select Committee staffer, who would look at it here in the Agency. Ray thought this would give the staffer a more balanced view of the situation in Chile. I had some reservati about it because I am not sure that it would accomplish the desired a objective. =assured me the docum ent would not be declassified, taken out of the building, or used other than for the staffer's back- ground. He said he had alread obt fined approval from OCI. (DATE) I said OK. FORM AUGN 54 10I WHICH REPLACES MAYF BEM USED. Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO1099AO01500070002-3 A mbO mtdF i t TI T 01 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO NAME AND ADDRESS DATE I S I 2 3 4 5 6 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Re arks : CSMti '~ FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE %pproved For Release 2007/03/ UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET 40 FORM N0. 917 Use previous editions ( )