ROMANIA: WHAT NEXT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A001500080002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 13, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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13 August 1974
SUBJECT: Romania: What Next?
SUMMARY
The Romanian party is preparing to launch an initiative
that will be a major attempt to further Bucharest's
pretensions to equality and sovereignty within the
Soviet orbit in particular and the world arena in gen-
eral. We expect the party's new programme -- which
will probably be published late this month -- to be
the most forthright and thoroughly reasoned rejection
of Soviet supremacy ever made by an ostensible sup-
porter of the USSR. The programme will also reaffirm
and update Romania's so-called "declaration of inde-
pendence" of April 1964. Its publication and the sur-
rounding events are sure to provoke Moscow and to in-
crease the risk that Ceausescu will miscalculate the
limits of Soviet tolerance.
BACKGROUND
The 1964 declaration was preceded by a period of Soviet-
Romanian dueling that in many ways resembles the current state
of relations between Moscow and. ,Bucharest. Then, as now, the
Romanians were:
-- Resisting Soviet efforts to isolate the Chinese;
-- Opposing Moscow's attempts to integrate the
Eastern European economies with that of the USSR;
-- Seeking to weaken Bucharest's commitment to the
Warsaw Pact;
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-- Banning the dissemination of Communist periodicals
containing propaganda contrary to Romanian ppli-
cies, particularly material attacking Peking.
For their part, the Soviets were demonstrating an increased
interest in the Romanian political scene, including:
-- Alleged efforts to pressure Romania indirectly
through neighboring Hungary, including staged
scattered demonstrations and work stoppages by
ethnic Hungarians living in northern Transyl-
vania;
-- Pressure on Bucharest from bloc diplomats who
circulated both "disinformation" and veiled
warnings.
Although current Soviet-Romanian relations axe correct on
the surface, several signs paint to differences and suspicions.
These include:
-- Ceausescu's adamant opposition to economic
integration within CEMA;
-- Ceausescu's determined resistance to reported
renewed Soviet efforts to gain some control
over elements of the Romanian armed forces,
including his opposition to Moscow's reported
request for a line of communication corridor
through the Dobrudja to Bulgaria.
-- Bucharest's continued courtship of the Chinese,
most recently evidenced by Foreign Minister
Macovescu's visit earlier this month to Peking
to underscore Romania's independent stance;
Radio Moscow promptly blasted the speech made
by the Chinese Foreign Minister at a dinner
for Macoveseu.
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THE DEVELOPING SITUATION
It is against this background that the latest military and
political developments must be read.
In addition, the Romanians have evidently heightened Soviet
concern about political developments in the country by drafting
such a reportedly provocative new party ~ragramme, which is
slated to be adopted at the 11th party congress in November.
The document is the first of its kind in Romania; it has not
yet been published, but has been approved by the Central Com-
mittee. It is likely to prove the most important statement
issued by the Romanian party since. its "declaration of indepen-
dence" in 1964.
The Romanians are fostering the impression that the document
will reiterate,. sharpen, and update the major points contained
in the "declaration of independence." Ceausescu has publicly
characterized the programme as having "exceptional theoretical
and practical significance." In addition, party cadres chief
Pana has privately told the. US ambassador that the document
will contain "surprises" which may not be well received in some
quarters. He was presumably referring primarily to Moscow,
which was the major target of the 1964 declaration.
Some of the "surprises" are sure to center on real and
imaginary Soviet abuses of the Romanian party from the Comintern
period to the present, but we .expect paramount attention to focus
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on Ceausescu's so-called "Ten Solemn Principles Governing the
Conduct of International Relations." These principles stress
the equality, independence, and .territorial integrity of all
states as a cornerstone for the future, and Ceausescu has pressed
for their inclusion in every agreement or communique Romania has
signed with a foreign country since the early 1970s.
The principles will surely be enshrined in an updated ver-
sion of the party declaration, carefully cast in pristine T~eninist
formulations .that will be extremely difficult to assail either in
doctrine or in logic. The net effect will be a renewed challenge
to Moscow's efforts to assert political, economic, and military
control over the communist world.
ADVANCE WORK IN BUCHAREST
Within this context, the remarks of Ceausescu and Pana indi-
cate that the Romanians expect the release of their party programme
to upset their allies and to lead to intense pressure on Bucharest.
In an effort to minimize the effects, the Romanians appear to be
orchestrating a campaign intended to suggest that they are already
under considerable pressures for pursuing .their independent line
and to try to head off further harsh reactions.
First, the Romanians have apparently instructed their mili-
tary attaches to spread an exaggerated sense of alarm.
-- Romanian attaches have been deliberately circu-
lating a variety of stories alleging Soviet
pressure to gain either an "extra--territorial
corridor" or unlimited transit rights across
Romania to Bulgaria. The circumstances sug-
gest that Bucharest is as much interested in
focusing international attention on its claimed
problems with Moscow as on any genuine demands.
-- Although the Western press speculated that
Soviet sabotage caused the recent spate of in-
dustrial accidents in Romani, Bucharest did
nothing to counter the stories until Pravda
denounced them in a long and authoritative
article. This adds to the impression that
Moscow is, in fact, putting the squeeze on
Bucharest.
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The other half of Bucharest's apparent campaign centers on
coming events:
-- A UN-sponsored conference on world population
is slated to be held in Bucharest August 19-30.
This conference, the first ever staged in East
Europe by the UN, will be attended by hundreds
of delegates -- especially from the West and the
Third World -- and by hordes of newsmen.
-- The UN conference will overlap with large-scale
celebrations of the 30th anniversary of Romania's
liberation from the Nazis on August 23.
Ceausescu probably sees the disparate nature of these events
-- the UN conference will have an internationalist tone while the
"liberation" festivities will be nationalistic -- as working to
his advantage. It is probable that the Romanian party will publish
its programme during the anniversary celebrations, when Bucharest
will coincidentally be host to the assemblage of news teams and
delegates at the UN conference. Bucharest could easily calculate
that this cast of potentially friendly witnesses would inhibit
any harsh and precipitate reaction to the programme from its
Warsaw Pact allies.
THE OUTLOOK
Every such initiative raises questions of how far Ceausescu
means to push the Soviets and whether he will miscalculate Mos-
cow's response. The Romanian leader is not incapable of trimming
his sails as he did, for example, after the invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia or following his trip to Peking in June 1971. Although
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Bucharest also often seems to take satisfaction in flaunting na-
tionalism for nationalism's sake, the language of the 1964 decla-
ration and the expected phrasing of the party programme appear de-
signed to preserve the regime's ability to maneuver. In this and
past instances, however, Bucharest gives the impression that it
is trying to calibrate its actions to within a notch of what it
considers Moscow's peak tolerance.
Ceausescu could, of course, underestimate Soviet wrath, and
simultaneously count too much on the restraining effect of moral
support for Romania obi the part of countries outside the Warsaw
Pact. So far, however, Ceausescu has been brilliant in estimating
the limits of the tolerable and in occupying all the ground avail-
able within those limits. The odds are that he will continue to
play the Soviets correctly.
Ceausescu apparently reasons that with the Soviets it is
better to accept risk than to show a spirit of compromise pre-
maturely. The latter course, in his eyes, almost certainly would
carry with it the prospects of increased demands from Moscow and
his other Pact allies as well as the likelihood of increased
problems at home.
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~ '~ of Centrai'"i~itelligence
DATE: 14 August 1974
SUBJECT: Romania, What Next?
Here is a copy of a memo an
Romania done for the NSC Staff
by CIA's Office of Current
Intelligence. Paul Cook asked
that a copy be sent to you.
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