THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A002200010003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 24, 1974
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DCI BRIEFING FOR
25 JANUARY WSAG MEETING
THE SITUA'IION IN INDOCHINA
Vietnam
I. The cease-fire agreement will be a year old this
month, and the war in South Vietnam is still sput-
tering on.
A. Although 1973 ended with some sharp fighting
in the highlands and Communist "highpoints"
in the southern provinces, December actually
saw a decline in cease-fire violations, and
1974 has begun quietly.
B. If the Communists are planning any large-scale
military offensive between now and May, when
the dry season ends, we should see a greatly
accelerated infiltration effort over the next
several weeks.
1. So far this dry season only 22,000 troops
have set out for South Vietnam. This is
far below the average for this stage in
previous dry seasons.
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2. The flow has picked up recently, and we
would expect it to continue steadily at
present levels or better if an offensive
is in the cards.
a. This would be a shift from the flow
so far in the dry season, which has
displayed a highly uncharacteristic
stop-and-go pattern.
3. All of the troops detected this dry sea-
son are headed for COSVN and the western
highlands.
a. They should help alleviate manpower
shortages in these areas, although
combat units in some parts of South
Vietnam will remain understrength and
reserve pools will still be small--
unless the rate of infiltration in-
creases.
b. It might be noted that the Communists
now have the capability to move troops
into the highlands and COSVN areas
about twice as fast as in past years.
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that the Communists will intensify the
level of fighting in early 1974 to prevent
government inroads and try to expand their
own holdings, but will not start a general
offensive.
II. There has been little change in the tactical sit-
uation in the past couple of months.
A. The recent heavy fighting in Quang Duc Prov-
ince in the western highlands has left the
Communists in control of two border outposts
they seized in early December, but the govern-
ment still holds the few populated centers.
2. The North Vietnamese recently moved a third
regiment into Quang Duc, possibly intending
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to renew their pressure and thwart the gov-
ernment' s plans.
3. Communist actions elsewhere since fall
have been largely small scale harassments
and terrorism aimed at securing a larger
share of the rice harvest.
Cambodia
III. In Cambodia, the Khmer Communists' dry season com-
bat capabilities have been improved by a substan-
tial delivery of Vietnamese Communist military
equipment.
A. Hanoi is giving the insurgents 900 tons of
arms, ammunition, and other equipment, plus
296 vehicles.
1. Initial deliveries were made late last
month in northeast Cambodia.
2. Some of the new equipment has already
been allocated to insurgent units in bat-
tlefield areas near Phnom Penh. Other
portions of it will be used in forming
a number of new battalions.
B. The equipment appears to represent most--if
not all--of North Vietnam's contribution to
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the Khmer Communists for this dry season.
The impact of this assistance on the military
situation and, more importantly, Hanoi's in-
tent in providing it are not clear.
1. Hanoi may judge that this level of sup-
port is enough to retain some leverage
with the insurgents--but not enough to
allow them to obtain a decided military
edge over Phnom Penh.
2. Still, the munitions should enable the
Khmer Communists to sustain a high level
of fighting well beyond the end of the
dry season in May.
IV. Meanwhile, the Khmer Communists' failure to date
to disrupt regular convoys on the Mekong has en-
abled the government to build up its stocks of
essential material.
A. Reserves of rice, POL, and munitions appear
adequate for the near term.
B. The government is also continuing its efforts
to increase its manpower reserves.
1. Since mid-October, approximately 16,000
new troops have been recruited, and most
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are now in training.
2. Another 10,000 new troops are still
needed, however.
V. The Khmer Communists retain the military initiative.
A. In the first weeks of the dry season they
concentrated on interdicting sections of
Phnom Penh's few remaining overland supply
routes.
1. The insurgents also gained some ground
on the Mekong's east bank, from which
they have been steadily shelling Phnom
Penh.
B. The Communists have now shifted the bulk of
their military effort to areas near Phnom Penh.
1. They mounted a heavy drive against the
capital's northern and northwestern de-
fenses earlier this month.
2. The Cambodian Army has been able to re-
gain the initiative in this sector, however.
C. The Communists are beginning to increase pres-
sure on Phnom Penh's southern defenses.
1. Some fighting has occurred within four
miles of the capital.
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2. Communist units in this area have been
having coordination problems. As things
now stand, government troops should be
able to contain the new threat.
Laos
VI. In Laos, Hanoi has made some significant troop
redeployments since the cease-fire went into ef-
fect last February.
A. As many as three North Vietnamese infantry
regiments have withdrawn from southern Laos,
and there are indications that additional
redeployments may soon occur in that sector.
B. In northern Laos, major elements of the North
Vietnamese 316th Division, formerly based in
the strategic Plaine des Jarres area, have
also recently returned home.
1. The withdrawals have not appreciablI weak-
ened North Vietnam's overall combat pos-
ture. An estimated 62,000 North Vietnam-
ese troops are still deployed in Laos--
33,000 in combat units and another 29,000
in logistic and administrative outfits.
2. The withdrawals do indicate, however,
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that Hanoi is satisfied with the effec-
tiveness of the cease-fire and anticipates
no early resumption of major hostilities.
C. The Chinese have also begun to scale down
their military presence in northern Laos.
1. During the past two months, virtually
all of their air defense troops have
returned to China. 'There are prepara-
tions for the withdrawal of two infantry
regiments which have provided ground
security for Chinese roadbuilders.
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