DCI BRIEFING OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY - 21 FEBRUARY 1974

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A002200010017-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: March 18, 1974
• Content Type: MFR

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H 4
Representative Melvin Price (D., Ill. ), Chairman
Senator Stuart Symington (D. , Mo. )
Senator Joseph M. Montoya (D., N. M. )
Senator Wallace F. Bennett (R., Utah)
Senator Peter H. Dominick (R. , Colo. )
Representative Craig Hosmer (R. , Calif.)
Representative Orval Hansen (R. , Idaho)
18 March 1974
Carl Duckett, DDS&T
SUBJECT: DCI Briefing of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy - 21 February 197
1, On 21 February 1974, the Director gave an annual briefing
to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The meeting lasted from
1400 hours until 1700 hours. L- -1
A transcript was taken and will be available
in the Office of Legislative Counsel. Discussions included Top Secret
Restricted Data material.
Edward J. Bauser, Executive Director
George F. Murphy, Deputy Director
Al Knight
4. Accompanying the Director were:
OS I
OCI
eorge ary, Legislative Counsel
E2ImpDet
C1 By Signer
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15 February 1974
DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING FOR
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY
21 February 1974
I. Mr. Chairman, before discussing Soviet strategic
weapons, I would like to say a few words about
the Soviet foreign policy developments we have
come to call detente. The Russians are still
holding to this policy, which is increasingly
identified with General Secretary Brezhnev.
When we speak of their policy of detente,
however, a careful definition is in order.
A. Detente does not mean a change of heart. Nor
does it mean that Moscow has abandoned its
basic objectives.
1. We see continuity most clearly in the
strategic field, as will become evident
when I discuss weapons development.
Detente does mean that the Soviets are seek-
ing advantages in their relationships with
the West through a new tactic, to which they
have committed considerable effort, and prestige.
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II. This new tactic reflects their realization that
they are falling behind in the technological
race. They have acknowledged to themselves
that, if they are to begin closing the gap be-
tween themselves and the West, they need to
import and absorb large amounts of Western
technology.
A. They are trying to do this in a number of
ways. One is normal trade, Another is the
project method, in which a Western firm
contracts to build and bring into operation
an entire plant. A third is the exchange
of technological data with individual
Western companies,
B. As one measure of this effort, Soviet
orders for Western machinery and equipment
hit $2.5 billion last year--a 60 percent
increase over 1972, The US is a major
recipient of such orders, but we by no
means monopolize the field. Only some
$435 million of that $2.5 billion was
placed with American firms.
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C.. A second factor in Moscow's new tactic is
that it sees China as holding a single-minded
hostility toward the USSR,
1. Peking has rebuffed all Soviet overtures
for an improvement of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions, and the border negotiations remain
at square one.
2. China devotes the energies of its new
diplomacy to countering Soviet policy in
every area of international politics.
3. Moscow realizes that this attitude is not
just a peculiarity of Mao's personality,
which will disappear when he does.
III. Both the economic factor and the Chinese factor
are thus fairly long-term ones, and both work in
the same direction on Soviet, foreign policy.
A. Obviously, normal, and amicable relations with
the West are necessary if the Soviets are to
promote their economic objectives. Major
confrontations over Berlin, or Cuba, or the
Middle East would undermine the chances for
technological gain.
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B. Tense relations with the West would also expose
the USSR to the risk of pressure on two fronts:
Western and Eastern. So long as China remains
actively hostile, the Soviets have a strong
interest in keeping relations with the West
on an even keel.
1. In particular, they want to give as little
encouragement as possible to cooperation
between China and the US--which appears to
them as collusion against the Soviet Union.
C. There are positive political incentives as
well. Detente provides a useful climate for
the extension of Soviet influence in Western
Europe. It also promotes the concept of So-
viet equality with the US and Moscow's claim
of its right to be involved in all interna-
tional questions, such as the Middle East.
IV. These current priorities have some impact on re-
lations with the US. Moscow is no longer so ac-
tive and automatic in opposing US policy in every
corner of the globe.
A. This has helped, for example, to get a Viet-
nam settlement and to bring about negotiations
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in the Middle East. It has not, of course,
solved major problems in either area, nor
do the Soviets intend to do that.
B. Brezhnev's personal prestige is commited to
detente. Last year he made his biggest gains
with his trips to Bonn and Washington.
1. All Brezhnev's politburo colleagues now
acknowledge his preeminent position but
he is aware he cannot get too far ahead
of them, and must show some fruits of
detente.
2. Coping with Solzhenitsyn and other dissi-
dents poses a continuing dilemma of how
to square the needs of domestic discipline
with foreign policy considerations.
C. Record grain production led the economy to a
comeback from a dismal 1972 showing, but Mos-
cow's goal of overtaking the US remains as dis-
tant as ever. The USSR still produces only
about half as much as the US with a labor
force 50 percent larger.
V. Logically, detente should also lead to a further
easing of the arms race. But this has not happened
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yet. The Soviet strategic programs which I shall
describe do not violate the SALT agreements, but
they represent a powerful competitive thrust in
the areas not covered by those agreements, mainly
in the area of qualitative improvement.
A. Thus far, Moscow seems to believe that it can
proceed on a vigorous program of weapons
modernization while simultaneously getting
the political and economic benefits of detente.
B. The Russians will probably continue on this
course unless they are persuaded of two things:
--that if they try to push past a relationship
of strategic equality, they will provoke US
reactions which will deny them any strategic
gain and perhaps even worsen their position;
and
--that Soviet restraint would be reciprocated
on terms that would give the USSR both the
image and the substance of equality.
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