SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE IN 1956

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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 30, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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N? 61
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE IN 1956
CIA/RR 111
30 October 1957
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SOVIET FOREIGN TRAUB IN 1956
CIA/RR 111
(ORR Project 42.1716)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
S-E-C-R-E-T
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CONTENTS
Summary
I. Foreign Trade Policy
II. Value and Direction
Page,
1
3
7
A. Free World
9
B. Sino-Soviet Bloc
13
I. European Satellites
13
2. 'Communist China
15
C. Gold .Sales and Policy
16
III.
Commodity Composition
18
A. Free World
21
B. European Satellites
22
C. Communist China and the Asian Satellites
?
?
22
1. Communist China
22
?
2. North Korea
25
3. North Vietnam
26
D. Selected Commodities
26
1. Grain
26
2. Wood Products
28
?
3. Petroleum
29
It. Cotton
31
5. Coal
31
6. Coke
33
7. Ferrous Metals
33
8. Ships
35
IV.
Soviet Aid to the Sino-toviet Bloc
35
A. European Satellites
35
1. Bulgaria
36
2: East Germany
36
3. Poland
39
4. Hungary
hi
5. Rumania
41
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B. Communist China and the Asian Satellites . . .
1. Communist China
2. North Korea
3. North Vietnam
Page
43
43
43
44
V. Economic Coordination in the Soviet Bloc 44
VI. Conclusions 45
Appendixes
Appendix A. Statistical Tables
49
Tables
1. Estimated Share of the USSR in World Trade, 1938,
1948, and 1956
8
2. Credits Accepted and Under Consideration by
Underdeveloped Countries of the Free World from
the Soviet Bloc, 1954-56 11
3. Trade of the European Satellites with the USSR, by
14
Country, 1953-56
4. Estimated Gold Sales and Balances of Trade of the
17
USSR, 1950-56
5. Structure of Imports and Exports of the USSR,
Selected Years, 1938-56 19
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Page
6. Estimated Trade of the European Satellites with
the USSR, by Commodity Group 23
7. Estimated Commodity Composition of Chinese Commu-
nist Imports from the USSR, 1954-55 24
8. Planned Commodity Composition of North Korean'
Exports to the USSR) 1950 25
9. Reported Commodity Composition of North Korean
Imports from the USSR, 1948 26 ?
10. Major Soviet Credits to the European Satellites,
1956 37
11. Estimated Foreign Trade Turnover of the USSR,
1948 and 1950-56 50
12. Geographical Distribution of Trade Between the
USSR and the Free World, 1948 and 1950-56 . . 51
13. Imports from the Free World by the USSR, by
Commodity Group, 1950-55 52
14. Exports from the USSR to the Free World, by
Commodity Group, 1950-55 53
15. Selected Trade Pacts of the USSR, 1955-56 . . 54
Charts
Following Page
Figure 1. Development of the Foreign Trade Turnover
of Selected Countries, 1950-56 8
Figure 2. USSR: Estimated Trade with the Sino-Soviet
Bloc and the Free World, 1937, 1948, and
1950-56
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Figure 3. USSR: Estimated Distribution of Trade
with the Free World, by Area, 1956 . . . 10
Figure 4. USSR: Estimated Total Trade with Other
Members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1950-56
Figure 5. USSR: Estimated Trade with Other Members
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1956
Figure 6. USSR: Principal Exports to the Free World,
1951-55 ' 22
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(ORB. Project 42.1716)
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE IN 1956*
In 1956, Soviet foreign trade reached a peak for the postwar years
estimated to be almost US $6:9 -- a growth rate in foreign
trade far in excess of leading Free World nations. In response to acute
shortages of foreign exchange and consumer goods within the Soviet Bloc,***
the USSR in 1956 launched an extensive and well-publicized campaign of
economic assistance to the European Satellites which resulted in a
Soviet credit commitment of more than $750 million. The modest but in-
geniously designed Soviet efforts in the underdeveloped areas, already
reaping a bountiful harvest of pro-Soviet and anti-Western sentiment,
were still further expanded during the year. Soviet credit extensions
to underdeveloped areas in 1956 were more than five times the value of
Soviet credits extended in 1955. The Soviet propaganda campaign for
"peaceful competitive coexistence" was also pressed with renewed vigor --
in both the United. Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and the
General Assembly the USSR presented elaborate proposals for a new
world economic conference in 1957 in an attempt to cause further dis-
sension in the Free World and nullification of strategic export controls.
In spite of the rapid increase in the volume of Soviet trade and
Soviet propaganda activity in Free World areas) there is little to sug-
gest that the USSR Js giving up its policy of autarky and taking on any
radically new attitudes and patterns of trade. On the contrary, Euro-
pean Satellite manifestations of political and economic independence
* ,The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 1 September 1957.
** Dollar values are given in terms of current US dollars throughout
this report unless otherwise indicated. Ruble values may be converted
at the official rate of 4 rubles to US $1.
*** The Soviet Bloc includes the USSR and the European Satellites --
Albania) Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and
China unless otherwise indicated. The Free World includes all coun-
tries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
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have undoubtedly shaken the growing Soviet confidence in the strength
and unity of the uSocialist camp" and may have served to reinforce the
specter of "capitalist encirclement" -- always a major determinant of
Soviet foreign economic policy. Any significant alteration of Soviet
economic policy with relation to the Satellites as a consequence of
the 1956 political upheavals is at present obscure. In the case of
Poland the degree of political autonomy granted carries with it cer-
tain economic freedom, and Polish trade has displayed an increasing
bias toward the Free World. On the other hand, the Hungarian up-
rising has resulted in the return of some degree of Stalinist control
in Eastern Europe, and the loans and promises of increased trade and
aid manifest in 1956 would seem to indicate that economic ties also
are being fairly firmly maintained.
Perhaps the one salient fact which emerges from a review of Soviet
trade activity during 1956 is that it continues to reflect the growing
economic capability of the USSR. Tilt USSR has exhibited an effective
versatility in directing its trade resources to markets singled out
for special attention by diplomacy and propaganda. Its much vaunted
capability for the export of machinery, unimpressive by Western
standards, has nevertheless found a ready market in the expanding
economies of the lesser developed European Satellite and Free World
countries. The Soviet economic aid program, representing a commitment
of considerably less than 1 percent of Soviet gross national product
(GNP) in 1956, does not yet appear to have caused the USSR any serious
economic strain. Soviet gold reserves, second only to those of the
US, are apparently adequate to satisfy the most pressing demands for
foreign exchange on the part of the USSR and the Satellites.
Thus Soviet foreign trade, of relatively marginal importance for
domestic economic growth, derives its effectiveness abroad less from
its size than from its selectivity. Soviet foreign economic activity
will undoubtedly become a matter of progressively greater concern to
the Free World as the Soviet concept of foreign trade is increasingly
merged, within the limits of Soviet capabilities, with an expanded
use of trade to achieve specific objectives of current foreign policy
the political and economic domination of the Satellites, the economic
penetration of underdeveloped areas, and the creation of dissension
in the Free World.
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I. Foreign Trade Policy.
In spite of the obvious expansion of Soviet trade in the postwar
period, there is little evidence to suggest that the USSR is discard-
ing its policy of autarky and taking on any radically new attitudes
and patterns of trade. The Soviet quest for security apparently lost
none of its urgency in 1956, when Soviet confidence in the strength
and unity of the "Socialist camp" was shaken by Satellite manifesta-
tions of economic and political independence.
It would be erroneous to conclude that Soviet economic philosophy
has viewed the attainment of self-sufficiency as desirable in itself.
Neither in the writings of Soviet economic theoreticians nor in the
official pronouncements of the Soviet government is autarky advocated
as a valid basis for economic organization. On the contrary, the
opposite is commonly asserted, and the advantages and desirability of
an international division of labor and worldwide exchange of goods
have been stressed by Soviet leaders from Lenin to Khrushchev. In
both the pre-World War II and postwar periods, Soviet commercial pol-
icy has incorporated two principal goals: the desire for expansion
of trade with the Free World and the quest, for an economically self-
sufficient state. These goals, far from being mutually exclusive,
serve to complement each other. Selective trade with the Free World
is a major instrument for more rapidly achieving the greater self-
sufficiency which the Soviet leaders desire. Although the actual
policies of the Soviet government have been consistently directed
toward rendering the USSR economically independent of the outside
world, they have been motivated less by a slavish acceptance of au-
tarky as an integral element of Socialist economy than by a relent-
less quest for security against another economic blockade and a de-
termination to insulate the country more effectively from the economic
fluctuations of the "crisis-ridden" capitalist Free World.
With the establishment of a Satellite trading bloc in the postwar
period and with Soviet productive capacity and reserves apparently
considered adequate to meet any contingencies, an element of change
was evident in the official attitude of the USSR toward foreign trade.
A Soviet economist wrote in 1956:
Whereas before the war the USSR found itself in a
capitalist encirclement and the capitalist monopolies
were still successful in obstructing the development
of our foreign trade, after the second world war the
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situation changes radically with the formation of the
Peoples Democracies in Europe and Asia ... . Vast man-
power reserves, natural resources, and the growing
might of the socialist camp are enabling them to pro-
duce almost everything they need. The world socialist
market has all the basic types of goods. Hence the
rapid growth of the trade of the socialist countries,
including the foreign trade of the USSR. 1/*
The Soviet concept of trade as primarily an instrumentality for
promoting industrialization and self-sufficiency was now merged with
that of an expanded use of foreign trade to achieve specific objectives
of current foreign policy. The foreign economic activity of the USSR
has become increasingly political in purpose) directed toward the po-
litical and economic domination of the Satellites, the economic pene-
tration of underdeveloped areas, and the nullification of Free World
export controls. This emergence of Soviet foreign economic activity
as a powerful adjunct of Soviet foreign policy bears testimony not
only to an increasing Soviet economic capability, but -- perhaps of even
greater significance -- to a new Communist appreciation of the role of
foreign trade as a tactical weapon in its struggle with world capitalism.
The Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 (characterized by
First Deputy Premier Mikoyan as "the most important Party Congress since
Lenin") was notable, among other things, for important pronouncements
on foreign trade. The restrictive implications for foreign trade con-
tained in Stalin's concept of "two parallel world markets" as enunciated
in his Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR were subject to tacit
modification by the Congress. Mikoyan urged Soviet economists "to make
a deep study and critical review ... from the point of view of Marxism-
Leninism" of certain postulates in this work and stated that the exist-
ence of two world markets did not preclude trade "between all countries":
We firmly believe that stable, peaceful coexistence is
unthinkable without trade, which can be a good basis for
this in spite of the establishment of two world markets.
The existence of two world markets -- those of socialism
and capitalism -- not only does not preclude, but, on the
contrary, presupposes a developed, mutually profitable
trade between all countries. The correct understanding of
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this question is of fundamental importance from the point
of view of the coexistence of the two worlds and is also
of practical, economic importance. 2/
Mikoyan went on to maintain a position) unique in recent Soviet
pronouncements, that there was much to be gained from the universal
division of labor:
We proceed from the belief that our trade with capi-
talist countries is profitable to both sides and has ob-
jective premises for further development. This is con-
ditioned by the very necessity of the social division of
labor, that universally known tenet that it is not equally
profitable to turn out all forms of production in all
countries. In one country it is easier to produce certain
items; in another, others. The differences in degree of
development of various branches, working class habits,
production traditions, and so forth are all influencing
factors. In this sense, international trade has been and
remains to an ever-increasing degree an expression of the
rational division of labor between the peoples. 2/
The USSR gave the utmost priority to strengthening its relations
with Communist China and the European Satellites. The concept of a
monolithic, increasingly coordinated bloc was given further official
sanction by Khrushchev when he stated:
Today it is no longer necessary for each socialist
country to develop all branches of heavy industry as had
to be done by the Soviet Union) which for a long time was
the only socialist country and existed in a capitalist
encirclement. Now, when there is a powerful community of
socialist countries whose defense potential and security
is based on the industrial might of the entire socialist
camp, each European Peoples Democracy can specialize in
developing those industries and producing those goods for
which it has the most favorable natural and economic con-
ditions. Li./
This division of labor within the Sino-Soviet Bloc was advocated
not only as a means of increasing the strength and security of the
"Socialist camp," but also as a necessary prerequisite "for releasing
considerable resources to develop agriculture and the light industries
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and on this basis to satisfy more fully the material and cultural re-
quirements of the peoples." V
Khrushchev also bad some encouraging words at the Twentieth Party
Congress for the lesser developed areas of the world. He warned the
Free World that "imperialists can no longer regard the underdeveloped
countries solely as potential sources for the extraction of maximum
profits" and assured them of Soviet readiness to help with their in-
dustrial development "on terms of equality and mutual benefit":
These countries) although they do not belong to the
socialist world system, can draw on its achievements to
build up an independent national economy and to raise the
living standards of their peoples. Today they need not
go begging for up-to-date equipment to their former op-
pressors. They can get it in the socialist countries,
free of any political or military obligations. L6/
Soviet economic diplomacy was giVen further impetus at the meeting
of the 11th session of the ECE in April 1956. In a major policy speech,
Ivan G. Kabanov) head of the Soviet delegation and Soviet Minister of
Foreign Trade, urged greater economic cooperation among the European
states and declared that the USSR, "proceeding from the principle of
peaceful coexistence of states with different socialist systems," was
vigorously pursuing a policy of extending mutually advantageous eco-
nomic relations with all countries. Directing his remarks toward
Western Europe, Kabanov held out glowing vistas of an expanding Soviet
economy willing and able to satisfy Europe's pressing demand for coal
and petroleum imports.
Repeating the slogan "Let us trade" proclaimed by Kbrushchev at the
Twentieth Party Congress, the Soviet delegate submitted three proposals
to the ECE, obviously with the purpose of undermining the Institutional
framework and policies of economic cooperation among Free World coun-
tries and the Atlantic alliance. The proposals included the draft of
an all-European agreement of economic cooperation within the framework
of the ECE, the establishment of an ECE committee for the peaceful uses
of atomic energy, and increased contacts between Eastern and Western Eu-
rope. ?
Although the Soviet proposals in the ECE elicited little positive
response, the USSR apparently remained undaunted in its determination
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to pose as the champion of increased East-West trade.* Similar pro-
posals were submitted to the Economic and Social Council of the UN in
the summer of 1956) and on 26 November the USSR proposed to the General
Assembly that a new world trade organization be established within the
framework of the UN and that a world economic conference be called for
1957. These persistent Soviet efforts in the UN and in the ECE may
reflect Soviet disappointment in the trade promotion committees which
grew out of the 1952 Moscow Economic Conference and a decision to use
the UN as a convenient forum for this type of trade promotional propa-
ganda.
II. Value and Direction.
In 1956, Soviet foreign trade reached a peak estimated to be almost
$6.9 billion, in contrast with the prewar peak of $1.8 billion. This
postwar expansion was in large measure a result of rapid strides in in-
dustrialization, intra-Sino-Soviet Bloc specialization) and the increas-
ing use of foreign trade to achieve specific objectives of Soviet foreign
* There is little doubt that the USSR has to some degree successfully
identified itself with the campaign for increased East-West trade. A
public opinion survey published in June 1956 by the United States In-
formation Agency // received the following responses to the question
"As far as you know, does Soviet Russia favor or oppose East-West trade?"
Percent
Great
Britain
West
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Favors
59
60
49
39
68
Opposes
11
7
2
15
5
Qualified
2
1
1
1
2
No opinion
28
32
48
45
25
Total
100
100
100
100
100
Net, "favors"
?
minus "opposes"
48
53
47
24
63
Net, upper socio-
economic level
53
78
57
28
67
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policy. Between 1938 and 1955 the USSR passed from 22d to 6th place
in world trade, and its share of total world trade registeted similar
gains. 'The estimated share of the USSR in world trade in 1938) 1948,
and 1956 is shown in Table 1. The foreign trade of the USSR'in 1956
was almost 170 percent greater than in 1948. By comparison, France
registered a gain of 88 percent; the US, 59 percent; and the UK, only
34 percent (see Figure 1*).
Table 1
Estimated Share of the USSR in World Trade
1938,
1948,
and 1956
Trade
1938
1948
1956
World (billion
current US $)
Exports
26.1
57.7
102.9
Imports
27.7
64.2
107.9
USSR (billion
current US $)
Exports
0.3
1.3
3.4
Imports
0.3
1.3
3.4
USSR (percent
of total)
Exports
1.2
2.3
3.3
Imports
1.1
2.0
3.2
The growth in postwar Soviet foreign trade is almost entirely to
be attributed to the expansion of Soviet trade with the Satellites.
Soviet trade with the rest of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in 1956 was about
300 percent greater than in 1948, but trade with the Free World was
* Following p. 8.
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Figure 1
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOREIGN TRADE TURNOVER
OF SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1950-56
(INDEX VALUE IN CURRENT US DOLLARS)
300
275
250
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
(1948
= 100)
USSR
..../
../
/
0,.....
, .4
FRANCE
...../
/
'
i
/ /........../US
/
"3/4.-.. ....-
---..---
e
.????
--. ?--,
--- ----
7
/ ....
/ ../
?
...... .,..
woof ..................................
?????? .??
...
1950
26094 8-57
1951
1952
1953
SECRET
1954
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less than 40 percent greater (see Figure 2*). For further data on
Soviet trade with the Free World and with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, see
Tables 11, 12, 13) 14) and 15, Appendix A.**
A. Free World.
Free World trade statistics indicate that Soviet trade turn-
over with the Free World rose from $1)233 million in 1955 to an amount
estimated to be $1,588 in 1956. This increase of 29 percent is to be
compared with the expansion of Sino-Soviet Bloc trade with the Free
World) which increased from $4,495 million in 1955 to an amount esti-
mated to be $5,429 million in 1956.***
Soviet trade with the Free World in 1955 and 1956 generally
maintained the geographical pattern of recent years -- approximately
80 percent was with the countries of Western Europe (see Figure 3*).
Large-scale Soviet purchases of Canadian wheat and Malayan rubber in
1956 served to increase the relative shares of North America and the
Far East in Soviet trade. The absence in 1956 of large Soviet pur-
chases of Cuban sugar) which accounted for the relatively large share
of Latin America in Soviet - Free World trade in 1955, resulted in a
significant decrease in the trade of that area with the USSR in 1956.
The UK, having become the chief Free World trading partner of
the USSR in 1955 (receiving about 28 percent of Soviet exports to the
Free World and accounting for about 16 percent of total Soviet imports'
from the Free World) continued to dominate the Soviet trade picture in
1956. Although Soviet exports to the UK have suffered a decline, Soviet
imports from the UK were 75 percent higher than in 1955, giving rise
to a unique (although small) Soviet import surplus. Other Western
European nations of some significance in Soviet trade with the Free
World, in order of importance, were Finland, France, West Germany, the
Netherlands) Belgium-Luxembourg, Italy, and Norway. As a consequence
of the normalization of their political relations in 1955) the USSR
and Yugoslavia rapidly expanded their trade, which reached $32 million
in 1955 compared with $2.5 Million the year before. Preliminary figures
* Following p. 10.
** Pp. 50) 51) 52, 53) and 54, respectively, below.
*** In spite of its substantial increase, Free World trade with the
Sino-Soviet Bloc accounted for only 2.7 percent of total Free World
trade in 1955.
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for 1956 which disclose a mutual trade turnover of almost $112 million
indicate that this rapid expansion of Soviet-Yugoslav trade has not
been inhibited by strained political relations.
Exports from the USSR to the Free World in recent years have
maintained a steady expansion of approximately 25 percent annually
and in 1956 were more than twice the level of 1953. On the other hand,
Soviet imports from the Free World vary from year to year with the
changing requirements of the USSR for raw materials. The increased
purchases of Canadian grain and Malayan rubber, together with substan-
tial purchases of copper wire from the UK (more than one-fourth of all
Soviet imports from the UK), resulted in a considerable increase in
Soviet imports from the Free World in 1956. The absence of its cus-
tomary export surplus with the UK, on which the USSR has hitherto re-
lied for sterling with which to settle its deficit with other nondollar
countries, was probably a major contributing factor to the record Soviet
gold sales in 1956 and early 1957.
The most striking aspect of the new Soviet economic diplomacy
is the entry of the Soviet Bloc into the foreign lending field, espe-
cially in the underdeveloped areas. After years of denouncing foreign
aid as an instrument of Free World imperialism, the USSR and the Euro-
pean Satellites have, through 31 December 1956, signed agreements to
extend to underdeveloped countries about $1.4 billion in credit for
the purchase of Bloc goods and technical services, including arms.*
The largest single beneficiary is to be Yugoslavia, with $464 million.
With the exception of Yugoslavia, the emphasis of this lending drive
has been on the underdeveloped nations of the Near East and South Asia.
Egypt with $283.6 million, India with $281.9 million, Afghanistan with
$161.9 million, and Indonesia with $112.3 million account for the bulk
of the remaining credits. The USSR is providing a little more than
half of the credits extended and the European Satellites the remainder.
Credits accepted and under consideration by underdeveloped countries
of the Free World from the Soviet Bloc in 1954-56 are shown in Table 2.**
Although the initiative in the economic offensive has come
from the USSR, the European Satellites have become the spearhead of
the offensive insofar as it involves trade rather than aid. Although
the USSR is now the world's second greatest industrial power, it is
still a net importer of capital equipment. The planned rates of Soviet
economic expansion and production of armaments apparently require a
* See Table 15, Appendix A, p. 541 below.
** Table 2 follows on p. 11.
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USSR
ESTIMATED TRADE WITH THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC AND THE FREE WORLD*
1937, 1948, AND 1950-56
Figure 2
11%
1-1 SINO-SOVIET BLOC
[1 FREE WORLD
(Millions of current US dollars)
611
89%
2550
49%
.3200
17%
4500
24%
5200
7.
1,/
20%
5750
17%
6250
22%
6300
23%
6875
. 35
25%
1937 1948 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
' Figures are derived entirely from Soviet sources and differ horn Free World data.
"Excluding East Germany.
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USSR
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF TRADE
WITH THE FREE WORLD, BY AREA, 1956
OCEAN IA
0.4%
U.S. & CANADA
LATIN AMERICA
WESTERN EUROPE
/ISNEAR EAST
.,?
& AFRICA
FAR EAST
Compiled from Free World sources.
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Table 2
Credits Accepted and Under Consideration
by Underdeveloped Countries of the Free World from the Soviet Bloc12/
1954-56
Million Current US $
Area and Country
Credits Accepted
(1 January 1954 -
31 December 1956)
Credit Offers
Under Consideration
(31 December 1956)
Total
Middle East and Africa
Egypt
283.6
236.0
519.6
Ethiopia
3.0
0
3.0
Iran
3.0
0
3.0
Lebanon
o
1.0
1.0
Saudi Arabia
0
5.0
5.0
Sudan
0
0.7
0.7
Syria
80.2
24.8
105.0
Turkey
16.9
220.5
237.4
Yemen
9.0
0
9.0
Subtotal
395.7
488.o
883.7
South and Southeast Asia
Afghanistan
161.9
0
161.9
India
281.9
22.0
303.9
Indonesia
112.3
0
112.3
Subtotal,
556.1
22.0
578.1
Europe
Iceland
1.7
9.5
11.2
Yugoslavia
464.0
o
464.0
Subtotal
14654
22
475.2
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Table 2
Credits Accepted and Under Consideration
by Underdeveloped Countries of the Free World from the Soviet Bloc
1954-56
(Continued)
Million Current US $
Credits Accepted
(1 January 1954 -
Credit Offers
Under Consideration
Area and Country
31 December 1956)
(31 December 1956)
Total
Latin America
Argentina
21.5
15.0
36.5
Brazil
2.6
11.5
14.1
Cuba
o
3.0
3.0
Mexico
0.1
o
0.1
Subtotal
24.2
29.5
53.7
Total
1,441.7
549.0
1,990.7
higher rate of industrial investment than the engineering industries of
the country can support from their own production. On the other hand,
the industrial progress of the European Satellites since the war has
made them less dependent on imports of Free World capital goods and more
anxious to find markets where they can sell the products of their own
industries and procure raw materials for them. The Satellites histori-
cally have maintained important connections with the underdeveloped areas,
whereas prewar Soviet trade with these areas was insignificant and Soviet
engineering products virtually unknown. These factors partly explain why
in 1956 the total trade of the Satellites with the Near East, Africa,
Asia, and Latin America amounted to more than 600 million, but the trade
of the USSR with these areas amounted to less than $250 million.
Soviet Bloc credits cover a fairly wide variety of projects for
developing industry, power, transport, and mineral resources as well as
facilities for scientific research and education. In each case, pro-
jects have been skillfully devised to have a particular appeal to the
recipient country, and initially at least, the psychological impact of
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the assistance has been substantial. The USSR has impressed most of
the recipients by the speed with which it has completed loan negotia-
tions and implemented agreements and by the quality of equipment and
technical service furnished. There seems little doubt that Soviet
efforts in underdeveloped areas have reaped significant political and
economic rewards. Although exports of capital goods tend to inten-
sify Soviet domestic economic problems, the imports in return, espe-
cially agricultural commodities, have a countervailing effect. The
total aid program is less than 1 percent of Soviet GNP, and there is
every evidence that the USSR has the capability to carry on indefi-
nitely with an economic program of this type.
B. Sino-Soviet Bloc.
At the Twentieth Party Congress, Premier Bulganin announced
that Soviet trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc was 19.5 billion rubles,
or $4.87 billion, in 1955. This figure, when compared with a total
for 1954 estimated to be $4.90 billion, represents a detrease of about
$30 million, the first such decline since the development of the so-
called "Socialist world market" (see Table 6*). This stabilization of
Soviet trade with the rest of the Sino-Soviet Bloc was only temporary
(see Figure 4**) -- $5.2 billion is estimated for 1956 (see Figure 5**),
and a planned goal of $5.8 billion has been reported for1957. 27
L. European Satellites.
SoViet trade with the European Satellites failed to main-
tain the large annual increases of the immediate postwar years. Con-
versely, the Satellites have shown both a masked shift in trade to
the Free World*** and a corresponding decrease in the share of this
total trade which is directed to the USSR. The trade of the European
Satellites with the USSR, by countries, in 1953-56 is shown in
Table 3.**** One apparent reason for the relative stability in Soviet
trade with the Satellites is the failure of the USSR to maintain its
previous level of export of consumer goods, particularly grain exports,
to the Satellites, where tiro bad harvests had raised import require-
ments. For example, out of total Satellite imports of 3.9 million
* P. 23, below.
** Following p. 14.
*** The trade of the European Satellites with the Free World was
$1.5 billion in 1953, $1.8 billion in 1954, and $2:4 billion in 1955
and is estimated to have been $2.8 billion in 1956.
**** Table 3 follows on p. 14.
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Table 3
of the European Satellites with the
1953-56
Percent of Total
USSR, by Country
for Each Country
Country
1953
1954
1925
1956
Bulgaria 2/
57
45
46
50
Czechoslovakia b
35
36
35
33
East Germany c
46
44
38
45
Hungaryy
32
29
22
30
Poland e
33
38
32
27
metric tons* of grain in the year 1 July 1955 to 30 June 1956, no more
than 1.7 million tons were supplied by the USSR. 12/ The Satellite
quest for foreign exchange with which to purchase needed goods in the
Free World necessarily led to a forced expansion of exports to that
area. Another contributing factor has been the apparent difficulty
faced by the Satellites (already heavily in debt to the USSR) in fi-
nancing their import surpluses from the USSR by drawing on Soviet
credits. The long-term credit extensions of the USSR to the Satellites
in 1956 were the first such major loans since 1950 (excluding those to
East Germany in 1953) and were apparently motivated in part by a belated
recognition of Satellite difficulties in their trade and payments rela-
tions with the USSR.
The moderate increase in Soviet trade with the European
Satellites in 1956 may be attributed to three factors. (a) The excel-
lent Soviet harvest in 1956 has probably removed the difficulties in
meeting Satellite import needs for 1957. (b) The payments position of
Poland, East Germany, Rumania, and Hungary in relation to the USSR has
been considerably improved by the economic agreements in late 1956.
* Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
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USSR: ESTIMATED TOTAL TRADE WITH OTHER MEMBERS
OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1950-56
Figure 4
PERCENTAGE CHANGE
OVER PREVIOUS YEAR
TOTAL TRADE
current rubles)
19.0
19.6
19.5
20.6"
L......J
13z.
7 ?
(Billion
15%
16.6
22%
_
13.6
28%
. .
10.6
-
104%*
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
` Above the level of 1948
" Planned
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USSR
ESTIMATED TRADE WITH OTHER MEMBERS
OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1956
(Million current US dollars)
OTHER
SINO-SOVIET BLOC
*Communist China data place Chinese trade
with the USSR somewhat higher than
announced Soviet figures.
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These arrangements include new credits, the canceling of some old debts,
and the postponement of repayments of others. (c) The conclusion of
trade agreements in 1956 calling for a "significant increase" in mutual
deliveries and the signing of supplementary trade protocols in mid-1956
with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland suggest an expan-
sion of Soviet-Satellite trade in 1956 and a considerable increase in
1957 (see Figure 5*).
The rate. of growth of trade between the USSR and the Euro-
pean Satellites after 1956 will probably depend on the extent to which
industrial and agricultural specialization and manifestations of eco-
nomic and political independence in the Satellites result in a reorien-
tation of their trade toward the Free World. Any modification of Soviet
economic policy toward the Satellites because of the political upheavals
in 1956 is, at this point, difficult to determine. In the case of Poland,
the degree of political autonomy granted carries with it a certain eco-
nomic freedom and, in point of fact, Poland's trade has displayed an in-
creasing bias in favor of the Free World. On the other hand, it would
be difficult to argue that the Hungarian uprisix4: has not resulted in
the revival of some degree of Stalinist control 4n Eastern Europe, and
the loans and promises of increased trade and al to the Satellites both
before and after the rebellion would seem to indi ate the economic ties,
too) are being rather firmly maintained.
2. Communist China.
Soviet trade with Communist China In 1956 is estimated to
be less than $1,400 million. The USSR indicated that China accounted
for about 20 percent of its foreign trade during 1956. No information
is available on the balance of Sino-Soviet trade during 1956, although
the USSR has continued to stress that its trade with the Sino-Soviet
Bloc is planned to balance in each year. During 1956, Communist China
may have utilized about $50 million under the industrial loan of $130
million which was extended by the USSR in October 1954, and it probably
made a repayment of $30 million to the USSR as required by the terms
of the industrial loan of 1950. If remaining trade movements were in
approximate balance, the Chinese would have shown an import balance of
about $20 million on the Soviet account, with imports from the USSR of
$710 million and exports to the USSR of $690 million.
* Following p. 14, above.
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C. Gold Sales and Policy.
In recognition that "short-term discrepancies between income
and expenditure are not impossible even in the balance of payments of
the USSR)" 1.6./ Soviet gold resources are an integral part of Soviet
foreign exchange reserves and operate as a fund out of which temporary
disequilibriums in the Soviet balance of external payments with the
Free World can be met. Soviet sales of gold, however, remain an uncer-
tain factor in Free World markets, as these sales appear to be dependent
upon the level of Soviet gold and foreign exchange reserves) Soviet
willingness to employ gold as payment for net commodity imports) and
the extent to which the USSR will assume the foreign exchange obliga-
tions of the European Satellites. The apparent reluctance with which
the USSR has employed gold to settle its international accounts shows
that it prefers to balance imports with merchandise exports. This posi-
tion was reaffirmed in a recent textbook on foreign trade which states:
"The Socialist state aims at balancing imports with exports, since only
such a balance can, in the long run, provide a healthy basis for inter-
national trade." However, "gold and foreign exchange have sometimes
been used if the need arose for urgent imports of certain commodities)
and if export commodity resources could not be mobilized fast enough
for such imports." 11/
Estimated gold sales and balances of trade of the USSR in 1950-56
are shown in Table U. Sales of gold by the USSR have declined from $150
million in 1953 and $93 million in 1954 to $70 million in 1955, which
may indicate that the increasingly favorable Soviet trade position with
the Free World (evident since 1953) has militated against any further
large-scale flows of Soviet gold to the Free World. Data available
for 1956) however, suggest a rather pronounced change in the Soviet
trade position with reference to both the Free World and the sterling
area.
The sizable sales of Soviet gold in 1956, estimated to be $150
million, cannot be accounted for merely in terms of the normal replenish-
ment of sterling reserves. In spite of trade surpluses with the sterling
area in the past, Soviet sterling reserves are not believed to be large,
and the demand for transferable sterling with which to settle the net
deficit of the USSR with other nondollar countries has not measurably
diminished. The abnormally heavy Soviet purchases of raw materials
and semiprocessed materials in the sterling area during 1956, however,
* Table 4 follows on p. 17.
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coupled with the increasing assumption by the USSR of Satellite foreign
exchange obligations, appear to be the major motivations of the recent
Soviet sales.
Table it
Estimated Gold Sales and Balances of Trade of the USSR 2/
1950-56
Million Current US $
Balances of Trade
Year
Gold
Sales
Total
Free World
UK
Other
Sterling Areas
1950
-90
+44
-83
1951
-35
+8o
-65
1952
-91
+37
-39
1953
150
-107
+65
-56
1954
93
-147
+63
-73
1955
70
-62
+65
-41
1956
150
-57
-25
-23
50X1
Although considerations of doctrine apparently do not prevent
the USSR from using gold either to settle moderate import surpluses or
to extend economic assistance to friendly nations, it appears unlikely
that the country will resort to gold financing on any large and per-
manent scale. If this assumption is correct, it is still necessary
to account in some way for the inordinately large Soviet gold reserve,
far larger than the prescribed 25-percent gold backing for the ruble
would appear to require. One possibility is that the USSR has thus
far refrained from any large-scale diminution of its gold reserve be-
cause of its belief in the inevitability of a major capitalist crisis
during which Soviet gold stocks could be employed with telling effect.
It has often been suggested that the USSR may dump gold on the world market
in an attempt to disrupt further the already dislocated Free World econo-
mies. If the USSR does intend to employ its gold reserves as a weapon of
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economic warfare, Soviet economic writers are obviously reluctant to
discuss the matter. It appears unlikely, however, that the USSR seri-
ously harbors any such plan. Any economic dislocations which would
result from Soviet dumping would be merely temporary, at most, in view
of existing national and international devices to insulate Free World
economies from such contingencies. Furthermore, if such a policy were
vigorously pursued, it could stimulate faltering economies of the Free
World through a reinforcement of foreign exchange reserves and might
depress the price of gold to the great disadvantage of the USSR, itself
a major gold producer.
The rationale for the large gold reserves of the USSR might be
found in the peculiar, almost mercantilist preeminence which it attri-
butes to its store of precious metals, most particularly to its gold
reserve. This psychological attachment to gold, however, may be moti-
vated by several more practical considerations. In the light of recent
Satellite manifestations of political and economic independence, it may
be assumed that the emphasis on large and growing state reserves as a
protective buffer against the economic encroachments of Free World
capitalism has not measurably abated. Soviet gold reserves, according
to the Soviet economist A. Notkin, still "provide the insurance neces-
sary to protect the USSR from major shifts in international market con-
ditions, the possibility of partial or general economic and financial
blockade, the possibility of crop failure within the country and the
possibility of direct armed assult upon the USSR." 1?/ To a lesser
extent, Soviet gold reserves have provided useful grist for its propa-
ganda machine. This identification of wealth with gold has enabled
the USSR not only to demonstrate its extreme solvency to hesitant Free
World businessmen, but also to prove to both neutralist Asians and
faltering Satellites the efficacy of the Communist system.
III. Commodity Composition.
The first usable percentage data on the commodity composition of
Soviet foreign trade in the recent period is contained in The National
Economy of the USSR, a statistical compilation reflecting the economic
development of the USSR between 1913 and 1956. Data from this work on
the structure of imports and exports of the USSR for selected years,
1938-56, are shown in Table 5.* For further data, see Tables 13 and
14, Appendix A.**
* Table 5 follows on p. 19.
** Pp. 52 and 53, reaPectively, below.
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Table 5
Structure of Imports and Exports of the USSR 2/
Selected Years, 1938-56
Percent of Total
1938
1950
1954
1955
1956
Exports
Machinery and equipment
5.0
16.3
21.5
24.3
19.5
Fuel, raw materials, and stock
Coal
1.0
0.3
1.1
1.4
1.8
Petroleum and petroleum products
7.8
1.5
4.2
6.2
7.1
Ferrous and nonferrous metals
1.6
12.6
18.2
15.0
14.2
Lumber
14.1
2.0
2.6
3.3
2.6
Other timber products
6.o
0.9
1.0
1.5
1.0
Cotton
1.9
11.7
12.1
11.5
8.6
Fiber-flax products
1.7
0.5
0.1
0.2
0.4
Furs
9.4
3.3
1.2
1.4
1.2
32.2
tie. ,f-
'Jo. C
4.')
Subtotal 0 C
57.7
50.7
58.5
57.4
66.1
Grain
21.3
18.5
12.2
10.5
7.1
Consumer goods
Meat and dairy products, eggs
0.3
4.6
0.1
0.3
1.1
Sugar
2.5
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.6
Fabrics
4.8
2.7
1.6
1.6
1.0
7.6-
r3
i.L
1.1
Subtotal
16.0
14.5
LI
8.0
ia
Total exports
"100.0
v100.0
v100.0
100.0
1.00.0
/00. 2
Imports
Machinery and equipment
34.5
27.1
32.6
35.3
26.6
Fuel, raw materials, and stock
Coal
2.3
3.7
3.4
1.8
Petroleum and petroleum products
1.2
5.5
3.3
3.4
2.1
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Table 5
Structure of Imports and Exports of the USSR
Selected Years, 1938-56
(Continued)
Percent of Total
3,938
3,950
1954
1955
1956
Imports (Continued)
Fuel, raw materials, and stock
(Continued)
Ores and concentrates
2.6
1.7
3.6
4.1
11.1
Ferrous and nonferrous metals
25.9
9.3
5.8
5.2
5.9
Natural rubber
3.5
3.8
o.4
o.8
3.0
Cotton
1.8
0.2
0.2
0.5
1.6
Other textile raw materials
7.9
5.5
6.8
5.6
4.8
Peanuts, soybeans, and other
oilseeds
0.1
3.1
3.6
3.7
3.0
Subtotal
60.7
56.6
46.2
44.6
55.1
Consumer goods
Meat and dairy products, eggs
0.3
1.9
6.o
4.4
2.8
Sugar
3.8
1.9
3.3
0.8
Fruit and vegetables
1.9
1.0
1.6
1.6
1.6
Fabrics
o.4
4.7
4.3
3.4
4.1
Subtotal
4.8
16.3
21.2
20.1
18.3
Total imports
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
The emergence of industrial equipment as a major-component of Soviet
exports is the most significant change in the commodity composition of
Soviet foreign trade since the end of World War II. The Soviet govern-
ment reported that machinery and equipment made up 19.5 percent of its
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exports to all markets in 1956. In 1938, the last reported prewar year,
only 5 percent of Soviet exports consisted of goods in the machinery
category, worth approximately $13 million in prices of that year.
Another major change shown by the latest Soviet data on trade is
the decline of grain as a dominant export item. In 1956, grain ac-
counted for only 7.1 percent of total exports compared with 21.3 per-
cent in 1938.
Apart from these two categories, raw materials continue to make
up the core of the Soviet export potential. This broad group of com-
modities accounted for 57.7 percent of total Soviet exports in 19381
and it accounted for 66.1 percent in 1956. Within this area, however,
a number of notable changes have occurred. Exports of semiprocessed
metal and raw cotton have increased, while coal and petroleum exports
remained substantially the same. At the same time, exports of raw
furs and lumber declined in relative importance.
A. Free World.
The commodity pattern of Soviet imports from the Free World
during 1955 showed a marked shift toward increased procurement of in-
dustrial equipment and ships (see Table 13, Appendix A*). There was
an increase of 27 percent in shipments to the USSR in 1955 above the
level of 1954 in the broad category of machinery and transport equip-
ment, or a total of $184.7 million compared with $145.1 million. As
a proportion of total Soviet imports from the Free World, this cate-
gory rose to 30.8 percent in 1955 compared with 25.3 percent in 1954.
Ships were the largest item in this category of goods, totaling $105
million compared with $71 minion in 1954. Imports of metal into the
USSR in 1955 were double the value of 1954, $57 million compared with
$28 million. The largest element in this expansion was the heavy So-
viet purchases of copper wire, $36.6 million in 1955 and $6.4 million
in 1954. Soviet imports of foodstuffs declined somewhat in 1955 from
the level of 1954 in spite of an increase in imports of sugar and rice.
The absolute decline was due in part to reduced purchases of meat and
the cessation of butter imports.
The Soviet export structure with the Free World in 1955 con-
tinued to show a saarp decline in grain exports and a rise in the
* P. 52, below.
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export of petroleum products (see Figure 6* and Table 14, Appendix A**).
The category "Mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials" increased
from $8.2 million in 1950, or 3.3 percent of total Soviet exports to the
Free World, to $110.2 million in 1955, or 17.4 percent of this total.
Since mid-1954, this component of Soviet exports has replaced grain as
one of the major earners of Free World currencies (see Figure 6*).
B. European Satellites.
Although precise information on the composition of Soviet trade
with the European Satellites is lacking, there is little evidence to
suggest any major change in the general pattern of Soviet-Satellite
commodity trade in 1956. On the basis of published trade agreements
and other data the USSR apparently still remains, with the Satellites
as with the Free World, a net importer of capital equipment, and the
bulk of Soviet exports to the Satellites consists of raw materials,
fuel, and foodstuffs. The trade of the European Satellites with the
USSR, by commodity groups, is shown in Table 6.***
C. Communist China and the Asian Satellites.
1. Communist China.
More than 90 percent of the exports of Communist China
to the USSR in 1954 and 1955 moved by rail and river routes, but no
detailed intelligence is available on their composition. Chinese rail
shipments to the USSR consisted of commodities of low and medium value,
such as grains and foodstuffs, pig iron, minerals, and cement, and also
of products having a much higher value per ton, such as silk, wool,
bristles, nonferrous ores, and leather products. River shipments con-
sisted of such low-value products as timber, grain, and cement. 21/
The USSR has announced that assistance to Communist China
in the construction of 211 industrial projects (originally 156 but
increased to 211 in April 1956) will involve the export of equipment
and machinery worth slightly more than $2 billion. g2/ Although the
exact time period involved is not known, it probably covers the period
of the Chinese First Five Year Plan (1953-57) and several years of the
Second Five Year Plan (1958-62). The value of the industrial equipment
* Following p. 22.
** P. 53, below.
*** Table 6 follows on p.23.
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SECRET
280
240
200
16
12
8
4
USSR
PRINCIPAL EXPORTS TO THE FREE WORLD
1951-55
(Million current US dollars)
Figure 6
GRAIN
/
/
/
WOOD
......?
te
/
.0.-- ...----?
............. ...
1
rm.. . :Ca .......
1
---_,
r
PETROLEUM
7?? ? ?ose ............. ...........
N/??? 4
?
... COTTON
1951
26099 8-57
1952
1953
SECRET
1954
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Table 6
Estimated Trade of the European Satellites with the USSR
by Commodity Group 2/
Percent of Total
Commodity Group
. Poland
(Planned 1957)
East Germany
(Planned 1956)
Czecho-
slovakia
(1955)
Hungary
(1956)
Exports
Machines
41.0
76.3
75.1
58.8
Raw materials
49.0
20.0
15.0
Food and consumer
[41.2
goods
10.0
3.7
9.1
Total
100.0
100.0
99.2
100.0
Imports
Machines
24.0
1.6
25.0
11.0
Raw materials
N.A.
70.8
44.o
87.0
Food and consumer
goods
N.A.
27.6
28.0
2.0
Total
100.0
100.0
97.0
100.0
a. 2S31
which China receives from the USSR under this program is estimated to
average from $250 million to $300 million annually during 1953-60, with
an acceleration of deliveries toward the end of the period.* In addition,
* This estimate of the annual value of Imports of equipment from the USSR
is from Soviet sources and is approximately confirmed by Chinese Communist
statements. The Chinese have said that the total cost of the industrial
projects built during 1956 under the First Five Year Plan will be 11 bil-
lion yuan, of which it is estimated from other Chinese statements that
about 45 percent (or 5 billion yuan) will be for mechanical equipment. The
Chinese have stated that 50 to 70 percent of irootnote continued on p. 2127
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during 1953-55 the USSR also exported to China vehicles, metals, agri-
cultural machinery, military goods (on current account), essential raw
materials and supplies, and miscellaneous products, with an annual value
of $425 million. The estimated commodity composition of Chinese Com-
munist imports from the USSR in 1954-55 on barter account is shown in
Table 7.
Table 7
Estimated Commodity Composition of Chinese Communist Imports
from the USSR 2/
1954-55
Commodity
1954
1955
Volume
(Thousand
Metric .
Value
(Million
Current
US $)
Volume
(Thousand
Metric
Value
(Million
Current
US $)
POL
870
44
1,165
60
Steel
200
30
200
30
Military end items
(imports on current
account only)
30
150
30
150
Other (industrial
equipment and
supplies and
miscellaneous)
225
321
400
560
Total
1,325
1,795
800
the mechanical equipment for these projects will be delivered by the
USSR, and it will be worth from 2.5 billion to 3.5 billion yuan. This
is equivalent (at the present yuan-dollar exchange rate) to about $1
billion to $1.5 billion, or an annual average for the 5 years of $200
million to $300 million.
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2. North Korea.
The planned commodity composition of North Korean exports to
the USSR in 1950 is shown in Table 8.
Table 8
Planned Commodity Composition of North Korean Exports to the USSR 2/
1950
Commodity
Value
(Million Current US $)
Percent
of Total
Nonferrous metals and minerals
30.2
42
Ferrous metals and minerals
27.5
38
Chemicals
11.0
15
Other
3.4
5
Total
72.1
100
a. ai
The reported commodity composition of North Korean imports
from the USSR in 1948 (the latest year for which data are available) is
shown in Table 9.*
In the period following the Korean War, Soviet trade with
North Korea on barter account developed slowly and probably did not
exceed $25 million in 1955 and $35 million in 1956. The USSR delivered
materials to North Korea under a grant-in-aid program, however) which
amounted to $97.5 million in 1954, $85 million in 1955, and is estimated
to be $67.5 million in 1956. Soviet deliveries of aid material to North
Korea in 1954 consisted of consumer goods such as food, shoes, drugs,
cloth, and wool (representing 23 percent of identified commodities);
flow capital goods such as cement) iron and steel, POL) building mater-
ials) and chemicals (representing 40 percent of identified commodities);
and fixed capital goods such as railroad equipment, vehicles) farm
* Table 9 follows on p. 26.
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Table 9
Reported Commodity Composition of North Korean Imports from the USSR 2/
1948
Value Percent
Commodity (Million Current US $) of Total
Machinery and raw materials for
nonconsumer goods industries 14.6 57
Raw materials for consumer goods
industries 5.1 20
Consumer goods 5.7 22
Medical supplies 0.2 0.7
Other . 0.1 0.3
Total
25.7 100.0
machinery, industrial machinery, and tools (representing 37 percent of
identified commodities). The composition of aid deliveries in 1955 and
J956 was approximately the same as in 1954. 4.61
3. North Vietnam.
The commodity composition of Soviet exports to North Vietnam
in 1955 is not available in detail, but it included $15 million of rice
which the USSR purchased from Burma and delivered to North Vietnam under
the Soviet grant-in-aid program for North Vietnam Additional Soviet
deliveries to North Vietnam were POL and possibly fertilizer. North
Vietnamese exports to the USSR were relatively insignificant in 1955,
probably consisting of such native products as spices, rattan, and
fruits.
D. Selected Commodities.
1. Grain.
Before World War I, Russia was a leading exporter of grain,
shipping abroad about 10 million tons per year. Grain exports in this
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period accounted for about 50 percent of the Russian agricultural exports
by value, and animal products constituted another 25 percent. Grain
exports declined sharply during the interwar years. After World War II,
exports to non-Soviet Bloc nations were resumed, but on a comparatively
small scale, reaching a peak of about 2 million tons of 1951/52. From
1951/52 to 1954/55, exports to the Free World declined steadily, falling
to less than 800,000 tons in 1954/55. In 1955/56, there was a slight
increase in grain shipments to non-Bloc countries. In February 1956 the
USSR signed a trade agreement with Canada in which the USSR contracted
to purchase 1.2 million to 1.5 million tons of wheat over a 3-year per-
iod in annual quantities of from 400,000 to 500,000 tons. 22./ In 1956
the specified 400,000 tons were imported by the USSR. 2E,/
Since World War II the USSR has had to supply grain to the
European Satellites, countries which before the war had been surplus
grain producers. Net grain exports to the Satellites reached a high
of about 2.5 million tons in 1953/54, but in the last 2 years they have
declined to less than 2 million tons. It is expected that in 1956/57
grain exports to the Satellites will be increased substantially -- a
record grain crop in 1956 in the USSR together with a rather poor har-
vest in the Satellites makes this likely. A report on Rumanian imports
of grain from the USSR stated: "Apart from its exports to the Rumanian
Peoples Republic the Soviet Union supplies wheat to other Socialist
countries, among which are Czechoslovakia, Albania, Hungary, Yugoslavia,
the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, and other countries.
Only this year 5pparently referring to 1956/527the Soviet Union is
exporting to these countries, under very advantageous conditions, up
to 5 million tons of wheat."* Long-term loans have been announced be-
tween the USSR and Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria in which the USSR con-
tracted to export in 1957 1.4 million tons of wheat to Poland, 12/
450,000 tons of wheat and 6o,000 tons of feed grain to Rumania, 11/
and an unspecified amount of grain to Bulgaria. In view of these grain
loans and of estimates of Satellite needs in relation to the current
Soviet policy of increased aid to the Satellites, it is possible that as
much as 5 million tons of grain may be exported to them in 1956/57.
* The reference is to "wheat," but the 5 million tons may refer to
total grain exports. A very large share of the grain exports to the
European Satellites will be wheat, however) because this grain is of
greatest value to the Satellites, and a favorable year in the "new
lands" has given the USSR an increased supply of wheat.
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Because of the expected increase in Soviet exports to the
European Satellites, it is unlikely that there will be any significant
increase in Soviet exports to Free World countries. The trade agreement
recently signed with Finland, a major importer, calls for an increased
amount of rye) with no significant change in the total.
2. Wood Products.
In terms of net trade in wood products, the USSR rose from
a $10-million import position in 1952 to a $124-mi11ion export position
in 1955.* This change in the Soviet market position was primarily the
result of an increase in exports of lumber and a decline in imports of
prefabricated houses. Although the wood shipments in 1955 amounted to
less than 2 percent of Soviet production of wood, 22/ they were suffi-
cient to rank the USSR along with other principal wood-exporting coun-
tries such as Finland, Sweden, and Canada. Although the exports of
other principal wood-exporting countries declined in 1956, net exports
of wood from the USSR continued at the same high level as in 1955. 211/
The USSR has been greatly interested in using wood as a means of pay-
ment this year and has made attractive price concessions on certain
specifications. The successful timing of these concessions indicates
that the Soviet export organization is in a position to take advantage
of limited market opportunities more effectively than the numerous in-
dividual exporters of the Free World. 32/
In 1955 the USSR exported pulpwood to the Free World for the
first time since 1950, and pulpwood exports are expected to amount to
$8 million in 1956.**
Soviet imports of prefabricated houses from Finland, which
ranged from $23 million to $28 million during 1951-54, dropped to less
than $8 million in 1955. The Finnish prefabricated industry, which
exports 70 percent of its products to the USSR, suffered accordingly.
Although the Soviet-Finnish trade agreement called for $23 million
worth of prefabricated buildings in 1956, the USSR discontinued buying
prefabricated houses entirely in 1956, and the Finnish prefabricated
industry is having difficulty locating new markets. 3// When Finland
.* Dollar values in this section are in terms of 1955 US dollars. Net
exports of wood from the USSR amounted to almost $500 million in 1937,
including exports from the Baltic countries. 32/
** Soviet export's of pulpwood amounted to more than $50 million in
1937. ay
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ceded territory to the USSR in 1944, a portion of the woodworking capa-
city of Finland was separated from its raw material base, and Finnish
wood transportation costs increased proportionately. aLii Amelioration
of this situation was initiated in 1955 by the shipment of wood from
the USSR to Finland. In 1955 the USSR exported $500,000 worth of pulp-
wood to Finland, and it is expected to ship $1.5 million worth of pulp-
wood and $5 million worth of timber to Finland in 1956.
In recent years, trade in wood products between the USSR
and other Soviet Bloc countries has been in rou0 balance. It is esti-
mated that the USSR imports from $5 million to $10 million worth of
wood from Rumania and exports about the same quantity to Hungary. Most
of these imports and exports are merely exchanges on paper -- wood is
shipped directly from Rumania to Hungary and is credited to the USSR
under trilateral trade agreements. 32/ The USSR plans to send about
$500,000 worth of lumber and timber to Hungary this year above its
usual commitments and free of charge. About $300,000 worth of this relief
lumber had been snipped from the Ukraine to Hungary as of 15 November
1956.112/
3. Petroleum.
Soviet exports
(net of foreign exports on
to about 5.76 million tons
crude oil), having a value
exports in 1955 of about 4
and 29 percent crude oil),
of crude oil and refined petroleum products
Soviet account) in 1956 may have increased
(70 percent refined products and 30 percent
of about $140 million compared with Soviet
.57 million tons (71 percent refined products
having a value of about $105 million.* Soviet
* If estimates. of exports in 1955 from Austria by (1) the SMV (Soviet
Oil Administration) and later by (2) Austria on the Soviet reparations
account are included, the estimate of Soviet exports in 1955 would rise
to approximately 5.91 million tons (64 percent refined products and 36
percent crude oil), having a value of about $132 million.
The foregoing does not. take account of any intra-Austria sales made
by the SMV during 1955. If intra-Austria sales, which are roughly cal-
culated to have been about 1.2 million tons and to have a value of about
$25 million, are included, the estimate of total Soviet petroleum exports
in 1955 is raised to approximately 7.11 million tons, having a value of
about $157 million.
On the basis of Soviet data in Table 5 (p. 19, above), 1.41/ however,
the value of Soviet petroleum exports in 1955
million.
the validity of the latter estimate Lfootnote continued on p. 32(50X1
is computed to be $204
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imports of petroleum in 1956 may have declined very slightly to about
4.38 million tons (virtually all refined products), having a value of
$130 million, compared with Soviet imports in 1955 of about 4.40 million
tons (virtually all refined products), having a value of about $129
million.* On balance, therefore, the Soviet foreign trade account (net
of foreign shipments on Soviet account) in petroleum for 1956 may have
shown a net export balance of 1.38 million tons, having a value of $9.99
million,** compared with 1955, when total export and import quantities
were virtually equal (4.57 million tons and 4)40 million tons, respec-
tively). In terms of value, however, there remained a net import bal-
ance in 1955 of approximately $25 million (imports, $130 million, and
exports, $105 million).
Soviet exports to the Free World increased in 1956 above
the level of 1955 more sharply than those to the Sino-Soviet Bloc --
that is, from. $70.6 million tc $93.8 million for the Free World, and
from $41.6 million to only $46.3 million for the Bloc. Western Eur-
ope received the major portion of Soviet exports to the Free World in
1955 and 19.56, or $40.2 million and $68.5 million, respectively, and
Finland and Sweden were the largest importing nations in that group
for both years. Soviet exports to the Near East and Africa rose in
1956 compared with 1955. The majority for 1955 ($10.7 million) was
divided almost equally between Israel and Egypt. In 1956, however,
cannot now be established. It appears that the major portion of the dis-
crepancy may derive from the Soviet practice of reporting as Soviet ex-
ports those made on Soviet account from East Germany, Albania, Hungary,
and Rumania. A case in point is an official Polish claim of petroleum
imports from the USSR in 1955, 1.1.1/ from which Soviet exports to Poland
in 1955 are calculated to be about $10 million to $12 million, con-
trasted with the estimate nf AP 12 millinn
* Net of imports from Austria during the period of SW ownership and
operation. A sharp discrepancy exists between this estimate and an
estimate of $89 million based on Soviet data.la/ The basis for the
discrepancy is not known, and the validity of the lower estimate has
not been finally established.
** Including Austrian reparations exports on Soviet account in 1956,
the net import balance may have been about 2.58 million tons, having
a value of $32 million.
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Soviet exports to Egypt may have risen very sharply to approximately
$16.2 million) and exports to Israel declined to $4.67 million because
of Soviet curtailment of exports at the time of the Middle East crisis.
Communist China was the major importer of Soviet petroleum
during 1955 and 1956. Chinese imports rose slightly, from $31.9 million
in 1955 to $34.2 million in 1956. Although Soviet exports to the Euro-
pean Satellites rose sharply from 1955 to 1956 ($8.23 million to $12.1
million), their share of total Soviet petroleum exports remained rela-
tively small, rising from about 8 percent in 1955 to only about 9 per-
cent in 1956.
4. Cotton.
Soviet exports of cotton increased steadily during the post-
war years) reaching a peak in 1954/55 and dropping slightly in 1955/56.
Most of this cotton was sent to the European Satellites, but a consid-
erable amount was returned in the form of finished products. In 1953/54,
about 20,000 tons (7 percent of total exports of cotton) were exported
to the Free World, and in 1954/55 and 1955/56) exports to the Free World
increased to 65,000 tons (20 to 25 percent of total exports of cotton). 125/
Soviet imports of cotton are small in relation to exports
and have fluctuated considerably in postwar years. These imports are
mainly from the Free World. Soviet imports of cotton from Egypt, its
major source of supply, totaled approximately $5.3 million in 1954 and
$16.6 million in 1955, accounting for 1.6 percent and 5.4 percent, re-
spectively, of total Egyptian cotton exports in these years.
5. Coal.
The USSR had a net import balance in its coal trade every
year since World War II, but the deficit was less in 1956 than in pre-
vious years (in spite of a sizable increase in exports to Yugoslavia),
mainly because of reduced imports from Poland and Communist China. It
is estimated that imports of coal in 1956 exceeded exports by about
6.5 million tons compared with 9.8 million tons in 1955. Indications
are that the USSR imported in 1956 about 9.3 million tons, which is
2.2 million tons less than the estimate for 1955. Estimates for both
years include 2.5 million tons of brown coal briquettes supplied by
East Germany to the Soviet armed forces.
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Polish shipments to the USSR, which amounted to 8 million
tons or more annually during 1949-55) were probably reduced in 1956
to about 6.5 million tons. Because Polish coal requirements have been
expanding faster than production, the country expected to have only
19.5 million tons available for export in 1956, or 4.8 million tons
less than in 1955. In 1956 as in 1955, Poland supplied roughly one-
third of its export coal to the Free World) one-third to other Euro-
pean Satellites, and one-third to the USSR. The USSR is reported to
have been buying coal from Poland at prices which were about 20 per-
cent under current world market prices, but Premier Gomulka, on a
recent visit to Moscow, obtained agreement from the Soviet government
to abolish these concessions. The reduction in Polish coal availabil-
ities came at a time when the USSR was experiencing difficulties in
raising output in the important Donets Basin coalfields sufficiently
to meet increasing requirements. As a result, there have been short-
ages of coal in the western USSR, in spite of the movement into those
areas of a large volume of coal from central Kazakhstan and western
Siberia.
Coal production in the Soviet Far East appears adequate,
and imports from Communist China apparently have been reduced from an
estimated total of 800,000 tons in 1955 to 300,000 tons in 1956.
If the USSR met its commitments in 1956 -- and insofar as
the Free World was concerned it apparently intended to do so -- its
coal shipments reached an all-time peak of approximately 2.8 million
tons and exceeded those in 1955 by more than 1 million tons and the pre-
vious peak in 1935 by almost 500,000 tons. Soviet export commitments to
the Free World in 1956 were about 2.6 million tons, and it is estimated
that at least 155,000 tons were furnished to the European Satellites.
The most significant change in 1956 involved Yugoslavia) which was to
receive 700,000 tons of coking coal and 80,000 tons of anthracite,
representing a large increase from a total of about 125,000 tons sup-
plied in 1955. About 130,000 tons were to be shipped to Austria, which
had obtained less than 1,000 tons the previous year, and exports to
Finland were to be raised from 207,000 tons in 1955 to about 350,000
tons in 1956. Most of the countries were to receive as much as or more
coal in 1956 than in 1955, with the notable exceptions of Belgium and
Italy. Whereas Italy was to obtain a little less coal in 1956, exports
to Belgium were to drop from 114,450 tons in 1955 to about 67,000 tons
in 1956. France, the largest importer of Soviet coal in 1955 (556,395
tons)) apparently was to get a little more in 1956.
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Shortages and high prices of coal in Western Europe along
with the easy accessibility of Donets Basin coal to Black SA ports
have been an inducement to the USSR to exploit the foreign market in
spite of the fact that there is a need for the coal in the USSR. Exports
of coal are presumably advantageous as a means of acquiring necessary
goods from the Free World.
6. Coke.
The USSR is estimated to have exported in 1956 approximately
350,000 tons more coke than it imported. Shipments out of the country
are estimated to be 757,000 tons compared with slightly more than 800,000
tons in 1955. Approximately 80 percent of the exports in each year went
to the European Satellites, and the balance, with the exception of a small
quantity to Iceland, was supplied to the Free World countries in Europe.
Among the European Satellites, Hungary and Rumania depend rather heavily.
on the USSR to provide coke for their metallurgical industries, receiving
about 300,000 and 225,000 tons, respectively, in 1956. It is believed
that East Germany obtained 75,000 tons and Bulgaria about 5,000 tons.
The USSR agreed to supply 152,000 tons to 5 Free World countries in
1956) including 76,600 tons to Finland) 50,000 tons to Austria, and
19,000 tons to Sweden. Exports of coke to Finland amounted to 135,000
tons in 1955, but Austria received none.
The USSR imported 434,000 tons of coke from Poland in 1955,
but it is believed that the quantity was reduced somewhat in 1956 be-
cause of Polish difficulties with production of both coking coal and
coke. It is estimated, therefore, that Poland furnished only about
44040,000 tons in 1956.
7. Ferrous Metals.
The USSR is a net exporter of iron and steel and of almost
all metallic raw and alloying meterials used in their production for
which trade data are available. The only exceptions are tungsten and
molybdenum ores and concentrates, the production of which is supple-
mented by imports from Communist China. Exports of the commodities
used by the iron and steel industry have increased substantially since
1950 and, except for finished steel, represent growing proportions of
domestic production. Net exports of finished steel have more than
doubled since 1950 but continue to represent only about 2 percent of
production in the USSR. Exports of manganese ore, iron ore, chromite,
and nickel represent from 10 to 15 percent of domestic production.
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Soviet trade in ferrous minerals and metals is largely with
the European Satellites. Tentative estimates indicate that exports to
these countries in 1956 accounted for about one-half of the finished
steel, one-third of the pig iron, almost one-half of the manganese ore,
most of the alloying materials, and all of the iron ore exported by the
USSR in that year. The Satellites also obtained a portion of their
coke requirements and possibly some iron and steel scrap and crude steel
from the USSR, but the available data do not warrant an evaluation of
the magnitude or relative importance of these exports.
There is little evidence of significant changes in the pat-
tern of Soviet trade with the European Satellites in 1956. East Germany
remained the largest Satellite importer of Soviet finished steel and pig
iron. Of these countries, Rumania is probably the second largest importer
of finished steel from the USSR. The USSR continued to supply about one-
half of the iron ore requirements of the Satellites, the principal im-
porters being Czechoslovakia and Poland. Manganese ore is exported to
East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, which are dependent on Soviet
supplies for 75 to 90 percent of their manganese imports. The USSR
probably continued to export nickel to the Satellites on a restricted
basis; much of it is returned to the USSR in alloy steels or as compo-
nents of manufactured articles.
There is little information on Soviet trade in ferrous
metals with Communist China and the Asian Satellites. Soviet exports
consist primarily of shipments of finished steel, which are estimated
at a minimum of 200,000 tons in 1956. The principal imports from
China are pig iron, tungsten, and molybdenum. The quantity of pig
iron imported in 1956 is not known but in previous years was reported
to have amounted to several hundred thousand tons. Imports from China
provide about 70 percent of the Soviet tungsten supply and about 6 per-
cent of the apparent Soviet requirements for molybdenum.
The incomplete data that are available reveal no significant
shifts in Soviet trade in ferrous metals with the Free World in 1955-56.
Soviet efforts to penetrate markets in some of the underdeveloped coun-
tries were continued in 1956. Shipments of finished steel to India
occurred in 1956 under the agreement calling for Soviet exports of 1
million tons of steel in 1956-58. Probably of greater significance,
however, is the Soviet agreement to construct an integrated steel plant
in India. This plant will have a capacity of 1 million tons of crude
steel and is scheduled to begin production by the end of 1958. Full
capacity operations, as presently planned, will not be reached until
the end of 1959.
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Other principal Free World importers of Soviet steel in
1956 were Argentina and Finland. Smaller quantities were shipped to
Greece, Belgium-Luxembourg, Pakistan, Austria, and Iceland. Almost
one-half of the apparent exports of pig iron to the Free World in 1956
were to the UK. These shipments, which approximated 300,000 tons, to-
gether with exports of 150,000 tons to Belgium-Luxembourg and 100,000
tons to West Germany, accounted for most of the Soviet exports of pig
iron to the Free World in 1956.
8. Ships.
The value of imports of ships into the USSR increased from
$140 million* in 1950 to $363 million in 1956. The ratio of Sino-Soviet
Bloc to Free World imports by the USSR varied in a range from about 3 to
1 in 1950 and 1953 to about 1 to 1 in 1956. Total imports increased in
every year except 1953, when they declined by more than $50 million from
the level of 1952. This decline was caused in large part by the decrease
in imports from East Germany because of the popular uprisings of that
year.
The major Free World supplier of ships to the USSR in 1950-56
was Finland. Imports from West Germany have been sizable since 1955 as
were those from Finland throughout the entire period 1950-56. Sweden
contributed important amounts in 1951-52 and 1956. Imports from the
Netherlands have been modest but consistent since 1954. Denmark and Bel-
gium contributed small amounts for most of these years. Poland and East
Germany predominate among the European Satellite suppliers of ships to
the USSR. The contribution of East Germany ranged from $61 million in
1950 to a high of $94 million in 1952. Poland has been an important
source of ships since 1952, and to a lesser extent Hungary has also con-
tributed. During 1950-56 the trend has been for the USSR to utilize
more countries of the Free World as suppliers of ships while simultan-
eously increasing purchases from the Satellites.
IV. Soviet Aid to the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
A. European Satellites.
Khrushchev's disclosure at the Twentieth Party Congress that the
USSR had thus far extended to the European Satellites credits totaling
* Dollar values in this section are in terms of 1955 US'dollars and
represent the cost of building the ships in the US in 1955.
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21 billion rubles ($5.25 billion), together with subsequent announcements
of similar long-term credit extensions to each of the Satellites (exclud-
ing Czechoslovakia and Albania) in 1956, began a new and well-publicized
Soviet program of economic aid to the Satellites. The rationale for this
move appears to be that the USSR must either help alleviate the acute
shortage of foreign exchange and consumer goods which plagues the Euro-
pean part of the Soviet Bloc or suffer a recurrence of the political
unrest to which it has already contributed in East Germany, Poland, and
Hungary. The USSR may also have felt it politically expedient to appear
more sympathetic to the economic needs of the Satellites in view of its
announced policy of economic assistance to underdeveloped countries of
the Free World. Soviet credits to the European Satellites in 1956 are
shown in Table 10.* See also Table 15, Appendix A.**
1. Bulgaria.
With the exception of a credit made available to East Ger-
many in 1953, the Soviet loan to Bulgaria in February 1956 was the first
sizable grant to a European Satellite since 19500L. The Soviet credit
provides Bulgaria with 370 million rubles ($92.5 million) over a 10-year
period with which to finance a program of agricultural development. The
major share of the credit is to be used to finance Bulgarian imports in
1956-59 of Soviet tractors, combines, other agricultural machinery, and
purebred livestock in an amount up to 300 million rubles ($75.0 million).
The remaining 70 million rubles ($17.5 million) will be used to pay for
technical assistance and unepecified equipment supplied by the USSR for
the construction of an ammonium nitrate and superphosphate plant. The
credit bears interest at 2 percent and is to be repaid by Bulgarian
deliveries of agricultural products and other goods.116./
2. East Germany.
On 17 July 1956 a joint Soviet - East German communique
announced the conclusion of a comprehensive economic agreement. Osten-
sibly designed to "raise the material well being of the East German
populace," the agreement provides the following:
a. A reduction in the cost of maintaining Soviet
troops in Germany from 1.6 billion to 800 million East German marks
(Deutsche Mark East --
* Table 10 iiollows on p. 37.
** P. 54, below.
*** Nominally, 2.2 DME equal US $1.
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Table 10
Major Soviet Credits to the European Satellites 2/
1956
Country Date Signed Provisions
Bulgaria
3 February A credit of $92.5 million is to be extended in 1956-59) $75 million of
which is to finance a program of agricultural development and $17.5 mil-
lion is to finance Soviet technical assistance and equipment in the con-
struction of two fertilizer plants. Repayment is to be made in part
through Bulgarian exports of agricultural products during a 10-year per-
iod at 2 percent interest.IS
A credit estimated to be $258 million) of which $85 million is freely
convertible foreign exchange, is to be extended in 1957 for the purchase
of "essential goods on the open world market." Repayment is possibly
to be made during a 10-year period at 2 percent interest. YU
4 October A credit of $25 million is to be extended in 1957, $15 million of which
is in Soviet goods "especially needed" by the Hungarian economy and $10
million is in free currency. Repayment is to be made in Hungarian goods in
1960-65 at 2 percent interest. 1_12/
18 September A credit of $25 million is to be extended in 1956 in gold and in supplies
of goods "necessary" to the Polish economy. Repayment is to be made in
Polish goods in 1957-60 at 2 percent interest. 52/
East Germany 17 July
Hungary
Poland
a. Dollar values in this table are given in terms of current US dollars.
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Table 10
Major Soviet Credits to the European Satellites
1956
(Continued)
Country Date Signed
Poland
(Continued) 18 November
Rumania
3 December
Provisions
A credit of $175 million is for delivery of goods to Poland in 1958-59, and
repayment is to be made in 1963-65. The USSR will also furnish Poland
in 1957 1.4 million tons of grain valued at $100 million, and repayment
is to be made in 1961-62. al
A long-term industrial credit of $67.5 million is to be extended for the
construction of 5 industrial plants, and repayment is to be made over
a 10-year period in goods produced by the above enterprises. The USSR
also granted Rumania a loan of wheat and fodder during the first half
of 1957 valued at approximately $35 million, and repayment is to be made
in wheat or other goods in 1959-61. .2Ey
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b. A "considerable increase" in the mutual exchange of
goods in 1956 over and above trade agreement levels and a grant by the
USSR to East Germany of free currency for the purchase of "essential
goods on the open World Market."*
c. An unspecified Soviet grant of long-term commodity
credits to East Germany on "favorable terms" later disclosed to be for
10 years at 2 percent interest.
d. A Soviet commitment to help East Germany construct
a 50,000- to 100,000-kilowatt atomic reactor sometime before 1960. Lr/
It has been estimated that assistance from the USSR during 1957-60
will total approximately 7.5 billion rubles ($1.87 billion), including
the sum accruing to East Germany as a result of the reduction in occu-
pation costs.
3. Poland.
Presumably in an effort to quell latent Polish unrest and
to forestall any recurrence of the recent Poznan demonstrations, the
USSR announced on 18 September 1956 that it had granted to Poland a
credit of 100 million rubles ($25 million) in gold and supplies of
copper, rubber, and fats. The credit is to be repaid by supplies of
Polish goods during 1957-60 in equal annual parts at 2 percent inter-
est. As added evidence of its desire to "contribute toward the further
development of the economy of the Polish Peoples Republic," the USSR
granted to Poland an extension of 4 to 5 years on payments for credits
which had been previously granted to Poland in the form of supplies of
equipment for building industrial enterprises. The USSR also agreed to
accept the remainder of the debt of Poland on loans in gold granted by.
the USSR in 1947-49, to be paid not in gold or convertible currency but
in supplies of Polish goods to the USSR.
This economic agreement, however, apparently proved inade-
quate either to solve the serious economic dislocations in Poland or
to stifle increasingly vocal Polish demands for some measure of politi-
cal independence from Moscow. Impelled by new anti-Soviet demonstra-
tions in late October, a Soviet-Polish conference was hastily convened
* An announcement in January 1957 of a Soviet credit to East Germany in
gold and convertible currency of 340 million rubles ($85 million) prob-
ably makes specific the foreign currency commitment of July 1956. IV
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in Moscow in November and resulted in some notable Soviet economic con-
cessions to Poland. The text of the joint Soviet-Polish statement,
issued on 18 November, reads in part:
Both sides, on the basis of mutusl inter-
ests, agreed to regard as settled as from No-
vember 1956 the Polish debts arising out of the
use of credits granted by the Soviet Government
to Poland in payment of the full value of coal
delivered by Poland to the Soviet Union in pi.946-
1953 on the basis of the agreement of August 16,
1945. Agreement was also reached on the settles.
ment of financial accounts in connection with
railroad transport and noncommercial payments.
The Soviet Government is ready to deliver to the
Polish Peoples Republic 1,400,000 tons of grain
in 1957. The above deliveries will be made on
credit. The Soviet Government has also agreed
to grant to the Polish Peoples Republic long-
term credits to the amount of 700,000,000 rubles
for the payment of commodities delivered by the
Soviet Union to Poland in accordance with a mu-
tually agreed list. 2.Y
Subsequent information further revealed the extent of the
Soviet-Polish agreement:
a. Polish debts to the USSR totaling approximately 2
billion rubles ($500 million) as of 1 November 1956 were canceled. 22/
b. The USSR will furnish Poland in 1957 1.4 million
tons of grain valued at $100 million. Repayment is to be made in 1961
and 1962.
c. The USSR agreed to grant a loan of 700 million rubles
($175 million) for delivery of goods to Poland during 1958-59. Repay-
ment is to be made in 1963-65. 22/
d. A commission was established to settle claims due
Poland for low rates charged Soviet commercial transit through Poland
in the period 1946 through July 1954. The sum was estimated by one
Polish official to total "many hundreds of millions of rubles." ,'112/
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The Soviet-Polish agreement will probably have two immediate
and salutary effects upon the international payments position of Poland.
The Soviet grain loan should provide substantial foreign exchange relief
in 1957 and possibly 1958 by eliminating the necessity for employing
Free World currencies in the purchase of large amounts of grain from
the Free World (Polish imports of grain from Free World sources totaled
$44.4 million in 1955 compared with $20.1 million in 1954). The credit
of 700 million rubles enables Poland further to import both consumer
goods and basic raw materials from the USSR such as iron ore) crude oil,
fats, fertilizers, and cotton.
Notwithstanding Polish enthusiasm over the USSR for "making
up arrears" from Stalin's more exploitative policy, the net effect for
Poland, as a result of the recent cancellation of old debts) has been
the assumption of more than 1 billion rubles of new debts and the con-
tinuation of a debtor status with relation to the USSR. The granting
to Poland of grain from. the Soviet bumper grain crop; the credit of
700 million rubles to be used for goods on "mutually agreed lists"
(that is, which the USSR can well afford to spare); and the cancel-
lation of debts whose repayment in the predictable future was highly
unlikely are perhaps considered by the USSR a moderate price to pay
to relieve the pressure on Poland to seek Free World credits and also
to forestall the possibility of any repetition of the developments in
Hungary.
4. Hungary.
On 4 October 1956 it was announced that the USSR had followed
its first loan to Poland with a credit of 100 million rubles ($25 mil-
lion) to Hungary. The USSR made available to Hungary 60 million rubles
in coke, cotton, synthetic rubber) and lead; and the remaining 40 mil-
lion were to be a "free currency" loan. Repayment is to be made over
a period of 5 years, 1960-65, in goods, at an interest rate of 2 per-
cent. 02
5. Rumania.
Rumania also has apparently benefited from the recent Soviet
credit offensive in the Soviet Bloc. Following a conference in Moscow
from 26 November to 3 December 1956, a joint Soviet-Rumanian statement
disclosed the following:
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a. The USSR agreed to deliver, in the form of a loan
in the first half of 1957, 450,000 tons of wheat and 60,000 tons of
fodder, valued at approximately $35 million. Repayment is to be made
over a 3-year period beginning in 1959.
b. Payment by Rumania to the USSR of the installments
due in 1957-59 on certain long-term credits was postponed, and problems
regarding reciprocal financial exchanges were solved.
c. The USSR agreed to give technical aid in the build-
ing of plants in the chemical and petroleum industries. The USSR will
carry out the planning of the chemical plants and will supply the equip-
ment on credit. Rumania will repay the credit by deliveries of products
made by these plants to the USSR. Li
the industrial credit 50X1
granted to Rumania amounts to 270 million rubles ($67.5 million) and is
to be repaid in goods from the Soviet-aided enterprises over a period
of 10 years. It was also disclosed that Rumanian debts to the USSR
arising out of Rumanian purchases of Soviet shares in joint stock com-
panies are to be reduced by 4.3 billion lei (approximately $716 million).
The repayment of remaining sums due the USSR on credits given Rumania
during 1949-56 was suspended for 4 years. Qi
If all these offers of aid materialize, the USSR, since
the beginning of 1956, will have extended to the European Satellites
credits totaling approximately $778 million* to be drawn upon in 1956-59
(exclusive of canceled debts for Rumania and Poland and the reduction
in East German military expenditures). The commodity aid to the Satel-
lites in 1957 alone represents an unforeseen commitment of roughly $500
million) equivalent in value to about one-seventh of total Soviet
exports in 1956.
The conflicting demands on the Soviet economy between these
new claims of the European Satellites and those of the Soviet trade
drive in the underdeveloped areas may aggravate the already consider-
able problems of priorities within the Soviet Bloc. Nevertheless, it
is considered probable that the economic offensive of the Bloc will be
maintained in 1957 and that the Satellite contribution to it is more
* This figure contrasts with the approximately $640 million worth of
Soviet credit extensions to Free World countries in 1956.
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likely to suffer from the recent upheavals in Poland and Hungary than
is the Soviet effort.
B. Communist China and the Asian Satellites.
1. Communist China.
In April 1950 the USSR extended an industrial loan of $300
million to Communist China at 1 percent interest, which was utilized
by China during 1950-54. China is now making annual repayments of
$30 million to the USSR on this loan; the first such payment was to
be made prior to 31 December 1954. In October 1954 the USSR granted
China a second industrial loan amounting to $130 million) the terms of
which were not announced. It is possible that China drew as much as
$50 million on this credit in each of the years 1955 and 1956. Li/
In October 1954 the Chinese announced that the USSR had granted a loan
to China to cover Chinese acquisition of the Soviet share in assets
of four Sino-Soviet joint stock companies, the value of which has been
estimated at roughly $75 million. Chinese repayment will be made "over
a period of years" through the export of traditional Chinese products
to the USSR. 0/
Other loans from the USSR to Communist China) assumed to
be primarily for military assistance, have been revealed in statements
by the Chinese at the National Peoples Congresses in 1955) 1956) and
1957. The value of the military loan in 1955 is estimated to be $545
million. It is believed that a great amount of military equipment
acquired under these loans was physically located in China and repre-
sented a transfer of ownership from the USSR to Communist China. 0,/
2. North Korea.
The USSR extended a 3-year grant of 1 billion rubles ($250
million) to North Korea in 1953. The Soviet aid includes deliveries of
physical equipment as well as allocations for designs and blueprints)
technical data, services of technicians, and training for North Korean
personnel. LT/ The USSR extended a loan of $40 million to North Korea
in 1949 for the purchase of industrial equipment and raw materials and
in technical assistance for industry and agriculture. The USSR canceled
half of this debt in 1953 and extended repayment for the remainder. 0/
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3. North Vietnam.
The USSR extended a grant of $100 million to North Vietnam
in 1955 for rehabilitation and construction) to extend over a 2-year
period. fi2/
V. Economic Coordination in the Soviet Bloc.
The existence of a central) Soviet-directed plan behind the current
trends in Soviet Bloc economic development was difficult to detect until
a few years ago) in spite of Soviet assertions to the contrary. Indus-
trialization appeared to proceed in each European Satellite country in
accordance with independent national plans, and the USSR showed little
initiative toward promoting any long-range division of labor and economic
interdependence within the Bloc. The heightened activity of the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) early in the latter part of 1955
and early 1956 raised the possibility of an enlarged and more active
role for it both in coordinating Bloc planning and in putting into effect
Soviet economic policies for the Satellites.
Reports on two CEMA conferences in February an May 1956 indicate
that the Soviet Bloc had already made impressive strides toward the
coordination of production and trade plans. A monitored Soviet broad-
cast reported that "For the first time the development of the most
important sectors of the economies of all participating countries was
coordinated." /2/ In recognition of the "international division of
labor between the Socialist countries," specific areas of production
responsibilities were allocated in accordance with the principle of
comparative economic advantage. The production of coal combines was
assigned to Poland, cement factory and knitting machinery equipment
to East Germany, aluminum-manufacturing equipment to Hungary, and
leather and chrome-manufacturing equipment to Czechoslovakia. The
USSR in turn consented to double its deliveries of Krivoy Rog iron
ore to the/Satellites by 1960 in order to help divert capital expended
on developing poorer European Satellite ore deposits to more productive
investment, specificallY the reconstruction and mechanization of exist-
ing metallurgical works. IL/
The rationale for this increased emphasis on coordination in the
Soviet Bloc was stated by E. Szyr, Chairman of the State Economic Plan-
ting Commission of Poland, as follows:
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First, it insures a fuller and more rationa; utilization
of the natural wealth and power resources of individual,coun-
tries in their own interest and in the interest of developing
the entire camp of peace and socialism. Secondly, specializa-
tion and cooperation of production on an international scale
make it possible to reduce the range of goods output in each
country, which enables a substantial cut in production costs
and rapid technical progress. Thirdly, coordination helps to
spread the latest techniques. 2/
European Satellite manifestations of political and economic indepen-
dence in the latter part of 1956, however, apparently necessitated a
reconsideration of the role of CEMA in the economic activity of the
Soviet Bloc. Soviet statements on the extehsion of CEMA operations,
very evident during the early part of the year) were conspicuously
absent during and after the-Satellite unrest. The procession of Satel-
lite delegations which followed one another to Moscow in search of
trade and aid agreements returned with promises of greater mutual eco-
nomic cooperation -- but significantly on a direct, bilateral basis in
contrast with the trend toward multilateral economic coordination within
the Bloc shown since 1949 and particularly since the inauguration of
the more ambitious program in early 1956.
Although the future role of CEMA is still obscure, clearly the rate
of expansion of both intra-Soviet Bloc trade and Bloc trade with the
Free World will ultimately depend on the degree to which European Satel-
lite Five Year Plans will be tailored to provide for greater industrial
and agricultural specialization in individual Bloc countries. If the
principle of the "Socialist division of labor" is emphasized in deed as
well as word, the development could provide the economic basis for a
steadily expanding intra-Bloc trade.
VI. Conclusions.
Whether or not Soviet foreign trade has undergone any real trans-
formation in 1956 may be indicated in the trends Of this trade with
the European Satellites and Western Europe (toward which the great
bulk of it is directed) rather than the highly propagandized Soviet
trade with underdeveloped countries. In spite of substantial gains
in recent years, the volume of Soviet trade remains unimpressive.
With a total foreign trade turnover comparable to that of the Nether-
lands) the USSR accounts for less than 3.5 percent of total world
trade. Within the Soviet Bloc the USSR is a net importer of capital
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equipment, absorbing nearly one-half the capital goods exported by the
European Satellites, and the bulk of Soviet exports is made up of raw
materials, fuels, and fqod. The composition of Soviet trade with Wes-
term Europe is similar -- exports are dominated by raw materials and
semiprocessed goods. A recent development is the emergence of POL as
a major earner of foreign exchange. Soviet imports continue to be pre-
dominantly manufactured goods -- imports of machinery and equipment in
particular have been growing steadily) and exports in this category,
though expanding at a rapid rate, remain quite small. Thus there is
little, if any, significant shift away from the traditional pattern.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the current position of
the USSR in world trade:
1. In the light of critical shortages in the USSR and the in-
creasing economic demands of the European Satellites, shortfalls in
planned production can be countered to a somewhat greater extent than
hitherto by imports. This is most likely to concern foodstuffs, where,
in spite of good crops in 1956 and anticipated higher levels of agri-
cultural production) fluctuations in weather may cause temporary short-
ages which have to be met by increased imports.
2. The fundamental order of Soviet priorities is not likely
to be altered in the near future; certain raw materials and machinery
for industry are still more likely imports than consumer goods. Soviet
export capability in heavy industry will probably be devoured by the
ambitious growth rates of the Sixth Five Year Plan and the heavy demands
of the developing economies of the European Satellites and particularly
Communist China and will probably make no serious inroads in world mar-
kets outside the areas singled out for special attention by Soviet di-
plomacy and propaganda.
3. There seems little doubt that the modest but ingeniously
designed Soviet efforts in underdeveloped areas have reaped significant
political and economic rewards. Although exports of capital goods may
tend to intensify Soviet domestic economic problems, the goods which
the USSR receives in return, especially agricultural commodities, have
a countervailing effect. Because its total aid program is only a small
fraction (less than 1 percent) of Soviet GNP, there is every evidence
that the USSR has the capability to carry on indefinitely with an eco-
nomic program of the type undertaken in the Near and Far East during
the past 2 years.
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4. Any move toward significant expansion of Soviet trade with
the Free World would appear to be inhibited by the continuing reluctance
of the USSR to tolerate more than a minimum degree of dependence on
external sources of supply. The apparent difficulty of finding goods
for export to the Free World is as much a political phenomenon as it
is an economic one. The USSR, with a large and diversified economy,
could certainly enjoy more of the advantages of foreign trade if it
only wanted to do so.. There does appear to be some official recogni-
tion of the advantages of international specialization, and. some efforts
have been made to promote an intra-Bloc division of labor, but the So-
viet quest for self-sufficiency must exercise an important limiting in-
fluence on the magnitude and growth of Soviet foreign trade.
S-E-C-R-E-T
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APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES
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Table 11
Estimated Foreign Trade Turnover of the USSR 2./
1948 and 1950-56
Billion Current Rubles
Area
1948
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
Sino-Soviet
Bloc
5.2 12/
10.6
2/
13.6 1/
16.62/
19.0
12/
19.62/
19.5
2/
20.6
1/
Free World
5.0 g/
2.2
2/
4.4 2/
4.2 2/
4.0
2/
5.4 hi
5.7
2/
6.9
2/
Total
10.2 1/
12.8
1/
18.0 h/
20.8 if
23.0
E/
25.0 E/
25.2
2/
27.5
2/
a. the
figures for Soviet-Free World trade differ from those in Free World statistics.
b. Fi e obtained by subtraction.
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Table 12
Geographical Distribution of Trade
Between the USSR and the Free World 2/
1948 and 1950-56
Area
Soviet lepurte
1948
1950
1951
1952
1953
taut
On11011
Current US 4)
Percent
of Total
Value
Csine
Perceat
of Total
Value
(Killion
Curr_5511.14_11
1
165
33
55
26
1
524.
316
Percent
of Mal
Value
(NMI=
Current LE 4)
Percent
of Total
Value
011111cra
Current 09 4)
Percent
of Total
LIS and Wads
torere (columns Soviet
floc countries)
gear Nun and Africa
Par That
Oceans
Latin Arks
26
314
64
81
3%
12
2.3.
560
5.3
58.9
12.0
15.2
El
2.3
as
0.3
61.5
11.0
18.3
0.6
0.3
as
Negligible
2107
o
42
17
Yedligible
a
har
7*4
10.3
10.8
El
as
Negligible
3147
67
30
Negligibla
Negligible
ha
sce
53.0
13.8
6.2
as
Neaten'.
335
34
8
33
12
"421
044
794
6.0
1.9
7.6
2.8
as
Total
Adjusted total
Area
Soviet Esparta
U8 arid Crain
dome (es:audios Soviet
Aloe marbles)
Aear Ent sal Africa
Far ftst
Oceania
ratio Arica
Si
339
50
17
Negligiblej
1
itbj
17.6
604
10.1
3.4
0.2
as
38
in
20
6
Negliable
M
221
15.1
70.6
11.1
2.4
0.4
as
28
316
la
4
3
Negligible
la
352
7.2
80.6
10.5
1.0
0.8
as
19
350
58
3
1
Negligible
hal
417
El
22.2
12.1
0.6
0.2
as
12
m
24
u
2
degligible
221
344
3.1
27.2
6.3
2.9
0.5
as
'Analit
Adjusted total
1954
Value
00.111.1213
Current te $1
5
1955
195612/
Pectin
of Total
Value
otinion
CurreSt3
Percent
of Total
Value
(1011100
Current 4_4119
29
619
48
6
787
Percent
of Total
0.9
ws
9.8
1.6
7.0
10.1
as
3
426
70
23
6
73
992as
693
0.5
71.0
11.7
1.0
12.2
3.7
79.2
6.1
6.g
0.
4.1
as
13
2.6
420
83.2
28
5.5
6
1.2
2
0.4
37
7.3
221 as
455
'1 R ItironS 6
2.8
8a.8
5.1
1.6
0.3
5.1
160.0
I1
3.1
62.3
5.5
01.7
0.1
3.7
mho
Wein...Be/C.14 of the running of all data after citation, _orals and omitted.* On sot agree vItla the cc:moment parta even.
on, 1956 an prelitinan and aresijustact for slapping costs of sponirtsiately 10 percent of the c.i.f. value of Soviet exports .r05 percent of the c.i.f. value of Soviet Legarts.
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Table 13
Imports from the Free World by the USSR, by Commodity Group a/
1950-55
Commodity Croup
1950
-
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Value
(Million
Current US $)
Percent
of Total
Value
(Million
Current US $)
Percent
of Total.
Value
(Million
Current US $)
Percent
of Total
Value
(Million
Current US $)
Percent
of Total
Value
(Million
Current US $)
Percent
of Total
Value
Current US $)
Percent
of Total
Food
10.5
3.5
40.3
10.4
47.6
9.8
86.0
20.3
139.3
24.3
126.3
21.0
Beverages and tobacco
1.0
0.3
8.0
2.1
3.5
0.7
3.3
0.8
6.9
1.2
4.7
0.8
Inedible raw materials,
except mineral fuels
118.7
39.4
130.7
33.7
203.7
42.1
1210.9
28.6
117.4
20.5
129.8
21.6
Mineral fuels, lubricants,
and related materials
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Neal-Bible
1.0
0.2
Animal and vegetable, oils
and fats
4.9
1.6
7.7
2.0
5.4
10.1
2.4
18.6
3.2
22.0
3.7
Chemicals-2.3
manufactured oods classified
chiefly by material
thsclainery and transport
equipment
25.6
122.8
0.8
8.5
40.8
3.3
28.9
133.0
0.9
7.5
34.3
6.2
42.8
129.3
1.3
8.9
26.7
6.1
58.5
106.7
1.4
13.8
25.2
8.9
81.5
145.1
1.6
14.2
25.3
5.3
90.6
184.7
0.9
15.1
30.8
Miscellaneous manufactured
articles
12.2
11.1
29.3
7.6
34.4
7.1
29.0
6.8
25.2
4.4
10.9
1.8
Miscellaneous transactions
and unspecified merchandise
3-1
1.0
6.3
1.6
10.6
2.2
2.8
0.7
29.8
5.2
24.9 .
4.1
Total
301.1
as
SI
100.0
483.5
100.0
423.4
100.0
572.7
as
00.2
as
a. ??/. Because of rounding, percentages ray not total exactly 100.0.
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Table 14
Exports from the USSR to the Free World, by Commodity Group 1./
1950-55
Commodity Croup
1950 1951 1952 ? 1953 1954 1955
Value -Value Value Value Value Value
(fUllIon Percent (Million Percent Percent (Million Percent (Million Percent (Million Percent
Current US $) of Total Current US $) of Total Current US $) of Total Current US $) of Total Current 9111 ol Total Current US $) of Total
20c4 112.1 44.5 190.0 48.6 291.7 63.0 157.3 41.2 103.0 20.4 94.1 14.9
Beverages and tobacco 2.7 1.1 2.3 o.6 1.1 0.2 2.7 0.7 1.1 0.2 1.2 0.2
Inedible rev materials,
except mineral fuels 51.3 36.2 117.7 30.1 95.2 20.6 128.6 33-7 188.0 37.2 259.8 41.o
Mineral fuels, lubricants,
and related materials 8.2 3.3 15.5 4.0 26.95.8 31.8 8.3 82.4 16.3 110.2 17.k
Animal and vegetable oils .
and fats Negligible 0.1 Negligible Negligible Negligible 0.1 1.0 0.2 1.0 0.2
Chemicals 6.7 2.6 6.6 1.7 5.1 1.1 7.4 1.9 14.4 2.8 16.8 2.7
Manufactured goods classified
chiefly by material 22.1 8.8 45.4 11.6 36.8 7.9 47.3 12.4 78.6 15.6 117.3 18.5
Yachinery end transport
equipment 1.7 0.7 1.6 0.4 1.7 0.4 3.6 0.9 11.4 2.3 15-9 2.5
Miscellaneous manufactured
articles 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.2 1.0 0.3 1.3 0.3 1.3 0.2
Miscellaneous transactions
and unspecified merchandise 6.3 2.5 10.5 2.7 3.6 0.8 1.8 0.5 24.2 ,12/ 4.8 15.3 2.4
Total 252.1 1C0.0 3P-A 100.0 461.1 100.0 381.5 100.0 505.4 100.0 02.9 100.0
a. d9/. Because of rounding, percentages ray not total 100.0.
b. Includes imports of gold by Finland valued at $5,022,030.
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Table 15
Selected Made Pacts of the USSR
1955-56
Country
Type of Agreement
Date Signed
Date Effective
Duration
(Mbntbs)
Deliveries
Country
Amount (Million
Current US $) ,
Renamim
Free World
Austria
Protocol to agreement
4 October 1956
1 January 1957
12
USSR
33
of 17 October 1955
Austria
33
Belgium-Luxembourg
Protocol to agreement
2 August 1956
1 January 1956
12
- USSR
40
of 18 February 1948
Belgium-Luxembourg
28
Canada
Protocol
29 February 1956
29 February
36
USSR
1.2 tons of unspecified goods
during 3-year period
Canada
1.2 million to 1.5 million
tons of wheat in annual quan-
tities of 400,000 to 500,000
tons
Denmark
Protocol to agreement
14 May 1956
15 May 1956
24
USSR
42
of 8 July 1946
Denmark
39
_Finland
Protocol to agreement
2 December 1955
1 January 1956
12
USSR
110
of 17 July 1954
Finland
147.5
28 November 1956
1 January 1957
12
USSR
132.5
(estimated)
Finland
165
(estimated)
France
Protocol to agreement
31 March 1956
1 January 1956
12
USER
57
of 15 July 1953
Prance
57
Iceland
Protocol to agreement
23 September 1955
1 January 1956
12
USSR
10.0
of 1 August 1958
Iceland
10.6
27 September 1956
1 January 1957
36
USSR
15
Iceland
15
a. Unless otherwise indicated.
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Table 15
Selected Trade Pacts of the USSR
1955-56
(Continued)
Deliveries
Country
Type of Agreement
Date Signed
Date Effective
Duration
(Months)
Country
Amount (Million
Current US $) Remarks
Free World
(Continued)
Italy
Protocol to agreement
1 June 1956
1 January 1956
12
USSR
25.6
of 1948
Italy
25.6
Netherlands
Protocol to agreement
27 June 1956
1 January 1956
12
USSR
40 to 45
of 2 Ally 1948
Netherlands
43 to 45
Norway
Protocol to 9?year
15 November 1955
1 January 1956
12
USSR
16.8
agreement of
Norway
18.2
15 November 1555
Sweden _
Protocol to agreement
9 December 1955
1 January 1956
12
USSR
28.9
of September 1948
Sweden
17.4
Yugoslavia
Protocol to agreement
6 January 1956
1 January 1956
12
USSR
35
of 5 January 1555
Yugoslavia
35
Supplementary agree-
6 June 1956
6 June 1556
6
USSR
20
ment to protocol of
Yugoslavia
20
6 January 1956
Sino-Soviet Bloc
Remarks
Albania
Protocol
11 February 1956
1 January 1956
12
No increase mentioned
Bulgaria
Protocol
14 January 1956
1 January 1956
12
Calls for increase in trade above "goods previously traded"
Communist
Protocol
27 December 1855
1 January 1556
12
Provides for "further increase"
China
Supplement
25 Jay 1956
25 July 1956
5
Provides for a higher level of trade than was indicated in trade
agreement of 27 December 1555
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,S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 15
Selected Made Pacts of
1955-56
(Continued)
the USSR
Country
Type of Agreement
Date Signed
Date Effective.
Duration
(Months)
Remarks
Nino-Soviet Bloc
(continued)
Czechoslovakia
Protocol
14 December 1955
1 January 1956
12
Provides for further increase above 1955 exchange
Consumer goods
supplement
July 1956
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
East Germany
Protocol
3 December 1955
1 January 1956
12
Calls for 24-percent increase above planned 1955 trade
Hungary
Protocol
3 February 1956
1 January 1956
12
Provides for "considerable increase in trade above 1955"
Consumer goods
supplement
16 July 1956
N.A,
'Turnover $2.5 million
North Korea
Protocol
26 January 1956
1 January 1956
12
"Protocol envisages a marked increase in trade between the two
countries in 1956 as compared with 1955"
North Vietnam
Protocol to agreement
of 18 July 1965
5 24?2 1956
1 January 1956
12.
"Trade to increase substantially compared with 1955"
Outer Mongolia
Protocol
16 November 1955
1 January 1956
12
Provides for a "further increase in mutual goods deliveries compared
with 1955"
Poland
Protocol
8 February 1956
1 January 1986
12
No increase mentioned
Consumer goods
supplement
9 May 1956
9 May 1956
8
Soviet deliveries 5
Polish deliveries 5
Romania
Protocol
11 February 1956
1 January 1956
12
"Foresees a further expanding of the volume of mutual deliveries"
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