PROBLEMS AND TRENDS IN THE ECONOMY OF POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A001300100002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
N? GS
PROBLEMS AND TRENDS
IN THE ECONOMY OF POLAND
CIA/RR 59-7
March 1959
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
CONFIDENTIAL
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PROBLEMS AND TRENDS IN TBE ECONOMY OF POLAND
CIA/RR 59-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
This report reviews the economy of Poland since the return of
Gomulka to power in 1956) analyzes the current situation, and offers
a summary of achievements accomplished to date and a preview of those
planned through 1960. Statistical tables provide extensive back-
ground information on specific phases of the economy.
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CONTENTS
Ems_
Summary
1
I. Introduction
2
1. General
2
2. Measures Taken by Gomulka and Their Short-Term
Effects
3
3. Prospects for the Next Few Years
4
4. Economic Growth and Allocation of Resources,
1950-60
6
II.
Living Standards and Monetary Stability
10
1.
Low Urban Living Standards
10
2.
Policies and Developments, 1956-57
11
a. General
b. Consumption, Wage Policy) and Monetary Sta-
II
bility
16
3.
Prospects for the Future
18
III.
Agriculture
19
1.
Background
19
2.
Recent Developments
22
3.
Prospects for the Future
27
IV.
Industry
29
1.
General
29
2.
Coal
32
3.
Construction Materials
34
if.
Metallurgy and Machinery
36
5.
Textiles
37
V.
Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments
38
1.
Balance of Payments
38
2.
Commodity Composition of Foreign Trade and Its
Relation to Domestic Economic Activity
45
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3. Evolution of the Balance of Payments and Foreign
Credits
U. Changes in Economic Dependence of Poland on the
USSR and on the Soviet Bloc
VI. New Economic Model
Pegs
47
50
55
Tables
1. Net Material Product at Market Prices and Indexes of
Growth in Poland, Selected Years, 1950-57, and 1958
and 1960 Plans
7
2: Distribution and Growth of Capital Investment in
Poland, by Type of Ownership and by Economic Sector,
1951-60 9
3. Selected Indicators of Living Standards in Poland,
Selected Years, 1938-57) and 1960 Plan 12
L. Sources and Uses of Selected Consumer Goods in Poland,
1956-57 15
5. Average Monthly Wages of Selected Categories of
Workers in Poland, 1955-57
6. Indicators of Trends in Agricultural Production and
Inventory in Poland, Selected Years) 1934-57 .
7. Share of Procurement in Total Production in Poland)
1950, 1953, and 1955-57
8. Use of Fertilizer in Polish Agriculture, Selected
Years, 1937/38-1956/57
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21
23
25
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9. Deliveries of Investment Goods to Agriculture in
Poland, 1954-57 and 1960 Plan 26
10. Indexes of Industrial Production in Poland, 1950-57
and 1960 Plan 30
U. Investments in Industry in Poland, 1951-55 and
1956-60 Plan 31
12. Changes in Stocks of Industrial Materials in Poland,
30 September 1956 and 30 September 1957 33
13. Selected Statistics on Production and Uses of Hard
Coal and on Employment and Productivity of Laborers
in the Hard Coal Industry in Poland, 1938 and
1949-57 35
14. Production of Selected Commodities in Poland,
Selected Years, 1949-57, and 1960 Plan 39
15. Exports by Poland of Selected Basic Materials as a
Percent of Production, Selected Years, 1949-57 . . . 46
16. Investment and Foreign Trade of Poland in Machinery
and Equipment, 1949-57 ? 46
17. Foreign Trade of Poland, 1948-57 and 1958 Plan . . 48
18. Credits Received by Poland from Countries of the
Soviet Bloc and the West Since Gomulka's Accession
to Power 49
19. Trade of Poland with the Soviet Bloc and the USSR,
1948-57 and 1958-60 Plans 51
20. Share of the Soviet Bloc in Polish Foreign Trade, by
Major Category of Goods, 1956 52
21. Polish Foreign Trade in Machinery and Equipment, by
Geographic Area) 1956 52
22. Percentage Relation of Foreign Trade and of Trade
with the Soviet Bloc and the USSR to Polish Consump-
tion and Production of Selected Commodities and
Commodity Groups) 1957 53
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23. Polish Imports and Exports, by Group and Selected
Commodity, 1949-57 56
24. Nonagricultural Private Employment in Poland)
Selected Years, 1945-57 62
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PROBLEMS AND TRENDS IN TBE ECONOMY OF POLAND*
Summary
Since Gomulka returned to power in Poland in 1956 the economic
policy of the country has been freed from certain elements of Marxist
dogma and has responded considerably less than before to direct in-
fluence from the USSR. This situation, in turn, has resulted in more
realistic planning, increased consideration for consumer welfare, and
growing concern with efficiency in the allocation of resources. The
recent hardening of the political attitude of the regime has not modi-
fied in any essential respect the economic policy of Poland.
New domestic policies and large-scale imports financed by foreign
credits resulted in a marked improvement during 1956-57 in the avail-
ability of most consumer goods and services except housing and also in
an easing of the shortage of raw materials. Changes in agricultural
policy, together with good weather, considerably increased production
and marketings in agriculture. The regime removed the threat of forced
collectivization and acquiesced in the dissolution of most existing
collective farms.
Solutions could not easily be found to the deep-seated problems in
industry which faced Gomulka's regime. The more modest production goals
set for 1957 served to regularize the flow of materials and power and
in some instances permitted increases in stocks, but progress toward a
solution of the underlying imbalance between supplies of raw materials
and production of manufactures was small. There was a decline in the
production of coal in 1957, although less than had been anticipated,
which reflected the shortening of the workweek and the shortsighted
policies of investment in the past. Production in the metallurgical
and machinery industries continued to rise largely because of increased
exports of these products to the Soviet Bloc. The food processing and
textile industries, however, could not meet the demands of domestic
consumption or foreign trade.
The economic situation in Poland is likely to be strained increas-
ingly during the next few years as a result of a decline in foreign
credits available; of growing requirements for investment in most eco-
nomic sectors; and, possibly, less favorable weather for agriculture
than in 1955-57. Compared with the past 4 years, the rate of growth
of personal consumption can be expected to decline considerably -- a
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 1 December 1958.
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fact which may cause large groups of the population to become increas-
ingly dissatisfied with the regime.
Expansion of exports sufficient to achieve a balance in foreign
transactions of goods and services by 1960 will be extremely difficult.
Exports of coal are not expected to increase above the level of 1958,
because of limited increases in production and rising demand on the
domestic market. Furthermore, domestic demand for consumer goods and
construction materials will tend to restrain the growth of exports of
these commodities. At the same time) the regime plans to increase in-
vestments substantially to support present goals of production and con-
sumption and to meet the needs of export after 1960 when repayments of
foreign credits will come due. The recent increase in agricultural
production is not expected to be maintained, even with liberal agricul-
tural policies) because it was too dependent on a season of exceptionally
good weather. Nevertheless, these policies are expected to continue at
least through 1960, and compulsory deliveries of agricultural products
may even be eliminated during 1959 and 1960.
Many opportunities exist for improving efficiency in the allocation
and management of resources in the nonagricultural sectors of the econ-
omy. The Polish government recognizes this and has reduced the scope
of direct planning and increased the degree of freedom allowed producers.
A general reform of the system of pricing and distribution is planned.
These reforms are being introduced too slowly to have a marked effect
during 1959-60) and their effects after 1960 cannot be predicted re-
liably.
I. Introduction.'
1. General.
The necessity immediately facing Gomulka on his return to power
in 1956 was that of raising urban living standards in Poland rapidly
enough to eliminate for the time being the threat which growing dis-
satisfaction among the workers posed to political stability. A low
level of personal consumption was partly the result of the failure of
the regime's agricultural policy to raise production appreciably and
to distribute what foodstuffs were available in such a way as to prevent
a decline in the food supply for urban areas. The low level was also
one of the consequences of several years of bad planning and unbalanced
industrial growth, during which time rapid expansion in metallurgy and
machine building had been promoted at the expense of coal mining and
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other industries which produce for export) and at the expense of light
industry) construction materials for private housing) and the develop-
ment of inputs for agriculture. This policy also resulted in the grow-
ing tendency of manufacturing to outrun supplies of raw materials and
power. Even apart from the question of living standards, therefore,
the pre-Gomulka pattern of industrial development could not have been
maintained.
Some steps had been taken after 1954, during the "new course"
(1954 to mid-1956), to meet these growing problems: investments had
leveled off) and stocks of consumer goods had been released. Moreover)
favorable weather for agriculture prevailed in 1955. These developments
arrested the decline in food consumption in urban areas, which had
reached its lowest point since the war in 1953, and even led to its
recovery for some groups of workers, although not to the levels of 1950.
On the other hand, housing conditions continued to worsen for all groups
of the population. In general) skilled and semiskilled workers) who
had already suffered the greatest decline in living standards relative
to prewar conditions, continued to receive the worst treatment in this
respect. The regime primarily relied on this segment of urban labor
for its political support.
Furthermore, the basic causes of low living standards -- a self-
defeating agricultural policy and an unbalanced structure of production
were not affected by the measures taken during these years, and the
shortage of raw materials was aggravated by the new demands of the con-
sumer program on limited resources. In 1956) for example) exports of
coal began to decline sharply as a result of a rapid rise in household
consumption of fuel added to the continued growth of industrial con-
sumption. The resulting deterioration of the balance of payments of
Poland Was relieved only temporarily by an improvement in the terms of
trade brought about by the Suez crisis.
2. Measures Taken by Gomulka and Their Short-Term Effects.
To achieve his immediate goal of increasing personal consumption)
Gomulka obtained large foreign credits and greatly liberalized agricul-
tural policy. At the same time, he took some preliminary steps toward
redressing the industrial imbalance responsible for the many grievances
of workers, for the shortage of raw materials, and for the difficulties
of foreign exchange. Pressure to maximize industrial output at all
cost was relaxed as plans were set intentionally low. Investments
planned for 1957 were pared down, and their allocation was shifted from
administration, defense, metallurgy) and machine building to industries
producing basic materials for domestic use and for export. Finally, in
the hope of eliminating the waste and inefficiency which pervade most
branches of economic activity in Poland) Gomulka sanctioned the gradual
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introduction of a "new economic model," in which economic incentives
will normally take the place of administrative orders. It was recog-
nized that for profitability to be the criterion in making economic
decisions; a new price structure would have to be established.
The most effective internal measure in checking the deteriora-
tion of the economic situation in Poland was Gomulka's farm policy.
Collectivization was postponed indefinitely, obligatory deliveries were
reduced, and prices for the produce of private farmers were raised.
These developments had some effect on production and a very great im-
pact on marketings; particularly on marketings of meat and dairy prod-
ucts. The success of the new policy was a major factor in the growth
of real wages, especially after the harvest of 1957. Another favorable
consequence of the policy was the great increase in private investments
in agriculture) especially in farm buildings.
The supply of goods available for final use increased in 1957
by 13.5 percent, and the increase was almost twice as fast as the in-
crease in national income because of a sizable surplus of imports fi-
nanced by foreign credits granted to Poland. This circumstance made
possible the acceleration of an already rising rate of growth in per-
sonal consumption and even a moderate increase in investment. Moreover,
together with setting conservative industrial targets) imports of ma-
terials financed by foreign credits permitted a considerable accumulation
of agricultural and industrial stocks by the end of the year. These
stocks facilitated regularity in the flow of materials and power -- the
lack of which had been an acute problem in 1956. Large stocks are also
a prerequisite to reforms in the production and distribution system in
connection with the "new economic model."
3. Prospects for the Next Few Years.
Continued improvements in living standards and the maintenance
of a moderately high rate of economic growth basically depend on the
ability of the regime to provide greater quantities of materials for
industry; housing, and agriculture from domestic production and imports.
The cost of doing this will be considerably greater in the next few
year.s than in 1956 and 1957.
In recent years, industrial production was increased by utiliz-
ing more intensively existing capacity or by completing investments
initiated earlier; production was stimulated in agriculture by changes
in policy and good weather; and, in 1957, all branches of the economy
gained from large imports financed by foreign credits. Many of these
advantages will not exist in 1959-60. Even to maintain recent rates
of growth in industry will require larger investments because, as avail-
abilities of foreign credits decline, exports will have to be increased
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much faster than imports. Weather conditions as favorable to agricul-
ture as those in 1957 cannot be counted on. The rate of improvement
in living standards, therefore, will almost certainly be much smaller
than in the past few years.
The regime has few opportunities to raise personal consumption,
in the short run, by reducing both investments and the rate of indus-
trial growth. Emphasis in the Five Year Plan (1956-60) is already on
the modernization and reconstruction of existing facilities. Moreover,
a substantial share of these outlays supports consumption, either
directly or indirectly. Investments in chemicals, for example, promote
the development of synthetic fibers for the textile industry and of
artificial fertilizer for agriculture. Investments in the construction
materials industry, which are to increase faster than those in any other
industry, should provide a rapidly growing supply of materials for re-
pair and for residential construction, although this attempt will not
halt the continuing deterioration of housing conditions until after
1960. Investments will be needed in the textile and food-processing
industries to overcome bottlenecks in production capacity, caused by
many years of neglect. Finally, investments in industries producing
for export are required in order to provide foreign exchange for the
import of vital materials. Investments in coal mining have been in-
creased greatly both in absolute terms and as a percent of total in-
dustrial investments, but this effort probably will not lead to a re-
covery of exports of coal until later, because of growing domestic
requirements for coal and the long time lag between the initiation and
completion of new projects. In the metallurgy and machinery industries,
investments have been reduced considerably in comparison with those
under the Six Year Plan (1950-55) but are concentrated in areas which
offer the best opportunities for rapidly expanding exports.
Although a continuation of present agricultural policies is
expected, production and marketings probably will increase at a lower
rate than in the past 2 years. A major contribution to the improvement
in living standards has been the sharp rise in the supply of meat, but
to relieve the balance of payments situation, a large part of any further
increment to supplies of meat may be exported. In addition, the small-
ness of expected increases in over-all supplies of consumer goods may
itself interfere with the program of increasing incentives for peasants
to market their products because the bulk of such increases is likely
to be channeled to urban areas where dissatisfaction is greatest.
Large potential savings of labor, capital, and materials even-
tually may be realized as a result of current and prospective reforms
in connection with the "new economic model," but their full effect cer-
tainly will not be felt until well after 1960, and there is some doubt
as to how drastic a change will be politically acceptable.
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The economic situation in Poland is likely to become increas-
ingly tight in the next few years, and the regime can be expected to
seek additional credits from the East and the West.
4. Economic Growth and Allocation of Resources, 1950-60.
Tables 1* and 2** indicate the evolution of the net material
product of Poland) its distribution during 1950-57 (actual) and 1958-60
(plan), and the growth and distribution of investments. Data on the
net material product are derived entirely from Polish sources and differ
substantially with regard to comprehensiveness and methodology from
Western calculations of gross national product or national income.
(See footnotes to Table 1.) Major conclusions as to trends and changes
in the rate of growth of production and of supplies and in the distri-
bution of the latter, however, are clearly revealed, as follows:
a. The rate of growth of the net material product of Poland)
valued at market prices and excluding services, has been exceptionally
stable, at slightly more than 7 percent a year since 1950) and is ex-
pected to remain about the same during the next 3 years. (If a measure
of the net material product more closely approximating valuations of the
factor cost is obtained by deducting the turnover tax and other forms
of indirect taxes from personal consumption) the rate of growth is
raised by about 1 percent during 1950-53 and correspondingly reduced
during 1954-57, but the long-run pattern remains unaffected.)
b. The net effect of the international transactions (net
foreign investment) of Poland on the national accounts was very small
until 1957. The use of foreign credits in 1957) however) accounted for
about 40 percent of the total increase in domestic supplies in that
year. Net foreign aid is expected to be about 40 percent smaller in
1958 than in 1957 and to have ceased by 1960.
c. During 1950-53, no more than one-third of increments to
domestic availabilities were used to increase personal consumption.
During 1954-56, personal consumption absorbed all the increments to the
national product) lower levels of stock accumulation offsetting slight
increases in capital investments and final government purchases of non-
consumer goods. During 1957, foreign credits provided the means for
increases in personal consumption exceeding the increase in the national
product and for what was probably the largest accumulation of stocks of the
postwar period. During 1958-60 the plan is to increase the rate of growth
of capital investment 2.5 times and to cut in half the rate of growth of
personal consumption. The resulting increases of more than 4 percent***
* Table 1 follows on p. 7.
** Table 2 follows on p. 9.
*** Text continued on p. 10.
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Table 1
Net Material Product at Market Prices and Indexes of Growth in Poland
Selected Years, 1950-57, and 1958 and 1960 Plans
Net material product 2/
1958, 1960
1950 PI/ 1953 2/ 1955 21 1956 21 1957 12/ (Plan) V (Plan) qi
Billion Zlotys in 1956 Prices
167 19_2. 255 277 312_4
Personal consumption of goods f/ 128 132 171 189 213 224 252
Government purchases of goods 8/ 8 8 13 13 14 16 17
Net capital investment 12/ 21 33 36 37 39 42 56
Increase in stocks 1/ 11 21 16 14 22 17 1/ 19
Net foreign investment hi N.A. N.A. -1 +2 -11 -6 0
Net material product 2/
Personal consumption of goods
Government purchases of goods
Net capital investment
Increase in stocks
a. 1/. Unless otherwise indicated.
values are at actual prices for final
b. g/
c. 3/. Unless otherwise indicated.
Indexes (1955 = 100)
71 83 100 108 117 124 146
751] 771] 100
57 64 100
57 91 loo
70 134 loo
111
102
103
87
125 131
108 124
109 116W
134 106
147
128
153
118
All
products.
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Table 1
Net Material Product at Market Prices and Indexes of Growth in Poland
Selected Years) 1950-57, and 1958, and 1960 Plans
(Continued)
d. Y. Because of the distribution of consumption (as between personal consumption and government pur-
chases) differing from that used in the Statistical Yearbook, 3957, the index for personal consumption has
been calculated as a residual.
e. Net material product (national income, Marxist definition) is the sum of incomes originating in all
"productive" sectors, calculated as the sum of the differences between the gross value of production in each
sector and the cost of materials, including depreciation. Income originating in "nonproductive" occupations
(private services, government services, passenger transport, rent, and interest) is not included. Net ma-
terial product equals net material product (US definition) excluding income originating in "nonproductive"
occupations. Totals may not agree with the sum of their rounded components.
f. Personal consumption of goods includes all expenditures of individuals for consumer goods, the value of
the goods obtained as income in kind by the urban population valued at market prices, farm income in kind
valued at above-quota delivery prices, and the value of materials contained in private services to consumers
g. Government purchases of goods include the value of materials and contracted services used by state
organizations (aaministrative, social-cultural, and military) and by passenger transport. The category also
includes the value of goods passing through the state budget but finally consumed by individuals.
h. Net capital investment equals gross investment in fixed capital (producer's plant and equipment and other
construction) plus capital repairs less depreciation.
i. Increase in stocks covers all levels of inventories and state stockpiles.
j. Residual.
k. Net foreign investment is the internal value of the foreign balance on goods and
imports). Where this balance is positive (exports larger than imports), it is added
ponents of the net material product; where it is negative, it is deducted.
1. J. The difference between this figure and the figure in the official index is d
flation.
m. Planned increase in gross capital investment. Q./
services (exports less
to the sum of other com-
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Table 2
Distribution and Growth of Capital Investment in Poland
by Type of Ownership and by Economic Sector 2/
1951-60
Distribution
(Percent of Total Investment)
Index of Growth (1951-55
Yearly Average = 100)
1956-60
1951-55
12/
1955 12/
1956 12/
1957 2/
(Plan) (1/
1955
1956
1957
1956-60
Type of ownership
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
116.2
119.8
125.4
143.3
Socialized investment
95.5
93.2
91.7
88.9
87.1
113.3
114.9
116.7
130.6
Private investment
4.5
6.8
8.3
11.1
12.9
178.8
219.2
315.6
420.2
Economic sector
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Industry and construction
47.1
44.3
45.1
44.7
42.4
109.5
114.9
119.0
130.4
Agriculture and forestry
13.0
18.2
19.0
19.1
18.9
163.1
175.1
184.6
215.8
Transport and communications
12.0
10.2
8.8
9.3
9.2
99.7
88.5
97.2
107.4
Housing
11.5
12.9
13.7
15.1
16.2
129.8
142.8
164.4
199.6
Social-cultural, utilities
and trade
10.7
10.8
10.3
10.6
11.8
117.6
116.1
124.6
158.5
Defense and administration
5.8
3.6
3.0
1.3
1.5
71.5
62.1
27.4
34.9
a. Calculated from unrounded data in 1956 prices. Totals may not agree with the sum of their rounded com-
ponents.
b.
c.
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a year in per capita consumption apply only to consumer goods. The
growth of personal services is likely to be less) and housing conditions,
a very important element in subjective valuations of living standards,
are expected to deteriorate.
d. The allocation of expenditures for capital investments
has shifted considerably in recent years in favor of housing and agri-
culture and away from transport and communications, defense and admin-
istration. (See Table 2.*) The share of industry and construction in
total capital investments has declined only slightly. According to the
plan for 1956-60) the share of housing will continue to rise, and that
of industry will fall.
II. Living Standards and Monetary Stability.
1. Low Urban Living Standards.
. Most of the current economic problems and policies in Poland
are influenced by low and politically dangerous living standards in
urban areas) which in many important respects remain below the prewar
level for white collar employees and certain groups of manual workers.
The basic food supply of urban inhabitants is adequate in terms of
calories) but the quality of their diet is poor. In relation to the
prewar period, and certainly to 1950) per capita consumption of meat
and fat has fallen considerably in urban areas. Among the various urban
groups, white collar employees have suffered by far the most drastic
decline in diet, but most workers who are not newcomers also are prob-
ably worse off. The peasant, on the other hand, has spectacularly im-
proved his diet since the war. In 1938, he was eating not much more
than one-fifth the amount of meat and fats consumed in the cities) but
by the time Gomulka arrived on the scene the peasant had nearly tripled
his consumption of these products and drawn level with the falling con-
sumption of urban inhabitants. Consumption of dairy products and sugar
in rural areas also has risen, although not as dramatically.
The fact that almost the entire monthly wage of a textile worker)
whose wage category is only a little below average, is required to buy
a minimum food supply for a family of four is another indication of the
low living standard prevailing for several million families. Clearly)
wives and other members of the family have been forced to work to cover
expenditure on necessary industrial goods and services) which consti-
tutes about 45 percent of the typical monthly budget. At the average
wage level, 2 months of work are needed to buy a suit) and 2 weeks to
buy a pair of poor-quality leather shoes. The supply of most consumer
durables other than pots and pans has increased but is still so limited
* P. 9, above.
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that such commodities usually cannot be obtained without 6 long wait or
special connections.
One of the most important zingle factors now contributing to a
low living standard is the housing situation in urban areas, which was
bad before World War II and has become worse since the initial postwar
recovery. In the face of a growth of urban population of 40 percent
and normal deterioration of older housing) there has not been enough
new residential construction or repair to maintain even the density of
1.6 persons per roam, which prevailed in 1950) and conditions of 3 or
4 persons per room are prevalent. The acquisition of an apartment is
in many cases the most difficult problem facing Polish families, par-
ticularly young people.
Table 3* shows the movement of various aspects of living stan-
dards between selected postwar years and in relation to the prewar
period. Following several years of rapid recovery, living standards
in 1950 probably were above prewar levels in both urban and rural
areas, although farmers had received the greater improvements. As a
result of industrialization and of agricultural policies) however,
living standards declined during 1951-53, per capita consumption in
urban areas fell sharply, whereas consumption on farms rose) and hous-
ing deteriorated everywhere.
The rise of living standards in urban areas since 1953 has been
very uneven as applied both to categories of workers and to types of
consumer items. The growth of per capita consumption on farms probably
exceeded that of per capita consumption in urban areas until 1957.
2. Policies and Developments, 1956-57.
a. General.
In 1956 and 1957, there were substantial improvements in
over-all per capita consumption of high-quality foods) clothing, and
consumer durables. These improvements were offset only partly by a
continued deterioration in housing conditions.
During the 2-year period, per capita consumption of meat
and animal fats rose by 10 percent; milk, by 7 to 8 percent; and sugar,
by 10 percent. Among the nonfood articles) improvements could be noted
in consumption of leather shoes, textile fabrics, and clothing and in
a rapid rise in sales of consumer durables -- radios, bicycles, motor-
cycles, sewing machines) and the like -- from very low previous levels.**
* Table 3 follows on p. 12.
** Text continued on p. 14.
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Table 3
Selected Indicators of Living Standards in Poland
Selected Years, 1938-57, and 1960 Plan
Amount in 3955
Total consumption per
capita
Indexes
(1955 = 100)
1938
(Prewar
Boundaries) 1950 1953 1955 1956 1957 (Plan)
1960
All goods purchased by
individuals
6,264 zlotys 21*
N.A.
82
80
loo
109
120
135
Meat and slaughter fats
37 kilograms Li
73 2/
102
88
100
103
110
N.A.
Sugar
24 kilograms d
51W
88 1/
83/
l00/
105 1/
1l0/
N.A.
Cotton fabrics
16.5 meters d
58 1/ g/
87 di
92 si/
loo a/
108 EV
114 Li
N.A.
Leather shoes
0.9 pair di
N.A.
N.A.
89 1/
100 di
118 di
133 1/
N.A.
Urban consumption per
capita
Urban real wages (1956
zlotys) di
N.A.
110
90
100
112
124
130
Meat and slaughter
fats di
45 kilograms
158 di
188
113
100
116
131
N.A.
housing space
7 square meters iil
87
113
N.A.
100
N.A.
97
98 1/
Footnotes for Table 3 follow on p. 13.
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Table 3
Selected Indicators of Living Standards in Poland
Selected Years, 1938-57, and 1960 Plan
(Continued)
a. In 1956 zlotys. Derived from series on the value of personal consumption in Table 1, p. 7, above.
b. Estimated.
c. 1934-38 average.
d. 12/
f. Calculated from data in Table 4, p. 15, below.
g. 1933-37 average.
h. Figures for 1956-57 were calculated from official indexes
of net money wages and retail prices.
i. Except in 1938, urban consumption of meat and slaughter fats is assumed to be approximately equal to
state procurements of slaughter animals (converted to slaughter weight by means of official ratios) less ex-
ports of meat products.
This is an extremely rough estimate which does not take into consideration sales of meat to peasants
through state channels) sales by peasants to urban inhabitants through the free market, waste and stocks in
state industry and the state distribution system, and the greater share of waste in slaughter meat than in
processed meat exports.
Although the over-all trend in per capita urban consumption of meat and slaughter fats is probably cor-
rect, there is strong reason to suspect that the index for 1950 is too high. There is also a possibility
that part of the increase in state procurements in 1956 and 1957 was at the expense of free market sales.
J- le
1. Estimated achievement.
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These improvements were due in part to increased agricul-
tural production and to conversion of plants from production of ma-
chinery and military end items to production of consumer durables. In
a number of cases, however, they stemmed not primarily from increased
production but from reductions in stocks between October 1956 and June
1957 and from increases in imports or decreases in exports of consumer
goods, financed by foreign credits. Consumption of wool and cotton
fabrics rose in the last half of 1956 and the first half of 1957 be-
cause of a sharp decline in stocks and continued in 1957 on the strength
of a very sharp fall in exports. The reduction in exports of sugar in
1956 was greater than the dip in production of sugar and because of the
poor sugar beet crop in 1956 exports remained on a relatively low level
in 1957. Imports of manufactured consumer goods rose rapidly in both
years. Table 4* shows the evolution of production, consumption, imports,
and exports during 1956-57 for selected consumer goods.
Total personal consumption (excluding services and housing)
increased about 11 percent in 1956 and another 12 percent in 1957. (See
Table 1.**) If housing and other services were included in consumption
and valued in accord with consumer preferences, the growth of consump-
tion would be considerably smaller. The rate of increase in consumption
in 1956-57, however, probably is greater than in any postrecovery year
except 1954, when large stocks of commodities, accumulated in 1953, were
released.
Another favorable development is the rise in the marketed
share of agricultural production and particularly of high-quality foods
(meat, milk, and the like) as a result of the successful application of
cash incentives in state purchases of agricultural products. (See
Table 7.***) This development reverses an upward trend in the ratio
of consumption on the farm to total production of these items which had
been in progress since the introduction of low-priced compulsory de-
liveries in 1951. Greater mutual benefit to town and country in the
exchange of food for manufactured goods has been gained thereby. Over
the 2-year period, the real incomes of farmers, including consumption
in kind and after purchases of current inputs) increased about 18 per-
cent, whereas the real wages of urban workers rose 24 percent.
The distribution of total gains in consumer goods was in
favor of the farmer in 1956 and of the urban population in 1957. Im-
provements in consumption, however, were distributed unevenly among
various categories of workers. This fact was particularly true in 1957,
when the Gomulka government attempted to use the incentive of higher
* Table 4 follows on p. 15.
** P. 7, above.
*** P. 23, below.
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Table 4
Sources and Uses of Selected Consumer Goods in Poland
1956-57
Increments Above Previous Year
Item
Year
Unit
Production 2/
Imports 2/
Exports 2/
Net
Domestic
Supplies
Consumption 2/
Stocks
and
Residual
Meat and slaughter fats 2/
1956
Thousand tons
+132
+15
+117
+117
1957
Thousand tons
+46
+46
+46 f/
Milk and products (as milk)
1956
Million liters
+364
+135 g/
+499
+407
+92
1957
Million liters
+621
+145 6/
+766
+551
+215
Sugar (refined)
1956
Thousand tons
-207
-311
+104
+46
+58
1957
Thousand tons
+282
+37
+245
+48 III/
+197
Cotton fabrics
1956
Million meters
-3.6
+35.2
-38.8
+44.9
-83.7
1957
Million meters
-14.9
-29-7
+44.6
+48.3
-3.7
Wool fabrics
1956
Million meters
+0.5
+1.4
-0.9
+7.2
-8.1
1957
Million meters
+0.3
-3.5
+3.8
+0.7 LI/
+3.1
Leather shoes
1956
Million pairs
+3.0
+0.4
+3.4
+5.2 1/
-1.8
1957
Million pairs
+2.2
-0.3
+1.9
+4.3 1/
-2.4
a. Production of meat and slaughter fats is estimated;
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
Net supplies minus consumption.
Slaughter weight; excludes poultry. Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
Assuming that the increment to consumption equals the increment to supplies.
Estimate of butter imports in tons converted to whole milk at a rate of 1 kilogram of butter to 28 liters of whole milk
Increase in retail sales.
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wages to attract workers to high-priority occupations, allotting 3 bil-
lion zlotys of a wage increase of 4-1/2 billion zlotys in January 1957
to coal mining. Over the 2-year period, money wages in the fuels indus-
try (which includes coal miners) increased about 50 percent; those of
workers in other high-wage industries, such as metallurgy and machinery,
30 to 35 percent, whereas in most of the remaining nonagricultural
occupations the increase was 25 to 30 percent, of which the greater
part took place in 1956. Table 5* shows the relative growth of money
wages for various categories of workers during 1956 and in 1957. The
increases of 1956 were distributed much more evenly than those of 19574
but, because price increases during 1957 were in areas which affected
high-paid workers more than low-paid workers, the distribution of in-
crements to real wages probably was less unequal than is indicated in
Table 5.*
b. Consumption, Wage Policy, and Monetary Stability.
The growth of personal consumption during 1956-57 did not
take place in a stable and controlled manner but was attended by infla-
tionary conditions. Real wages began to rise significantly in the sum-
mer of 1956, when, after the Poznan riots, Gomulkays predecessors
authorized an increase in the wage fund beyond the original plan. By
the end of the year, not only had legal increases in monthly pay again
assumed larger proportions than first expected, but the confusion and
wage "indiscipline" surrounding the change in regime had resulted in
unauthorized increases in take-home pay the momentum of which did not
subside until well into the following year. At that point, about 5
million workers and employees were affected by the wage increases, and
the average monthly wage had grown 17 percent above the level in the
first half of 1956.
During 1956, farmers' cash incomes also were raised 18 per-
cent as a result of increased sales and of higher prices paid for Agri-
cultural products following the reduction of compulsory deliveries. For
example, the average state procurement price for wheat rose 39 percent;
that for hogs, 25 percent; and for flax, 29 percent.
Considerable pressure was thus suddenly brought to bear on
the supply of consumer goods, particularly as prices in state stores
were held stable. The lag of production behind sales was reflected in
an alarming decline of retail stocks of many items, notably cotton fab-
rics, which dropped 57 percent between the last hAlf of 1956 and June
1957. Because even the rapid increase in sales did not absorb fully
the newly created purchasing power, the amount of money in circulation
expanded 2 billion to 3 billion zlotys more than that needed to finance
the increased volume of transactions at the given price level.
* Table 5 follows on p. 17.
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Table 5
Average Monthly Wages of Selected Categories of Workers in Poland 2/
1955-57
Current Zlotys
1955
First Half
1956
Second Half
1956
1957
Fuels
Zlotys
1,681
1,755
1,987
2,513
Previous period = 100
104
113
126
Metallurgy
Zlotys
1,515
1,599
1,760
1,984
Previous period = 100
106
110
113
Machine building and metal
products
Zlotys
1,266
1,283
1,507
1,693
Previous period = 100
101
117
112
Railroads
Zlotys
1,097
1,079
1,316
1,471
Previous period = 100
98
122
112
Chemical, building materials,
construction
Zlotys
1,214
1,235
1,424
1,543
Previous period = 100
102
115
108
Other industries and remaining
services
Zlotys
961
998
1,136
1,237
Previous period = 100
104
114
109
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In 1957, money incomes of the urban population increased
by about 23 billion zlotys, or 18 percent, as a result of higher wages)
family allowances, and sickness benefits. At the same time) prices
paid for farm products continued to rise) and the receipts of farmers
from sales to the state rose 10 billion zlotys) or 31 percent. Never-
theless) serious inflation in 1957 was forestalled. In the first place,
Gomulka had recourse to large foreign credits and was aided further in
the second half of the year by an excellent crop. The rate of growth
in wages for the urban population slackened toward the end of 1957)
chiefly because of suppression of indiscriminate raises early in the
year. More than half of the increase in the wage bill for that year
was caused by wage raises authorized before or just after Gomulka's
accession to power; whereas only 5.5 billion zlotys of a total 18.5
billion zlotys resulted from new authorizations. Moreover) 8 percent
of the increase in gross wages was absorbed through higher taxes on
wages and salaries.
Another step taken was to raise prices for a number of con-
sumer goods sold in state stores: vodka, furniture, paper products, and
a number of scarce consumer durables such as automobiles, commodities
which, under Polish conditions) are not considered necessities. This
action absorbed about 18 percent of the addition in 1957 to incomes of
both farmer and worker. At the same time, substantial increases in
prices of industrial goods used in agriculture (plows, fertilizer, bricks,
lime, and lumber) offset by a further 24 percent, the gain of the farmers
in money income from all sources. Finally) the growth of the private
market in manufactured consumer goods, where prices had long been far
above those in state stores, further reduced consumer purchasing power
by an estimated 2 percent. As a result of these developments) the in-
crease in net money incomes was almost identical with the increase in
the value of retail sales. Moreover, an improved outlook for monetary
stability probably was at least partly responsible for a shift from cash
hoards to savings deposits, which grew by 3.2 billion zlotys in 1957.
3. Prospects for the Future.
As was indicated in I)* above, rates of growth in personal con-
sumption are planned to be much lower during 1958-60 than during 1956-57.
Because this situation resulted more from economic limitations than from
policies regulating production and distribution, large increases in con-
sumption in excess of plan probably cannot be achieved without additional
foreign aid.
Prospects are particularly poor in the case of urban housing be-
cause plans for new urban housing construction, which barely cover the
deterioration of old buildings, will not prevent a continued decline in
* P. 2, above.
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per capita living space. Moreover, the housing plan may not be fulfilled.
There is also little hope for a substantial improvement in supplies of
clothing) unless investments in the textile industry are raised above
present planned limits and more scarce foreign exchange is allocated to
imports of wool and cotton.
Food prospects are better for the urban worker because of the
favorable effect of the new agricultural policy on state collections of
foodstuffs and on agricultural production. During the first quarter of
1958, procurement of certain foods was outrunning processing facilities.
A probable decline in grain imports after 1958 and a probable increase
in meat exports as a means of achieving a more rapid improvement in the
balance of payments situation; however, will tend to slow the growth
of consumption of high-quality foods.
Large increases in production of consumer durables can be ex-
pected) but sales of these items represented less than 6 percent of
turnover in retail trade in 1957.
The growing tightness of the economic position of Poland is
reflected in the plan for 1958, which calls for very few wage increases.
It is also a factor in some of the recent retreats of the Gomulka re-
gime from the liberalization of October 1955; for example, the removal
of the independent status of workers' councils may have been motivated
partly by the desire to avoid organized opposition of workers to un-
popular economic measures.
In one important respect, however) the present situation is
favorable. Because of US and Soviet credits and the excellent grain
harvest of 1957) stocks of grain, wool) and cotton probably are the
highest in several years and may even grow further in 1958) and stocks
of consumer goods at the retail level also are rising. While these
stocks may be in part tied up in the process of establishing a more
flexible system of economic management; they also constitute a reserve
against such contingencies as a bad harvest.
III. Agriculture.
1. Background.
The most important change in economic policy introduced to date
by the Gomulka government in Poland is in agriculture. The predominance
of private farming has been accepted, and both the means and the incen-
tives to increase private farm production and sales are being provided.
This new turn results from the total failure of the policy in effect
during 1950-55, when private agriculture was prevented from operating
effectivelyj whereas) on the other hand) the regime was never able to
expand the socialized sector beyond 23 percent of the agricultural land.
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Stimulated by conditions in the free market and terms of trade
favorable to farmers, Polish agriculture had almost regained prewar
levels of production and marketings by 1949/50. After the introduction
of compulsory deliveries at low prices the following year, however, and
with growing discrimination against private farming, production stag-
nated and marketings declined. The production of food crops fell during
1951/52 and remained below prewar levels and those of 1950 (in both old
and new boundaries) until 1956) and the production of meat did not ex-
ceed the output of 1950 until 1956. (See Table 6.*) Except for horses,
livestock herds increased, but because of an insufficient supply of
fodder, the average weight per anima/ declined. Only in milk, eggs,
and especially wool were there significant increases in production.
Production as a whole did not regain prewar levels or those of 1950
until 1954/55.
Insufficient investments and a maldistribution of investments
and current industrial inputs were partly responsible for these fail-
ures. As a result of the industrialization policies, investments in
agriculture were small under the Six Year Plan (1950-55) in relation
to the contribution of agriculture to national income -- they were
about 12 percent of total investments, whereas the contribution of
agriculture to the national income was about 30 percent at market
prices and more than this at factor cost. Moreover, investments in
private farms, which comprised about 80 percent of total agricultural
land, were less than one-third of all investments in agriculture and
probably did not even compensate for depreciation of existing assets.
Great stress was placed on investments in heavy agricultural machinery
and tractors appropriate for extensive agriculture on state farms,
whereas sales of small agricultural machinery and tools declined in
comparison with early postwar levels. Similarly, the amounts of con-
struction materials sold to private farmers did not even satisfy de-
mands for essential repairs. Discrimination was strong also in allo-
cations of chemical fertilizer, private farmers receiving less than
half as much per hectare as collective and state farms, and most of
this was reserved for land under state contracts. In addition to
these specific factors, the fear of collectivization, the low prices
paid to farmers, and the very small supplies of goods in rural retail
stores gave the farmer little incentive to raise production and to
invest.
In spite of concentrated economic efforts and preferential
treatment with respect to taxes, prices, and the like, results on state
and collective farms were even poorer than on private farms. Produc-
tion per hectare of arable land in the crop year of 1955/56 was 17 per-
cent less on collective farms and 37 percent less on state farms than
* Table 6 follows on p. 21.
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Table 6
Trdicators of Trends in Agricultural Production and Inventory in Poland
Selected Years, 1934-57
1934-38
Prewar
Present
Boundaries
Boundaries
1950 1951-55 1955
1956
1957
Indexes (1955 = 100) LI/
Total production
97
95 93 loo
108
112
Food crops
Industrial crops
109
47
N.A.
N .A.
loo 95 100
8o 85 100
110
85
110.7
N.A.
Animal products
84
N.A. ,
90 92 100
Million Metric Tons
107
113
Crops hi
Four major grains
12.5
13.3
11.3 11.2 12.7
12.1
13.5
Potatoes
35.0
38.0
36.5 29.8 27.0
38.1
35.1
Sugar beets
2.8
6.o
6.4 6.5 7.3
6.4
7.6
Million Head
Livestock inventory hi 2/
Cattle
10.6
9.9
7.2 7.5 7.9
8.4
8.3
Hogs
7.5
9.7
9.4 9.5 10.9
11.6
12.3
Sheep
3.4
1.9
2.2 3.4 4.2
4.2
4.0
Thousand Metric Tons
Meat, slaughter weight 1/
1,005
1,165
1,132 1,012 1,110
1,242
1,335
a. 23/
b. 21i/
c. Prewar data relate to the
d. Estimated; including meat
census of June 1938.
and slaughter fats.
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on private farms. In the case of state farms, inefficiency was re-
flected partly in heavy and growing budgetary subsidies.
Equally as serious as the stagnation of production was the
decline in agricultural marketings at a time when the urban population
was growing rapidly. Although procurement of bread grains was adequate,
the supply of certain quality foods purchased through compulsory and
other deliveries dropped both absolutely and as a percent of production.
The clearest case is that of meat, the purchase of which by the state
sank from 72 percent to only 52 percent of total slaughter between the
first year of compulsory deliveries and 1955. (See Table 7.*) The
trend is less clear for dairy products) in sales of which the free mar-
ket of the peasants plays a large role, but here also an improvement
in per capita consumption in rural areas relative to that in urban areas
probably occurred. One of the major purposes of the collectivization
and compulsory delivery policies was to insure an adequate supply of
foods for the urban population; the result was the opposite.
2. Recent Developments.
Some modifications of agricultural policies were made during the
period of the "new course" (1954 to mid-1956). Compulsory deliveries
remained about stable, but above-quota purchases at near-market prices
were raised. As a result of these measures and of reductions in prices
of industrial consumer goods, farmers' terms of trade improved, in con-
trast to the preceding 3 years when the purchasing power of farm cash
incomes fell continually. Increases in agricultural production during
1954-56, however, were certainly more attributable to favorable weather
than to the "new course."
Elements of a new approach to agricultural problems had already
appeared during the first three quarters of 1956, although a new policy
as such was not introduced until after Gomulka came to power. Gomulka's
speech to the Eighth Plenum of the Communist Party Congress in October
1956 was taken as a signal for dissolving about 8o percent of existing
collective farms during the fourth quarter of 1956. (Of total arable
land, 9.6 percent was in collective farms in June 1956, and 1.1 percent
in December 1956.) A number of basic measures were then taken by the
Gomulka government, and some measures previously Approved were put into
effect -- all intended to restore the individual peasant's incentives
for production and sales.
First, the liquidation of most of the collective farms was
accepted de facto and the threat of a resumption of collectivization
was removed, at least for the foreseeable future. This procedure was
* Table 7 follows on p. 23.
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Table 7
Share of Procurement in Total Production in Poland
1950, 1953,
and 1955-57
Unit
1950
1953
1955
1956
1957
Meat (live weight)
Production 2/
Thousand tons
1,625
1,512
1,674
1,894
2,047 12/
Procurement 2/
Thousand tons
1,167
906
869
1,094
1,241 12/
Ratio
.72
.60
.52
.58
.61
Milk
Production Lti
Million liters
7,760
9,022
9,615
9,979
10,600
Procurement 2/
Million liters
1,376
2,137
2,453
2,514
3,046
Ratio
.18
.24
.26
.25
.29
Eggs
Production Lt/
Million units
N.A.
3,953
4,160
4,253
4,210
Procurement 2/
Million units
1,220
1,592
1,636
1,646
1,659
Ratio
N.A.
.40
.39
.39
.39
Bread grains
Production 2/
Thousand tons
8,126
6,708
9,137
8,679
9,764
Procurement 2/
Thousand tons
2,104
1,789
2,249
1,896
1,733
Ratio
.26
.27
.25
.22
.18
b. Including horsemeat.
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backed up by legalizing the free transfer of property rights in land,
including inheritance. A decision was also made to sell 500,000 hec-
tares of state farm land, 300,000 hectares from state farms (over 10
percent of the total state farm area), and 200,000 hectares from the
State Land Fund, to private farmers who, it was expected, would util-
ize the land more effectively.
Large arrears in compulsory quotas for delivery in 1956 were
allowed to accumulate, and the eventual elimination of these quotas was
promised. By virtue of a decision made in July 1956) milk was removed
entirely from compulsory quotas as of 1 January 1957. Deliveries of
grain quotas were reduced by one-third, and prices paid for grain under
compulsory quotas were doubled. Farms up to 2 hectares in size were
exempted altogether from compulsory deliveries of grain and potatoes,
and schedules for compulsory delivery were lessened progressively in
relation to the size of farms. Thus some of the discrimination against
medium- and large-size farms, which had been an important factor hin-
dering production, was reduced. Quota purchases of hogs were allowed
to decline by 20 percent in 1956 and another 33 percent in 1957, although
no reduction in quotas was announced officially.
Between 1955 and 1957 the value of quota purchases fell by 40
percent in constant prices and declined substantially as a percent of
total procurement. Because of the drop in the quantity of compulsory
deliveries, because of higher prices paid for compulsory deliveries,
and because of increased above-quota sales, the cash income of farmers
rose about 27 percent in 1956 and another 31 percent in 1957.
Simultaneously, steps were taken to increase supplies of agri-
cultural equipment, tools, artificial fertilizer, and construction ma-
terials to private farmers. The amount of artificial fertilizer (pure
content) applied per hectare of sown area increased 14 percent in all
agriculture but 22 percent on private farms between the crop years of
1954/55 and 1956/57. (See Table 8.*) In 1957, there was also a con-
siderable shift from production of large agricultural machinery to small
machinery usable on private farms (see Table 9**), and existing machine
tractor stations are now being used primarily to service private and
collective farms. Plans called for 60 percent of the value of agri-
cultural machinery to be sold to private farms in 1957 and nearly
three-quarters in 1958, compared with only 30 percent in 1956. Large
increases in sales of construction materials to agriculture from state
sources also occurred (see Table 9**) and private production of bricks
and lime in rural areas was encouraged.
* Table 8 follows on p. 25.
** Table 9 follows on p. 26.
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Table 8
Use of Fertilizer in Polish Agriculture 2/
Selected Years, 1937/38-1956/57
Kilograms per Hectare of Sown Land
Chemical fertilizer (pure content)
1937/38
1948/49
1954/55
1955/56
1956/57
Prewar
Boundaries
Postwar
Boundaries
n.
Sa
17.7
322.1
s
lio . /4
Nitrogenous (as N)
1.7
9.3
4.8
8.9
10.6
12.6
Phosphorous (as P205)
3.1
11.4
5.5
9.5
9.8
10.1
Potassium (at 1(20)
2.3
17.5
7.4
16.9
17.7
17.7
Manure (pure content)
68.4
78.1
NA.
62.3
65.0
NA.
Total fertilizer (pure content)
75.5
116.3
NA.
97.6
103.1
NA.
N
23.9
34.6
NA.
29.1
31.7
NA.
P205
18.9
29.5
NA.
23.9
24.8
NA.
K20
32.7
52.2
NA.
44.6
46.6
N.A.
Private farms: total
75.5
116.3,
NA.
91.24
NA.
N.A.
Chemical
7.1
38.2
NA.
28.1
31.0
34.3
Manure
68.4
78.1
N.A.
67.3
NA.
N.A.
Collective farms: total
NA.
104.0
NA.
N.A.
Chemical
NA.
54.3
60.6
N.A.
Manure
NA.
49.7
NA.
NA.
State farms: total
NA.
22.:2.
NA.
N.A.
Chemical
NA.
59.2
61.5
NA.
Manure
AA.
40.7
N.A.
NA.
a. Ej
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Table 9
Deliveries of Investment Goods to Agriculture in Poland
1954-57 and 1960 Plan
Percent Sold
1960 to Private Farms
Unit 1954 El/ 1955 8/ 2/ 1956 2/ 2/ 1957 2/ (Plan) 11 1956
large machinery and equipment
Tractors 15 horsepower unit 8,600 9,206 8,694 5,799 N.A. Negligible
Grain combines Chits 690 966 1,134 458 N.A. 0
Threshers, with motor Units 1,300 818 955 1,332 N.A. 21
Grain sowers, tractor-drawn Chits 1,200 2,192 616 N.A. N.A. Negligible
Mowers, tractor-drawn Units 1,100 1,800 2,609 I,920 N.A. Negligible
Potato diggers, tractor-drawn Units 1,400 3,000 3,367 832 N.A. 0
Small machinery and equipment
Plows, horse-drawn Thousand units 93.3 85.1 Io5.6 139.0 N.A. 100
Field harrows, horse-drawn Thousand units N.A. 114.1 110.9 149.3 N.A. 97
Cultivators, horse-drawn Thousand units N.A. N.A. 9.3 21.5 N.A. N.A.
Grain sowers, horse-drawn Thousand units 14.7 17.8 21.0 21.5 N.A. 41
Potato diggers, horse-drawn Thousand units 17.8 18.7 15.9 21.4 N.A. 80
Chaff cutters Thousand units N.A. N.A. 26.9 31-7 NA. 94
Construction materials 2/
Cement Thousand tons 369 426 618 1,043 1,340
Lime Thousand tons 283 324 295 332 585
Bricks Million units 366 392 412 377 900 E/
Tarpaper Million square meters 9.9 15.2 17.4 27.6 N.A.
a. 4.4./
b.
22/
e. Retail sales to priyate and cooperative farms.
f. All wall materials. Sales of those other than bricks were insignificant in 1955-56 but are said to have increased in 1957.
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Although prices of most industrial inputs for agriculture were
substantislly raised in 1957 to absorb part of the increment to cash
farm incomes and prevent a large shift in the terms of trade in favor
of agriculture, real farm incomes continued to increase in 1957, al-
though at a slower rate than in the preceding year. During the 2-year
period, the increase is estimated at about 18 percent.
These policies appear to have mat with considerable success.
Probably, it is too early to distinguish the effects of favorable
weather on agricultural, production which, in 1955-57, surpassed prewar
levels and those of 1950 in both old and present boundaries and well
exceeded the plan; from the effect of the new policies. The rapid rise
in the marketed share of high-quality products, however, is due, cer-
tainly in significant part, to the newly gained financial incentives.
Between 1955 and. 1957, the share of state purchases to total slaughter
of livestock (in terms of live weight) rose from 52 percent to 61 per-
cent. Thus meat procurement reached the highest absolute and percentage
level since the start of collectivization and compulsory deliveries in
1950-51, although it probably remained below the levels of 1950: Pur-
chases of grains declined as a percent of production as large-scale
imports of grain permitted a larger share of domestic production to be
used for feed.
Another major gain is the rapid rise in investments by peasants
from their awn means, estimated at 16 percent in 1956 and another 18
percent in 1957, above the previous year. If state credits are in-
cluded, investments in private farms grew more than 30 percent in 1957.
Many observers have noted greatly increased construction activity in
the countryside, and it is known that most of the long-term credits
were used for this purpose. Larger investments by the peasants are an
indication of increased confidence in government policies and particu-
larly in the protection of private ownership in agriculture. The same
growth of confidence is reflected in rising prices for land and horses
(about 50 percent and 200 percent, respectively, from 1955 to the end
of 1957).
The shift in priorities in favor of private agriculture, one
of the effects of which was a decline in state agricultural investments,
dOes not appear to have damaged the remaining portion of socialized
agriculture. The value of production per hectare in both collective
and state farms increased considerably in 1956 and 1957, primarily be-
cause of good weather. The campaign to eliminate budgetary subsidies
to state farms, however, may have improved efficiency.
3. Prospects for the Future.
The new agricultural policy has improved greatly the outlook
for Polish agriculture for the next few years. The goal for 1960 is
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to reach a level of agricultural production 25 percent above that of
1955, a seas.= of exceptionally good weather. Perhaps such a goal is
overoptimistic except under very favorable weather conditions, but a
substantial increase in production, amounting to 15 to 20 percent on
a gross basis, above the average production for the years 1951 to 1955
can be expected.
There is evidence that supplies of industrial inputs for agri-
culture will continue to rise rapidly. Production of agricultural ma-
chinery and artificial fertilizer are to increase 46 percent and 55
percent, respectively, between 1957 and 1960. About 19 percent of total
investments went to agriculture in 1956 and 1957, the same percent as
is planned for 1956-60. Also, the share of private investments com-
pared with total investments in agriculture probably will continue to
increase. In 1957, private investment first approached the average of
50 percent planned for the 1956-60 period.
Considerable effort is being concentrated on increasing yields
in the Western Territories -- current yields being still far below pre-
war levels. This lag has been due to underpopulation in these areas,
to the substitution of poorly trained immigrants from eastern Poland
for German farmers who had fled or been forced out, to war damage, to
insufficient investments and inputs of fertilizer by comparison with
German practices, to the inefficiency of state farms which comprised
60 percent of the agricultural land in these territories, and to the
fear of possible future adjustments of boundaries. Factors such as
encouragement of further migration into these areas, private production
of construction materials, and the sale of state farm land to private
farmers are intended to improve this situation,. In general, agricul-
tural prospects in the Western Territories are better than those in
other parts of Poland, as increased inputs of labor, fertilizer, and
investments probably will yield higher marginal returns.
Further development of the policy of stimulating farm production
and sales through market incentives is also expected, particularly as
the Polish government appears to attribute the successes of 1957 largely
to this policy. Compulsory deliveries probably will be eliminated before
1960. Large stocks of grain, mostly financed by US and Soviet credits,
are estimated to have been accumulated as means of stabilizing market
supplies in the event that, upon being freed from compulsory quotas,
peasants hold back their crops for speculative purposes. Whether or not
the Polish government considers that compulsory deliveries can be safely
eliminated with present stock levels is unknown. Judging from official
statements, it seems more likely that this step will be taken in 1959,
coincident with a general price reform, than in 1958. The actual timing
of these moves will depend on the harvest of 1958 as well as on the
political atmosphere.
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A factor which tends to postpone the elimination of compulsory
deliveries at least until 1959 is the government's desire to channel to
urban areas most of the expected small increments to availabilities of
foods. Under these circumstances, the terms of trade between agricul-
tural and industrial products will have to be kept stable, or possibly
even shifted somewhat in favor of urban areas. It may then be difficult
to induce large and growing private investments, although farmers
apparently were willing to save and invest a considerable part of the
increment to their income during 1957.
Another problem is the reliance of Poland on imports of grain
for indirect support of its increasing production of meat. These im-
ports are expected to remain at about 1 million tons a year through 1960
and to cause a severe drain on Poland's limited supply of foreign ex-
change. On the other hand, some Polish officials and economists con-
sider imports of grain to be justified economically by the larger exports
of meat which thereby are made possible.
IV. Industry.
1. General.
The most serious problem of the industrial sector in Poland is
the severe shortage of raw materials, particularly coal and construction
materials. This shortage has influenced the recent reduction in the
rate of industrial growth from about 10 percent a year in 1953-55 to
about 7 percent in 1956 and 1957. (See Table 10.*) It has resulted
also in an inability to improve the housing situation and is reflected in
the difficulties of maintaining a balance of payments. The problem is
rooted in the improvident investment policy of 1949-53, which promoted
rapid growth in areas where large returns on investment in terms of
gross value of production could be expected (especially machinery,
metallurgy to support machinery, and advanced chemicals), to the detri-
ment of industries which were either capital intensive (basic chemicals)
or where investments took a long time to come to fruition (coal).
Investment priorities in industry under the Five Year Plan
(1956-60) are designed primarily to expand the supply of basic materials
for domestic use and exports. This policy will stimulate the growth of
personal consumption by developing the production of materials used as
inputs for agriculture, housing) and some branches of light industry,
but it will not permit a large expansion of capacity in the industries
producing final consumer goods. The main purpose of these priorities
seems to be the creation of an industrial structure which) in the long
* Table 10 follows on p. 30.
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Table 10
Indexes of Industrial Production in Poland
1950-57 and 1960 Plan
Year
Index
(1955 =
100)
Index
(Previous Year = 100)
Official W
Computed
Official a/
Computed
1950
47.2
64.5
127.9
114.6
1951
57.6
70.7
122.0
109.6
1952
68.7
76.1
119.3
107.6
1953
80.6
84.5
117.3
111.4
1954
89.8
92.2
iii..4
109.1
1955
100.0
100.0
111.3
108.5
1956
109.0
107.0
109.0
107.0
1957
119.5
114.0
109.6
107.0
1960 (plan)
149.0
N.A.
run, entails less strain on the Polish consumer and is more in accord
with the resources of Poland than in the past.*
According to current achievements and plans for the remainder
of the period 1956-60 (see Table 11**), the largest increases in in-
dustrial investments under the Five Year Plan are going to the following
industries: (a) coal mining, because of its predominant role as a
source of fuels and an earner of foreign exchange; (b) electric power,
in order to increase the efficiency of coal inputs in the production of
energy; (c) construction materials, because of the severe shortage of
housing; (d) chemicals, in order to increase supplies of fertilizer to
agriculture and to save on foreign exchange by replacing imported wool
and cotton with domestic artificial fibers and because many Polish
planners believe that this industry offers the best prospects for prof-
itable growth in the long run.
* Thus the present goals of the Five Year Plan are more realistic
than those adopted before Gomulka headed the government and also are
oriented more to the needs of the consumer. Production goals for 1960
for most items of heavy industry were cut by 3 to 10 percent, whereas
goals for consumer goods generally were left unchanged.
** Table 11 follows on p. 31.
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Table 11
Investments in Industry in Poland II/
1951-55 and 1956-60 Plan
Value
(Billion 1956 Zlotys)
Percent
Index
(1951-55 = 100)
1956-60
1951-55 Plan
1951-55
1956-60
Plan
1956-60 Plan
Electric power
10.3
19.5
9.8
14.2
189
Fuels (including coal mining)
19.6
29.1
18.6
21.2
148
Ferrous and nonferrous metals
21.5
17.9
20.4
13.1
83
Machine building and metal working
18.2
16.8
17.2
12.3
92
Chemicals, rubber, and sulfur
14.0
17.6
13.3
12.8
126
Construction materials, glass,
and fine ceramics
5.9
11.6
5.6
8.5
197
Wood and paper
3.3
4.5
3.1
3.3
136
Textiles, leather, and shoes
5.4
6.0
5.1
4.4
in
Foods and fats
7.1
10.9
6.7
7.9
154
Other and unallocated
0.2
3.1
0.2
2.3
N.A.
Total industry
10'.5 117.0 100.0 100.0 130
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On the other hand, significant cuts in investments are being
made in metallurgy and machine building, areas which had the highest
priorities under the Six Year Plan (1950-55) but give the least support
to consumption. Large increases in production of steel and machinery
are expected to require much smaller investments than in the past.
Planned increases in investments for light industry and the
food industry can provide only small additions to present production
capacity, which already is almost fully employed. Supplies of imported
raw materials, moreover, will continue to be an important limitation on
the growth of production in these industries.
Table 14* shows that there has been a significant reduction in
the rate of growth of most basic industrial commodities during 1956-57
compared with that during 1950-53 or during 1954-55. The reduction is
due both to the shortage of materials and to the leveling off of in-
vestments since 1953. The decline is general among fuels, metals, and
chemicals but applies also to many items of machinery, construction
materials, and light industry. Coal production declined in absolute
terms during 1957, and the production of such important commodities as
bricks) cotton and wool fabrics, and zinc stagnated. The rate of growth
in output of most commodities, but particularly coal, basic construction
materials and chemicals, and most categories of textile fabrics must be
raised during the next 3 years if the production goals for 1960 are to
be fulfilled. Nevertheless, although underfulfillment is likely in
certain areas, projected increases in capital investments may enable
the rate of growth of industry as a whole to rise sufficiently to ful-
fill the over-all plan.
Some progress was made in 1957 in reducing the shortage of raw
materials, primarily by increasing imports of these materials. Table 12**
shows that stocks of nearly all important industrial materials were in-
creasing rapidly during the period from September 1956 to September 1957.
Probably, further growth in stocks of cotton, wool, and hides occurred
during the last quarter of 1957 and the first months of 1958 as a result
of deliveries financed by the US loans.
Four problem areas in industry -- coal, construction materials,
steel and machinery, and textiles -- are discussed in more detail in the
following sections.
2. Coal.
Coal provides more than 90 percent of fuel and power for Poland
and, together with coke, accounted between 1949 and 1955 for about 50
percent of the nation's export earnings.
* P. 390 below.
** Table 12 follows on p. 33.
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Table 12
Changes in Stocks of Industrial Materials in Poland 2/
30 September 1956 and 30 September 1957
Thousand Tons
Index
30 September 1956
30 September 1957
Iron ore
1,709.0
20123.0
124
Steel scrap
387.0
589.0
152
Copper concentrate
16.0
20.6
129
Zinc
2.9
1.8
62
Aluminum
0.5
1.4
280
Sulfuric acid
21.5
16.2
75
Caustic soda
5.2
9.6
185
Crude carbide
9.5
19.8
208
Natural rubber
1.1
2.9
264
Cement
324.0
398.0
123
Cellulose
13.7
12.2
89
Cotton
9.9
25.7
260
Washed wool
2.9
4.5
155
Staple fibers
3.7
6.4
173
Fine wool yarn
1.3
1.0
77
Raw hides
9.1
12.9
142
Hard leather
2.0
2.3
115
In the absence of sufficient investments in new mines (see
Table 11*), the increase of 27 percent in production of coal during
1949-55 was achieved by expanding employment, overtime, and Sunday work
and by the use of military and forced labor. By 1955, output per work-
day in hard coal mines had declined to a level about 5 percent below
that of 1949 and 30 percent below that of 1938 (prewar boundaries). In
order to satisfy the demands of industry and transportation for coal,
sales of coal to private consumers for heating were held stable, and
exports were reduced slightly.
Since 1956 the policy of Poland on coal has been oriented toward
a long-run solution of the problem of coal production. Sunday work, as
well as the use of military and forced labor in coal mines) was reduced;
wages of coal miners were increased substantially, and the construction
of houses for them was accelerated. It was hoped that these measures
* P. 31, above.
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would stimulate greater productivity and therefore compensate at least
partly for the decline in total number of days worked. At the same
time, investment allocations to the coal industry have been raised
greatly. An upward trend in production is not expected, however) until
1959, when several deep mines, construction of which was initiated dur-
ing 1954-55, are scheduled for completion and when a number of shallow
and strip mines will be newly exploited. Current investments in new
deep mines will have no impact until after 1960.
During 1957, production of hard coal declined 1.1 percent less
than had been planned. Reduced compulsion and a wage policy which
attracted large numbers of workers into coal mining (partly at the ex-
pense of other mining activities) were to some degree accountable for
this improvement and also may have helped to stem the downward trend
in output per man-day, but at the same time absenteeism rose.
The stagnation and decline of coal production occurred at a
time when allocations of coal to private consumers for heating pur-
poses were rising rapidly -- 12 percent in 1956, and another 12 per-
cent in 1957. As a result of this and of continued industrial growth,
coal exports fell about 5 million tons in 1956 and almost 6 million
tons more in 1957. Even the small planned recovery of coal exports)
to a level still below that of 1955, is contingent on difficult savings
in the use of coal in industry and transportation. Plans to achieve
these economies include the partial substitution of brown coal for hard
coal as fuel for electric power stations and further electrification of
railroads. Trends in production and uses of hard coal and in employment
and productivity of labor in hard coal mining are shown in Table 13.*
3. Construction Materials.
Most branches of the construction materials industry have suf-
fered from sluggish technology, from the failure to reconstruct plants
located in the ex-German territories, and from the repression of small-
scale private and local production. By 1955 the weighted average pro-
duction of basic construction materials (bricks, roofing tiles, cement,
and lime) was less than in 1938 (in comparable boundaries). In the
manufacture of bricks, productivity of labor was considerably below the
prewar level in either set of boundaries.
Under the Six Year Plan (1950-55), the shortage of construction
materials was manifest principally in residential and farm construction,
but it also affected low-priority industrial construction (as in light
industry) and repairs. The rapid increase in housing construction dur-
ing recent years, coupled with continued demands for investment elsewhere,
* Table 13 follows on p. 35.
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Table 13
Selected Statistics on Production and Uses of Hard Coal and on Enoployment
and Productivity of Lanorers in the Hard Coal Industry in Poland 2/
1938 and 1949-57
1938
Prewar
Postwar
Boundaries
Boundaries
3,949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1955
1956
1957
Production (million tons)
38.1
69.4
74.1
78.0
82.0
84.4
88.7
_1954
91.6
94.5
95.1
94.1
Uses (million tons)
Industry and further processing
N.A.
N.A.
28.7
31.4
34.4
38.6
42.4
45.0
48.3
51.0
54.0
Railroad transport
N.A.
N.A.
6.4
6.8
7.3
7.7
8.2
9.0
9.1
9.5
9.6
Private consumers; public
institutions; and the like
N.A.
N.A.
12.5
13.5
14.1
13.5
13.7
13.5
13.5
15.1
16.9
Exports
N.A.
N.A.
26.3
26.6
25.9
24.5
24.2
24.2
24.1
19.2
13.4
Employment (thousands)
12/
LD/
214.9
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
296.3
312.8
329.6
Production per workday per
employee (tons)
1.814
1.718
1.328
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1.308
1.288
1.267
1.247
1.247
a. 32/. Totals are derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sum of the rounded components.
b. Available data are not comparable with postwar series.
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has made the shortage of building materials acute in all parts of the
economy. To relieve the situation) centralized investments assigned by
the Gomulka regime to the construction materials industry have doubled
from the period 1951-55 to 1960, by far the largest increase in cen-
tralized investments to be received by any industry under the Five Year
Plan. (See Table 11*). At the same time) small-scale private, local,
and auxiliary production is being encouraged. During the first half of
1957, these small plants accounted for about 6 percent of the production
of bricks and 10 percent of the production of lime. These policies met
with some success during 1957) as production of cement and lime developed
rapidly, but production of bricks lagged far behind the plan.
Fulfillment of the plan for 1960 will require a very large in-
crease in the rate of growth of most basic construction materials. The
plan to double output of all wall materials by 1960 (in relation to
1955) depends, in addition, on rapid growth of prefabricated concrete
products and of materials utilizing various kinds of waste matter (saw-
dust, slag, cinder, and the like). Hopes for avoiding further over-
cutting of forests depend on the substitution of these for sawn wood,
the output of which is to decline, according to plan.
4. Metallurgy and Machinery.
The spectacular increase of steel production in Poland during
the postwar period to a level in 1955 of 2.5 times greater than the
prewar level in comparable boundaries was achieved at very great cost.
In spite of the fact that investments in metallurgy and iron ore mining
during 1950-55 were more than 20 percent of total investments in indus-
try) productivity of labor remained below prewar levels. Attempts are
now being made to increase the efficiency of utilization of plants built
under the Six Year Plan (1950-55), primarily by expanding production -
capacity in rolling mills. (See Table 11.*) Investments required per
unit of output are expected to be substantially less than in past years)
as is indicated by the 58-percent increase in production of steel
planned for 1956-60 in the face of declining investment. The average
rate of increase in steel production during 1956-57 was 9.4 percent,
a rate which, if maintained annually, would result in achieving the
goals for 1960.
Efficient use of capacity for steel production depends to a
large extent on the expansion of production of machinery and equipment.
The output of this industry approximately tripled between 1949 and
1955 and has increased rapidly in 1956 and 1957; the plan is to double
it during 1956-60. Because much recent and prospective growth is
based on productive capacity created earlier) planned expenditures on
* P. 31, above.
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new investments in the machinery industries are less than half as large
as they were in 1951-55.
This industry is experiencing serious economic difficulties as
a result of the unevenness of its past development) which has led to
bottlenecks in some areas and unused capacity in others. At the same
time) averdiversification of production has caused unnecessarily high
costs and poor quality) a circumstance which seriously hinders the
development of exports of machinery. Nonetheless, a sharp decline in
the rate of growth in the uses of domestic machinery for investment
purposes has provoked strong efforts to put existing capacity to use
by expanding exports of machinery. These exports have increased sub-
stantially in the past 2 years, whereas imports of machinery have
declined.
Present policies are aimed at deriving the largest possible
short-run benefits from the machinery industries, as follows: a further
rapid expansion of exports of machinery to gain badly needed foreign
exchange and a rapid growth in the output of agricultural machinery)
mining machinery) and consumer durables for home use. Although attempts
to eliminate bottlenecks, improve quality) and reduce unit costs by
fuller utilization of capacity may meet with same auccess) part of the
production of machinery in Poland will remain uneconomic in the long
run.
5. Textiles.
Investment policies under the Six Year Plan (1950-55) have left
the textile industry of Poland in a state of disrepair. Although
accounting for more than 10 percent of all fixed assets in state in-
dustry at the beginning of 1949, the textile industry probably received
lees than 4 percent of total industrial investments in the next 6 years.
Descriptions of the Lodz textile factories indicate that the buildings
are rotting) that much of the machinery dates to before World War I (and
over a third to before 1900)) and that the limited numbers of new Polish-
made machines do not attain the productivity of the old machines.
The scarcity of raw materials still remains an important im-
mediate limitation on the growth of textile production in Poland. The
quantity of production was increased slightly during 1949-53) in spite
of a decline in imports of textile materials) by increasing the mix of
domestic artificial fibers In textiles and by reducing quality. The
recovery of imports of textile materials during 1954-55 permitted a
faster growth of domestic textile production, but the limitations of
foreign exchange stopped this rise in 1956, and whatever improvements
occurred in 1957 took place in the linen and rayon industries) not in
the cotton and wool industries. Bottlenecks in cotton spinning mills,
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shortages of imported raw materials, and growing absenteeism are men-
tioned as the principal factors hindering production of textiles.
The Five Year Plan (1956-60) calls for only a moderate increase
in the output of basic textile products (17 percent for wool fabrics
and 19 percent for cotton fabrics in 1960 relative to 1955), but even
to fulfill this goal the rate of growth of production will have to be
much larger than in 1956-57. According to the Five Year Plan, invest-
ments are to increase 50 percent between 1957 and 1960, enough to make
only marginal improvements in methods of production and in capacity.
These are indications, however, that allocations of investment to the
textile industry in 1958 will be greater than had been planned.
Production of selected commodities in Poland for the years
1949-57 and plans for 1960 are summArized in Table 14.*
V. Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments.
1. Balance of Payments.
During 1957, Poland had a deficit on current foreign account
amounting to at least UB $250 million, or about 20 percent of the value
of commodity exports by Poland. This deficit was financed by drawings
on a number of long- and short-term loans from the USSR; the US; East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, and several Western European countries. The
existence of the deficit reflects the attempt of the Gomulka regime to
raise personal consumption and accumulate stockpiles without a sharp
curtailment of the rate of industrial growth.
The immediate cause of the deficit in the balance of payments
was a decline in the volume of coal exported during 1956-57 to a level
about 45 percent below that exported during 1955. Extremely favorable
terms of trade resulting from the increased demand for Polish coal at
the time of the Suez crisis gave Poland a temporary reprieve in 1956,
but in 1957 a reverse swing in the terms of trade caused additional
losses of foreign exchange, estimated by one Polish source at about
UB $150 million.
The roots of the present problem of the balance of payments
are found in the pattern of economic development in Poland under the
Six Year Plan (1950-55) and particularly during 1950-53, when invest-
ments in coal mining did not provide sufficient new capacity to satisfy
growing domestic requirements and increased exports at the same time;
when agricultural production stagnated; and when the demand for imports
in the high-priority industries (steel and machinery) multiplied.**
* Table 14 follows on p. 39.
** Text continued on p. 45.
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Table 14
Production of Selected Commodities in Poland 2i*
Selected Years,
1949-57, and 1960 Plan
Producer goods
Fuels and power
Bard coal
Brown coal
Electric power
Coke
Crude petroleum
Metals
Iron ore (gross)
Crude steel
Zinc-lead ore
(gross)
Zinc
Unit
Absolute Data
1949
1953
1955
1956
1957
1960
(plan)
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
Million kilowatt-hours
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
74,081
4,621
8,300
5,773
151
684
2,304
1,144
108
88,719
5,633
13,679
7,902
189
1,309
3,604
2,008
138
94,476
6,045
17,751
10,036
180
1,856
4,426
2,378
156
95,149
6,183
19,491
10,486
184
1,973
5,014
2,231
153
94,096
5,954
21,155
10,897
181
1,994
5,304
2)028
159
105,000
11,900
28,300
11,800
N.A.
3,113 y
7,000
2,530
175
* Footnotes for Table 14 follow on p. 43.
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Table 14
Production of Selected Commodities in Poland 2./
Selected Years, 1949-57, and 1960 Plan
(Continued)
Machinery and
equipment
Metal working
machine tools
Agricultural
machinery
Mining machinery
Electric motors
Standard-gauge
freight cars
Trucks
Automobiles
Ships of more than
100 deadweight
tons commissioned
Chemicals
Sulfuric acid,
100 percent
Calcinated soda,
98 percent
Unit
Tons
Million zlotys
Million zlotys
Thousand units
2-axle units
Units
Units
Thousand deadweight tons
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
Absolute Data
1949 1953
1955
9,438 20,165 27,797
1/ 932
1/ 933
158.0 200.9
16,800 12,496
245 10,935
0 1,563
5
67
276 370
121 180
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12,480 f/
4,015
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103
45o
211
1956
29,357
1,225
1,173
261.4
16,259
12,904 E/
5,765
120
481
215
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1957
31,315
1,387
1,298
401.2
16,651
12,112 El
7,953
147
499
232
1960
(Plan)
58,300 2/
2,023
2,166
N .A.
20,038 2/
13,600
29,000
224
723
490
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Table 14
Production of Selected Commodities in Poland 2./
Selected Years, 1949-571 and 1960 Plan
(Continued)
Dyes
Nitrogenous fer-
Unit
Absolute Data
1949
1953
1955
1956
1957
1960
(plan)
Thousand tons
3.8
6.1
6.6
6.5
N.A.
N.A.
tilizer (as 112)
Thousand tons
74
84
154
175
201
298
Phosphorous fer-
tilizer (as P205)
Thousand tons
74
109
132
123
138
229
Rayon
Thousand tons
9.0
13.1
15.4
16.3
17.0
21.5
Staple fiber
Thousand tons
13.0
25.4
35.0
39.0
41.4
49.0
Rubber tires
Thousand tons
5.7
13.1
17.0
20.7
29.3
N.A.
Construction
materials
Bricks
Cement
Concrete
Window glass
Sawn wood
Million units
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
Million square meters
Million cubic meters
1,167
2,344
N.A.
10.7
4,585
2,310
3,294
N.A.
15.7
5,849
2,740
3,813
1,213
16.1
6,907
2,786
4,035
1,390
18.5
6,764
2,860
4,487
N.A.
18.6
6,388
3,892
6,874
3,174
28.0
6,603 bJ
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Table 14
Production of Selected Commodities in Poland LI
Selected Years, 1949-57, and 1960 Plan
(Continued)
Consumer goods
Textiles and shoes
Unit
Absolute Data
1949
1953
1955
1956
]857
1960
(Plan)
Cotton fabrics
Million meters
4o6.5
499.5
568.3
564.7
578.2
679.1 y
Wool fabrics
Million meters
50.1
70.7
75.7
76.2
76.5
88.6 W
Linen fabrics
Million meters
47.2
50.8
51.4
64.2
69.1
911.0 y
Rayon fabrics
(including
synthetics)
Million meters
47.7
68.o
81.3
85.5
91.1
114.5 12/
Total footwear
Million pairs
1/
50.3
55.0
61.3
68.3
93.112/
Other nondurable
goods
Paper
Thousand tons
253
314 g/
376
397
403
5o8
Soap
Thousand tons
52
65
55
68
77 LI
92 y
Furniture
Pharmaceuticals
Million zlotys
Million zlotys
14
g4
21.11
1,410
1,020
1,580
1,232
N.A.
1,474
2,375
2,397
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Table 14
Production of Selected Commodities in Poland
Selected Years, 1949-57, and 1960 Plan
(Continued)
Durable consumer
goods
Unit
Absolute Data
1949
1953
1955
1956
1957
1960
(Plan)
Bicycles (except
Children's)
Thousand units
91
131
167
185
208
600
Motorcycles and
motorbicycles
Thousand units
4.2
13.7
30.1
45.5
62.2
190
Radios
Thousand units
66
268
461
499
646
950
Processed foods
Sugar
Thousand tons
745
1,107
980
776
1,059
1,250
Beer
Thousand hectoliters
2,532
4,978
5,170
5,197
5,692
6,014
Alcohol,
100 percent
Million liters
85.8
124.6
115.2
88.5
N.A.
134.0
Cigarettes
Billion units
21.3
32.5
37.5
41.3
42.8
50.0
b. Production planned for 1960 does not include total production. In order to obtain consistent commodity series,
it was assumed that total production would increase at the same rate as production planned between 1955 and 1960. .
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Table 14
Production of Selected Commodities in Poland 2/
Selected Years, 1949-57, and 1960 Flan
(Continued)
c. Estimated.
d. Available data are not comparable with those of other years.
e. Obtained by applying an index of total freight cars in units to production of freight cars in 2-axle units in
1955.
f. Truck production in 1955 from Statistical Yearbook) 1956. This figure is consistent with that used in the Five
Year Plan. On the other hand, available data for 1956 and1957 exclude certain special vehicles. It was assumed
that all truck production increased at the same rate as the more limited series during 1955 and 1956.
g. Data for 1953 include cardboard while data for other years exclude it. Cardboard was removed from the 1953
data on the assumption that it was the same relation to paper production in that year as in 1955.
h. Obtained by applying an index of laundry soap to total soap production in 1956.
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Although the present investment policy of Poland is aimed in part at
recovering its traditional position of exporting food and coal, the
reestablishment of a sound export structure will take several years.
In the meantime, to support its domestic economic program, Poland is
forced to rely heavily on foreign credits and on exports of machinery,
which entail difficult marketing problems and encounter very tough
competition abroad.
In the absence of new foreign credits, the difficulties of re-
storing a balance of payments will increase. during 1958-60 as previous
credits are exhausted, and scheduled repayments after 1960 will create
further strains.
2. Commodity Composition of Foreign Trade and Its Relation to
Domestic Economic Activity.
Table 23* shows the evolution of the foreign trade of Poland
by commodity group in constant 1955 US dollars during 1950-57 and
1960 (planned). This evolution clearly reflects the pattern of eco-
nomic development and changes in domestic priorities in Poland. The
expansion of heavy industry and motor transport required an almost
proportional growth in imports of materials for heavy industry (iron
and other ferrous ore, nonferrous metals other than zinc and lead,
organic chemicals, and the like) and of fuels (crude petroleum and
petroleum products). At the same time, growing domestic demands
coupled with insufficient investments in basic materials reduced the
supply of most of these materials (that is, coal, coke, and cement)
and, during 1951-56, rolled products for export, in relation to their
production. (See Table 15.**) Rapid industrialization under the Six
Year Plan (1950-55) also necessitated very large imports of machinery
and equipment. During 1951-53 these imports amounted to about 40 per-
cent of total imports by Poland. Net imports of machinery and equip-
ment, however, were reduced steadily during 1952-56 as the domestic
production of machinery developed and exports of machinery became sig-
nificant. As can be calculated from Table 16,*** the value of net im-
ports of machinery and equipment probably was more than 50 percent of
the value of domestic investment in machinery and equipment (with no
lag, or assuming that imports of one year become investments in the
next) in 1952) but only 10 to 15 percent in 1957. It should be em-
phasized, however, that domestic substitutes for a wide range of im-
ported items have not been developed and that production capacity in
a number of branches far exceeds domestic needs.
* P. 56, below.
** Table 15 follows on p. 46.
*** Table 16 follows on p. 46.
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Table 15
Exports by Poland of Selected Basic Materials
as a Percent of Production L.L/
Selected Years, 1949-57
Material
1949
1954
1956
122/
Bard coal
35
26
20
14
Coke
32
23
22
17
Cement
22
16
14
3
Rolled products
11
7
14
16
Zinc
53
62
63
57
Table 16
Investment and Foreign Trade of Poland in Machinery and Equipment
1949-57
Million US $
Year
imports 2/
Exports 2/
Net Imports
Investment hi
1949
154
14
140
257
1950
217
49
168
390
1951
313
51
262
386
1952
310
75
235
48o
1953
319
102
217
589
1954
294
97
197
675
1955
288
120 .
168
719
1956
230
134
96
734
1957
196. 2/
176 2/
20
710
a. From Table 230 p. 56, below, except as indicated.
b. Investment in 1955-56 is in 1956 zlotys. .3?/ Investment during
1950-55 in machinery and equipment was converted to 1956 prices by
means of a price index calculated from data on the value of investment
in 1955 in both sets of prices./ Investment in 1949 was assumed to
be the same percentage of total investment in the socialized econo as
in 1950 40 and was converted to 19s6 zlotys as above. 50X1
NJA1
Investments in 1956 50X1
zlotys were converted to dollars at the rate of 20 zlotys to US $1.
c. Calculated by multiplying absolute figures for 1956 (1955 prices)
by the index for 1957 (1956 prices).
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Much of the cost of imports for the program of industrialization
in Poland during 1950-53 was borne by the Polish consumer. Imports of
materials for light industry (wool, cotton, and hides) in particular
were reduced sharply without compensating increases in production of do-
mestic wool and hides, and exports of foods and manufactured consumer
goods (mostly textile fabrics) were increased or maintained in spite of
the low production level of these items. Priorities for the "new course"
after 1953, on the other hand, are reflected in large imports of grains,
rapidly growing imports of manufactured consumer goods of all types,
and a recovery in imports of materials for light industry.
Plans for 1960 can for a much larger increase in commodity ex-
ports than in imports from present levels. Because exports of coal,
coke, and manufactured consumer goods are not expected to regain the
levels of 1955 during the period of the Five Year Plan (1956-60), great
hopes are being placed on a rapid expansion of exports of machinery.
By 1960, such exports are to be three times what they were in 1955 and
twice what they were in 1957. Because of the relatively high costs of
domestic production and the high requirements for imports of raw ma-
terials and parts (in the form of iron ore, some rolled products, and
machine parts), exports of machinery probably are less advantageous to
Poland than such traditional exports as coal and meat. Moreover, such
exports create difficult problems within the industry itself and cause
considerable difficulties in marketing abroad. The USSR has agreed to
purchase half of the planned exports of machinery from Poland during
1958-60, but competition in other markets from higher quality or better
established products from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or the
West will be very strong. In spite of these difficulties, it is cer-
tainly to the short-tun advantage of Poland to press exports of machinery
at present, for without them the substantial capacity of the metallur-
gical and machine building industries created under the Six Year Plan
(1950-55) could not be utilized efficiently. A partial substitute for
exports of machinery may be found in increased exports of rolled prod-
ucts. Recent improvements in the agricultural situation should stimu-
late exports of meat, but, given existing policies, the plan for total
exports for 1960 will be very difficult to achieve, and, in addition,
there will be strong pressure to raise imports beyond planned levels.
3. Evolution of the Balance of Payments and Foreign Credits.
Table 17* indicates the trade balance of Poland in current US
dollars during 1948-57. Part of the large deficit in commodity trade
during 1951-52 reflects drawings from the US $400 million credit from
the USSR to finance the peak rate of imports of machinery. If all
Polish exports had been sold at world market prices, however, the
* Table 17 follows on p. 48.
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Table 17
Foreign Trade of Poland it/
1948-57 and 1958 Plan
Million Current US $
Year
Imports
Exports
Balance of Trade
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958 (plan)
516
632
668
924
863
774
904
932
1,022
1,252
1,175
531
619
634
762
776
831
869
910
985
975
998
+15
-14
-34
-162
-88
+57
-35
-22
-37
-277
-177
a. .31
deficit would have been smaller because large deliveries of Polish coal
from the ex-German territories to the USSR were transacted at nominal
prices. During 1953-56, when the value of Polish imports and exports
was in approximate balance, these deliveries probably were a form of
net capital export. Difficulties in the balance of payments of Poland
increased during 1955 and early 1956 as a result both of the "new
course" and of the beginning of repayments of the earlier Soviet credits.
This problem led the Polish government to negotiate several small loans.
Not until Gomulka's accession to power, however, was an all-out
effort made to obtain large-scale foreign support for the economic pro-
gram of Poland. Long-term credits were obtained from the USSR, the US,
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Canada, and the UK, and medium- and short-
term credits from several other Western countries. In addition, Polish
debts to the USSR were canceled in return for cancellation of unrequited
Polish claims on German reparations, and payments for past Soviet use of
Polish railroad transit facilities were made, higher rates being set for
future years. Known foreign credits received by Poland since Gomulka's
accession to power are presented in Table 18.* These credits amount to
about US $747 million, and all except for Czechoslovak and East German
credits are to be utilized fully during 1957-60.
* Table 18 follows on p. 49.
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Table 18
Credits Received by Poland from Countries of the Soviet Bloc and the West
Since Gomulka's Accession to Power 21
Source of Credit
Date
Amount of Credit
(Million US $)
Period of
Delivery
Period of
Repayment
Soviet Bloc credits
USSR
November 1956
275
1956-59
1961-65
East Germany
April 1957
100
1957-65
1963-74
Czechoslovakia
June 1957
25
1957-60
1961-67
Czechoslovakia
October 1957
62.5
1957-65
N.A.
Total
462.5
Western credits
US
1957
95
1957-58
1962-81
US
February 1958
98
1958
1963-82
Other hi
101.7
Total
294.7
Grand total
757.2
a. 123/
b. Including both short-term and long-term credits.
Drawings on these credits are estimated to have been about
US $250 million in 1957, and amounts available in 1958 will be about
US $170 million. A further sharp drop in credit funds available will
occur in 1959) and repayments may equal the balance of credits avail-
able in 1960.
This analysis suggests that Poland will have to re-create a sound
structure of foreign trade during the next 2 years if very serious dif-
ficulties in its balance of payments are to be avoided in 1960 and later)
when repayments will be growing rapidly.
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4. Changes in Economic Dependence of Poland on the USSR and on the
Soviet Bloc.
The steady upward trend) initiated soon after World War II, in
the volume of Polish foreign trade with the Soviet Bloc was reversed
after 1954 (see Table 19*); 59 percent of Polish foreign trade turnover
was with countries of the Soviet Bloc in 1957 compared with nearly 70
percent In 1954. There was a similar decline in the share of the USSR
in Polish exports) but imports from the USSR have been supported by
substantial Soviet credits. Part of the reduction in the economic de-
pendence of Poland on the Soviet Bloc results from changes in the Polish.
economy, particularly the decline in Polish imports of machinery. To
some extent) however) Poland has had a conscious policy of reorienting
part of its trade to the West. During the latter part of 1956 and in
1957 an important role in this shift was played by credits from the West.
The Soviet Bloc is still the dominant supplier to Poland of
machinery and equipment, materials for heavy industry) and industrial
consumer goods. (See Table 20.**) At the same time) nearly 90 percent
of the exports of machinery from Poland are going to countries of the
Soviet Bloc -- about 50 percent to the USSR and nearly all the rest to
Communist China and the underdeveloped countries of Eastern Europe.
(See Table 21.***) The Soviet Bloc also receives about one-half of the
coal) most of the coke) and three-quarters of the zinc exported by
Poland. (See Table 22.xxxx) Trade with the West has been heaviest in
agricultural commodities) primarily imports of grain) which were resumed
on a large scale in 1954. Trade included also imports of wool, jute)
and hides and exports of meat products. A large portion of agricultural
imports from the West during 1957 was financed by foreign credits.
The degree of economic dependence of Poland on the Soviet Bloc
is not likely to be reduced significantly during the next 3 years. A
Soviet credit of US $175 million for the purchase of consumer goods and
agricultural products is still available, and the USSR has agreed.to
purchase half of Poland's planned exports of machinery and larger amounts
of zinc) rolled products) coal, and calcinated soda in return for in-
creased supplies of iron ore, petroleum and petroleum products) cotton,
and other basic materials needed by Poland. On the basis of this agree-
ment) the share of the USSR in the trade turnover of Poland will be
about the same during 1958-60 as during the past 2 years (28 percent
compared with about 31 percent in 1956 and 1957). The East German andt
Table 19 follows on p. 51.
** Table 20 follows on p. 52.
1HHE Table 21 follows on p. 52.
xxxx Table 22 follows on p. 53.
Text continued on p. 54.
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Table 19
Trade of Poland with the Soviet Bloc and the USSR 2/
1948-57 and 1958-60 Plans
Year
Million Current US $ Percent of Total Trade
Turnover Imports Exports Turnover Imports Exports
Trade with the Soviet Bloc
1948
432
219
213
41
42
40
1949
541
265
276
43
42
45
1950
769
408
361
59
61
57
1951
970
535
434
58
58
57
1952
1,086
582
504
66
67
65
1953
1,122
556
566
70
72
68
1954
1,240
642
598
70
71
69
1955
1,166
6o1
565
63
65
62
1956
1,241
669
573
62
65
58
1957
1,319
760
559
59
61
57
1958-60
(plan)
N .A .
N.A.
N.A.
55 to 60 2/
N.A.
N.A.
Trade with the USSR
1948
230
120
110
22
23
21
1949
238
118
120
19
19
19
1950
346
192
154
27
29
24
1951
421
241
180
25
26
24
1952
522
275
247
32
32
32
1953
537
263
274
33
34
33
1954
666
337
329
38
37
38
1955
593
313
280
32
34
31
1956
614 551
2/
344
270
31
34
27
1957
680
422
258
31
34
26
1958
plan
712 1./ 640
2/
N .A .
N . A .
N.A.
NA.
1959
plan
804 1/ 722
2/
N .A .
N .A .
-28
N.A.
N .A .
1960
plan
835 2/ 750
2/
LA.
NA.
I
LA..
LA.
a. LOS
b. Estimated.
c. As indicated in the Trade Agreement) 1955 prices.
d. Obtained by applying indexes from Trade Agreement to values in 1956
prices.
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Table 20
Share of the Soviet Bloc in Polish Foreign Trade
by Major Category of Goods 2/
1956
Category
Percent
of Total in 1956
Imports Exports
from the Soviet Bloc to the Soviet Bloc
Machinery and equipment
78.1
89.2
Materials for production
58.5
6o.4
Agricultural and food articles
38.4
17.0
Industrial consumer goods
82.0
54.1
a. Li-.5/. The Soviet Bloc includes Yugoslavia in this table. Calculations
are from values in 1955 prices.
Table 21
Polish Foreign Trade in Machinery and Equipment, by Geographic Area 2/
1956
Imports
Exports
Million
Dollars
Percent
of Total
Million
Dollars
Percent
of Total
Soviet Bloc
179.0
78.0
118.8
88.8
USSR
70.7
30.8
70.0
52.3
Other developed countries 2/
107.6
46.9
3.7
2.8
Underdeveloped Eastern Europe
0.7
0.3
5.3
4.0
Far Eastern Soviet Bloc
39.8
29.7
Non-Bloc
50.6
22.0
15.0
11.2
Western Europe 2/
50.5
22.0
0.8
o.6
Underdeveloped Western
countries 21
0.1
Insignificant
14.2
10.6
Total
229.6
loom
133.8
loom
a. ig
b. Including East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
c. EXcluding Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Trade with the US
and Canada is nil or insignificant.
d. All other countries outside the Soviet Bloc, including Spain, Yugoslavia,
Greece, and Turkey.
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Table 22
Percentage Relation of Foreign Trade and of Trade with the Soviet Bloc
and the USSR to Polish Consumption and Production
of Selected Commodities and Commodity Groups
1957
Imports hi
Total
Imports
Imports
from the
Soviet Bloc
Imports
from the
USSR
Machinery and equipment 2/
28
22 A/
11
Iron ore (iron content)
82
58
54
Manganese ore
loo
93
75
Chromium ore
loo
95
52
Zinc concentrates
30
20
o
Copper (finished and blister)
71
40
39
Alumina
100
94
40
Phosphate rock
90
33
33
Potash
100
98
o
Rubber (natural and synthetic)
100
45
21
Petroleum (crude and products
90
74
48
Cotton
100
53
50
Wool
69
o
o
Jute
100
o
o
Raw hides
66
3,
o
Grains
11 g
3 a/
3 A/
Tobacco
23
5
o
Oilseeds
25
12
o
Leather shoes
14
2
o
Exports 2/
Total
Exports
Exports
to the
Soviet Bloc
Exports
to the
USSR
Machinery and equipment fi
14
12 g/
7 e
Railroad freight cars
26
N.A.
25
Railroad passenger cars
84
84
83
Locomotives
42
42
42
Ships
'
59
59
31
* Footnotes for Table 22 follow on p. 54.
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Table 22
Percentage Relation of Foreign Trade and of Trade with the Soviet Bloc
and the USSR to Polish Consumption and Production
of Selected Commodities and Commodity Groups 2/
1957
(Continued)
Exports 2/ (Continued)
Total
Exports
Exports
to the
Soviet Bloc
Exports
to the
USSR
Hard coal
14
7
0
Coke
18
17
0
Rolled products
17
10
2
Zinc
52
42
19
Soda ash and caustic
soda
18
12
11
Cement
3
0.3
0.3
Cotton fabrics
11
1
0.2
Wool fabrics
5
3
3
Linen fabrics
8
1
0
Sugar
32
17
17
Meat
7
5
4
a.121/. In some instances, data are estimates.
b. As a percent of Polish consumption (production plus imports).
"c. As a percent of investment in machinery and equipment.
d. Expected in 1958.
e. As a percent of Polish production.
f. As a percent of gross production, including intermediate products.
g. Assuming the same geographic distribution as in 1956.
Czechoslovak investment credits, moreover, will tend to reinforce the
trade of these countries with Poland.
The short-term prospects for the trade of Poland with the West
are not very good except for imports financed from the second US loan.
Hard currency reserves of Poland are said to be extremely small, most
possible lines of credit outside the US have been exhausted) and the
countries of Western Europe have proved reluctant to enter into agree-
ments for large purchases of Pdlish coal because of increased domestic
coal production, unusually high stocks, and a slower growth of consump-
tion. Over the next few years, moreover, export surpluses of coal and
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meat products) normally Poland's most marketable exports to the West,
are likely to increase very slowly. Poland probably has a potential
market in the West for a variety of Polish manufactures (glass and
ceramic articles) specialized machinery items) and the like), but it
will take time to develop and organize this type of production for ex-
port purposes.
After 1960) shifts away from metallurgy and machinery and toward
coal mining, agriculture, light industry, and possibly chemicals prob-
ably would tend to increase the opportunities of Poland for earning
Western currency, but the actual distribution of Polish trade cannot
be predicted at present.
Table 23* summarizes imports and exports of selected commodities
by Poland for 1949-57.
VI. New Economic Nadel.
Since the summer of 1956 the Polish government has tended increas-
ingly to reduce the area of central planning and to substitute economic
incentives for executive orders. One of the major forces behind this
trend is the conviction of the majority of economists and technicians
in Poland and of a number of influential government officials as well
that the old) or Stalinist, system was too inefficient for a country in
Poland's situation and that its effects tended to defeat the basic
goals of the state. In the process of developing a more efficient
system, the official view of what constitutes axiomatic socialist prin-
ciples has narrowed considerably) and the area subject to pragmatic ex-
amination has broadened correspondingly. Reformist thought has, of
course) encountered disagreement on the extent to which remodeling is
necessary and the steps to be taken in concrete situations) but out of
the discussion a conception of a "new Polish economic model" has emerged
which appears to fall somewhere between the Soviet and the Yugoslav
systems with respect to the role of state planning and management of
the economy.
Underlying the changes now taking place or anticipated are both
failures of policy and the shortcomings of Poland's system of planning
and management, all adding to the inevitable costa of industrializing
under the first major plan. Forced collectivization and the virtual
elimination of private handicrafts between 1948 and 1955 are glaring
examples of costly policies which were dictated primarily by political
rather than economic motives. On a deeper level are deficiencies of
the planning and administrative machinery itself.**
* Table 23 follows on p. 56.
** Text continued on p. 60.
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Table 23
Polish Imports and Ekports, by Group and Selected Commodity 2/*
1949-57
Total imports
Machinery and equipment
Materials for production
Fuels
Crude petroleum
Petroleum products
Materials for heavy industry
Iron ore
Manganese ore
Rolled products
Zinc concentrates
Copper
Rubber
Materials for light industry
Cotton
Wool and tops
Cellulose
Jute
Artificial fibers
Raw hides
Unit.
Million dollars
Million dollars
Million dollars
Million dollars
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
Million dollars
1949 1950 _1951 1952 1953 1954
629 /22 8o1 fl 22L
!21 I23.
192.1 4181 18i. 323. la 460
14.5 17 23 26 28 37
91.5 N.A. N.A. N.A. 412.4 463.2
254.8 B.A. N.A. N.A. 534.5 716.2
132.1 129 117 131 152 188
1955
288
482
44
1956 1957
544.9 537 630
885.7 952 1,134
190 209 12/
Thousand tons 1,617 N.A. N.A. N.A. 3,097 4,105 4,4o7 4,477 5,914
Thousand tons N.A. N.A. N.A. B.A. N.A. N.A. 335 2/ 412 s/ 242
Thousand tons N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 146 s/ 183s/ 290
Thousand tons 69.2 N.A. N.A. N.A. 60.2 80.7 80.1 91.0 152
Thousand tons N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 13.5 9.0 9.6
Thousand tons 12.6 N.A. N.A. N.A. 22.0 23.6 25.7 33.8 42.5
Million dollars 228 219 211 170 173 204 221 210 12/ N.A.
Thousand tons 98.3 N.A. B.A. B.A. 82.5 93.8 95.2 85.8 121.4
Thousand tons 15.4 N.A. N.A. N.A. 10.7 14.3 16.3 15.9 20.6
Thousand tons 36.1 N.A. NJ. NJ. 45.3 45.7 52.8 49.0 56.9
Thousand tons N.A. NJ. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 18.1 2/ 19.6 2/ 23.1
Thousand tons N.A. N.A. N.A. NJ. N.A. N.A. 6.5 2/ 7.6 2/ 10.5
Thousand tons 26.3 N.A. N.A. N.A. 20.3 24.7 30.1 36.2 36.7
* Footnotes for Table 23 follow on p. 59.
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Table 23
Doll& Imports and Exports, by Group and Selected Commodity 2/
1949-57
(Continued)
Materials for agriculture
Apatites and phosphorites
Phosphorous fertilizers
Potassium fertilizers
Consumer goods
Agricultural and food articles
Grains
Tobacco
Oilseeds (fat content)
Rice
Tea
Coffee
Industrial consumer
Footwear
Textiles
Total exports
Machinery and equiment
Machine tools
Unit
Million dollars
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
18.6 23 33 26 31 32
4'W*3 NA.
EA. NA.
NJ. NA.
B.A. N.A.
381.0 NA. NA. NA. NA.
Million dollars a 100 104 112 68
Million dollars 60 65 61 81 48
Thousandtons
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
Thousand tons
6 Million dollars
Thousand pairs
Thousand tons
Million dollars
Mdllion dollars
Million dollars
167.0 N.A. N.A. N.A. 163.0
4.8 N.A. N.A. N.A. 5.5
12.3 NA. NA. NA. 17.5
2.3 NA. NA. NA. 6.o
o.6 NA. NA. NJ. 1.3
NA. NA. NA. NA. 0.5
23 35 43 31 20