GROMYKO'S APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST AT VIENNA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A000500100002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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State Dept. review completed.
GROMYKO'S APPROACH TO THE
MIDDLE EAST AT VIENNA
Gromyko's general posture at Vienna will be that
in the wake of the breakdown of the step-by-step approach,
the Soviet Union has acted responsibly and postively to
get meaningful Geneva negotiations underway.
In fact, the Soviets have been very active over
the past six weeks. They have:
--talked in Moscow with senior Iraqi,
Syrian and Egyptian leaders,
?-received a Palestinian delegation
headed by Yasir Arafat,
--dispatched emissaries to meet with
top level Israeli officials in Tel
Aviv, and
--sent Premier Kosygin to Libya and
Tunisia.
Following his meeting with you and before Sadat's
meeting with the President, Gromyko will probably visit
Cairo.
The Soviets' underlying purpose is to demonstrate
that
--they are genuinely interested in a
Middle East settlement and have a
constructive role to play,
--the USSR must be granted a permanent
role in the Middle East if peace is to
come, and
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--responsibility for another war cannot
be laid at Moscow's doorstep.
Gromyko is likely to assert that the Soviet Union
is doing its part to pave the way to Geneva and now
it is up to the US to move Israel. Gromyko can point
to the explicit reference he made to guaranteeing,
Israel's existence -- clearly words that would not
ingratiate Moscow with the Syrians or the Palestinians --
and to the contacts in Tel Aviv.
The evidence suggests that none of the Soviet con-
tacts with the Arabs went smoothly, in part because
the Soviets were not telling their interlocutors only
what they wanted to hear about Geneva.
--Gromyko may argue that Moscow put in
jeopardy its standing with its Arab
friends for the sake of real progress
on a settlement.
--In his speech on the Warsaw Pact
anniversary Wednesday, Gromyko
did seem to pull back a bit to a
harder line in order to soothe
Arab sensitivities.
How much of a contribution the Soviets actually
made is a different question.
--Gromyko can claim that he got a
commitment from Arafat to go to
Geneva,
--but there is no evidence that Arafat
compromised on more troublesome points
such as folding his delegation into
somebody else's,
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--or agreeing to delay the time when the
PLO would formally show up at the Con-
ference.
--Moreover, he apparently rejected
Moscow's suggestion that the PLO make
some gesture toward recognizing Israel.
It seems clear that even if the Soviets did twist Arafat's
arm a bit, they did not get the PLO to do their bidding,
and Arafat himself does not feel that he has sufficient
political. .security within the Palestinian movement to
make significant concessions.
The Soviets also made no breakthrough on the
Palestinian representation issue in their talks with
the Syrians and Egyptians.
--We do not know the Soviet reaction,
but we think Gromyko recognizes the
problems that such a proposal would
cause Washington and Tel Aviv.
He may seek to finesse the issue by suggesting that
Moscow and Washington publicly pledge that the Pales-
tinian issue will be dealt with at some point in the
conference. We doubt, however, that Gromyko has reason
to be confident that the Syrians, much less the PLO,
will go along with this.
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The Soviets clearly foresee the possibility of
another round of step-by-step negotiations, and they
have even suggested that such negotiations may be
necessary if Geneva is not to fail. They would prefer
to call them "careful preparations" and they have, of
course, sought to get the Arabs, and particularly the
Egyptians, to forego dealing with the US alone and to
operate under the auspices of the Geneva Conference.
--The Soviet message seems to be that
while it may be possible to make
progress cn part of the problem,
this time the Soviet Union should be
fully cut in and qet due credit for
any achievements.
--President Ford's upcoming meetings
with Sadat and Rabin and the US
"reassessment" of its Middle East
policy have aroused new fears in
Moscow that the US intends to em-
bark on another round of bilateral
talks, using Geneva merely as a
figleaf. One senior Soviet official,
for example, recently told Ambassador
Stoessel that Moscow thought Washington's
commitment to Geneva had become "more
ambiguous" and Gromyko in his Warsaw
Pact speech accused "certain capitals"
of wanting to renew step-by-step
diplomacy.
While Gromyko is likely to assert that the US must
bring Israel around to a "more realistic" attitude on
the Palestinians and other issues, it seems likely that
he will be concerned that that is precisely what the
US intends to do.
--The Soviets clearly do not know what
exactly the US policy reassessment
portends, but they fear that it means
a more Arab-leaning policy.
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--Inevitably this would be at Moscow's
expense.
--Gromyko is likely to probe vigorously
for "new ideas" coming out of this
reassessment, proffering in return
some details of the recent Soviet-
Arab conversations.
There is no evidence of a change in the Soviet
position on other issues.
--They continue to argue for a return
to the 1967 borders, although in
private they do not foreclose the
possibility of minor changes.
--A Palestinian state that included the
West Bank and Gaza remains a key ele-
ment of the Soviet position.
Gromyko will probably be relatively flexible on
the timing and a enaa for Geneva. At t~iis point, it is
mare important to Moscow that Geneva be held than that
it achieve immediate progress.
--Several Soviets have spoken unofficially
in terms of a short Geneva session in
early summer, with more serious dis-
cussions put off till fall.
--They may suggest that working groups
be formed at such an opening session
to explore possible agenda items such
as a Palestinian state, boundaries,
and guarantees.
--Gromyko may suggest that Syrian renewal
of UNDOF later this month will depend
on a firm US and Soviet pronouncement
on Geneva.
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