SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP: IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT EAST EUROPEAN GRAIN CROP FORECAST

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R01142A000700160001-4
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 8, 2004
Sequence Number: 
1
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Publication Date: 
July 23, 1975
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R01142A000700160001-4.pdf318.76 KB
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Approved For Release 20041 ff c CI$4t. DP MMIOZA000700160001-4 of'ten''l Intelligence NIO # 1722/75 23 July 1975 MFRANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby SUBJECT . Support for the President's Trip: Implications of Current East European Grain Crop Forecast Bill, Floods and drought have reduced OER's Eastern Europe grain crop forecast by alncst 10% in the last month. So far the policy implication is that the various countries involved will manage without increasing US or other Western grain imports, but weather (or politics) ma yet this season change all that. So in OER has pulled together a mini estimate as back-up for the President's discussions with East European leaders in Warsaw, Helsinki, Bucharest and Belgrade. 25X1 Nationi_Intelligence Officer for USSR/FE Approved For. Release 2004/12/21: CIA-RDP79ROl142A000700160001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/21 ;:C,IA-RDP79R01142A000700160001-4 - 2 - ME2 ORANDUM FOR. Mr. Colby 23 July 1975 SUBJECT Support for the President's Trip: Implications of Current East European Grain Crop Forecast Distribution: Original -- Addressee 1--DDCI 1 -- D/DCI/NIO 1 -- Exec.Reg. 1 -- NIO/EC 2 NIO/USSR 1 -- NIO/RI 1 - DDI (Mr.Proctor) 1 - D/OER (Mr. Ernest) 1 - D/OCI (Mr. Parmenter) 1 - OER/U Q 1 .- OER/EE NIO/USSR/, 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79R01142A000700160001-4 Approved For Release 2004R411~#CIb %'k1 11t 21400070016000'1-4 of Genf Intelligence 23 July 1975 MEMRANDUM FOR: Mr. Denis Clift Mr. Robert Gates NSC Staff SUBJECT . East European Grain Situation: Implications for the President' Trip Denis and Bob, Here is a free-will offering on the current outlook for the Eastern European grain crop, and our best guess on grain import in-1- plications. We were moved by t1Ye recenL, flood/ drought combinations in the area to think the estimate might be of use in connection with the President's trip and discussions with East European leaders. I of CIA's Office of Economic Research wrote the piece. I also call to your attention a piece on the current overall Eastern European economic situation, published this morning in OER' s Economic Intelli gence, Weekly. A copy is attached. National Intelligence Officer for USSR/LE 25X1 25X1 Approvgc~ eraLSe 2004/12/21: CIA-RDP79R01142A000700160001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/2 1:,CIA-RDP79R01142A000700160001-4 mov 23 July 1975 MENJRANDUM FOR: Mr. Denis Clift, Mr. Robert Gates NSC Staff SUBJECT East European Grain Situation: Implications for the President's Trip Distribution: Original - Addressees 1- 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 2 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - NIO/USSR,4 DCI DDCI D/DCI/NIO Exec.Rog. NIO/EC NIO/USSR NIO/RI DDI DDI/D/OER DDI/D/OCI DDI/OER/U DDI/OER/EE Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79R01142A000700160001-4 Approved For Release 2004/1/IAfiF~bP'16t0(T1000700160001-4 of Central intoiiiigenco 23 July 1975 MFMOPPNDUM FOR: Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt Counselor of the Department of State SUBJECT . East European Grain Site aticr.: Implications for the President's Trip Hal, Here is a free-will offering on the current outlook for the Eastern E_ ropean crrai n crop, and our best guess on gain isnx>rt irrr- plicaLi.ons. We were moved by the recent flcoci/ cirought combinations in the area to think the estimate might be of use in connection with the President's trip and discussions with East European leaders . of CIA's Office of Economic Researc wrote the piece. I also call to your attention a piece on the current overall Eastern European economic situation, published this morning in OER's Economic Intelligence Wookly. AJ Naciony. nte_ igencc Officer for USStP/E Approve Forr ass 2004/12/21: CIA-RDP79RO1142A000700160001=4 cc s ; M r . Hy and 1,:r. Hartrnan 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79R01142A000700160001-4 23 July 1975 MEMOEANDUM FOR: Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt SUBJECT . East European Grain Situation: Implications for the President's Trip Distribution: Original. - Addressee 1_ - Wm. Hyland/State 1 - Arthur Hartman/State I - John Armi.tage/State 1_ - Nicholas Andrews/State 1_ - DCI 1.-DDCI 1 - D/DCI/NIO 1 - Exec.Eeg. 1_ - NIO/EC 2. - NIO/USSR 1 - NIO/RI 1 - DDI I.. - DDI/D/OER 1 - DDI/D/OCI 1 - DDI/OEE/U 1 - DDI/OEF./EE NIO/USSR,4 Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79R0l142A000700160001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79R0l14ZO00700160001-4 ,%W EASTERN EUROPE: ECONOMIC SITUATION REPORT Poor crop weather in July in Eastern Europe portends a disappointing agricultural performance in 1975 and an almost certain slowdown in economic growth. The various Communist regimes had already been braced for a difficult year because of prolonged Western recession and the substantial rise in the price of Soviet raw materials. Agriculture: Floods in the South, Drought in the North The East European governments had been counting on a grain crop even greater than the record 90 million tons of 1974. However, rains, floods, and drought combined forces in early July to dim these hopes. With the harvest under way, torrential rains and flooding hit Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, causing considerable damage to grains. Meanwhile, grain crops in East Germany and fodder crops in Poland were threatened by drought. We have lowered our estimate of the region's grain crop to 86 million tons. Impact of Western Recession Recession among major non-Communist countries has held back Eastern Europe's export sales in 1975, with the decline in volume being hidden by price increases and revaluations of currencies. Yugoslavia purchased three-fourths of its imports from the West in 1974 and, with its more open and less centrally planned economy, is particularly vulnerable to economic developments in the West. Exports to its major Western markets declined in the first quarter compared with a year earlier while imports continued to increase rapidly. Belgrade imposed import restrictions in June. It has requested debt rescheduling on a selective basis, being able so far to finance only two-thirds of the hard currency requirements we estimate for 1975. Growth of industrial production slackened in late spring as a result of earlier import restrictions and deliberate efforts to rein in new investment. In spite of government efforts to curb imports and investment, inflation is still running at 25%. A unique factor in the inflation problem in Yugoslavia is the ability of local worker councils to press for higher wages. Romania, as an exporter of petroleum and a beneficiary of higher world prices, continued its rapid industrial growth through the first quarter. Growth of exports to the West was about the same as in 1974 but, like the others, Romania was Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79R0l142A000700160001-4 Secret Approved For elease 2004/12/21S! f -RDP79R0112.000700160001-4 having difficulty in marketing such goods as textiles and chemicals in the West. Also, Romania is no longer self-sufficient in crude oil and will require increasing imports to utilize its refining capacity. Bucharest in July imposed price increases for various consumer goods and services, ranging from 25% for natural gas to 103% for heating oil. Poland, with the advantage of growing foreign demand for raw materials such as coal and sulfur, has been less affected than the others by world economic problems. Prices for its exports to the West actually increased more in 1974 than prices for its imports. Warsaw is having little difficulty in obtaining Western credits, having secured at least $2.6 billion so far in 1975. The largest deal is the $1.7 billion in government-guaranteed credits from France arranged during Giscard D'Estaing's visit to Warsaw in June. The regime is still managing to satisfy consumer demand sufficiently to avoid widespread discontent. Adverse consumer reaction to scattered meat shortages last winter and again in June underline the continuing pressure on the regime to step up supplies of quality goods. Hungary, which purchased less than half of its imports from the West in 1974, already has lowered its goals for economic growth and levels of consumption for the next five years. Poor in mineral resources, Hungary is more heavily dependent on trade for its economic progress than are the other East European countries. Exports to the West declined in the first quarter and continued to decline in April and May. The government has been tightening restrictions on imports. Hungary was the only East European country to reduce orders for Western machinery and equipment in January-May 1975 compared with a year earlier. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany are less dependent on Western imports and have generally been less affected by the recession. Eastern Europe: Imports from the Non-Communist Countries Percent of Total imports 27 24 21 56 48 53 46 79 74 77 1970 73 74 1970 73 74 1970 73 74 1970 73 74 1970 73 74 1970 73 74 1970 73 74 Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Hungary Poland Romania Yugoslavia Germany Approved For Release 2004/1 2/251 lA-RDP79R01142A000700160001-4 Approved Forlease 2004/12/21?hA-RDP79R0114W00700160001-4 Eastern Europe: Trade with the West' Imports Exports Jan-Mar Jan-Mar Jan-Mar Jan-Mar 1973 1974 1974 19752 1973 1974 1974 19752 Total 10,521 15,311 3,080 4,421 7,828 9,485 2,110 2,337 Bulgaria 408 717 122 243 299 325 83 89 Czecho- slovakia 1,118 1,417 289 385 963 1,139 238 299 East Germany 1,580 2,020 414 559 1,413 1,819 396 457 Hungary 929 1,526 308 461 939 1,115 235 233 Poland 2,605 3,723 778 1,084 1,589 2,029 489 543 Romania 1,164 1,809 362 581 919 1,187 237 306 Yugo- slavia 2,717 4,099 807 1,108 1,706 1,871 432 410 1. Austria, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany. Data are from Western sources. 2. Preliminary estimates. Eastern Europe: Trade with the United States' Imports Exports Jan-Mar Jan-Mar Jan-Mar Jan-Mar 1973 1974 1974 1975 1973 1974 1974 1975 Total 839 1,130 302 374 471 807 178 192 Bulgaria 6 22 2 11 5 8 6 9 Czecho- slovakia 72 49 13 12 35 46 8 11 East Germany 28 21 6 2 10 14 3 3 Hungary 33 56 20 30 16 75 7 13 Poland 349 395 104 141 182 266 68 69 Romania 116 277 72 74 56 130 28 18 Yugo- slavia 235 310 85 104 167 268 58 69 1. US data. Approved For Release 2004/12Inr9iCIA-RDP79R01142A000700160001-4 Approved Fo;Aplease 2004/12/2'9!tA-RDP79R011 00700160001-4 Trade with the United States is dominated by Poland and Yugoslavia, the only countries having Export-Import Bank financing and most-favored-nation status. Romania found its access to Export-Import credits suspended under the 1974 US Trade Act; a Romanian-US trade agreement now awaits legislative action in the Congress. The stiff price increases for Soviet oil and other raw materials in early 1975 have had their greatest impact on Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Poland with its coal and Romania with its oil have been less affected. Bulgaria has fallen in between. Yugoslavia had been paying world market prices for its Soviet raw materials and has not been affected by the price hikes. The impact on the hardest hit countries has been mitigated - at least in 1975 - by various Soviet concessions. For instance, the Hungarians have benefited from Soviet long-term credits and above-plan deliveries of vital raw materials. Near-Term Prospects We expect the East European regimes to search for additional financing in Western money markets while dampening consumption at home. Indebtedness to the West is high and growing, although not yet a serious problem (except in Yugoslavia). Poland alone may avoid an economic slowdown this year. Approved For Release 2004/12/2lecr(MA-RDP79R01142A000700160001-4