PAPERS I - 3 THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A001700010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 135
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 9, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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9 July 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
L.
C.
Dirks,
D/OD&E
25X1
G.
A.
Carver,
D/DCl/NIO
Comptroller 25X1
DDA
Herewith a draft of Paper I. In it I've tried
to synthesize the ideas we've been talking about
into something that might serve as the introduction
to our. study. You will note regurgitation of a number
of your ideas, although usually in my own words.
I have misgivings about language too rhetorical,
assertions too sweeping, judgments too facile, but
perhaps for stage-setting purposes these sins are
less heinous.
RICHARD LEHMAN
S-E-C-R-E-T
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Paper I
R. Lehman
7/9
In recent months the American people have been
waking up to the idea that they have an intelligence
service, and they are clearly of two minds about it.
Their ambivalence is rooted in the problems created by
the secrecy of intelligence, and in a popular view of the
United States in the world that is not in tune with
reality.
The Central Intelligence Agency and a national
intelligence system were created by the National Security
Act of 1947. They grew out of a consensus among the
national elite--in Congress, the Executive, and
the national media--that wartime experience and the
emergence of the United States as the first superpower
required the creation of a permanent national intelligence
capability--"No more Pearl Harbors." Moreover the elite
accepted the traditions of total secrecy characteristic
of other national systems, notably the British, as
appropriate for an American system, and the Acts of 1947
and 1949 encouraged CIA to folow this traditional path.
In hindsight, this appears to have been a mistake,
because it prevented the education of the public and all
but a few Congressmen in the realities of intelligence,
and because it protected intelligence itself from the
oversight that would have required a greater sensitivity
to public interests.
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In these circumstances, intelligence had no constituency
except a small group of senior Congressmen who both protected
it from and blocked its access to their younger and more
liberal colleagues. Thus when the national elite of the
1940-1965 period was discredited by the Vietnam War and by
'Watergate, and "our" Congressmen grew too few and too weak
to maintain their control, intelligence was exposed to a
rapidly growing new generation of national leadership--in
Congress and the media--that shared neither its traditions
nor its view of the world.
This new generation, rejecting many of the doctrines
of its predecessors, has tended to return to the doctrines
of an earlier generation yet. The more extreme of its
members, rejecting any suggestion of realpolitik, would have
us reestablish a foreign policy of goodwill to all except
(some) tyrants. A public opinion deeply attracted by
these doctrines rooted in our innocent past, and repelled
by the realities of the present, find it increasingly
difficult to believe in the threat posed by powerful
enemies, an'd even more in the concept that another power,
acting in its national interest, can do damage ours as to
require us to respond.
By one who can deny the existence of evil, those who
seem evil are seen merely to be ignorant. Thus comes the
concept of foreign policy by example, or "do unto others--'t.
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The tyranny of the Soviet Union is not true tyranny; it
is Soviet reaction to our misguided abandonment in the
1940's of the foreign policy of goodwill. Since it is
our own creation, we have a moral obligation to turn the
other cheek.
To the revisionist intelligence seems of little
value. Worse, secret intelligence sets a bad example.
Thus many of the new elite in Congress and the media
initially approach intelligence from a hostile position,
, and their hostility has a considerable impact on a public
completely unsophisticated in intelligence matters.
The national turmoil that has fostered these new
attitudes has had an especially damaging effect on
intelligence security, and this in turn has fed public
disillusionment with intelligence. Resistance to the
Vietnam war led to some breakdown in intelligence
discipline, as intelligence was leaked for advantage in
partisan debate. Each leak encouraged another, until
the security of all intelligence operations had been ser-
iously eroded. When exposed to the investigative report-
ing in vogue since Watergate, the dyke gave way. Many
intelligence activities were exposed for the sake of
exposure, and many skeletons--real and imagined--were
dragged from the intelligence closet. The disclosure
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that a few of these activities had in fact been illegal
and others injudicious gave ammunition to those hostile
to intelligence itself, and a public conditioned by recent
events to believe the worst of its government was
inclined to accept at face value the wildest exaggera-
tions and the most far-fetched imputation of impropriety
to legitimate activites.
The American people have thus been confronted
not with the full reality of their intelligence service
but with its worst aspects. The Congress, also with a
large admixture of the new generation, has reinforced
the impression of wickedness by sanctimonious posturing
and uninformed criticism. Public dismay, however, goes
beyond shock at illegal mail openings or jackass ex-
periments with LED. It is at least as much an unease with
the whole idea of large organizations working in secrecy
among us to ends we do not understand. Moreover, the
unease is as great with the "large" as it is with the
"secret".
The intelligence officer must cope with the reality
of the world about him whatever the popular attitude. For
him, the idea of a foreign policy for the United States
rising above national interests has been obsolete ever
since the Industrial Revolution set the world on the road
to strategic warfare, economic interdependence, and
ideological struggle not matched since the Reformation.
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He knows the United States needs intelligence, and he
knows that today US intelligence systems must be both
large and secret.
To the intelligence officer, if Pearl Harbor was
a valid reason for creating a national intelligence
system in 1947, the possibility of a Soviet first strike
is an equally valid reason for strengthening it today.
The argument that nuclear war is unthinkable, or that the
construction of nuclear armaments is driven by action and
reaction of military-industrial complexes)i to him
largely irrelevant; as long as the USSR continues to
build and improve its strategic forces, the US must know
how and why.
To the intelligence officer, the knowledge that the
world's resources are finite, and that population growth
is rapidly overtaking supplies of food and energy, means
that national interests once considered important will
soon become vital. When there is not enough to go around,
intelligente on the capabilities and intentions of pro-
ducers and consumers becomes more essential to the sur-
vival of the United States than intelligence on Japanese
intentions was in 1941.
To the intelligence officer, detente, until proven
otherwise, must be viewed as a short-term tactic. He
must assess Soviet political intentions against his
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knowledge that the Soviet leadership has not deviated
significantly in the ends it has sought since 1917, and
that its professed desire to change the rules of its
competition with capitalism has not changed its
dedication to that competition. He recognizes that
the political turmoil afflicting most of the world
.provides new opportunities for ideological competition
to be conducted around or behind established governments,
and he sees in this new demands for him to provide
intelligence on the political and social upheavals in
foreign societies.
While the framers of the Act of 1947 recognized a
continuing need for a national intelligence system, they
could not have foreseen the complexity or scale of
such requirements as these. They probably did not
envisage the difficulties we would meet in penetrating
closed societies or in assembling and correlating the vast
amounts of data that flow from open ones. Nor could they
anticipate the management and organizational
ments of large technical collection
believed they were creating a small
zation on top of existing agencies,
reduced from wartime strength.
which they laid the foundation
systems.
require-
They
coordinating organi-
themselves drastically
In fact, the
has met these
with some success, but is probably larger in
system for
challenges
the peace of
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1975 than it was in the war of 1945, and certainly
much more complex and expensive.
Moreover, in 1947 the tradition of secrecy that
the creators of CIA sought to maintain was primarily
that of espiOnage. A break meant the loss of an agent
or a net; this can be painful indeed in the short run,
but need not be permanently weakening. They were only
beginning to comprehend from SIGINT the greater risk
in technical collection: a break in a system can
cripple you forever. On the other hand, the existence
of the agent and the system that supports him must be
totally concealed if he is to survive; the "fact of" is
a crucial consideration. Technical systems, however,
usually cannot and therefore need not be concealed;
only the degree of success must in all cases be kept
secret. By 1975 it has become apparent that the require-
ments for security for human and technical collection
are radically different. In this as much as in our
response to public attitudes, the secrecy concepts of
1947 are no longer applicable.
This, then, is the dilemma for American intelli-
gence in 1975. We see the nation's requirement for
foreign intelligence as greater than ever, yet we have
failed to hold public acceptance, partly because public
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attitudes have changed, partly because our own secrecy
has prevented us from educating the public to the need
for intelligence and to the costs, moral and monetary,
of getting it. Public and Congressional concern, however,
is only part of the problem.
Since 1947 we have evolved procedures and developed
techniques far beyond any conceived at that time. We
have added a new dimension to the concept of intelligence,
and have demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Executive--
over a number of Administrations--that a copious flow of
objective national intelligence is central to the conduct
of national security policy in today's complex world. But
our efforts have often been wasteful and our product some-
times mediocre, to a considerable extent because the
organization and management of the national intelligence
system have kept pace neither with the complexity of its
techniques nor the scope of. the requirements placed upon
it. The Act of 1947 provides the DCI with authorities
and administrative structure quite inadequate for the
fulfillment of his assigned mission under the conditions
of 1975. Rather, he attempts to fulfill it through an
accretion of independent jerry-built structures,
lacking statutory basis, in which he exercises varying
degress of influence. In short, the act of 1947 would
be out of date even if the system had total public
acceptance.
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The problem then has two parts. The system must be
made more efficient, but it must also be made more
acceptable. This means that efficiency cannot be
achieved simply by rationalization and centralization of
authority. Rather, it must be accompanied by provisions
for external controls and internal checks and balances,
perhaps at some cost to efficiency, in order to recover
public confidence. The public must be satisfied not only
that a computer-driven monster does not threaten the
state from within, but that such a monster cannot be
created. At the same time, the public must be brought
to accept, and thus controls must be designed to
provide secrecy for those intelligence operations that
cannot succeed without it.
This is not impossible. The public accepts--because
it understands--the need for secrecy in a wide range of
private and public matters, from the laWyer-client
relationship to the protection of patents. It accepts--
)
when it understands--the need commit large public
funds to purposes that give at best only indirect benefit
to the taxpayer. We must seek to reestablish that under-
standing.
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OLUII,L I
MEMORANDUM FOR:
10 July 1975
Mr. Lehman
Mr. Dirks
SUBJECT : Paper 2
1. Attached is a rough draft of Paper 2. I
apologize for its form, but thought getting it to you
promptly by 00B Friday (11 July) was more important
than taking the time for a clean run through the
typewriter.
2. The language could stand much improvement,
but I can polish the prose later. At this stage I am
more concerned with getting the right ideas in the
right order.
Attachment
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
SECRET
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Paper 2 - The United States Future Need for Intelligence
(Paper to pinpoint kinds of substantive problems on which USG
will continue to require analyzed, evaluated information and to explain
why we believe these substantive areas must be of concern to the USG
intelligence apparatus (specifically noting the fact that this includes
both Defense and CIA, helping to establish the Community Perspective
of the paper). Add one or two first rate examples per category to
illustrate our abstract words.)
Proper and essential intelligence functions for the future
can be broadly categorized into six areas (following material is an
attempt to combine the original Dirks draft with the Lehman draft
of June 30):
I. Intelliaence for Current Policy Support--Operations Center
actions, current intelligence, SNIE's, some NIEls, NSSM
contributions, some monographs, support of negotiations.
a. Foreign Intelligence Support for US Foreign Policy
Formulation. This includes a broad range of political, economic
and military matters which pertain to and influence US policy.
Specific critical requirements at any one point in time are
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OUTLINE D
Paper 1 - US Intelligence in 1975
A. Setting the Stage - Two Themes in American History
Current discussions of intelligence are heavily influenced
by two different strains of thought, one deeply rooted in American
$4.�112.4tvki. �
intellectual history, the other far older
The first involves the myth of youthful, virtuous innocence and that
sulw.f....sir
of the efficacy of virtuous example. 34-
T-41-Q�f.o.r..pn.gup-4e-141sCthat we are a young country, imbued with the
innocence of childhood and, accordingly, qualitatively different from
'4irewol the cynical, corrupt, "old" societies of Europe and the rest of the
benighted world.
The second myth, closely related, is heavily colored by
romantic Eighteenth Century concepts of a pure state of nature which
preceeded the :orrupting influences of organized society. This myth
denies the dark side of human behavior. It represents the flowering
of the Eighteenth Century concept of rationalism and rests, ultimately,
on a postulate that no humans are really wicked or evil; those who
seem so are only ignorant or uninformed. Man is infinitely educable and,
through education, perfectible. All he needs to become virtuous is the
force of virtuous example. Thus, in international affairs, we should
provide the example.
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Both of these myths color our .perceptions of foreign policy and
the techniques and instrumentalities essential to its conduct. Both
are nurtured by a misreading or misunderstanding of our history.
In point of fact, we are not now a "young" country. Indeed, we
are now not only the wealthiest and probably the most complex nation
on this planet, in a very real sense we are the oldest. We have a
set of governing institutions that have evolved in size and complexity,
but have not been radically modified�or overthrown--for almost two
centwities. The only other country whose founding predates ours which
has not had its governing system toppled and altered by war or
revolution is Great Britain. However, Britain has undergone far
more profound governmental change over the past two centuries than
have we. Our only real structural change, courtesy of Mr. Justice
Marshall, has been the establishment of thejudiciary as a branch
of Government co-equal with the Executive and Legislative Branches.
Britain has seen the complete atrophication of the monarchy as a
more than symbolic, ceremonial institution; the eclipse of the
House of Lords and the political power of the hereditary peerage;
the consolidation of all effective governing power in the House of
Commons, the evolution of the office of Prime Minister as the country's
chief executive executive and the-ft4,1-1.-...341.t of cabinet rule. Our Government in
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1975 would be far more recognizable to George Washington and
Thomas Jefferson than Harold Wilson's would be to William Pitt and
George
With respect to foreign policy, our successful, relatively untroubled
evolution into a major world power had precious little to do with our
innate virtue or the force of our virtuous example. The fact is that
during the first 165 years of our history we had little need for any
foreign policy, let alone a consistent one. Our primary source of
protection lay in certain accidents of geography, plus two extremely
fortunate economic transactions--one Presidential, one done by the
Executive Branch, both hotly challenged in Congress and both of
doubtful domestic legality: Jefferson's purchase of the Louisiana
terrytories from Napoleon and Seward's of Alaska from the Czar.
It is not that our ventures into foreign policy were invariably successful
but, rather, that we were cushioned from the consequences of folly
or error by the fact that on our northern and southern borders
we had weak neighbors incapable of posing any serious threat while
on East and West we were shielded by to oceans�which it took days
or weeks to transit�and the British Navy.
Despite their lack of historical, or other, substance these
two myths are deeply rooted in our intellectual history particularly
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in the strain that runs from certain of our founding fathers (Jefferson,
Sam Adams and Thomas Paine), through the Congregational and
Unitarian divines of Greater Boston, the mid-nineteenth century
n.ortheastern�predominantly New England--literati (Henry Ward
Beecher, Emerson and Harriet Beecher Stowe), later lay preachers
such as William Jennings Bryan and Woodrow Wilson to those of our
contemporaries who wear their Liberalism (capital-L) as a fashionable
badge of honor and now that Walter Lippman is no longer available
to show them the path of true religion, tend to regard the New York Times
as canonical writ. Persons of this intellectual and ideological bent
are often articulate and loom disproportionately large in the history
of American letters--partly because of their talents but also because
they tend to be something of a self-annointed, self-perpetuating elite
which prefers to publish articles and books it finds doctrinally
congenial than those which smack of heresy.
This cast of thought, and way of thinking, is prevalent in Congress,
especially among the younger members, and even more prevalent in
congressional staffs. It is predominant among those who write and
edit our "national" publications--The New York Times, The Washington
Post, Harpers, The Atlantic, The New Yorker, The New York Review
of Books, Time, Newsweek, etc. those publications from which
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many opinion leaders are wont to take their ideas. Even more significantly,
persons of this intellectual and ideological persuasion have an almost
monopoly control over the production, treatment and content of the
news and commentary broadcast over our major national television
networks.
Within the framework of these myths there is no place for secret
intelligence; and those who believe in these myths instinctively--if
unconsciously--reject the reality of a world in which intelligence is
necessary for national survival.
The National Security Act of 1947 implicitly rejected these myths
and established the United States' Defense and intelligence organizations
essentially as they exist today. This act acknowledged a different
�set of principals, more "realistic" and rooted less in the American
tradition than in the origins of the nation state itself.
The evolution of the Greek city state into a nation state
brought an expansion of the boundaries of that state's
concern for its own security. The factors bearing upon
its security were limited to those few items of direct
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concerned with the relative strengths of its capability
to defend itself and its immediate neighbors' capabilities
to attack it. Little concern was given to the military
capabilities of nation states that would not have a means
of direct access to the nation state. Thus, England in the
17th century was concerned with the military capabilities
of neighboring France and Spain because both nations had
access to England by means of the sea.' England' was not
terribly concerned with the military capabilities of Russia
which had no means of effectively attacking England and had
little competition with England for those other things
England considered important, such as trade routes.
The other matters that directly affected national
security, were those things which permitted the nation state
to survive as a viable economic unit. The security of internal
commerce, access to foreign markets if the nation state were
not self sufficient, a source of appropriately skilled labor,
access to an avenue for the carrying out of commerce.
Occasionally the nation state would worry about protecting
its boundaries from epidemics originating outside of its
borders. Although the intrigues were numerous and the need
for intelligence many and complex, they were concerned with
neighbors near at hand and with their military capabilities,
the political alliances that might develop, and the commercial
benefits for the nation state.
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3LL,t't. I
In the second half of the twentieth century, the concept of national
security has become very much more complicated.
Some of the world's nations are controlled by people committed
(with varying degrees of intensity) to certain ideologies which they
are anxious to spread--advancing their own or their group's interests
in the process. This ideological consideration makes them regard the
US as a natural enemy to be neutralized around the world and ultimately--if
possible--either conquered or overtaken from within.
In addition, we are concerned with the widespread knowledge
of nuclear technology with the implied threat of demented intelligence
or an anarchistic organization being able to make their own nuclear
weapons. Finite and diminishing energy resources make us view nations
which are not super powers as possible threats to our national way
of life and even our national survival. Shifting power in nations QL-40.04t#11 � to
no apparent direct concern now affect energy, trade objectives or
regional balances of power. In fact, even since 1947 the definition
of national security has expanded considerably, and with this expansion
the definition of intelligence has also changed to include targets in new
areas. Economic intelligence may well grow as resources become
scarcer, either through depletion or a managing policy of scarcity.
Industrial intelligence may also become increasingly a matter of
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national concern in order to maintain the competitive status of US
industries in world markets, thus maintaining a high level of employment
of humans and capital. (There may also be-increasing national
concern about the impact of the actions of multi-national corporations
upon national goals.) Shortages of food which now exist may be
exacerbated by climatological changes and shortages in fertilizer.
These food shortages, real and potential, may be coupled with large
population increases in the "have-not" nations. This suggests that
agricultural and demographic intelligence will become of increasing
importance.
B. Intelligence in an ''Open" Society
The US exists in a world of nations with interests reaching
beyond their own borders. Other states take actions and maintain
capabilities to take actions which affect our interests. Some of these
actions and capabilities are openly acknowledged; others are secret.
In the past we have from time to time paid a heavy price for our
failure to acknowledge this and to take appropriate steps to under-
stand both the capabilities and the intentions of others with respect
to us.
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Extraordinary measures must be taken to gather information
on and understand those activities and capabilities shrouded in
secrecy by foreign state policy. Attempts by the United States to collect
such information often involve violation of the laws of other nations.
This is generally more true with respect to human and agent operation
than it is in those areas where major technical systems do the
collection task for us, although it is sometimes, true for these systems
as well. Thus, if information of this type is to be collected, espionage
and other collection activities often need to be conducted in secrecy
if they are to be conducted at all.
There has been a good deal of public discussion about the need
to reconcile intelligence activity conducted in secret with the goals
of an open American society.
It is not secrecy or "openness" per se that seem to be at issue.
The need for secrecy is widely accepted in many areas of our
society.
Outside of Government:
Lawyers and doctors maintain secrets conveyed by clients
in priviledged communication. This is widely thought necessary
and desirable to protect both the rights and privacy of individuals.
Business firms routinely deny their plans and trade secrets
to their competitors or the public at large. There is little
public call for "openness" in this regard; it being widely
accepted that businesses have this "right."
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Newsmen believe that both the "fact of" a relationship
between the press and a soIrce, and the identify of the source
itself, must often be secret if newsmen are to continue to
perform their function in a free society (though this right has
come under attack in the courts).
Within the Government:
important details of our nuclear weapons and strategic
capabilities are widely acknowledged, to require secrecy because
to treat them otherwise would facilitate the efforts of others
to develop counteri,veapons and/or countermeasures.
The Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve Board
protects its decisions from public view in order to help assure
that individuals are unable to take unfair advantage of those
decisions and to insure that others will not be able to take
steps to reverse the decision's intended effect.
Grand jury proceedings are secret to avoid violating the
rights of individuals or prejudicing the outcome of a legal
proceeding.
Census data on individuals (not aggregate data) is protected
-rorn public disclosure to protect the rights to privacy of
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These examples should illustrate the point that as a society we
rather easily accept the need for secrecy in a variety of areas.
Secrecy per se is not antithetical to American values; indeed our
value structure accepts secrecy in many endeavors as necessary
and important. In intelligence, we face some erosion of public
understanding of our function--fueled both by evidence
of failure (Vietnam?) and by public discussion of activities
once accepted as reasonable but now questionable (covert
action in general?). At the same time, we are faced with a major
decline in the credibility of those who have been responsible for
oversight and control of us both in the Executive Branch and the
Congress. Our most fundamental problems would seem to be to
restore public understanding of the need for intelligence activities
conducted in secrecy, eliminate those aspects of our program which
no longer enjoy broad public support, and reestablish .the credibility
of those oversight budies which seem to reassure the public that we
are not exceeding our newly redefined charter.
_
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_ .
'',01! W.5
Paper 1 - The Future of Intelligence.
Our initial thoughts were set down in drafts and discussed 6/26/75.
Based on the papers and discussion, basic themes of this paper
probably include: some history explaining what intelligence assets
the USG had before Pearl Harbor; major considerations included in the
1947 Act; the apparently changing role of intelligence in such areas
as economics, terrorism/counterterrorism, world resource use,
etc.; ghastly definitional problems which need clarification (national
security, intelligence foreign vs. domestic, national vs. tactical,
covert action, etc.); changed requirements for public accountability
in the future; the need to be -aware that we could be talking about
.creating an efficient apparatus with great potential for misuse; the
need for some sort of balance of forces within the Intelligence
Community to. (minimize abuses? produce healthy competition?
the need to .set forth the substantive areas in which intelligence
will be expected to contribute; the need to build a more effective set
of constituents for intelligence; the need to point out that our very
dynamic society imposes special responsibilities on US intelligence;
the need to point out that intelligence of the future will more often
need to be focused on individuals and groups- with great potential
for destructive behavior; the probable need to continue to have an
3CCHT
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Intelligence Community in which there is both an "objective" body
with no policy/operational responsibilities as well as continued
Defense participation in intelligence operations; the need to explore
further the various leadership responsibilities of the DCI and CIA
(including but not limited to the COS' coordination role, the DCI's
responsibility for protection of sources and methods, the DCI's
resource review role in the Community, the Agency's and the DCI's
production "leadership" responsibilities, etc.).
Paper 2 - What is the Intelligence Community?
A descriptive piece explaining the various components of the
Community; the production, collection, processing, R&D roles
of the various components; and describing the management inter-
relationships between the various components including the DCI's
resource management responsibilities as set forth in the
November, 1971, letter. 5 pages ultimately.
Paper 3 - The Management of Intelligence/CIA Leadership in the Community.
This paper must grapple with the question of alternative management
arrangements for the Intelligence Community. Here we will need
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1
to describe DCI and CIA current leadership responsibilities and how
they have developed over the years (both with respect to substantive
and to resource matters). This will require focusing particularly
on the production, collection and R&D responsibilities of the Agency
and on the various mechanisms available to the Agency and the
DCI to exercise leadership in the Intelligence Community including
control over covert activities abroad, control of the estimates process,
the various USIB committees with policy making responsibilities
in functional areas, the November 1971 letter, etc. We will then
have set the stage for whatever analysis/critique we care to make
of existing arrangements and for defining a set of problems we
think should be solved. A tentative list of these might include the
facts that the DCI has a Community resource review responsibility
but no authority; the DCI has a Community "sources and methods"
responsibility but no authority; the DCI lacks full access to DoD
collection and resource information, despite the law and a Presidential
letter; etc.
Having defined a series of fundamental problems, we can then
analyze possible alternative arrangements. In concept, these
seem to fall into about four basic categories:
3
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"
1. No Community resource management role for DCI at all,
return to pre-1971 and focus only on a Community
production role for Agency. (Comment: A step backward
and probably undesirable.)
2. Consolidate all "national" (what are they?) programs under
the DCI's command and control. (Comment: Politically
unrealistic and probably not sensible in any event. )
3. Take certain minimum steps to expand DCI's effective
authority to do better what he now does. (Example of such
steps: Segregate out within Defense all resource decision
making related to intelligence and establish a parallel review
procedure involving the DCI. Comment: Worth considering
further.)
4. Examine the joint management arrangements between CIA
and NRO, isolate reasons why this arrangement is considered
"successful" and a) nsider whether the model could or should
be applied to the SIGINT world,
favorite, with possibilities. )
4
etc. (Comment: A Colby
QFCRUT
J L
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Paper 4 - Secrec and Intelligence.
The principal task is to explain what must always remain secret
(if we are to do our job) in the Intelligence Community and to
explain our legislative proposal on protection of sources and methods
in this context. The "open-budget" issue will need to be explored
as well, though our position on this is quite clear.
On the other side of the coin, the DCI has asked that we pursue
the issues surrounding secrecy of the "fact of" overhead reconnaissance,
with the hope that certain basic activities in this area could
be declassified. Probably there are other similar issues.
Basic to this paper is the need to reconsider where the line
must be drawn on revelation of our activities, to examine critically
whether that line must be drawn where it is now, and to see if clear
guidelines can be drawn for the future.
Paper 5 - External Controls on the Agency and Community.
a. What are these controls and how do they work (with respect to
covert action, clandestine and technical collection, and so forth)?
5
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JC.k../REI
b. What additional controls did Rockefeller Commission recommend?
c. What additional controls might Congress recommend?
d. Recognizing Rockefeller Commission recommendations and
probable congressional demands, what would we recommend,
both within Executive Branch and with respect to Congress?
Paper 6 - Intelligence and the Congress.
(Paper to deal with substantive intelligence issues, not oversight
and controls which should be treated above.)
What use is now made of intelligence by the Congress? Do we
react to requests or do we have a conscious program? Where might
Congress--if it could keep secrets--benefit from more intelligence
information? What could we do to make more information more widely
available to Congress? What problems would this cause? Is Congress
likely to legislate a request that we make substantive information
available to relevant members on a periodic basis? If they did,
what ground rules for handling this should there be? 5 pages.
6
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--
6 /26 /75
Paper 3 - The Future of Intelligence.
The USG's intelligence capability over the next few years should
be marked by three fundamental characteristics:
First, it must continue to supply useful information for a
wide variety of Executive Branch policy makers concerned
today with:
- Strategic peace keeping involving the USSR.
- Other peace keeping efforts in explosive regional situations,
(southern tier of NATO; the Middle East).
- Making macro-economic decisions.
- Understanding threats to stability in nations where we
have important interests.
- Making resource decisions about the level and thrust of
our national defense effort.
- World resource use.
- And other questions.
Second, it must continue to recognize the need both for an
independent production capability (coupled with some
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ocurir
collection, R&D and other responsibilities) and certain production
and collection activities carried out by the Department of
Defense in support of that Department's principal mission--national
defense. The former is required because policy -makers must
have access to information supplied by an objective organization
without policy making or operational responsibilities. The latter
is required because it is fundamentally unreasonable to require
those charged with monitoring our military preparedness to do that
without an element of control over information necessary to the
accomplishment of their mission.
Third, it should continue to recognize the need for a central
leadership responsibility within the Community to organize
thinking on substantive issues, to eliminate redundancy wherever
possible, and to facilitate a coordinated USG response to foreign
governments on intelligence issues.
RE
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Paper 3 - The Future of Intelligence.
The USG's intelligence capability over the next few years should
be marked by three fundamental characteristics:
First, it must continue to supply useful information for a
wide variety of Executive Branch policy makers concerned
today with:
Strategic peace keeping involving the USSR.
Other peace keeping efforts in explosive regional situations,
� (southern tier of NATO; the Middle East).
Making macro-economic decisions.
- Understanding threats to stability in nations where we
have important interests.
- Making resource decisions about the level and thrust of
our national defense effort.
- World resource use.
- And other questions.
Second, it must continue to recognize the need both for an
independent production capability (coupled with some
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Nrimo,
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collection, R&D and other responsibilities) and certain production
and collection activities carried out by the Department of
Defense in support of that Department's principal mission�national
defense. The former is required because policy makers must
have access to information supplied by an objective organization
without policy making or operational responsibilities. The latter
is required because it is fundamentally unreasonable to require
those charged with monitoring our military preparedness to do that
without an element of control over information necessary to the
accomplishment of their mission.
Third, it should continue to recognize the need for a central
leadership responsibility within the Community to organize
thinking on substantive issues, to eliminate redundancy wherever
possible, and to facilitate a coordinated USG response to foreign
governments on intelligence issues.
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26 June 1975
L.C. Dirks
FUTURE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS
Proper and essential intelligence functions can be
broadly categorized into seven areas:
1. Strategic military intelligence
2. Indications and warning intelligence
3. Tactical military intelligence
4. SALT MBFR verification
5. Foreign intelligence support to
U.S. foreign policy decision making
6. Foreign intelligence support to U.S.
economic policy decision making
7. Intelligence on foreign terrorist activities.
Strategic Military Intelligence
Intelligence needs falling under this heading are those
pertaining to the strategic military posture, capabilities,
a-Ay t,r5 c-r'
related long range R&D, and intentions of potentially 44*4.sary
foreign governments. Intelligence on these matters support
a range of military budgetary and policy issues. The most
critical decisions involve long range U.S. decisions effecting
the future military posture of the country. This issue is
particularly critical given the long lead times required to
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substantially change U.S. military capability. Closely related
and perhaps equally important is the operational planning for
force disposition and structure with available military
resources. There are many other issues such as the long
range research and development programs looking forward to
future weapons systems, relationships of military capabilities
to U.S. foreign policy, etc.
Indications and Warning Intelligence
The intelligence functions in this area pertain principally
to providing indications of changes in military posture of
potentially hostile governments and warning of imminent
military actions against U.S. interests. Appropriate intelli-
gence functions under this heading fall short of tactical
warning, such as that provided by BMEWS and by the defense
support program with regard to ballistic missiles launched
against the continental U.S.
Tactical Military Intelligence
Tactical military intelligence is that required by field
commanders engaged in military actions. There was a time when
tactical could be cleanly distinguished and separated from
strategic intelligence. However, the complexity of current
and future weapon systems and the sophistication of technical
intelligence collection capabilities lead to a situation
where in practice tactical and strategic intelligence are
impossible to separate. Almost all of the major technical
collection systems developed primarily in response to strategic
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intelligence requirements have significant tactical implications.
At the same time, intelligence systems driven in the first
instance primarily by tactical requirements, both in scope
and sophistication, are rapidly approaching strategic intelligence
capability. This is particularly true currently with regard to
SIGINT. In recognition of this process, the President has
charged the DCI with responsibilities for the total world of
intelligence including tactical as well as the more traditional
strategic. There is no doubt that in the future intelligence
will have to be regarded as a whole without attempting to
divide it into relatively non-interacting compartments.
SALT and MBFR Verification
Intelligence requirements in this area pertain both to
supporting negotiations and the development of U.S. positions
in future negotiations and in the verification of treaties
or agreements developing from these negotiations. Even though
SALT and MBFR matters pertain to military capabilities and
equipment, intelligence problems are significantly different.
Most notably the intelligence establishment must (1) be able
to project future intelligence capabilities against a range
of contingencies, (2) the Intelligence Community is called
upon to make positive statements to the effect that certain
events which might constitute a violation have not taken
place. In addition some measure of confidence in these negative
judgments must be associated with the process.
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r,i
NOTES ON "PAPER 3"
Before we plunge into the thicket of specific
recommendations and concrete solutions to perceived problems,
we ought to step back and sort out some of the central concepts
indispensible to our deliberations. In these deliberations,
we will have to use certain key words -- which are, actually,
the "names" for these central concepts. Sterile endeavors to
frame perfect definitions should be avoided, but we should be
reasonably clear what our key terms denote and, especially,
be sure that we are all employing these terms as names or
labels for essentially similar concepts. If in using such
words, we are privately -- and unknowingly -- using them in a
sense different from that in which they are being used by our
colleagues, little but confusion is likely to result.
-- Two terms I consider indispensible in our endeavor
are "intelligence" and "information." To my mind, they are
not the same. Information is what intelligence officers and
services collect; intelligence is what they produce. Intelli-
gence is amalgamated, collated and evaluated information refined
and distilled by analysis -- i.e., by the intelligence process.
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-- When you speak of a country's need for intelligence
you are actually speaking of its need for (a) information
and (b) an analytical capacity and organizational structure
capable of refining that information into intelligence.
-- In normal discourse, the word "intelligence" also
encompasses a different meaning or set of meanings namely
the capacity to conduct what we call covert action. This is
something different from the kind of intelligence just dis-
cussed and the distinction needs to be borne in mind, though
covert action capabilities are also proper objects of consid-
eration in any overall assessment of a country's intelligence
needs.
-- As for the US, we start with the fact that ours is
the wealthiest country in the world and that, given its size
and its wealth, its actions -- or non-actions -- will inevitably
have a major impact on events and situations beyond its borders,
whether that impact be intended or not. Furthermore,
-- The wealth and potential impact of the United
States inevitably makes it the target of other nations
and political groups who would like access to its
wealth and who want to induce it to behave in a way
that enhances their own interests.
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-- The preceding considerations are non-ideological.
It is also a fact of international life in the last
half of the 20th Century, however, that some of the
world's nations are controlled by people committed
(with varying degrees of intensity) to certain ideologies
which they are anxious to spread -- advancing their own
or their group's interests in the process. This
ideological consideration makes them regard the US
as a natural enemy to be neutralized around the world
and ultimately -- if possible -- either conquered or
overtaken from within.
-- The ideological struggle being waged is not
unprecedented. In fact, it bears strong analogies to
partially religious European wars and conflicts of
the 16th and 17th Centuries. One important phenomenon
in such a struggle is that those waging it do not
take opposing governments or nations as givens.
Instead, they try to go around, behind or over the
heads of such governments to factions, groups or individuals
within the target society who can somehow be co-opted and
exploited to behave in a way that advances the interests
of the crusaders. This fact, in turn, fuzzes and in
some cases obliterates the boundary between foreign
intelligence questions and those relating to internal
security.
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-- Given this international environment, the US does
have certain basic intelligence-related needs which it will
have to fulfill if it is to survive, let alone prosper.
-- First, it has informational needs. These fall
broadly into two categories, which ought to be distinguished
because the sources which can best service one are not
necessarily those which can best service the other.
-- One cluster of informational needs relates to
the capabilities of other nations or groups with whom
we share this planet. To a significant extent, these
informational needs can be met by an exploitation of
overt sources augmented by technological collection
which is essentially passive -- e.g., imaging or
SIGINT satellites.
-- The other cluster of needs relates to the
intentions of those whose actions can impact on the
interests or the security of the United States.
Questions of intent are closely related to questions
of perception and are inextricably tied to questions
of human attitude. These are not amenable to passive
collection by sophisticated technical devices and
servicing these needs is virtually impossible without
the assistance of human sources.
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5
-- Our government also needs an analytic structure
capable of digesting the information that government garners
and refining it into intelligence. If analyzed information
i.e., intelligence -- is to have an impact on major policy
decisions, however, it has to have the greatest attainable
degree of objectivity. The goal must be an attempt to ascertain
what the facts of a given situation are before making a decision
on what course of action is most likely to serve the national
interests in light of these facts. Humans being humans, this
degree of objectivity -- or the closest possible approximation
thereto -- is unlikely to be attained if the analysis is con-
trolled by people who for departmental, budgetary, policy or
other reasons have a vested interest in its outcome.
-- Also, if the US Government is to be able to protect
its interests and frustrate the designs of its adversaries
by means short of formal war it has to have a capacity for some
form of covert action more efficacious than diplomatic rhetoric
or verbal suasion.
-- If the US Government has the various types of intelli-
gence needs outlined above, then there are three further re-
quirements which have to be fulfilled if these needs are to be
met:
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-- The US must be capable of protecting and
concealing (the two are not quite the same) its
sources of information.
-- It must be capable of concealing its techniques
of analysis, especially those which would inevitably
provide clues as to the sources of information on
which that analysis has to be based.
-- It also needs some capacity for protecting the
fruits of its collection of analysis so that its
adversaries will not necessarily know the full informa-
tional base on which US decisions are being made.
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The
-
The Place of Intelligence in the U.S. from 1975 Forward
The intelligence process is defined as "Intelligence
gathering involves collecting information about other
countries' military capabilities, subversive activities,
economic conditions, political developments, scientific and
technological progress, and social activities and conditions."
The intelligence process assumes that there are actions which
can be taken by the policy leaders of the U.S., based upon
this intelligence, which can affect the course of events
either favorably, or less unfavorably, in terms of U.S.
national security interests.
It is likely that the forthcoming years will see the
definition of national security rewritten in broader terms
to account for all of the economic, political, and social
factors present in other countries which threaten or could
threaten the existence of this country. Such a broadening
of the definition of national security implies a change in
the definition of intelligence to include targets in new
areas. Economic intelligence may well grow as resources
become scarcer, either through depletion or a managing
policy of scarcity. Industrial intelligence may also
become increasingly a matter of national concern in order
to maintain the competitive status of U.S. industries in
world markets, thus maintaining a high level of employment
of humans and capital. (There may also be increasing national
concern about the impact of the actions of multi-national
corporations upon national goals.) Shortages of food which
now exist may be exacerbated by climatological changes and
shortages in fertilizer. These food shortages, real and
potential, may be coupled with large population increases
in the "have-not" nations. This suggests that agricultural
and demographic intelligence will become of increasing
importance.
The aftermath of Watergate has resulted in the desire
on the part of the American people for greater accountability
in its officials, both public and private. This desire for
accountability will undoubtedly be increased in terms of
the intelligence structure as a result of various allegations
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made relative to this Agency and to other members of the
intelligence community. This could well lead, during the
period in question, for a demand from the American public
for access to much of the information obtained by the
intelligence community, which is perceived as being in
areas of interest to that public.
It would appear obvious that the intelligence process
of the U.S. must be made more efficient, less costly, and
extremely selective in what it is used for. The analytical
process needs for study and more attention to achieve this
end. The mere existence of a technological capability
should not call for its massive employment.
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Paper #3 (Dirks, Carver)
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ft- toir,tr
3talit
Notes on the Intelligence Community
The "Intelligence Community" is a collective name
for those components of the US Government which collect
and produce foreign intelligence. The key to its member-
ship is the membership of the United States Intelligence
Board, though here (as is frequently the case) appearances
are slightly deceptive.
a. The "full" members of the Community are the
CIA, NSA and DIA.
b. The three service intelligence components (ONI,
ACSI, AFCIN) are also Community members but the rela-
tionship between DIA and the three services is one
of the complications in the Community's
c. Actually, the role of the Defense
some
of whose components are members of
to the Community,as a whole, is another
organization.
Department,
the Community,
complicating
factor. NSA is clearly a member though, in the two,
command line, the Director of NSA reports to the Secretary
of Defense. Whether the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence is a Community member is
a matter of considerable dispute, as is the precise
relationship between that office (and its head) and
the DIA.
d. State shows a similar anomaly. Its Bureau of
Intelligence and Research is a full member of USIB, but
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whether Foreign Service Officers are or are not part
of the US Government's intelligence collection
mechanism is also a disputed subject.
e. The FBI has a liaison relationship, being
represented on the USIB by a member who usually abstains --
and �quite properly -- since most of USIB's deliberations
deal with foreign topics which are outside its jurisdiction.
f. ERDA's position (inherited from the AEC) is similarly
anomalous. Its representatives at USIB used to abstain as a
matter of normal practice on most Estimates, but
the current representative (General Giller) is much more
prone to an activist participatory role than were his
predecessors.
g. Treasury is analogous to State in the Community
but not really of it.
The management and relationship problems affecting the
Community's organization include the following:
a. The precise role of the DCI, particularly in his
capacity as Chairman of IRAC (as well as Chairman of
USIB).
b. The organzation and allocation of responsibilities
within the intelligence components of the Defense
Department and the way they relate to the concept of
a Community head4-- in some fashion -- by a DCI who
is not subordinate to the Secretary of Defense.
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c. A perhaps temporary but at this writing very real
problem is whether the Community, through the DCI,
reports to the President, the "NSC" or the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs, who happens
also to be the Secretary of State. (The latter
causes considerable heartburn to the Secretary of
Defense, a former DCI, who is prone to regard the
Intelligence Community as often functioning as an
instrument of the Secretary of State and, hence, an
organization not geared to serving the needs of the
Secretary of Defense.)
d. The responsibilities of the Community, and the
DCI, to Congress and where the border line comes
between its responsibilities to Congress and its
responsibilities to the Executive Branch.
e. The extent to which the Community has an obligation
to make intelligence information available to the Press
and the general public and who within the Community
has what proprietary rights over intelligence information,
including the right of veto or at least consultation
before any other Community components -- including the DCI
in
releases information/which the initial component thinks
it has a proprietary interest.
f. The whole question of the management and tasking
of certain national assets
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g. The whole matter of budgetary responsibility,
guidance and command direction.
�� 1-.4t Cip.Att),- p.
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z0 June 1975
The Intelligence Community
As I noted yesterday, I am somewhat puzzled by the
various authorities for the existence of intelligence
agencies. The Central Intelligence Agency and the National
Security Council are, to the best of my knowledge, the only
ones assigned responsibilities and safeguards by law. Other
members of the community exist by executive intent (most
frequently expressed by Executive Order) or by departmental
Nape regulation. Setting aside the question of the desirability
of an intelligence community, shouldn't all members have
the same level of authority as the basis for their being?
Should consumer elements whose interests in intel-
ligence are relatively narrow (infantry battalions, patrol
boats) be represented in the intelligence community?
Maybe limiting the forum of the intelligence community
to the collectors and primary consumers of national intel-
ligence would serve a purpose.
Is the Intelligence Community Staff a worthwhile
management mechanism or is it merely window dressing which
is necessary politically to the DCI in his "community"
role?
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I think our discussion of 26 June 1975 ended in the
consensus that it is undesirable in our democracy to have
a single intelligence agency controlling collection,
analysis and production. But perhaps it would be useful
to assign roles within the community more precisely and
to a fewer number of participants.
If the Intelligence Community Staff serves a useful
purpose to the nation, should it be physically housed
within the CIA?
This obviously raises the question relative to the
DCI and gets back to his dual identity.
Should he be the leader of the community, with
authorities in this regard or should the DCI stand removed
from the community?
Does the R&D Council accomplish anything of value
to the national intelligence interest?
Could the National Security Council be revitalized
and redefined by legislation to become a legal, effective
intelligence directing and controlling body?
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SECRET
EYES ONLY
27 June 1975
WHAT IS THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY?
1. Although this is not my area of knowledge, I
understand the Intelligence Community to include elements
of the National Security Council, the intelligence community
of the NSC chaired by Secretary Kissinger, the members of
the United States Intelligence Board, elements of the
Defense Department and OMB. I have no experience in just
how these organizations interrelate and how they are drawn
together under the new KIQ system. My knowledge, therefore,
is pretty much that contained in the Schlesinger report of
March 1971.
2.. It strikes me that other organizations ought to be
included in the Intelligence Community. I assume, for
example, that ERDA is. The Department of Commerce probably
also should be represented. As a consequence of our dis-
cussion yesterday, I believe we should discuss Congressional
representation. Some means of judicial notification (if
not actual representation) because of FOI and possibly some
mechanism to the individual States should also be considered.
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SECRET
EYES ONLY
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SECRET
EYES ONLY
2
3. As for the functions of the Intelligence Community
in miniature, specifically the CIA Station abroad, and its
relationships to military intelligence, this story is properly
part of the paper I will prepare on the CIA Station.
SECRET
EYES ONLY
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L.U.
What is (should be) an Intelligence Community?
One current operational definition of an Intelligence
Community is those agencies, projects and programs funded
from the four major intelligence budgets
Unfortunately this definition does not include some
organizational entities which for the "R" part of the )7,
Intelligence Community; e.g., State, and does include some
organizations which do more than intelligence related
activities; e.g., NSA. Using the USIB as an operational
definition for the Intelligence Community has problems including
organizations which have a very real interest as users of
intelligence, but do not contribute to the generation of
intelligence product; and excluding other organizations which
have major tributary roles; e.g., NRP.
The principal organizational entities which should be
included under the heading of Intelligence Community are
CIA, State, DIA, NSA, service intelligence organizat-ions (FTD,
MIA, NSK, etc.) and the service cryptological agencies (NSG,
ASA, and AFSS). The AEC, now ERDA, occupies a peculiar role
and historically has been an important member of USIB and some
USIB committees. I am not clear why this has been or should
continue in that they are not a user of intelligence, but
rather represent a unique and exclusive body of information
and technology which bears on the important strategic intelligence
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questions. I also have some trouble understanding the FBI
participation in the USIB environment. Again, in this case
there needs to be a close and unique relationship between
the Intelligence Community and the FBI, but I do not see why
that requires in any sense the FBI to be a member of the
Intelligence Community. Commerce and Treasury are different
cases and no doubt have real requirements for intelligence
support, but to date make relatively minor contributions to the
intelligence process and therefore do not satisfy any of the
usual criteria for full membership in the Intelligence
Community as such. Perhaps good working criteria for community
membership are organizational entities which are predominantly
occupied with the collection, processing, analysis and
production cycle.
At the current time the above Intelligence Community
entities are linked together in an almost ad hoc manner with
no uniform or consistent pattern of relationships among the
associated entities. DIA, for example, is responsible for
administering
and includes an-assortment of people 25X1
and organizations and projects strewn through the three
services and several civilian agencies. On the other hand,
DIA is not responsible for significant pieces of the GDIP;
e.g., the
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The service cryptological agencies are parties to the
Intelligence Community only through the loose and involving
process of NSA coordination and review under the new NSCID
charter. IRAC seems to be helping, particularly through its
IRU Council, but significant resources are being developed,
deployed and operated in a manner which is not generally
visible to the Intelligence Community at large and the product
of which frequently does not flow into the available
community data bases.
I think it is extremely important to take advantage of
the current opportunity to restructure the community and
rationalize the management both in the aggregate and in the
component parts.
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- � 3 3....
Paper 4 - Managerial, Organizational, and Prodecural Assumptions
about the Future of the USG's Intelligence Apparatus
This paper should be assertive in tone, setting forth a series of
policy assumptions which will form a basis for the analysis and recom-
mendations in Paper 5. It should include an explanation of our reasons
for making these assumptions. Assumptions include but are not
limited to:
a. The USG's continuing need for certain basic capabilities
(apart from their exact dimensions) such as overt collection
by radio monitoring and personal contact overseas and in the
US, SIGINT collection, overhead photography, a clandestine
collection/operations apparatus, and the analytic capability
referred to below. Emphasize the continuing desirability of an
overseas clandestine collection apparatus (theDDO) despite
technical collection improvements, with certain capabilities
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including separate communications 25X1
channels-. Reasons why.
b. The co ntinuing need for Defense participation in, or
operation of, many important programs and the unrealistic
r,
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UPPPT
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nature of proposals to put the entire Intelligence Community
under the command and control of the DCI. Reasons why.
c. The continuing need for an organization., independent of the
NSC, State, Defense, Treasury, or any other governmental
entity with a policy making role or major operational mission,
devoted to the analysis of information from a variety of
collection sources. Reasons why.
d. The need for leadership within the Community from this
"independent" organization with respect to the tasking of
collection systems, the production of intelligence, and certain
resource matters and the need for this organization to have
access to all data collected in the Community. Reasons why.
e. The need to simplify and clarify (at the very least, to
avoid further zomplicating)_the very complex interrelationships
between CIA and Defense with respect to responsibility for
resource, production, and tasking matters.
f. The need for a committment to excellence in the quality
of the Community's people, in the institutional arrangements
within which people work, in the management of our programs,
and in the product ultimately delivered.
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7/2/75
Paper Zero - Fundamental Considerations - Intelligence in an
"Open" Society
The US exists in a world of nations with interests reaching
beyond their own borders. Other states take actions and maintain
capabilities to take actions which affect our interests. Some of these
actions and capabilities are openly acknowledged; others are secret.
In the past we have from time to time paid a heavy price for our
failure to acknowledge this and to take appropriate steps to under-
stand both the capabilities and the intentions of others with respect
to us.
Extraordinary measures must be taken to gather information
on and understand those activities and capabilities shrouded in
secrecy by foreign state policy. Attempts by the United States to collect
such information often involve violation of the laws of other nations.
This is generally more true with respect to human and agent operations
than it is in those areas where major technical systems do the
collection �task for us, although it is sometimes true for these systems
as well. Thus, if information of this type is to be collected, espionage
and other collection activities often need to be conducted in secrecy
if they are to be conducted at all.
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There has been a good deal of public discussion about the need
to reconcile intelligence activity conducted in secret with the goals
of an open American society.
It is not secrecy or "openness" per se that seem to be at issue.
The need for secrecy is widely accepted in many areas of our
society.
Outside of Government:
Lawyers and doctors maintain secrets conveyed by clients
in priviledged communication. This is widely thought necessary
and desirable to protect both the rights and privacy of individuals.
Business firms routinely deny their plans and trade secrets
to their competitors or the public at large. There is little
public call for "openness" in this regard, it being widely
accepted that businesses have this "right."
Newsmen believe that both the "fact of" a relationship
between the press and a source, and the identify of the source
itself, must often be secret if newsmen are to continue to
perform their function in a free society (though this right has
come under attack in the courts).
2
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I-. 1
Within the Government:
Important details of our nuclear weapons and strategic
capabilities are widely acknowledged. to require secrecy because
to treat them otherwise would facilitate the efforts of others
to develop counterweapons and/or countermeasures.
The Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve Board
protects its decisions from public view in order to help assure
that individuals are unable to take unfair advantage of those
decisions and to insure that others will not be able to take
steps to reverse the decision's intended effect.
Grand jury proceedings are secret to avoid violating the
rights of individuals or prejudicing the outcome of a legal
proceeding.
Census data on individuals (not aggregate data) is protected
from public disclosure to protect the rights to privacy of
individuals.
Etc.
These examples should illustrate the point that as a society we
rather easily accept the need for secrecy so long as the reasons
for secrecy are understood and generally accepted. In intelligence, we
face some erosion of public understanding of our function--fueled
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,YClitct
both by evidence of failure (Vietnam?) and by public discussion of
activities once accepted as reasonable but now questionable (covert
action in general? ). At the same time, we are faced with a major
decline in the credibility of those who have been responsible for
oversight and control of us both in the Executive Branch and the
Congress. Our most fundamental problems would seem to be to
�
restore public understanding of the need for intelligence activities
conducted in secrecy, eliminate those aspects of our program which
no longer enjoy broad public support, and reestablish the credibility
of those oversight budies which seem to reassure the public that we
are not exceeding our newly redefined charter.
4
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Paper 5 - Fundamental Intelligence Issues - Analysis and Recommendations
(This paper should be analytical in tone and should build upon the
descriptive material in Paper 3 and the assumptions in Paper 4 to
set forth analysis, alternatives, and recommendations on the issues
we believe require Presidential consideration. ) I suggest the following
major topics for analysis and recommendations:
A. External Controls/Credibility/Public Support for Intelligence
B. Management and Organization of the Intelligence Corrim.unity
1. Leadership in the Production of Finished Intelligence
2. The DCI Role in the Collection Management Problem
3. The DCI Role in the Review of Community Resource Needs
4. Summary of Recommendations
C. Congress and (Substantive) Intelligence
A. External Controls/Credibility/Public Support for Intelligence. Paper
should focus on what the President ought to want in this area, based
on the "Problems and Prospects" paper, the Rockefeller Commission
Report and the Murphy Commission report. (I recognize the feeling
of the Group that these are problems which "will be solved for us"
P f:T
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I
and that for this reason we need take little account of them in our paper.
I agree with the first half of this proposition but feel that the paper
will lack credibility if it make a series of recommendations for change
in the Intelligence Community, many of which may involve enhancing
the DCI's role, without somehow acknowledging that we are under fire
and offering some thoughts on how we propose to accommodate ourselves
to that fire. I welcome your thoughts on how to face this issue. )
B. Management and Organization of the Intelligence Community. In
Paper 3 we have made the point that the Intelligence Community is
really several communities: a community of entities with an interest
in production; a different community of concern to the DCI in his
resource review role; a community of collectors of intelligence; and
a community of consumers of intelligence (which generally lies out-
side the Intelligence Community). In this paper we should develop
the theme that the DCl/CLA. properly and reasonably has a leadership
role to play with respect to the first three of these areas and that
future changes in the organizational/management structure of US
intelligence should provide for these responsibilities and give the
DCl/CIA tools with which to carry them out.
PRT
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OCIall C. I
Bi. Leadership in the Production of Finished Intelligence. Review
history of the development of CIA responsibility for production including
factors which led up to passage of the 1947 Act. Briefly explain the
existing organizations in the Community which work in the topical
areas identified in Paper 2 as being of continuing interest; explain
mechanisms available to DCI to carry out production process (NIO's
to organize estimates, DDI towrite them and other materials--NID's
etc.). Discuss the need for CIA access to all raw information collected
in the Community, discuss periodic problems in this regard and the
need for a mechanism (probably outside CIA and the DCI) to solve
questions of this type short of the President; consider the organizational
split within the Agency between a DCI-related apparatus (the NIO's)
and the regular line production components and explore whether
this distinction is important and whether it should be preserved
in present form; explore relevance of the idea of competing
analytical centers as set forth in the Schlesinger report in
specific functional areas (economic, strategic, etc.) and analyze
what one can expect to achieve with such competition and the
factors which would need to be present to bring it off; and make
recommendations related to the above.
3
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uLtifiL. I
History
The DCI is in the best position on substantive judgment. Here
there is an established mechanism for focusing Community resources
through USIB and the NIO's, the authority for the DCI to override
(with footnotes, as is proper), and a reputation for objectivity.
The 1947 Act assigned to the Agency, not to the DCI, the task
of coordinating, evaluating and disseminating "intelligence relating to
the national security, " using existing agencies where appropriate.
It authorized other agencies to produce, etc., departmental intelligence.
As "national intelligence" Congress clearly had in mind intelligence
on foreign military intentions and capabilities, and probably to spme
extent political intentions in the case of hostile powers. It did not
envisage the inclusion of economic intelligence, except as this
intelligence bore on the vulnerabilities and military production capabilities
of hostile powers.
As a practical matter, neither the DCI nor CIA had the clout in
the early years to do any of this. Since OSS/R&A was assigned in
1946 to State, CIA had to start from scratch with the formation of ORE,
and ORE had to compete with strong existing organizations in Army,
Navy, and State. Moreover, ORE from its inception was a feckless
organization that squandered its resources on secondary projects
for which there was no established need.
4
(4:PPrT
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3tIritit. I
'Name
Only with the arrival of General Smith was it
possible to create a coherent Community organization.
Personally, he had the clout. He, and Allen Dulles,
were considerably more the first among equals in USIB
and its predecessors. But to bring order out of chaos
they in effect had to apply the allocation of "services
of common concern" principle to the production of
finished intelligence. The DCI was to correlate and
evaluate through BNE and ONE. CIA was only to produce
economic and scientific intelligence in the Soviet bloc.
The Services were to produce military intelligence, and
State was to produce political and non-Soviet economic.
There was one anomaly, however. President Truman had
required Smith to give him a daily current intelligence
report. ONE declined the responsibility. Thus CIA was
able to keep an embryo political and military production
organization in CCI.
During the fifties and early sixties the following
trends can be discerned:
--An effective National Estimates apparatus
and process, fully integrated with the policy-
making apparatus that existed through the Eisen-
hower Administration.
5
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--An increasing national appetite for
current intelligence, resulting in the growth
of a strong political capability in CCI?
--An ORR gradually spreading from Soviet
affairs into third world trade-and-aid matters.
--An inability on the part of the services
to rise above departmental viewpoints in mili-
tary intelligence, forcing the beginnings of a
military intelligence capability in CIA/ORR and
OSI.
Again, in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations,
these trends were modified.
--The appetite for current intelligence
became insatiable, and CCI prospered thereby.
As this tendency became recognized, there were
pressures to produce "national current intelli-
gence,: that is, to permit State and Defense
to have a say in service to the national authori-
ties.
--Over the period, ONE lost contact with the
policy apparatus, and came more and more to be
operating in a vacuum.
--The weakness of the service agencies was
recognized in the formation of DIA, but they on
the one hand hid their assets and DIA on the
other was unable to overcome its antecedents.
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--In the face of increasing technological
challenge, CIA formed DDS&T and, especially,
FMSAC.
--Under similar pressures, DDI formed OSR.
--INR, ignored by successive Secretaries
of State, atrophied.
--ORR, now OER, moved not only to fill the
vacuum left by INR, but also to meet new needs
of the Federal Government for macroeconomic
analysis of foreign countries that no tradi-
tional arm of the US Government was able to
provide.
The Nixon and Ford Administrations:
--The isolation and obsolescense of ONE
became apparent, and it was replaced with the
NIO apparatus. One important element in the
change was to give a larger role, under the DCI,
to other agencies, and to reduce, at least nom-
inally, the influence of CIA.
--The demand for economic intelligence
became insatiable, and could be met only by
OER.
--DIA, under Graham, reasserted its rights
in military intelligence, and began to develop
a claim to support of the national authorities
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in crises that goes beyond departmental bounds.
--CIA in effect institutionalized its role
in military matters in the reorganization that
produced OWI and the
--National Current Intelligence, if there
can be such a beast, was also institutionalized
and DIA retired at least temporarily from the
field.
--Longer range political research was given
a home in CIA with the formation of OPR.
--INR continued to decline, nearly to ex-
tinction, until the arrival of Bill Hyland.
Hyland, first of INR directors to have the con-
fidence of HAK, was able to employ at least some
of his assets in support of the Secretary. Hence
INR, to the extent it is active, is devoted to
departmented ends. Unfortunately, because HAK
wears two hats, these tend also to be national
ends.
The present situation in production of national
intelligence.
Functionally:
--Political intelligence is produced mostly
by CIA/OCI, secondarily by State/INR, thirdly (by
design) by CIA/OPR.
� est-4 irt
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k'Ytii.HET
--Economic intelligence worldwide is produced
by CIA/OER, very much secondarily by State/INR.
--Military intelligence on important national
questions is produced in parallel and to some extent
in competition by CIA/OSR and OWI and by DIA with
some support from AF and Navy. (Individual service
activities have finally given way to the budget.)
On routine matters (0/B on lesser countries) DIA
does it all.
By category:
--Estimates, etc., are produced under the NI0s,
with CIA bearing most of the drafting load except
in the military area, where it is shared with DIA.
--Current intelligence is primarily assigned to
CIA/OCI, with economic and military inputs from
other CIA components, and occasional contributions
from other agencies. The NIB is fully coordinated.
The NID is somewhat less so.
Three other matters not directly touched on so far:
--NSA. NSA is a full member of USIB, yet is
supposed to confine itself to collection and to its
own source. This produces bizarre results when NSA
attempts to produce finished intelligence.
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f
--The NMIC. DIA has created
with
the stated intentions of supporting the "National
� Command Authorities" in "crises." .Its definition
of "crisis" subsumes anything beyond total tranquil-
ity, and demands that all national collection assets
come under its control once "crisis" is declared.
Neither the Secretary of Stat nor the DCI are
included among the National Command Authorities.
The basic issues have not.been resolved, and are
the most important that would be facing the DCI
under any other circumstances than the present ones.
--The DDI. As George pointed out, the DDI (and
OWI and OSI) are in an anomalous position. They are
a unique national asset (none of our critics would
like to turn the military foe back into the-chicken
coop and there is no alternative to OER) but they
are not the national correlating and evaluating
agency, as the Act of '47 specifies, nor are they
departmental.
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Nemo'
B2'. The DCI Role in the Collection Management Problem. There
exists no mechanism by which the DM can exercise "collection management, "
which might be defined as the allocation of collection resources across
systems to specific targets. There do exist a number of separate
arrangements, developed ad hoc, but sometimes quite elaborate,
whereby particular systems are targeted--viz COMIREX. But the4
arrangements are not interrelated and some
are weak at
best. The paper should identify these ad hoc arrangements: COMIREX,
whatever it is that "tasks" DDO, attaches, Foreign Service, CCP,
etc., and show which work effectively, which do not, and why.
The paper should explore competition between Defense components and
us as to requirements to be pursued. Based on analysis above,
develop ideas about what is required to make the mechanisms work
effectively, and recommend how this task might be better approached.
Consider whether such mechanisms ought to be written into a new
law. Explore possibility that some kind of EXCOM arrangement
between CIA and various other programs in the Community might
facilitate solutions to these problems. Consider the question of how,
even if formal requirements for tasking mechanisms are set forth
in a new CIA statute, such requirements would be enforced in the
absence of line control.
11
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B3. The DCI Role in the Review of Community Resource Needs.
Describe existing responsibilities as set forth in the Schlesinger
letter; the organizational arrangements (the IC Staff and the IRAC)
set up to carry out these responsibilities; and the effectiveness of
this process to date in doing the assigned tasks. Explain nature of
CIA's resource review role with respect to CIA, the EX60M
programs, and the other DoD programs (see below); rethink
the boundaries of the DCI's resource review task (i.e., should
the whole CCP be included, all of the GDIP, Tactical?);
rethink the nature of the DCI's responsibilities with respect
to the EXCOM programs, the CCP, the GDIP, etc. (What
is the importance to anyone of having a DCI view on whethr there
should be a new DTA building? Shouldn't the DCI comment on
aspects of programs which impact on substantive capabilities
in the Community leaving other resource problems to OMB?)
Analyze problems inherent in the DCI role as conceived by the �
Schlesinger report (poor access to needed information, problem that
Defense must look at intelligence in the context of the whole
DoD program and intelligence and the DCI's interest in it get
lost, fact that DCI given a responsibility by November 1971
letter but no real authority), Recommend changes in scope and nature
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oLi-JhLi
� �
'WOW
.*taire'
of DCI role. Explore idea that resource review task envisioned by
November 1971 letter ought to be carried out by line organizations
within CIA with substantive competence; the problems inhrent
in such a concept; the organizational implications for the directorates,
the DCI, and the IC Staff. Explore notion that production components
with access to knowledge about which collection programs are
contributing best to production should have a role in resource task
and suggest how this might be accomplished.
Basic Description of Resource ae view Process and DCIrs Role in It.
Resource Review of the CIA Program.
(Much like normal Federal agency. DCI makes decision,
OMB reviews as with normal agency. Congress reviews.)
Resource Review of the NRO Program.
The NRP EXCOM meets regularly in November, April and July
of each year with typically several additional sessions during the course
of the year as required. While the OMB does not have a formal member
on the EXCOM, there is always at least one OMB representative
present at EXCOM meetings. Since Mr. Colby assumed chairmanship
of the EXCOM, he has broadened participation in the EXCOM deliberations
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DIA; DD/S&T; Chairmen of the SIGINT and the COMIREX; a representative
from NSC; Director, IC Staff; and others as appropriate.
The NRP EXCOM reviews and approves all NRP budget line items.
The EXCOM pays particular attention to the early pahase of new
programs and usually specifically reviews and approves each step,
including definition of new programs as well as initiation of major
new system acquisitions. The EXCOM also addresses a range of
policy issues and keeps closely appraised of the ongoing process of
all NRP developmental and operational programs.
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As a matter of practical fact, the NRP budgets go forward to the
President as submitted by the Secretary of Defense. While
the OMB from time to time attempts to influence the EXCOM on
particular actions vis-a-vis certain programs, any major budget
issues quickly become a matter for Presidential decision.
Resource Review of CCP Budget.
(Explain briefly how this works; explain DCI role and limitations.)
Resource Review of GDIP Budget.
(As above.) 1,1 QcrPri
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B4. Summary of Recommendations. This
paper (to be written later) will pull together the recommendations covered
in Parts A and B and show how the 1947 Act might be amended to
carry out our recommendations.
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Amendments to the
The National Security Act of 1947
Amend the National Security Act of 1947 (as.am.ended) to
preserve Section 10 establishing and defining the National
Security Council but to retitle and rewrite Section 102(a) to apply
to the Intelligence Community instead of CIA. In addition, this
revised section should:
a. Specify DCIls role in Intelligence Community with respect
to production of Intel, tasking of collection mechanism, and
consultation on resource matters.
b. Modify existing provisions of law which specify what kind
of individual should be selected for DCI and DDCI positions.
c. -Reestablish CIA's "termination of employment" authority
(and write this provision into law for other Community elements
as yell?).
d. Rewrite Section 102(d)(1-5) referring to the duties of the
Agency to emphasize the duties of the Community.
e. Im-prove the language of 102(e) relating to DCI right of
access to information collected elsewhere.
f. Define the Intelligence Community.
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Amend the CIA Act of 1949 to:
a. Preserve the Agency's administrative authorities (Sections 1-4)
and clarify who (DCI?) should exercise them.
b. Preserve the Section 5 transfer and other authorities.,
c. Assign the sources and methods authority to individual
elements of the Community.
d. Preserve appropriations authorization language of
Section 8.
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C. Congress and (Substantive) Intelligence. Explore what Congress
may need and what it may want; how we might be helpful; effect of
this on relations to the Executive Branch. Break problem down
into substantive areas such as suggested in Paper 2 to illustrate
(for example) fact that problems in making information on economic
matters available to Congress are probably different from problems
with respect to sharing information on SALT monitoring. The four
papers of 3 July contain most of the points that need to be made but
all concentrate on problems inherent in providing intelligence to
Congress. At the least we could state what we now do in this
area--a good deal. Perhaps also there are additional opportunities?
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,..... ,. _ .
NOTE: The introduction to 5A2 will be a reviSea ana
shortened version of "The Production of Finished
Intelligence Within the Community", 6/27.
R. Lehman
15 July 1975
Paper 5A2
Issues
I. The membership and functions of USIB. Papers
3 and 5A1 discussed some of the anomalies in the present
makeup of USIB. This is not strictly a production
question, but should be briefly addressed here if discus-
sion of the production issues is to make sense. The
options would appear to be:
A. Enlarge USIB's membership and scope to
include all the players and management problems
for US intelligence.
B. Leave it as it is.
C. Divide it into a collection board and
production board, with appropriate membership.
D. Eliminate it, at least as in its production
role, giving the DCI'line authority for national
intelligence support to the President and the NSC.
The DCI's position as production manager would appear
to be the same under Options A,. B, and C, although it
would be somewhat more complicated by his other duties,
under Option A than at present, and considerably less so
under Option C. We have therefore transferred discussions
of the production aspects of this question to Issue II,
where variants of the USIB or production Board arrangement
show up as Option II A-D, and Option ID becomes II E.
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cq:(11)L
Discussion of other aspects of USIB organization will
come at appropriate points later in the study.
Henceforth, we assume the primary production
members of USIB, or of a national intelligence produc-
tion board, to be CIA, DIA, and State/INR. We recognize
the contribution made by the Service intelligence agencies
and therefore would include them as observers as long
as their status relative to DIA is unchanged. We believe,
however, that Treasury is more a consumer than a producer
of intelligence and would therefore make it only an
observer in a production board
NSA presents a special problem for a production
board. National intelligence is all-source, and NSA
is one-source. Occasionally, for operational use or for
highly specialized analysis problems, NSA's product can
stand by itself, but NSA has neither the analytic resources
nor the access to information that would put it in a class
with the three primary producers. On the other hand NSA
is more than a collector and processor; in this its
situation is not unlike that o:.! NRO/NPIC. The traditional
view of the producing analysts has alwaysrbeen "just give
us the factso NSA will diagram the nets. NPIC will count
the trucks and buildings. We will integrate these into
a national product." Under budgetary pressure, however,
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and faced with everarger amounts of data, the analysts
have given way, and are in fact looking for help. They
are now encouraging NSA and NPIC to go much deeper into
QacE-Rvuic�.
such subjects as order-of-battle, Leaui for themselves
At,
only the finAaggregation and analytic interpretation.
Moreover, they now recognize that an NSA analyst develops
a feel for his source that enables him in a fact-moving
and complex situation to draw useful intuitive conclusions
that are beyond the competence of the analyst farther re-
moved from the traffic. For these reasons we recommend
that NSA too be an observer to a production board anth
that perhaps the contribution of the photointerpreter cJ
=
be similarly recognized.
II. The DCI as Production Manager. We have already
noted that the DCI is better equipped to handle this
job than any other.
His statutory powers include the Act of 1947, which
is more explicit on the "Correlation and valuation" of
intelligence than on any of his other duties, and the
President's letter of 1971, which makes USIB advisory
to him. More important than either of these, however,
is his de facto position as Presidential adviser: he has
some access to the President and he represents the intelli-
gence apparatus on the NSC and participates in all its
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subcommittees. While he accepts and encourages dissents,
he nonetheless himself gives the briefings to these bodies,
and he controls the estimates and major current intelli-
that serve their membership.
in fact so well in control of produc-
changes? One answer is that the major
we are considering are not primarily
gence publications
If the DCI is
tion, why consider
structural changes
directed at production, but can affect it a great deal.
The existing strengths of
not be lost. Another is
handled better than other
the production system must
that because production is
intelligence matters does not
mean that it is handled well. There are major problems
between the DCI and the DOD, and lesser ones in regard
to NSA. The NIO system has solved many problems but
created others.
The structural changes we are considering in the
first instance concern the DCI's three roles.
Option A. No changes. The DCI retains his present
powers and continues simultaneously a's Presidential
adviser, head of the Community and DCIA.
Pros:
--No disruption
t,--Continuation of a working production system
Cons:
--Maintaining this structure means no job other
than production is done well.
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--The system is frozen
--The DCI has a powerful public image that is
not support in fact.
--His responsibilities to Congress are confused.
Option B. The DCI continues as Presidential adviser,
and as Chairman of USIB, with a separate DCIA. Option B
has three variants: the DCI has a small staff responsible
only for production review; a somewhat larger
one responsible for production only for the NSC and its
sub-Committees; the full production components of the DDI
and DDS&T, (in which case DCIA probably does not belong
to a production board, but might chair a collection one).
Pros:
--The DCIA is separated from the DCI as
Presidential adviser, and hence appears
less powerful.
--Under the second variant a small elite staff
could provide a rather special policy-oriented
product. Problems of feed-back and of access
to policy information would be minimized.
--Under variants 2 and 3 the DCI is able to
concentrate his attention on his primary
job.
--Under all hree variants product review,
collection management, and resource review
are under the same control and hence can work
in a coordinated manner.
;-
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The possibly divergent interests of
"central intelligence: and of CIA are
recognized.
Cons:
--Under variant 2 another intelligence produc-
tion organization is created which can be at
odds with the present ones.
--Under variant 1, the DCI has no tools for
effective substantive leadership.
--Under variant 3, the DDI etc. is put in
a superior position which, regardless of
statute, might create additional problems
with the other agencies.
Option C. The DCI serves only as Presidential
adviser. The DCIA serves as Chairman of USIB, or of a
production board, and is the substantive intelligence
officer on the NSC. There are two variants: the DCI
out of the production business entirely; the DCI with
responsibility for product review and the staff to do it.
Pros:
--the DCI is taken completely out of the
public line of fire.
--He can concentrate on management problems
and, being in the White House can most
easily exercise budgetary control.
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Cons:
--He does not have sufficient control of
product to exercise properly the three
inter-related elements of control.
--In variant 1 he has two sides of the control
triangle but not the third.
Option D. Each of the three DCI's is a separate
officer. Variants: the DCI reviews product and has a
staff for it, Chairman USIB controls CIA production and
sits in the NSC, (and DCIA is not in the production act);
the DCI is not involved in product at all, Chairman USIB
controls CIA production, and reviews product, etc; Chair-
man USIB has a product review staff only, and DCIA is
very much a member and sites on the NSC.
Pros:
--Further diffusion of DCI power
--Maximum managerial attention at each level
Cons:
--Cumbersome
--Fragmentation of controls
Option E. The DCI ha � line authority over the
production elements of CIA and line responsibility for
national intelligence support of the NSC and its support-
ing structure.
(Note that this is not the DNI concept.)
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,41,..Urtv_
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Pros:
--Maximum flexibility
--Maximum control for DCI over production
structure.
Cons:
--Public image frightening
--Exclusion of legitimate military and
State interests.
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46
30 June 1975
The Management of Intelligence
This piece has two assumptions. One, there is an
intelligence community. Two, this intelligence community
should be managed. We seem to agree on Friday that there
is an intelligence community, although the discussion seemed
to focus upon that community serving, among other things, as
a forum for the forwarding of parochial interests. Obviously,
there is more to the present role of the intelligence'
community than that.
I have the impression that as presently constituted,
that thing which we call the intelligence community is a
mishmash of collectors, producers, and to a certain extent
consumers. Not all consumers are represented on the USIB,
although the Defense Intelligence Agencies do represent
departments which are consumers. Likewise, to a certain
extent, INR represents the Department of State, which is
a consumer of intelligence. The Department of Treasury
would have to be viewed as primarily a consumer, as would
ERDA and the FBI. In the interactions of the members of
the intelligence communities, each agency has several roles
to play, but in the formal mechanics of the USIB or the
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the various committees, the actual representation of the
Agency may come from only one facet of the Agency's
interests.
There is a need for management of resources in all
areas. Since the collection methodology involves the
largest expenditure of funds, this might be an initial
starting point. But, can we start to manage the collection
process and the resources devoted to collection unless we have
some control over requirements? Are requirements presently
generated by consumers or are the requirements essentially
created by the intelligence community itself? The consumers,
I would think, should be in the institutions that are
responsible for generating requirements. It is their
perceived need for intelligence which should be a prime
determinant in our collection targeting. Do we presently
receive such guidance from consumers? Presumably, the KIQ's
represent input from consumers, including the President and
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
How are these requirements gathered? How are they written?
Do requirements appear on the KIQ's as a result of agree-
ments among the consumers, taking into account resource
availability, or are consumers' requirements floated on
the air to be collected by the Intelligence Community Staff
and solidified into KIQ's without further resource to
consumers?
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The same types of questions can be asked of the other
elements of the intelligence process. Do collectors gear
their efforts to the demands of the consumers of intelligence
or are they driven by the capability, of the technology to
collect information which the consumer does not yet perceive
a need for? If the technology permits a given type of
collection, does the collector believe that the need for
the information will eventually develop so that he goes
ahead to establish the collecting mechanism in anticipation
of the requirement? In the same light, how is R&D managed
and controlled? How much effort should be devoted to pure,
far-our research to anticipate collection needs which will .
arise ten years hence?
The production world appears to be the one which has
the least capability of misuse of technical capabilities.
But at the same time, it is obvious that the production
area is the one which has the opportunity for the most
disastrous misapplication of intellectual talents. Consensus
opinions among producers can be dangerous. Lack of dissent
can distort the balanced flow of intelligence to the policy-
makers. The production mechanism should be one which
provides the opportunity for intellectual dissent, but not
at the expense of overredundancy. It should permit indiv-
idual analysts the arena for voicing the conclusions of his
3
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analysis without forcing that analysis to be submerged in
a desired unanimity.
The foregoing merely says in my mind that there is a
need for managing various aspects of the intelligence
community. Who should manage the intelligence community?
In the November 1971 Presidential letter to the Director
of Central Intelligence, the President directs him to take
an active role of leadership in the community. At the same
time, the fact that the bulk of intelligence funds are
located in the Department of Defense budget limits the
leadership role of the DCI. His efforts to lead lack the
power base of resources and must be based upon intellectual
suasion and the impact of the Presidential letter.
Inevitably, in such a world, the DCI's role
that of managing acceptable compromises.
What real tools does the Director have
is limited to
available to him
within the Central Intelligence Agency to permit him to
establish a leadership role? Firstly, he has the respon-
sibility for the protection of intelligence sources and
methods. To date, the leadership role here has been aimed
primarily at ferreting out the sources of leaks. The report
of the Rockefeller Commission would limit the DCI's authority
in this regard to protecting the Central Intelligence Agency's
sources and methods and not those of the community. That is
viewed against the backdrop of active surveillance of
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personnel to determine if they are the source of leaks.
But the DCI could assume an aggressive leadership role in
defining intelligence sources and methods, in establishing
the standards for protecting such sources and methods, and
in pursuing legal remedies to prosecute violators of the
protection of sources and methods. There are some efforts
under way in this regard. For example, OGC is presently
attempting to define those things which the Central
Intelligence Agency considers sources and methods. But
they'restill on a limited basis and do not affect the
community except inferentially.
The effect of the National Security Act of 1947 and
various Presidential statements and letters is to make
eign
the Director the principal for/intelligence officer of the
government. In this regard, he is the Chairman of the
United States Intelligence Board charged with establishing
the necessary policies and procedures to assure adequate
coordination of foreign intelligence activities and
reviewing those activities to assure efficiency effective-
ness and avoiding undesirable duplication. It is apparent
from that part of the law aimed at the DCI and in the
subsequent supplementing authorities granted by various
presidents, that the intent is for the DCI to become the
focal point of foreign intelligence matters with the right
of inspection of intelligence as part of the DCI's function.
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Essentially, the terms of operation of the intelligence
community are such as to limit authorities, particularly to
the DCI drastically. Obviously, this was done deliberately
when the community was established. The question is now,
can the DCI establish leadership in the intelligence
community without legislation. My first reaction is no.
The only real arrow he has to his bow is that of sources and
methods and that has been inferentially limited to the
protection of sources and methods of his own Agency. Even
if he can assume the intellectual leadership in this
particular area of endeavor, it does not avail him much.
Legislation could be a way of improving the DCI's role
and since we are going to be getting legislation whether we
like it or not, we might as well endeavor to get the right
kind of legislation. But should we seek legislation which
will enhance the DCI's role or should we seek legislation
which redefines the role of the National Security Council
and the relationship of the intelligence community to that
body? If we are going to do anything with the National
Security Act, probably the membership should be modified
to provide for those other than the secretaries who are
already primarily concerned with national security matters.
Indeed if we could come up with a membership which was not
tied into vested interests this might be a workable solution.
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The DCI could then be a creature of the National Security
Council and responsible to that body for the management
of the intelligence community. The legislative enactment
relative to the Agency would make him responsible to the
President and to the legislature for the management of
this Agency. This would call for the National Security
Council �to be some kind of a mix probably of those of the
present membership and a new membership faction and would
call for a professional staff of its own. The Security
Council could then be the representative of the consumer
in defining requirements and could be the evaluator in
assessing the success of the collectors
requirements. We might be able then to
Council in with a legislative oversight
kinds of feedbacks in which Congress is
against
tie the
those
Security
to provide the
interested.
It is unlikely in today's political world that there
is going to be much desire to enhance the role of the DCI
or of the Central Intelligence Agency. Given that, and
also given what is probably a large distrust of the
intelligence community as a whole, it might be best to
envisage an arrangement which identifies in some public
fashion by legislation or executive order the intelligence
organs of the intelligence community and make those respon-
sible either through their chain of command or outside of it
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to the National Security Council. That body then becomes
accountable both to the Executive and the Legislative
Branch and ultimately to the public for the performance
of the intelligence community.
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6/7 o
*mud
1. If one takes as the primary function of the
DCI (leaving CIA aside for the moment) as one of
R,
asswng the provision of foreign intelligence to the
President and the National Security Council, then it
follows that he must exercise authority in three basic
areas, resources, "collection mana:gement", and sub-
stantive judgment.
2. In simpl er terms, if he is to supply judgment
to the primary consumer, he must be able to collect
what he perceives is the information necessary to enable
him to arrive at that judgment. If the collectors are
to be responsive to his requirements, then in the real
world he must have budgetary control over them.
3. His need for at least some influence on re-
source allocations was recognized in the President's
letter of November 1971 and the subsequent formation
of IRAC. This is not my line of work, but it is my
impression that the arrangement leaves much to be desired.
Can such authority extending a..:ross agency lines
really be exercised at any level below the White House?
4. There exists no mechanism by which the DCI can
exercise "collection management", which might be defined
as the allocation of collection resources across
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systems to specific targets. There do exist a number of
separate arrangements, developed ad hoc, but
sometimes quite elaborate, whereby particular systems
are targeted--viz COMIREX. But these arrangements are
-
not inter-ca.ta4 and some are weak at best.
Thus the DCI would have no efficient mechanism for
directing these responses to his purposes, even if
he had the authority to do so.
5. The DCI is in the best position on judgment.
Here there is an established mechanism for focusing
Cu v�,"1
Communi1
t resources through USIB and the NIO's.the
authority for the DCI to override (with footnotes, as
is Proper)) and a reputation for objectivity.
t{,
6. We might find it useful to _get at these elements
a different way. Is there really one Community, or is
this one of the reasons that we are trapped in a
traditional framework? We could make a case for three
Communities:
Collectors.
NSA.
NHO and
CIA/DDO, OEL,
State/FS
DIA/Attaches,
FBI?
FBIS
etc.
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--Producers CIA/DDI, OWI, OSI
DIA/DI
(Services? FTD?)
State/INR
ERDA?
--Consumers President
NSC and its Subcommittees*
7. At present, USIB more or less combines the
first two of these, while NSCIC is supposed to repre-
sent the third. (But we should remember that NSCIC
has met twice(?) altogether since 1971). Would it
be more efficient to separate them?
-nimEr
8. If one could buy the idea ofU.los..41, Communities,
two interesting ideas emerge. The first is that a plura-
listic intelligence organism is far less alarming than
a monolithic one. The second is that the authorities.
postulated for the DCI deal with the relationships among
these communities rather than with line authority over
the communities themselves, or even any of the components
of the communities.
*Wiamot we are talking about the 40-50 senior officers
of State, State, Defense, Treasury and NSC Staff who really
make national security policy (the r41otioRship of
the NID).
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Resource
Management),
COLLECTORS
PRODUCERS
� S.
(SUBSTANTIVE
(3_7(12SENT
CONSUMERS
9. Such an arrangement would not necessarily provide
GftcKiwc-
tbe DCI with the troops to provide independent hrie.faallos
for his substantive judgment, and he would need such
backing if he is to be the principal substantive intelli-
gence adviser to the NSC. But need he be? Could he be
thought of rather as a consumer and monitor of the Quality
of output, while another officer representing the producers
sitsin the NSC? Thought: if the DCI were substantive
N.p.stcs
adviser, and had the troops to go with it, but tmem in a
parallel position with the Director of OMB, he would be
shielded from Congress by executive privilege. The
producer community could keep the congress informed
rA
mr
without raising the constitutional questionsAnow botlius.
10. Our problem is to define a DCI who has the
authority to create order and to make the best use of
finite resources, and at the same time does not scare
IC
thppants of the body politic (much less pose a genuine
i /
potential threat to civil liberties. An arrangement that
(6-0D
limits the DCI's authority to the interfaces, .1a,a41, save*
the word and excludes him from line authority over most
..)
elements of intelligencerO-ould meet this prescription.
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11: This dicussion has not touched on the DCI's
present secondary functions: provision of intelligence
to lower echelons of government, CA, and CI, nor has
it addressed the tactical questions. The first of
these is easy, because such intelligence is usually the
by-product of national intelligence. As to CA and CI,
need they be responsibilities of this sort of DCI at
all? Tactical is another matter. This has been
tackled primary in budgetary terms and has been
Vid-RC
slippery indeed to get hold of. But if it vazz tackled
from the collection management end, the problem might
be stated in terms of the share of national collection
systems to be devoted to tactical purposes. Thus the
-rw
' of SAC, CINCEUR and CINCPAC could be viewed as
members of the producer community.
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7/z/(5
The National Security Act of 1976
Amend the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) to
preserve Section 10, establishing and defining the National
Security Council but to retitle and rewrite Section 102(a) to apply
to the Intelligence Community instead of CIA. In addition, this
revised section should:
a. Specify DCI's role in Intelligence Community with respect
to production of intel, tasking of collection mechanism, and
consultation on resource matters.
b. Modify existing provisions of law which specify what kind
of individual should be selected for DCI and DDCI positions.
c. Reestablish CIA's "termination of employment" authority
(and write this provision into law far other Community elements
as well?).
d. Rewrite Section 102(d)(1-5) referring to the duties of the
Agency to emphasize the duties of the Community.
C. Improve the language of 102(e) relating to DCI right of
access to information collected elsewhere.
f. Define the intelligence Community.
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Amend the CIA Act of 1949 to:
a. Preserve the Agency's administrative authorities (Sections 1-4)
and clarify who (DCI?) should exercise them.
b. Preserve the Section 5 transfer and other authorities.
c. Assign the sources and methods authority to individual
elements of the Community.
d. Preserve appropriations authorization language of
Section 8.
2
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7/3/75
Paper 4f - The Congressional Role in Substantive Matters
In an ideal world,problem of what intelligence we would supply
to Congress would be rather simple. We would simply examine the
substative problems that Congress deals with, to some degree reflected
in its standing committee structure, match that up with the substantive
areas in which we produce intelligence, then let the information flow.
That we cannot do this as neatly as suggested is a reflection of two
fundamental real world problem. First, members of Congress cannot
be depended upon to understand our great concern about divulging
sources and methods to the public. (DCI is charged by law with
protecting these two aspects--not because he likes the idea that no one
should be told what his sources are but because he cannot do his
job if he does not control this information.) This means that the
flow of intelligence information to Congressmen must often be tempered
by a requirement to state that information in a way that does not
reveal sources. (The nature of the particular topic being discussed
and the sources of information about the topic obviously dictate the
extent to which this is a problem.)
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Lr1C.
Second, intelligence has classically been viewed in the US as
a service to the President and the Executive departments to be used
in arriving at policy judgments. As such, it involves the provision
of information which constitutes almost always only one of several
factors which the Executive must consider in arriving at a decision--
and the ultimate decision reached may or may not reflect the intelligence
reviewed or be consistent with it. When an Administration policy
judgment is fully consistent with an intelligence appraisal of the facts,
there is no problem (except as may relate to sources and methods)
in sharing our appraisal of a given problem or situation with the
Congress. When the policy decision reached is inconsistent with
'Nfter, the facts as we see them, sharing our view of the situation with
portions of the Congress can effectively put us in the position of
undermining an Administration policy, a position no Executive
agency wishes to be in. In the real world of course the issues are
seldom so clearly drawn, though there are enough recent real examples
to support the point.
Within existing understandings of the role of intelligence in the
decision-making process we have little alternative but to live with
the dilemma. In point of fact, the dilemma is not significantly different
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from a similar problem faced constantly by any Federal agency.
Each year all agencies request funds from OMB/the President for
the coming year. After decisions on the budget are rendered, each
agency head is expected to defend his agreed-to budget before the
Congress. This often means that agency head "X'; who has argued
strongly with the President that California must have a $1B earthquake
prevention program, n-iust ultimately tell the Congress that no such
program is desirable or even needed. In the practical world this
dilemma is solved very easily, with agency head "X" stating "for
the record" that the program is not needed while quietly telling the
relevant Committee Chairman that he had thought such a program was
vital but had been overruled.
One can, however, argue that all of this is beside the point, that
the answer to all these problems is simply to rewrite the CIA's
charter so that it reports substantive intelligence to both the Executive
Branch and the Congress. This, it is argued, would solve the problem
by eliminating the Agency's loyalty to any particular master, thereby
guaranteeing its independence. Beyond the constitutional
issues raised by this dilution of Presidential control over the
foreign policy process, there are two principal problems with this approach.
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First, knowing that information collected in the field by a wide
variety of collection systems would find its way to the Congress in
some form, collectors would from time to time deny the CIA access
to basic information. If this problem were not overcome, the utility
of CIA to either the Congress or the Executive would be severely
reduced. To overcome the problem could well require that all
collection be placed under CIA control. Even if not a legislative
impossibility, such a structure might be unwise in that it would probably
produce strong pressures for a parallel apparatus under Defense or
other control. This general problem has already risen in connection
with distribution of NID's to Congress and State's views on the contents
of those NID's.
Second, and related to the above, there would arise the question
of feedback from Executive Branch consumers of intelligence with
respect to ongoing current negotiations and the US policy interest
in them. This question of Hfeedback- the information that intelligence
analysts get from policy makers as to what they are trying to do about
a given situation and therefore what information they need--is difficult
enough under the best of circumstances. We can foresee that that
'feedback" which does exist would disappear entirely if Executive
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Branch policy makers begin to perceive that this information was
finding its way to the Congress in unpredictable ways. This, too,
would severely damage the intelligence process�further limiting
its relevance to both Executive Branch and Legislative consumers.
5
7)7 :flT
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SECRET.
3 July 1975
CONGRESSIONAL
RELATIONS
1. The interest of the Congress in intelligence is not
very clear. At first blush it would appear that Congress
wants to be sure there is an establishment which produces
information to help the nation avoid another Pearl Harbor.
2. Individual Congressmen, particularly Senators, are
sometimes interested in area briefings, or briefings on
Now, problems which really affect their constituents, such as
the Vietnam war. It has been my experience, however, both
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2
3. Similarly, those briefings of Congress given by the
DCI over the years which I have been privileged to read, have
struck me as superficial. I have also given Congressmen
briefings in the United States which have paralleled those in
the field. All in all nothing in my experience demonstrates
much interest on the part of Congress, collectively or
individually, in foreign intelligence.
4. It is clear, however, the Congress has an interest
in the Central Intelligence Agency. Neither the National
Security Act nor the CIA Act requires that the Agency or the
DCI report to Congress, even on an infrequent basis. There-
fore it was presumably not the intent of Congress to insist
that the CIA or the DCI keep it informed. Congressional
interest to date appears to center on two concepts: oversight
that is, investigating to see if CIA has done anything wrong,
and simple curiosity about what CIA has been and is doing.
There are, of course, some foreign areas which concern
specific Congressmenfor political reasons affecting his
constituents. Congressmen from New York City are interested
in affairs in Israel, Greece, and Italy. The Congressman
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3
from Fall River, Massachusetts is interested in Portuguese
affairs, and so forth.
5. Oversight: I think we should draw up some proposals
for Congressional oversight going somewhat beyond the simple
desire to have a convenient joint oversight committee.
Congressional oversight suggestions might include:
-An annual audit review of Agency expenditures.
-An annual presentation of the DCI of the overall
� plan for IC collection activitiy including that
of the CIA (in addition to the current "State
of the World" briefing).
-A periodic review, perhaps once very five years,
of the enabling legislation for the intelligence
colymunity.
-Selected briefings of committee chairmen on
actions to be taken by elements of the intelli-
gence community in areas of interest to that committee.
6. Curiosity: Congressional curiosity, which may or
may not have political roots, but which is most certainly
heightened by what they see and hear in the media, might be
satisfied by two actions. With very little editing the NID
could be made available to the Congress in a classified
version. Frankly, I think it could be joined with the FBIS
material in a new publication. Congress receives, like the
average American citizen, virtually no media coverage of
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Niumre
4
foreign media, either from Communist or the non-Communist
areas. Our daily newspapers are in most parts advocacy
journals and limited available overseas coverage is
heavily edited to the requirements of advertising, The
FBIS product is an excellent translation job but is presented
in a way which demands a most rigidly disciplined readership.
A wedding of the FBIS summary with the NID would produce
a true newspaper and might develop a lively readership in
Congress.
7. In addition to publications, the intelligence
community should be prepared to present the individual
Congressman with specific briefings at the request of the
Congressman. We are obviously prepared to do this now to
some extent but we definitely lack a public relations
mechanism which responds quickly and pasily to either
Executive or Congressional branch requests. Our PR is
nearly all bad simply because we have done nothing about it.
The way to satisfy legitimate Congressional curiosity is to
make some attempt to sell our product to Congress, This can
be done without violating sources and methods.
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NOTES ON CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
1. Collective nouns are tricky. When we speak of
dealings with "Congress," it is easy to slide into the
trap of thinking of "Congress" as a kind of corporate
being with a single personality and a single will. This,
of course, is nonsense. Congress has 535 Members, each
different from the others and at times its main problem
is that it seems almost incapable of acting with any
collective cohesion. Thus, we are talking about a large
set of individual problems as much as or more than a
single task.
2. Over the past two decades there have been
certain profound shifts in Congress which need to be
recognized and which have a major impact on our rela-
tionships with the Senate and the House.
-- The way Congress is led has changed markedly.
Even though the seniority system still exists, it has
been diluted and the Chairmen of major committees have
not a fraction of the clout they used to enjoy. In the
1950s and 60s there was something that could be meaning-
fully called Congressional leadership -- i.e., if you
could get a commitment or an endorsement from the
Speaker of the House and the Minority leader, the Majority
and Minority leaders of the Senate and the Chairmen
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and ranking Minority members of a few key committees (say
around a dozen people), they were capable of delivering
whatever it was they had promised to deliver. This is no
longer so.
-- Another phenomenon of the past two decades,
intensified over the past five years, has been a
proliferation of personal and committee staffs and a rapid
rise in the real influence of the staffers, many of whom
are not really controlled by the Senators or Congressmen
they purport to serve. Furthermore, this burgeoning
staff structure has personal links and loyalties within
itself which, in many instances, transcend a staff
member's loyalties to his or her respective nominal
master.
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3 July 1975
LCDirks
Congressional Role in Substantive Matters
1. There are at least three major legislative and
appropriation areas where congress has a need for intelligence
inputs and/or generate a good rational for needing such inputs:
1) defense budget, 2) foreign policy, 3) U. S. economic and
resource policy.
2. The debate in substantive issues surrounding the
annual defense appropriation is heavily dependent upon military
intelligence estimates. The U. S. defense posture is routinely
and appropriately rationalized and measured by perceived threats
to U. S. security either Teal or potential. The Executive
in defending its defense budget proposals relies heavily upon
the spectre of foreign military powers and their military
capability and hostile intent. This debate involves not just
general force structures of foreign military establishments but
frequently specific and detailed weapon systems characteristics,
e.g., Soviet MIRV configurations and performance characteristics,
such as weapons yields and delivery accuracy. In addition to
hostile military capabilities foreign strategic plans and policies
are frequently debated by inference from military capabilities.
This debate dips deep into detailed technical intelligence issues
and frequently focuses on issues surrounding long range intent
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