THE PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A001900020005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 27, 1975
• Content Type: PAPER

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R. LEHMAN
D R A F T
27 Jun 75
,THE PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
WITHIN THE COMMUNITY
1. The 1947 Act assigned to the Agency, not to the
DCI, the task of coordinating, evaluating and disseminat-
ing "intelligence relating to the national security,"
using existing agencies where appropriate. It authorized
other agencies to produce, etc., departmental intelligence.
As "national. intelligence" Congress clearly had in mind
intelligence on foreign military intentions and capabili-
and probably to some extent political intentions in
the case of hostile powers. It did not envisage the
inclusion of economic intelligence, except as this intelli-
gence bore on the vulnerabilities and military production
capabilities of hostile powers.
2. As a practical matter, neither the DCI nor CIA
had the clout in the early years to do any of this. Since
OSS/R&A was assigned in 1946 to State, CIA had to start
from scratch with the formation of ORE, and ORE had to
compete with strong existing organizations in Army, Navy,
and State. Moreover, ORE from its inception was a feckless
organization that squandered its resources on secondary
projects for which there was no established need..
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3. Only with the arrival of General Smith was it
possible to create a coherent Community organization.
Personally, he had the clout. He, and Allen Dulles,
were considerably more thd,,,first among equals in USIB
and its predecessors. But to bring order out of chaos
they in effect had to apply the allocation of "services
of common concern" principle to the production of
finished intelligence. The DCI was to correlate and
evaluate through BNE and ONE. CIA was only to produce
economic and scientific intelligence in the Soviet bloc.
The Services were to produce military intelligence, and
State was to produce political and non-Soviet economic.
There was one anomaly, however. President Truman had
required Smith to give him a daily current intelligence
report. ONE declined the responsibility. Thus CIA was
able to keep an embryo political and military production
organization in OCI.
4. During the fifties and early sixties the following
trends can be discerned:
--An effective National Estimates apparatus
and process, fully integrated with the policy-
making apparatus that existed through the Eisen-
hower Administration.
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--An increasing national appetite for
current intelligence, resulting in the growth
of a strong political capability in OCI.
--An ORR gradually spreading from Soviet
affairs'.into third world trade-and-aid matters.
--An inability on the part of the services
to rise above departmental viewpoints in mili-
tary intelligence, forcing the beginnings of a
military intelligence capability in CIA/ORR and
OSI.
5. Again, in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations,
these trends were modified.
--The appetite for current intelligence
became insatiable, and OCI prospered thereby.
As this tendency became recognized, there were
pressures to produce "national current intelli-
gence,; that is, to permit State and Defense
to have a say in service to the national authori-
ties.
--Over the period, ONE lost contact with the
policy apparatus, and came more and more to be
operating in a vacuum.
--The weakness of the service agencies was
recognized in the formation of DIA, but they on
the one hand hid their assets and DIA on the
other was unable to overcome its antecedents.
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--In the face of increasing technological
challenge, CIA formed DDS&T and, especially,
FMS AC .
--Under similar pressures, DDI formed OSR.
--INR, ignored by successive Secretaries
of State, atrophied.
--ORR, now OER, moved not only to fill the
vacuum left by INR, but also to meet new needs
of the Federal Government for macroeconomic
analysis of foreign countries that no tradi-
tional arm of the US Government was able to
provide.
6. The Nixon and Ford Administrations:
--Theand obsolescence of ONE
became apparent, and it was replaced with the
NIO apparatus. One important element in the
change was to give a larger role, under the DCI,
to other agencies, and to reduce, at least nom-
inally, the influence of CIA.
--The demand for economic intelligence
became insatiable, and could be met only by
OER.
--DIA, under Graham, reasserted its rights
in military intelligence, and began to develop
a claim to support of the national authorities
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in crises that goes beyond departmental bounds.
--CIA in effect institutionalized its role
in military matters in the reorganization that
produced OWI and the`.`
--National Current Intelligence, if there
can be such a beast, was also institutionalized
and DIA retired at least temporarily from the
field.
--Longer range political research was given
a home in CIA with the formation of OPR.
--INR continued to decline, nearly to ex-
tinction, until the arrival of
II
fidence of IIAK, was able to employ at least some
of his assets in support of the Secretary. Hence
INR, to the extent it is active, is devoted to
departmenteA ends. Unfortunately, because HAK
wears two hats, these tend also to be national
ends.
7. The present situation in production of national
intelligence.
Functionally:
--Political intelligence is produced mostly
by CIA/OCI, secondarily by State/INR, thirdly (by
design) by CIA/OPR.
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--Economic intelligence worldwide is produced
by CIA/OER, very much secondarily by State/INR.
--Military intelligence on important national
questions is produced in parallel and to some extent
in competition by CIA/OSR and OWI and by DIA with
some support from AF and Navy. (Individual service
activities have finally given way to the budget.)
On routine matters (O/B on lesser countries) DIA
does it all.
By category:
,--Estimates, etc., are produced under the NIOs,
with CIA bearing most of the drafting load except
in the military area, where it is shared with DIA.
--Current intelligence is primarily assigned to
CIA/OCI, with economic and military inputs from
other CIA components, and occasional contributions
from other agencies. The NIB is fully coordinated.
The NID is somewhat less so.
8. Three other matters not directly touched on so far:
--NSA. NSA is a full member of USIB, yet is
supposed to confine itself to collection and to its
own source. This produces bizarre results when NSA
attempts to produce finished intelligence. The tra-
ditional approval of State, DIA and CIA has been to
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J:eep NSA in its place, but lately there has been
some recognition that the old-line agencies no
longer have the manpower to be able to stick to
the line that NSA should only give them the facts.
--The NMIC. DIA has created this monster with
the stated intentions of supporting the "National
Command Authorities" in "crises." Its definition
of "crisis" subsumes anything beyond total tranquil-
ity, and demands that all national collection assets
come under its control once "crisis" is declared.
Neither the Secretary of State nor the DCI are
included among the National Command Authorities.
The basic issues have not,been resolved, and are
the most important that would be facing the DCI
under any other circumstances than the present ones.
The DDI. As George pointed out, the DDI (and
OWl and OSI) are in an anomalous position. They are
a unique national asset (none of our critics would
like to turn the military foe back into the chicken
coop and there is no alternative to OER) but they
are not the national correlating and evaluating
agency, as the Act of '47 specifies, nor are they
departmental.
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