THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A002000010001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 7, 1975
• Content Type: BRIEF

x Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142AO02000010001-5
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142AO02000010001-5
 wshG
Approved For Releass^ /S6R% - 4 q 2000010001-5
7 SAN ~5!
7 January 1975
DCI BRIEFING FOR
7 JANUARY WSAG MEETING
THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA
I. There has been intense fighting in South Vietnam
for some weeks, and, more recently, an upsurge in
Cambodia. We look for increased combat in both
countries as the dry season progresses.
Vietnam
II. In South Vietnam, the Communists began their winter-
spring campaign in early December with widespread
attacks in the southern half of the country.
A. In the past month, North Vietnamese troops have
overrun numerous delta outposts, and captured
six district towns.
1. Territorial losses have been particularly
heavy in Phuoc Long Province, where Commu-
nist forces have seized all four district
towns and captured the provincial capital
yesterday after heavy fighting.
2. Most Communist gains, however, have been in
remote, sparsely populated areas defended by
South Vietnamese local forces.
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142AO02000010001-5
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142AO02000010001-5
Number of Troops Entering the Pipeline. Destined for South Vietnam,
Southern Laos, and Cambodia Since January 1, 19731
3 January 1975
NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY
COMBAT PERSONNEL - In SVN 187,000
In NVN 170,000 (357,000 total)
NVN STRATEGIC RESERVE (70,000)
ARMOR - In SVN
In NVN
ARTILLERY - In SVN
In NVN
RVNAF
COMBAT PERSONNEL
ARMOR
ARTILLERY
COSVN
B-3 Front
MR 5
MR Tri-
Thien
Southern Laos/
MR 559
Total
Total
57,000
19,000
29,000
25,000
33,500
163,500
1973
Jan-Mar
12,000
5,500
4,000
5,000
1,000
27,500
Apr-Jun
1,000
....
...
7,000
1,500
9,500
Jul-Sep
....
5,000
2,000
4,500
11,500
Oct-Dec
4,500
2,000
....
....
20,000
26,500
1974
Jan-Mar
28,500
7,000
6,000
....
41,500
Apr-Jun
6,500
1,000
9,000
3,000
...
19,500
Jul-Sep
....
....
5,000
5,500
5,500
16,000
Oct
500
500
Nov
4,000
.???
2,000
6,000
Dec 1-18
500
3,500
1,000
5,000
1. Excluding special-purpose personnel. The totals are rounded to thu .nearest 500.
600
300
320
400
370,000
600 Tanks
1,400
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142AO02000010001-5
 Approved For Release
/(LWj Sj1fj 2000010001-5
B. Saigon has held back its regular forces, to keep
them fresh for expected new attacks against vital
communication lines and populated areas closer
to the capital.
1. In several battles in the delta, government
regulars have taken on Communist main force
units. The government troops have not yet
pushed the Communists back, but they have
inflicted heavy casualties.
C. The Communists are continuing to build up their
manpower and supply position in the South. They
are more powerful and in better shape logistically
than at any time in the war.
1. Since early November, Hanoi has sent some
12,000 troops to South Vietnam, in infiltra-
tion groups. This is a moderate number, but
about twice as many as in the last quarter of
1973. Nearly half of them are for the south-
ern part of the country, and some have al-
ready arrived.
2. The seasonal resupply effort also has begun.
Shipments include new field'guns and unusually
large quantities of artillery munitions.
D. The Saigon government, on the other hand, is
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142A002000010001-5
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142AO02000010001-5
Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
Regular Combat Forces MR I
VC/NVA R VNAF
VC/NVA I
R VNAF2
84,000
103,000
187,000
372,000
325th
VNMC
3240
Airborne
304th
1st
2d
2d
673d AD
377th AD
3d
Regional
1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground
combat, combat support, and air defense units and
local force companies and platoons.
2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes
assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground
combat and combat support units, and Regional
Force battalions. Although present for duty
strength is no longer available, it is estimated to
be about SS% of assigned strength.
9th 25th
7th 18th
377th AAA 5th
75th Arty Cmd Regional
27th Sap Cmd Forces
MR4
VC/NVA R VNAF
26,000 97,000
21st
9th
7th
ForcFs
320th 23d
IOth 22d
3d Regional
Forces
-. t Omh Tuoag
tnn Long Kien Hoe
. ati n\ f \
Wien f, '? Dinh, Vinh
Clang "t. '. 1 Binh
Chitong ?Y s?_
`??' 7` an ?t` f.~, _ MR 4
An
Xuyen
Military region boundary
Province boundary
0 25 50 75 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142AO02000010001-5
 Approved For Release/MR~1ll4f"2000010001-5
concerned over diminished US military aid, and
has begun conserving its ammunition and fuel
stocks.
1. So far, this has had little impact on Sai-
gon's overall position, but its forces are
now less aggressive, and more willing to
abandon remote and non-essential outposts.
E. Saigon also has serious economic problems. Since
mid-1972, the urban industrial and services sec-
tors have operated at well below capacity, and
inflation has eroded real incomes of military
personnel, civil servants, and city dwellers in
general. The agricultural situation, however,
has improved, and rice stocks are sufficient to
assure adequate supplies without US PL-480 as-
sistance for the first time in ten years.
1. Unless security conditions markedly deteri-
orate, economic problems are not likely to
put the government under acute pressure over
the next year or so.
F. In the political arena, President Thieu's posi-
tion is still quite solid. Efforts by various
opposition groups to exploit popular frustrations
have borne little fruit, and have now died down.
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142A002000010001-5
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142A002000010001-5
CIA/DIA Order of Battle of Communist
Military Forces in Indochina
(in thousands)
Administrative
Total Combat Forces
Services
19 Dec 74
28 Jan 73
19 Dec 74
28 Jan 73
19 Dec 74
28 Jan 73
South Vietnam
295
221
187
149
108
72
NVA
223
159
157
124
66
35
VC
72
62
30
25
42
37
Cambodia
84
87
59
58
25
29
NVA
9
26
2a
4
7
22
VC
1
16
0
9
1
7
KC
74
45
57
45
17
NA
73
99
38
50
35
49
NVA
40
69
16
30
24
39
PL
33
30
22
20
11
10
a Advisory/liaison personnel not organized into combat units.
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142A002000010001-5
 Approved For Release/9 R I 2000010001-5
III. Recent reporting from reliable sources clearly points
to a further stepup in the fighting during the next
six months. However, the latest National Intelli-
gence Estimate on Vietnam concluded that the step-
up would fall short of a general offensive this year.
A. The NIE also concluded that the Communist mili-
tary action would be directed toward:
-- defeating the government's pacification program,
--- inflicting heavy casualties on the South
Vietnamese armed forces,
gaining control of more people and territory,
and
forcing the government into new negotiations
at a disadvantage.
B. Under this scenario, without an increase in US
military assistance some time this spring, the
Communists will be in a significantly stronger
position by June than the South Vietnamese for
any subsequent fighting.
C. However, if Hanoi perceived particular South
Vietnamese vulnerabilities as a result of aid
cutbacks, internal political troubles, or a
firm rejection by the US, it probably would
commit some of its strategic reserve divisions
to exploit the situation.
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142A002000010001-5
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
 SECRET
Kampo
Government positions
under siege s
PHNOM
PENH
xc~mpong Speu.
Prek Thndu
o Narrows Neak Luong
Under
Communis
control
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142AO02000010001-5
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142AO02000010001-5
CAMBODIA
RAIE DE
KOMPONG SOM
 Approved For Releasyp5/RR1'14Q2000010001-5
Cambodia
IV. In Cambodia, the Khmer Communists began their dry
season offensive on New Year's Day, and have breached
Phnom Penh's outer defenses in several places. Gov-
ernment forces are now counterattacking, but will
need several weeks to retake lost territory near
the capital and push the Communists out of rocket
range of Phnom Penh. No clear outcome is likely in
this dry season's fighting.
A. The most serious insurgent attacks have been
along the Mekong River southeast of Phnom Penh.
The Communists have captured positions near two
key chokepoints downstream from the capital, and
they are now in position to shell river convoys
from close range.
B. Most reporting indicates most insurgent attacks
this dry season will be against major lines of
communication, rather than the capital itself,
1. But a recent report does mention Communist
plans for widespread terrorist attacks within
Phnom Penh,
C. Communist China and North Vietnam both give
military assistance to the insurgents.
1. Most of the arms and munitions are supplied
by Peking, under an agreement worked out
- 5 -
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142A002000010001-5
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
 Approved For Releasy 6/RWRC PMI14 02000010001-5
last spring. The North Vietnamese deliver
the supplies to the insurgents.
V. On the political front, there are still no signs of
any breakthrough in negotiations.
A. Sihanouk and Khmer Communist leaders have turned
thumbs down on the call for peace talks in the
UN resolution that preserved the Lon Nol gov-
ernment's seat in the General Assembly. Commu-
nist conditions for talks still amount to a de-
mand that Phnom Penh accept defeat and that the
US terminate its aid.
1. Sihanouk has stated privately that he would
Z3 I c
consider a compromise solution, but adm-a.-
that his hands are tied by the in-country
Communist leaders, who will not.
B. The political scene in Phnom Penh is quiet, and
should remain so for awhile.
1. There are, however, severe economic problems,
which can only get worse as the effects of
US aid cutbacks take hold.
Laos
VI. In Laos, the coalition government has survived severe
political, economic, and social strains -- as well as
the shock of Souvanna Phouma's midsummer heart attack.
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142AO02000010001-5
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142A002000010001-5
Souvanna probably has not focused on this problem -- and
indeed may not yet have admitted to himself that it may be
a problem. When or if he does, there are several potential
contenders for his mantle:
King's Council President PRINCE KHAMMAO, a
political cipher acceptable to both sides as
a possible compromise choice;
non-Communist Interior Minister PHENG PHONGSAVAN,
a political opportunist with strong neutralist
credentials and generally acceptable to both sides;
-- Lao Communist leader PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG,
Souvanna's half-brother and chairman of the
coalition's Joint National Political Council;
Communist Deputy Prime Minister PHOUMI VONGVICHIT,
clearly the most capable political leader in the
cabinet next to Souvanna.
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142A002000010001-5
 Approved For Releasy/6`CMI114172000010001-5
A. Despite the opening Souvanna's absence gave the
Communists, they made no serious effort to take
over the leadership of the coalition. They shared
the day to day running of the government with non-
Communists.
1. Souvanna returned to Laos from France in
early November, and has gradually resumed
some of his former responsibilities.
a. Nonetheless, the coalition feels that
he may never return to full-time politi-
cal activity, and both sides are think-
ing about a successor.
b. Neither is likely to approve a hard-core
candidate from the other side, however,
and -- if necessary -- Souvanna himself
may have to pick someone.
B. The military situation is still stable, and there
are no signs that either side intends to resume
major hostilities.
1. Some 40,000 North Vietnamese troops and about
23,000 Chinese engineers are still in Laos
more than six months after the foreign troop
withdrawal deadline.
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142A002000010001-5
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142AO02000010001-5
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79R01142AO02000010001-5