DCI BRIEFING FOR 2 APRIL WSAG MEETING THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A002000010014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 2, 1975
• Content Type: BRIEF

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25X1 ARCHIVAL RECORD
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2 April 1975
DCI BRIEFING FOR
2 APRIL WSAG MEETING
THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA
Vietnam
1. Government control along the coastal strip of
Military Region 2 has crumbled rapidly after
the loss of DaNang.
A. The major central coastal cities of Qui Nhon
and Nha Trang have been lost, and there are
reports that territorial forces joined the
Communists in attacks against the govern-
ment defenders.
B. There are still small pockets of government
presence in southern Military Region 2, but
they will evaporate quickly.
1. The status of Tuyen Duc, Ninh Thuan, and
Binh Thuan provinces is unclear. The gov-
ernment had no regular army units in these
three provinces, and provincial authorities
reportedly have fled.
2. The Military Region 2 Headcuartexs is said
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to be still functioning at Cam Ranh, al-
though the regional commander and some of
his senior staff have left. The Marine
Division, which initially was sent to Cam
Ranh from DaNang, has now gone to Vung
Tau for regroupment.
C. There is no sign, as yet, that the evacuation
mentality that led to the collapse in the
North has spread to government troops in Mili-
tary Regions 3 and 4.
1. The military situation in these areas has
been relatively quiet, although government
commanders,are expecting strong Communist
attacks around the major delta cities of
Can Tho and My Tho.
D. There are two ways the situation could now
evolve:
1. There could be a stabilization of the
situation in Military Regions 3 and 4.
But even if this occurs, it will prob-
ably be only temporary until the Commu-
nists bring more military pressure to
bear.
2. The process of demoralization and de-
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featism already underway could prove
irreversible and lead quickly to the
collapse of the GVN and its will to
resist.
E. The debate and congressional action on the
question of US aid to South Vietnam will be
a key factor in the situation.
1. The provision of additional US aid would
provide a psychological boost for the
GVN's flagging morale.
2. The denial of aid would further deepen
defeatism in South Vietnam and strengthen
the already growing fear that a Communist
victory is inevitable. It might also lead
to a rise in anti-American sentiment.
Such sentiment already appears to be run-
ning high among military units and refugees
escaping from the north.
II. We lack firm evidence on the Communist timetable
for military action in the provinces around Sai-
gon.and in the delta, but we believe that Hanoi
intends to push its military advantage as force-
fully and as rapidly as possible. The balance
of forces in South Vietnam now has shifted decisively
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in Communist favor, and there are signs that addi-
tional North Vietnamese strategic reserve units are
being moved into the country.
III. Given the fragility of the present military situa-
tion in South Vietnam and the rapid pace of events
there, Thieu's political position is now highly
vulnerable. Major political changes, as a prelude
to a settlement of Communist terms, could occur
at any time.
A. Rumors abound that various moves are afoot to
replace Thieu or force him to resign the presi-
dency. Attempts could occur at any time, and
would probably be made by an individual or
group of officers within the military.
B. The civilian opposition -- including figures
such as General "Big" Minh and former premier
Phan Huy Quat and individuals more closely
associated with the government such as Senator
Tran Van Lam and Deputy Prime Minister Dan
are already beginning to maneuver for position.-
1. Although these people are not likely to be
prime movers in an early_change of leader-
ship, they would probably hope to play a
role in selecting a successor for Thieu.
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C. A decision by the An Quang Buddhist opposi-
tion, led by Tri Quang, to take to the streets
in an all-out effort to force Thieu's removal
is another strong possibility. Tri Quang
may now see a transitional non-Communist gov-
ernment, dominated by the Buddhists, as the
best and quickest way to protect Buddhist in-
terests and reach some sort of accommodation
with the Communists.
D. But if the South Vietnamese military position
is not stabilized in the immediate future,
Saigon will face complete military collapse
before a move to replace Thieu or an attempt
to negotiate an end to the war can materialize.
IV. The tone of its propaganda and the speed with
which it has redeployed its forces make it clear
,that Hanoi now sees military victory in its grasp.
The North Vietnamese also clearly sense the pos-
sibility of a final demoralization and political
collapse in the South, which would give them their
final objectives without the cost of a major as-
sault against Saigon.
A. In an obvious effort to encourage a political
upheaval in Saigon, the Communists have been
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reemphasizing their willingness to reopen nego-
tiations once Thieu has been removed from power.
1. Recent Communist statements, however, make
no mention of a coalition government, but
declare only that new negotiations would
result "in the speedy settlement of the af-
fairs of South Vietnam."
B. This terse offer reflects the radically
altered strategic situation in Vietnam.
Hanoi no longer sees the need for a lengthy
intermediate state of negotiations and coali-
tion rule in the South prior to the achieve-
ment of its basic objective -- the rein-
tegration of Vietnam under Communist rule.
C. Hanoi's shortened timetable in the South
has obvious implications for the role of
the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary
Government. The North Vietnamese now have
little incentive to promote the PRG as a
separate political force ready to play a role'
in a Lao-style coalition government.
1. In this regard, Hanoi now faces a basic
decision on whether or not to install
a PRG capital in one of the major South
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Vietnamese cities now under Communist
control. Failure to do so would indicate
that the role of the PRG in North Vietnam-
ese strategic thinking has been significantly
downgraded.
2. Although North Vietnamese strategy prob-
ably still involves the establishment
of a transitional southern government,
perhaps with token participation by
neutralist "third force" elements, it
seems fairly clear that Hanoi is now
interested in providing only the barest
of fig leaves for a Communist takeover
in the South.
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Cambodia
V. In Cambodia, the government's military fortunes
continue to slide downhill. It is difficult to
see the situation holding together more thane
V week G^+4y~a
A. Communist forces yesterday overran the nei h-
g
boring towns of Banam and Neak Luong, thereby
eliminating the government's last foothold on
the lower Mekong River.
1. A few survivors have reached Phnom Penh
aboard navy boats, but it is doubtful
that many more of the enclave's 4,400
former defenders will reach government
lines.
2. With the fall of Banam and Neak Luong,
a significant portion of the 6,000 to
7,000 Communist troops in the area could
now be deployed to the Phnom Penh area.
B. Communist commanders around Phnom Penh yester-
day began calling in units from several north-
ern provinces for increased attacks, but it
will take at least several days for them to
arrive in the capital area and prepare for com-
bat. It is clear, however, that the Communists
r
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have interpreted Lon Nol's departure as a
sign of weakness on the government side,
and are ready to push for a final military
victory.
C. The Communist threat against Phnom Penh is
already substantial.
1. Insurgent rocket crews have the range of
vital facilities at Pochentong airport,
and have fired over 30 rockets at the
airfield in each of the past several days.
a. Ammunition shortages have apparently
halted Communist artillery attacks
against the airport, but they could
resume at any time.
b. There is a clear danger that shell-
ings could force an indefinite sus-
pension of the airlift.
2. On the ground, government units on Monday
closed a gap in the defense line.north of
the airfield, reducing the threat of a
ground attack -- but at the cost of post-
poning the operation to retake Tuol Leap
and eliminate Communist rocket and artil-
lery sites in the area.
3. The anticipated threat southeast of the
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capital has developed, and government
forces have been giving ground in the
face of steady ground attacks. Commu-
nist units in this sector may soon be
within heavy weapons range of the south-
ern suburb of Takhmau.
4. The situation is not much better on the
east bank of the Mekong River, where the
insurgents have taken some riverside-po-
sitions within sight of Phnom Penh's
waterfront.
IV. Even if the Cambodian Army manages to stablize
the ground situation around the capital for the
next week to ten days, the time is rapidly ap-
proaching when supply shortages will begin having
a direct effect on government military capabilities.
A. On April 11 parachutes and pallets will no
longer be available in Thailand, and supply
drops to isolated enclaves in Cambodia will
have to be halted.
B. On April 17 all ammunition ear-marked for
Cambodia will have been delivered. In-coun-
try stocks of some types of ammunition will
be exhausted soon thereafter, and all ammu-
nition will be gone by April 25.
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C. When the seriousness of the supply situa-
tion becomes apparent to army units, they
may begin to lay down their arms. A two-
week supply of ammunition is considered
essential to prevent such a collapse of the
army's will to resist, and some stocks will
hit this critical point beginning on April 6.
VII. On the political front, Lon Nol's departure has
had no immediate effect on government morale.
A. Most Cambodians -- including a good number
of military commanders -- had come to view
him as the major obstacle both to negotia-
tions and to a favorable US Congressional vote
on supplemental aid for Cambodia.
1. As a result, his departure appears to
have been met with a feeling of relief
and ?r ^-p^'~ ~tn that a compromise
settlement short of total surrender to
the Communists can now be arranged.
2. Sihanouk's naming of all key members of
the recently reshuffled government as "war
criminals," however, along with the thrust
of recently intercepted Communist messages,
makes any breakthrough toward negotiations
highly unlikely.
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3. Under these conditions, whatever hope
exists in Phnom Penh will soon turn to
dismay.
4. The end could come in several ways.
a. The military situation could collapse
from overwhelming Communist pressure,
from a disintegration of army morale,
or from a combination of the two.
b. A complete political unravelling
could occur, either by a military
coup, a resignation of the government,
or a total breakdown of control in
Phnom Penh accompanied by widespread
looting and rioting.
511 In any case, some sort of denouement is
almost certain before the end of the
month.
1?3
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