DCI BRIEFING FOR 15 MAY NSC MEETING PANAMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A002100010015-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: May 12, 1975
• Content Type: BRIEF

SECRE'T' N SC
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IS' MA- I 1S'
12 May 1975
DCI BRIEFING FOR
1 MAY NSC MEETING
PANAMA
I. Mr. President, two intelligence assessments are
appropriate to today's deliberations:
-- The consequences of several possible results
of the current canal negotiations, and
-- The present mood and tactics of the Panaman-
ian Government regarding the negotiations.
A. On the possible results of negotiations, our
estimate focusses on three major possible
courses of events.
First Scenario
Ii. The first scenario assumes that a treaty is signed,
and both Panama and the US begin the ratification
process.
A. The Panamanian Government will be able to ob-
tain prompt ratification of any treaty that.
General Torrijos endorses and energetically
supports.
1. Torrijos fully dominates the political
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scene -- a unique position for a Pana-
manian leader dealing with the US.
B. The principal uncertainty is the timing.
1. Torrijos probably would act fairly
quickly, before the US Senate. He would
hope, among other motives, to influence
the Senate and place the onus for any
failure squarely on the US.
C. Under this scenario, we do not believe that
a future Panamanian Government would denounce
such a treaty, although it is always possible.
The advantages accruing to Panama would be
substantial, and, perhaps more important,
would increase as time passes.
Second Scenario
III. Under the second scenario, a treaty is signed but
the US Senate fails to act for an extended period,
or rejects it entirely.
A. In the case of extended delay, Panama's re-
action would depend on Torrijos' perception
of the reasons for the delay and of the chances
for eventual ratification -- and on how much
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confidence he retained in the US executive
branch's intentions.
1. We believe that Torrijos would have dif-
ficulty living with an extended delay.
2. Within a year, he would bow to national-
ist pressure and openly criticize the de-
lay. We could expect some demonstrations
and some harassment of US personnel.
3. But as long as Torrijos believed the door
still open for US ratification, he would
control the level of the Panamanian re-
sponse.
B. The consequences would be much more serious
if the Senate rejected a treaty. Nationalistic
feelings would be ignited, and give rise to
violence and rioting against US installations.
1. After initial disorders, we believe that
Panama would begin more calculated hostile
acts designed to impede operation of the
canal, such as closure of Canal Zone borders.
-- Terrorists would move against US in-
stallations, and US personnel would be
in some physical danger.
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-- Torrijos would probably break relations
with the US and denounce the 1903 treaty.
2. International support for Panama would be
extensive, especially elsewhere in Latin
America. This would deal a severe blow to
prospects for a multilateral dialogue and
damage the climate for bilateral relations.
Regional organizations would be more in-
clined to exclude the US.
Third Scenario
IV. In the third scenario, the negotiators cannot agree
and talks break down. What happens would depend on
Torrijos? perceptions.
A. If he believed talks might be resumed on his
terms, he would maintain a responsible image
for a while.
B. If in fact talks were not resumed fairly soon,
however, we could expect Panama to follow tac-
tics like those described in the case of
Senate rejection -- harassment and a break
in relations.
C. Torrijos would adopt such tactics quickly
if he concluded at the outset of a break-
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down that there was no hope for resuming
the talks. He might well feel a sense of
betrayal, and react emotionally and aggres-
sively.
1. If so, his government would then play
a greater role in directing the popular
response, and there would be a greater
chance that members of the National Guard
would join in the harassment.
2. There would be less prospect for any
meaningful communication between the
US and Panama.
Present Thinking in Panama
V. The mood of the Panamanian Government seems to
be changing. We have recently noted signs of
growing apprehension about the prospects for a
new canal treaty.
A. The change has sprung from fear that op-
position in the Congress, and the domestic
problems that you would face in getting a
treaty ratified, will undermine the will to
conclude one.
B. There is also concern about the argument
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D
being made by some in the US that a treaty
meeting Panama's aspirations would be viewed
as a foreign policy weakness, and that the US
should stand firm.
VI. These concerns about what they take to be the
situation in the US have caused the Panamanians
to adjust their tactics.
A. First, they are trying to get across the mes-
sage that they want and must have a treaty,
and are willing to worry later about the
acknowledged difficulties of ratification.
1. They are now suggesting that they could
tolerate a delay in ratification if a
satisfactory treaty is negotiated and
signed -- and that the prospects for
ratification should not be allowed to
influence the content of the treaty.
B. Secondly, sensing that negotiations are reach-
ing a critical point, Panamanian leaders are
conducting a vigorous campaign to get world
opinion on their side.
1. Within the hemisphere, this effort has
become particularly intense. Between
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them, Foreign Minister Tack and Torrijos
himself have visited some nine Latin
American countries within the last sev-
eral weeks.
2. Panamanian representatives will eventually
go to all the remaining Latin American
countries, as well as to any international
meetings where support might be obtained.
VII. Finally, on the two main unresolved substantive
issues:
A. On the question of the duration of a treaty,
Panama has twice announced publicly -- most
recently in the March 1973 UN Security Coun-
cil meeting in Panama -- that it can never ac-
cept a 50-year period.
1. To most Panamanians this sounds like per-
petuit, a key factor of the 1903 treaty
they insist must be changed.
B. As for the issue of land and water, the Panaman-
ians are insisting that the US retain for use
only the land and water essential for the op-
eration, maintenance and defense of the canal.
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1. We believe that Torrijos must obtain some
visible benefit to Panama on this issue
at the treaty's outset, especially adjacent
to Panama City and Colon.
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