DCI BRIEFING FOR 27 JUNE NSC MEETING ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A002100010020-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: June 27, 1975
• Content Type: BRIEF

NSC.0
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27 June 1975
DCI BRIEFING FOR
27 JUNE NSC MEETING
I. The current situation in Angola is highly un-
stable. Rivalry between contending nationalist
groups has featured increasing violence, with
each group trying to stake out territory and
gain military superiority before independence
on November 11 and final Portuguese withdrawal
by next February.
A. The fighting over the past few months has
been between the two largest groups, the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola, led by Agostinho Neto, and the
National Front for the Liberation of An-
gola led by Holden Roberto. A third group
in the picture is the National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola, led by
Jonas Savimbi.
1. In action early this month Neto's Popu-
lar Movement pushed the National Front
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out of some areas north and east of
Luanda, thus blocking the Front's sup-
ply lines into the capital.
2. Although there were some clashes in Luanda
this month, the two remain essentially
in a standoff there.
a. Military control of Luanda by either
group would necessarily not determine
control of or influence over the rest
of Angola, particularly
ur _asor_ along all the
main transportation routes.
3. Roberto's National Front still remains
strongly entrenched in large areas of
northern Angola where it has substantial
tribal support.
B. New fighting can erupt at any time:
-- There is a continuing buildup of the mili-
tary forces of all three nationalist groups;
-- Heavier weapons -- mortars and bazookas --
are being introduced into Angola by the USSR
and Zaire;
-- Armed and undisciplined civilians are in
Luanda on behalf of the Popular Movement;
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-- Neither major group is able or willing
to exercise effective control over its own
forces;
-- All three groups are initiating military
operations in parts of Angola yet untouched
by the fighting where no single group has
an edge; and
-- Politicking for the October elections for
a constituent assembly will increase tensions.
C. The oil-rich enclave of Cabinda remains a tinder-
box. The Popular Movement has a slight military
edge there, but both other groups also have
forces active.
1. All three want the enclave to remain a part
of an independent Angola.
2. The picture is complicated by the pres-
ence of a factionalized separatist move-
ment supported by both Zaire and Congo.
3. Both countries have endorsed Cabindan in-
dependence, and any intensification of
the fighting there could bring outside
intervention either directly or in sup-
port of the separatists.
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II. The transitional government installed last January
has proved unworkable.
A. It is constructed on a system of checks and
balances, but in the current climate members
of the three liberation groups, as government
officials, concentrate on the competition be-
tween them.
1. Portuguese officials are not effective --
they are caught in the middle.
2. The liberation groups have not honored
their commitment to establish an integrated
national army as called for in the inde-
pendence accord.
B. The 24,000 Portuguese troops are mostly kept
in Luanda. They will intervene in the fighting
only to protect the whites.
1. The Portuguese have in effect abandoned
most of the countryside to the nation-
alists, and are already crating some of
their heavy equipment for shipment to
Lisbon.
2. Portuguese forces are scheduled to be-
gin withdrawal in October and are to be
totally removed by next February.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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3. There is nothing in the independence ac-
cord to prevent the Portuguese from with-
drawing as fast as possible after October.
C. Lisbon's policy insofar as it has one, is
neutrality among the factions.
1. Portugal wants to protect its important
agricultural and mining interests.
2. The Portuguese also want to be on good
terms with whoever ends up in charge
after independence, but their ability
to affect events is diminishing.
3. At this point, the Portuguese leaders'
major concern is to prevent civil war, which
could have serious political repercussions
in Lisbon. They hope to avoid, for ex-
ample, an increase in the number of white
refugees returning to Portugal who would'
add to the turbulence there.
4. Thus, Lisbon can be expected to expend
considerable diplomatic effort to reduce
tension in Angola, and would certainly
welcome similar efforts by interested
third countries.
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III. The role of outside powers in supplying military
assistance to the nationalist groups remains a
key factor.
A. The Soviet Union has been a long time sup-
porter of Neto's Popular Movement, providing
both arms and cash during the years of the
insurgency against the Portuguese.
1. We are unable to determine how much So-
viet military aid is now reaching the
Movement, but it helped the Movement
score some of its recent gains.
2. Most of the aid is being channeled through
Congo.
3. Soviet long-range goals in Angola are un-
clear, but in the short run Moscow supports
the Popular Movement in a situation
where all three nationalist groups are
viable contenders for power.
B. Peking has had some association with all of
the liberation movements in the past, but
the Chinese are most closely associated with
Roberto's National Front.
1. They have supplied military equipment
as well as some training. Some 100
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Chinese advisers may now be in Zaire
working with the Front.
2. Chinese assistance has helped the Front
to establish its forces firmly in north-
ern Angola.
C. Roberto has had little success in finding
assistance elsewhere.
1. Zaire's President Mobutu has loose
family ties with Roberto and has long
supported him and the Front with funds,
arms, and training. He has also allowed
Roberto to maintain his headquarters in
Zaire.
a. Recently, however, Mobutu has cut
back his assistance to the Front,
in part because of his govern-
ment's serious financial problems
and because he is cooling toward Ro-
berto.
b. Mobutu is alarmed over the Front's
recent setbacks and feels Roberto's
position has been damaged because he
refuses to leave Zaire and go to
Luanda.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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c. Mobutu now believes Jonas Savimbi
of the National Union should be
the primary figure in an inde-
pendent Angolan government.
2. Mobutu, of course, has some serious con-
cerns of his own.
a. Zaire is experiencing a severe for-
eign exchange shortage because of the
low price of copper on the interna-
tional market.
IV. The prospects for Angola between now and Novem-
ber are poor. Further violence could take place
and edge the territory closer to civil war.
At best, Angola will lurch along and become
independent without a strong leader.
A. The constituent assembly scheduled to be
elected in October is supposed to select a
head of government of an independent Angola,
but new violence could force a postponement.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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B. At a meeting in Kenya last week Savimbi,
Roberto, and Neto reached what amounts to
an uncertain truce that merely postpones a
confrontation.
1. They "agreed" to a number of measures,
such as disarming civilians, designed
to prevent new fighting. Similar agree-
ments in the past have failed, however.
All three contenders
the inconclusiveness
state that they will
another form for the
if the elections are
seem to recognize
of the pact. They
meet again to try
transfer of power
not held.
V. After independence, it now appears that no single
liberation group in Angola will have the power to
impose its own ideology as national policy.
A. If civil war is averted and the three lib-
eration groups establish some kind of coali-
tion, the government's policies probably will
be a delicate mix of the philosophies of the
two major groups.
B. Both major groups want a non-aligned foreign
policy and will seek to maintain some balance
between East and West.
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1. The Popular Movement, if dominant, would
establish a high-centralized and authori-
tarian one-party regime with a pronounced
socialist orientation and close ties to
the communist world, with US ties kept
to a minimum.
2. The National Front would probably seek to
establish a highly nationalistic and per-
sonalized regime. Because of the Front's
rather narrow political base, an FNLA state
might be highly coercive. The Front would
likely accept development and/or military
aid from the West as well as the East.
C. Both-groups can be expected to nationalize An-
gola's major productive enterprises, but the
Front probably would be more hsopitable toward
selective Western investment than the Popular
Movement.
D. As long as an independent Angola does not re-
strict access to its transportation facilities,
good relations with its neighbors Zaire and
Zambia probably can be maintained.
1. An independent Angola will give moral and
political support to black nationalists in
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Rhodesia and South Africa. It would prob-
ably not become immediately involved in
supporting insurgencies there, however,
because of distance and the dominant role
now being played by Zambia, Tanzania, and
Mozambique in seeking a settlement with
the Smith regime.
VI. If, on the other hand, protracted civil war develops
Congo and Zaire could be brought into the conflict.
A. Civil war could also convince either one, or
both to move into Cabinda in an attempt to an-
nex or neutralize the enclave.
B. Continued fighting in Angola, would exacerbate
the confrontation between black and white
Africa. It would intensify the fears of
Rhodesia and South Africa concerning black
majority rule.
1. South Africa is particularly concerned
that a communist or unfriendly regime in
Angola might support guerrilla activity
in Namibia.
2. A hostile or unstable Angola would increase
South African pressure on us to support its
domestic and international policies. This
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would complicate our efforts to promote
peaceful solutions to Southern Africa's
racial problems.
3. South Africa does not seem to be planning
any action to counter this threat.
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 ECONOMY
1~~ lrj lest. , about $210 per
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Population based on 1970 census
A. Total 5.7 million
B. Urban whites 250,000
C. Urban mesticos (mulattos) 63,000
Blacks - 5.3 million
Mesticos- .1 million
Whites - .3 million
Total 5.7 million
Estimated 1974 total 6.2 million
LAND
481,000 sq. mi.; 1% cultivated, 44% forested, 22%
meadows and pastures, 33% other (including fallow)
Land boundaries: 3,150 mi.
WATER
Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 6 n. mi.
(fishing 12 n. mi.)
Coastline: 1.,000 mi.
PEOPLE
elation: 6,051,000, avera ual growth ra'tC
1.b-% (12/60-12/70)
Agriculture: cash crops - coffee, sisal, corn,
cotton, sugar, manioc, and tobacco; food crops -
cassava, corn, vegetables, plantains, bananas, and
other local foodstuffs; largely self-sufficient in food
Fishing: catch 599,000 metric tons, $18.3 million
(1972); exports $18.7 million; imports $5.5 million
(1971)
Major industries: mining (oil, iron, diamonds), fish
processing, brewing, tobacco, sugar processing,
cement, food processing plants, building construction
Electric power: 443,000 kw. capacity (1973); 865
million kw.-hr. produced (1973), 145 kw.-hr. per
capita
Exports: $650 million (est. f.o.b., 1973); coffee, oil,
diamonds, sisal, fish and fish products, iron ore, oil,
timber, and corn
Imports: $500 million (est. c.i.f., 1973); capital
equipment (machinery and electrical equipment),
wines, bulk iron and ironwork, steel and metals,
vehicles and spare parts, textiles and clothing,
medicines
Major trade partners: main partner Portugal,
followed by West Germany, U.S., U.K., Japan
Aid: Portugal only donor
Budget: balanced at $453.3 million (1973)
Monetary conversion rate: 25.37 escudos= US$I as
of July 1974 (floating since February 1973)
Fiscal year: calendar year
COMMUNICATIONS
Railroads: 1,918 mi.; 1,724 mi, 3'6" gage, 194 mi.
1' l t gage
Highways: 45,000 mi.; 4,970 mi. bituminous-
surface treatment, 28,000 mi. crushed stone, gravel, or
improved earth, remainder unimproved earth
Inland waterways: 2,000 mi. navigable
Ports: 3 major (Luanda, Lobito, Mocamedes), 15
minor
Pipelines: crude oil, 111 mi.
Civil air: 14 major transport aircraft
Airfields: 521 total, 438 usable; 23 with
permanent-surface runways; 1 with runway over
12,000 ft., 7 with runways 8,000-11,999 ft., 58 with
runways 4,000-7,999 ft.; 2 seaplane stations
Telecommunications: simple network of low-
capacity open-wire and radio-relay facilities; 32,300
telephones; 115,000 radio receivers; 21 AM, 7 FM,
and no TV stations
Religion: about 84% animist, 12% Roman
Catholic, 4`' 0 Protestant
Language: Portuguese (official), many native
dialects
Literacy: 10?10-] 5%
Labor force: 2.6 million economically active
(1964);531,000 wage workers (1967)
Organized labor: approx. 65,000 (1967)
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