DCI BRIEFING FOR 23 JULY NSC MEETING PANAMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A002100010023-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: July 23, 1975
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DCI BRIEFING FOR
23 JULY NSC MEETING
PANAMA
23 July 19 75
I. Mr. President, I will focus on two key questions:
-- First, what are the real pressures on General
Torrijos to obtain a treaty?
-- And, second, are we dealing with a government
that is responsible enough to carry out the
provisions of a new treaty?
II. As for the first question, Torrijos' political
future and, in his view, his place in Panamanian
history, depend on securing a treaty that will
satisfy Panama's main aspirations. He sees his
reputation on the line, and thus some of the pres-
sure on him is self-generated.
A. There are, however, other important pressures
on him.
1. Torrijos'rauthority derives from his
position as commander of the National
Guard -- Panama's only military and
police establishment. Its officers
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continue to support him largely because
of his substantial record of success,
both at home and abroad. A major failure
-- such as a breakdown in the canal nego-
tiations -- could lead to a. reappraisal
of this commitment.
2. The students are another key constituency
that Torrijos knows he must not disapoint.
A small but vocal number of ultra-nationalist
youth already believe he is not standing
firm enough against what they view as US
"demands" for a prolonged presence on
"sovereign Panamanian soil." Should these
highly volatile students take things into
their own hands -- and they are fully
capable of doing so -- they could-make
Torrijos a prisoner of events. There
could be a danger of real violence against
canal installations.
3. .And, lastly, the general population's ex-
pectations' about the benefits of a new
treaty for Panama have been raised signifi-
cantly. There is not only a national con-
sensus that the time for a new treaty has
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come, but also a belief that it should
clearly provide for complete Panamanian
control over the present canal zone before
the end of this century.
III. As for the second question, if Torrijos does get
a new treaty generally consistent with the declara-
tion of eight negotiating principles signed in
February 1974, we believe his government will live
up to its terms.
A. There would be no reason for subsequent gov-
ernments to renege, provided that key.Panamanian
interests are satisfied. (Most Panamanian gov-
ernments since 1903 have been unhappy with the
present treaty, but all have generally respected
its provisions.)
B. It would be difficult for Torrijos to repudiate
a treaty he himself had negotiated, and in
which most Panamanians saw benefits such as:
-- a considerable increase in direct revenue
to Panama;
-- new land for commercial and residential de-
velopment; and
a greater role for Panamainans in the opera-
tion and defense of the canal, looking to
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the time when they would have complete re-
sponsibility.
IV. Torrijos has had significant success in getting ex-
pressions of support for his canal aspirations from
his Latin American neighbors -- largely because in
much of the area, the canal negotiations are re-
garded as the single most important indicator of
whether the US intends to work out a new relation-
ship with Latin America.
A. Thus, even leaders who are privately indif-
ferent or cool toward Panama's desire to gain
control over the canal, such as those in Ecuador
and Chile, would line up with a Latin American
consensus highly critical of the US if Panama
took its case to international forums such as
the OAS and the UN.
B. If the negotiations break down, Torrijos could
count on particularly strong support from Vene-
zuela, Mexico, and, of course, Cuba. The pros-
pects for an effective multilateral dialogue
with the region would be dealt a severe blow.
C. Also, impetus would be given to Latin American
organizations that exclude the US, such as the
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proposed Latin American Economic System, and
there would probably be damage to bilateral
relations in some countries.
1. Venezuela and Colombia would be particularly
upset, while in others -- especially Argentina
.and Brazil -- the effect on bilateral rela-
tions would be minimal.
V. Finally, Mr. President, let me review the two main
unresolved substantive issues:
A. On the question of the duration of a treaty,
Panama has twice announced publicly --
.re-oentl-y in-the March 1973 UN -Security n-
c I.-==:eti-ng mma's that it can never ac-
cept a 50-year period.
1. To most Panamanians this sounds like p.r-
petuity, a key factor of the 1903 treaty
? they insist must be changed.
B. As for the issue of land and water, the Panaman-
ians are insisting that the US retain for use
only the land and water essential for the op-
eration, maintenance and defense of the canal.
1. We believe that Torrijos must obtain some
visible benefit to Panama or this issue
at the treaty's outset, especially adjacent
to Panama City and Colon.
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