PRIMARY ELECTIONS IN KENYA, 18-23 JANUARY 1961; LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 20-27 FEBRUARY 1961

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000500010002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 11, 1961
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
11 January 1961'
OCT-1vo-.1 Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
V J
SUBJECT: Primary elections in Kenya, 18-23 January 1961;
Legislative Council elections, 20-27 February 1961
1. Offices to be filled:
Of the 65 elective seats in the new Legislative Council,
53 are to be filled in the February elections. Voting is to
take place on the basis of a common roll, with the franchise
limited only by a few low educational and financial qualifications.
Of the 53 seats, 33 will be contested on an open basis and in
effect are guaranteed to Africans. The remaining 20 seats are
reserved for the various ethnic minorities--10 for Europeans,
8 for Asians, and 2 for Arabs. Contestants for these seats must
obtain the approval of at least 25 percent of their own racial
groups in the January primaries before going on to the February
elections in which Africans in most cases will have a decisive
voice in the outcome. There will be no primaries for the open
seats.
The directly elected members of the Legislative Council
are to elect 12 "national members"--four Africans, four Europeans,
three Asians, and one Arab; In addition, the governor has the
right to nominate other members in order to ensure an effective
working majority.
2. Parties participating:
The Kenya African National Union (KANU) is basically a
coalition of leaders from the Kikuyu and Luo tribes, the two largest
groups in Kenya. It has been the more extreme of the two African
parties in its demands for early independence and a reduction of
European influence in the Kenya Government. Recently, however,
party President James Gichuru and Secretary General Tom Mboya' have
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attempted to reassure white settlers and investors of the
continuing importance of the Europeans to the country. The
party contains a so-called "ginger" faction, consisting mostly
of young Luos, which favors a more militant approach to the
independence and racial questions. KANU has had considerable
success in identifying itself as the party ofe.x -Mau Mau leader
Jomo Kenyatta, a development which is adding to its popularity
among radical Africans.
The Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) appears to
be largely a defensive alliance of minor tribes against KANU's
Kikuyu-Luo coalition. Although its potential supporters are
about equal in number to those of KANU, KADU seems to be lagging
behind its rival in actual membership. Its leadership lacks
the dynamic quality of KANU's, its heterogeneousmembership inter-
feres with party unity, and its moderate program has restricted
its popularity to the relatively conservative portions of its
tribal base.
The New Kenya party, led by Michael Blundell, is the
political vehicle for moderate Europeans. Blundell and his
followers have recognized the inevitability of further con-
cessions to African political aspirations and have expressed
their willingness to work with an African-dominated government.
They hope that by keeping African good will the-Europeans will
retain some measure of influence as Kenya moves toward inde-
pendence.
The Kenya Coalition, led by Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-
Bentinck, is a right-wing party which is attempting to put a
brake on further concessions to Africans. It has absorbed the
United party, whose delegates to the February 1960 constitutional
conference were the only ones who refused to agree to the present
constitution.
There are a variety of groups representing Asians and
Arabs, the most important of which are the Kenya Indian Congress
and the Moslem League. In general, these communities have in
the past avoided giving strong support to either Europeans or
Africans. At present, however, they are tending to support the
rising African parties.
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4. Present party strengths:
The last Legislative Council elections took place
before the present party alignments emerged, and allegiances
of many members are doubtful. KANU claims eight of the 14
directly elected African members. Information on European
members is unavailable.
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Nor
5. Principal issues:
The principal issue is the pace of African advance-
ment. Both KANU and KADU are urging the early creation of a
chief ministership similar to that held by Julius Nyerere in
Tanganyika; there is general outward agreement that the post
should go to Kenyatta, although most of the other leaders
doubtless hope to attain it themselves. The European parties
and the British Government have so far remained adamantly
opposed to African demands for the release of Kenyatta and
his participation in government.
Both African parties are urging the rapid opening
of the "white ' highlands"--the principal area of Kenya's
cash-crop agriculture--to farmers of all races. When talking
to Africans, most Of.:the.African leaders tend to make vehement
demands for action verging on outright expropriation of
European farms, only to back down on these demands in later
statements to European audiences. As a result, the Europeans
have no clear idea of the land policies of either KANU or KADU
--particularly. KANU!s--and are highly nervous about their
future in the country,
Kenya's deteriorating economic situation is coming
in for increasing comment and is acting as a brake on KANU's
more moderate leaders. Mboya and Gichuru appear concerned over
loss of overseas confidence in the colony's finances and have
attempted to reassure prospective investors, while simultaneously
attempting to preserve the party's image as the most assiduous
African nationalist organization.
British military and naval bases in the colony have
become an emotional issue for most Africans. Until recently,
Mboya and other KANU members have urged Britaiin..~s- outright
expulsion; however, with the exception of the "ginger" group,
most of the party's leadership seems reconciled to attempting
to negotiate Britaif:s military status in the colony.
6. Background:
The elections are the result of Britain's recent
willingness to make substantial concessions to Africans in
its East African territories. The February elections will
be the first in Kenya to have a common voting roll, and the,
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Legislative Council to be convened in March will be the first
with an African majority. The 12-member executive council
(cabinet) is to be composed of four ex,,officio members, in-
cluding the colony's chief secretary who acts as chairman,
and eight "unofficials" (elected and nominated members). The
unofficial side is to be composed of four Africans, three
Europeans, and one Asian,
7. Principal factors influencing the outcome:
Among Africans, tribal loyalties and :'~.:idtimidation
are likely to be the determining factors in the outcomes KANU
in.particular has indulged in extensive strong-arm tactics,
both in order to keep its own tribal elements in line and in
an.(attempt to extend its influence among other African groups.
Many Africans are also likely to be swayed by the Kenyatta
issue and to vote for the party they believe represents him.
For those living in overcrowded areas near the white highlands,
the land issue is likely to assume importance.
White and Asian voters are likely to be swayed chiefly
by their assessment of the relative merits of their various
parties vis-a-vis the Africans. The results in these areas
will depend in large measure on whether the electorate favors
opposition to or,.;aecommOdation `with,. the;:Africans .
Informed opinion on outcome:
Most informed observers believe that KANU
will
obtain a plurality of the seats;. however, it is doubtful that
any one party will gain an absolute majority. Some form of
African coalition is thus a possibility. Results in non-
African constituencies are difficult to predict: if the non-
African communities are disunited in their primaries, pre-
sumably a number of candidates will receive the necessary 25
percent of the total and go onto the elections, with the
selection of the most liberal of these alternatives a likely
result. However, Europeans in some areas have urged their
followers to agree on one candidate in each constituency.: If
only one contestant receives 25 percent or more of the vote
in the primaries, he is automatically declared elected. A
successful non-African campaign along these lines could thus
result in the election of a substantial minority opposed to
cooperation with the African majority.
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9. Significance for US security interests:
Kenya is a key political and economic area in East
Africa, and the United States has an interest in continued
peaceful African advance there and in the preservation of the
pro-West orientation of most of the present leaders. There
is also an indirect American interest in the maintenance of
Britain's military establishment, which is one of the largest
British military concentrations south and east of the Suez
Canal,,
Orig., AA DIV
Ext. 8595
Dist: CIA INTERNAL ONLY
LDON
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence
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