ISRAELI ELECTIONS ON 15 AUGUST 1961

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000500020003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 3, 1961
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
3 August 1961
OCI No. 0418/61 Copy No.
SUBJECT: Israeli Elections on 15 August 1961
1. Offices to be filled: All of the 120 seats in
the Knesset, Israel's unicameral parliament.
2. Parties participatin : Fifteen parties, nine
fewer than in the previous tion in November 1959,
have presented election lists from which, under Israel's
system of proportional representation, the members of the
fifth Knesset will be chosen. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's
moderate Israel Labor party (Mapai) is the largest and
most powerful. The Freedom party (Herut), a non-socialist
Zionist party descendant from the extremist Irgun Zvai
Leumi of the British mandate period, heads the opposition.
The newly formed Liberal party is a merger of the Progres-
sive and General Zionist parties. There are two left-wing
socialist parties, Labor Unity (Achdut Haa.voda)) and the
United Workers' party (Mapam), and a small but active Com-
munist party (Maki). The National Religious party, Agudat
Israel (The Assembly of Jewry),~and Paolei Agudat Israel
(The Assembly of Jewish Workers) represent clerical inter-
ests. Of the six remaining parties, two are Arab parties
affiliated with Mapai, two are independent Arab parties,
and two purport to represent "oriental" Jewish immigrants.
The latter four are all new groups that did not participate
in the elections for the fourth Knesset.
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4. Present party strengths: Mapai, which has
dominated every government since the state's birth in
1948, has 47 of the 120 Knesset seats. Herut has 17
the National Religious party 12, Mapam 9, Achdut Haavoda-
7, and the Communists 3. The 8 former General Zionist
seats together with the Progressives' 6 are now con-
trolled by the new Liberal party. The remaining 11 seats
are divided among the other two religious parties and the
Arab parties affiliated with Mapai.
5. Principal issues: The issue underlying all
others is whether Ben-Gurion's continued leadership of
the government is desirable or necessary. The question
was raised during the crisis early this year over the
so-called "Lavon affair" when Ben-Gurion resigned and
brought down the government. The prime minister acted
in response to charges that two of Ben-Gurion's protegds,
Dayan and Perez, had "framed" Lavon while he was serving
as defense minister in 1955. Ben-Gurion's action, which
was coupled with a threat to retire for good, forced his
reluctant Mapai colleagues to accede to his demands that
Lavon be ousted as secretary general of the powerful
Israel Labor Federation (Histadrut) controlled by the
party.
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This drastic exertion of power by Ben-Gurion
aroused considerable public indignation and alienated
non-Mapai oabinet members in the coalition who had
voted to exonerate Lavon, Following Lavon's removal,
the Achdut Iianv?da.,', Mapam, Progressive, and National
Religious party representatives refused to form a new
coalition with Ben-Gurion as prime minister. Mapai's
opponents are attempting to project a specter of Ben-
Gurion's alleged "undemocratic" or "dictatorialpro-
pensities.
In an effort to silence or vitiate criticism
of the prime minister and his party for their handling
of the Lavon affair, Mapai spokesmen have been emphasiz-
ing the Arab threat to Israel's security and the impor-
tance of Ben-Gurion and the party to the successful de-
fense of the country during its thirteen-year existence.
Other issues stressed by Mapai are the country's eco-
nomic prosperity and Ben-Gurion's perennial plea to
reform the electoral process by instituting a system
based on constituencies.
Herut is trying to cast discredit on the rec-
ord of Ben-Gurion and Mapai in security matters by ex-
ploiting the arrest and trial for espionage of Israel
Beer, who had been closely associated with the prime min-
ister.
6. Principal factors influencing the outcome: The
outcome of !he election w epen on how success ul
Ben-Gurion and his party are in overcoming whatever dam-
age there has been to their prestige as a result of the
Lavon affair. According to the embassy, Mapai is en-
couraged by the fact that the affair, which reached its
climax in February, has tended to recede from public in-
terest as a campaign issue. The same may be said of the
Israel Beer espionage case.
Mapai's superior organization in the past has
made an important contribution to the party's success by
getting out the vote. This capability apparently will be
tested severely in the forthcoming election in view of
the apparent apathy of the public toward the election and
the absence of an estimated 40,000 Israelis on holidays
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outside the country. The proportion of eligible vot-
ers who actually participate in the election accord-
ingly may fall below the usual high percentages.
The embassy reports it is generally agreed
that a low turnout at the polls will be harmful to
Mapai, which in the past has drawn heavily from among
the "floating" voters, and to the new Liberal -}iarty.
The latter appeals to the professional classes, to the
intelligentsia, and to the business-industrial inter-
ests; many of these supporters are assumed to be among
the thousands on vacations. Herut, whose appeal is
primarily to the underprivileged, might receive a pro-
portionally larger percentage of votes if the turnout
is low. The two left-wing parties and the religious
parties receive their support primarily from their own
members, who are believed sufficiently disciplined to
get to the polls in full strength.
7. Background: All Israelis who were 18 years
of age as of31 ecember 1960 and who are properly
registered are eligible to vote. This includes im-
migrants. The total number of eligible voters report-
edly is 1,263,369 out of a total population of over
2,250,000. In 1959, 81 percent of those eligible voted.
In 1955, 1951, and 1948 the figures were 83, 77, and 87
percent respectively.
There is only one constituency -.covering 'the
entire country. The voter casts his ballot for a party
and its entire list of candidates rather than for indi-
vidual candidates. The number of Knesset seats each
party obtains is determined by the percentage of the
total vote it receives.
8. Informed opinion on outcome: It is generally
agreed that there will be no ras c shift in the rela-
tive strength of the major parties. The only real ques-
tion is how large a plurality Mapai will obtain. It ap-
pears to have weathered the storm over the Lavon affair,
and the consensus now is that it it loses any seats at
all, the number will be no more than five. The Liberal
party stands to gain from any substantial defection of
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erstwhile Mapai supporters. Some of these, however,
may not choose to go to the polls at all. The strength
of the other parties, with the possible exception of
some of the smaller parties, probably will remain the
same.
9. Significance for US security interests: No
issue directly affecting the rnife;l States is involved
in the election. The plurality Mapai is almost certain
to receive at the polls will mean that it again, with
Ben-Gurion as prime minister, will dominate Israel's
government. Israel's policies accordingly will continue
to be pro-Western to the extent that they are related to
East-West issues. In a regional context, the current
Israeli position on points of dispute with the Arabs--
differences which constitute a perennial threat to peace
in the area--will also be perpetuated.
In 1963 and 1964 Israel will face the problem
of making drastic adjustments in Its economy due to the
scheduled expiration of German reparations payments. Dur-
ing the same period, the Israelis expect to implement the
first stage of their Jordan River diversion project--a
development which almost certainly will be attended by
increased Arab-Israeli hostility, if indeed it hasibot.-
caused a crisis before that time. Under normal circum-
stances, the new Knesset would have been elected in the
midst of these events. The forthcoming election, just
22 months after the previous one, has upset this time-
table, but the result could mean that Israel will have a
stable and settled government and parliament during the
critical period of 1963-64.
HUNTINGTPN DD.KSHELWNI
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence
Orig:
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