NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN GREECE - -29 OCTOBER 1961.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000500020016-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 5, 1961
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
5 October 1961
OCI No. 3957/61 Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: National Elections in Greece--29 October 1961.
1. ')f_f ices to be filled: All 300 seats in the
Chamber of Deputies.
2. Parties participating:
a. National Radical Union (ERE); moderate
right-of-center party.
parties.
b. Center Union; non-Communist coalition of
c. Progressive Party (KTP); small, right-
wing, nationalist party.
d. United Democratic Left (EDA); Communist-
front party.
e. National Agricultural Party (EAK); small,
extreme leftist party. EAK was founded by and is in
electoral coalition with EDA.
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State Department review completed
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4. Party strengths in Chamber of Deputies (as
of 1 September 1961): -
ERE
EDA and affili
t
a
es - 68
Agrarian Liberal Union of the - 21*
Democratic Center (DKAFE)
National Regeneration Movement - 18**
(KEA)
EAK
Democratic Union (DE)
KTP
Venizelos supporters and inde- - 7*
pendents
Vacancy _ l
* ost o t ese deputies joined the Center Union on
20 September 1961.
** KEA leader George Grivas released members of his
party in early September. Most of them later joined
the Center Union.
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5. Principal Issues:
Foreign affairs: The Cyprus settlement;
Greek association with the Common Market; economic
burdens of defense policy; dangers of West German
economic and political penetration.
Internal affairs: Unemployment in urban
areas and underemployment in rural regions; con-
tinuing rise in cost of living; farmer discontent
over government's price-support policies; labor
policy of Karamanlis government; charges of scandal
within the government; alleged government repression
of the opposition.
6. Principal factors influencing the outcome:
The government party is expected to capi-
talize on Premier Karamanlis' personal prestige, the
country's economic progress since 1955, and the issue
of governmental stability. Karamanlis has held the
premiership for a longer uninterrupted period than
any other politician in modern Greek history. His
trip to the United States in April 1961 enhanced his
prestige at home, and the visit to Greece by Presi-
dent Kennedy's wife this summer was helpful in em-
phasizing the friendly personal relationship between
the Greek premier and the US President.
In the past, Karamanlis' strength has been
largely in the conservative rural regions. It is
likely that he will continue to find widespread
support here. Autumn is normally a good time for
the Greek farmer, as crops are in and he has more
money in his pocket than at any other time of year.
The economic picture at first glance is good--par-
ticularly in light of the devastation to the country
caused by World War II and the 1946-49 Greek Civil
War. The currency is stable, and fiscal indicators
such as Greece's gold and hard currency reserves and
personal savings accounts are impressive. Karamanlis
has also received political benefits from the recent
successful conclusion of negotiations leading to
Greek association with the Common Market.
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Yet despite the economic gains of the past
six years, the standard of living remains among the
lowest in Europe; there is widespread unemployment
in cities and chronic underemployment in the agricul-
tural regions. Economic progress has not been as
rapid as many desire, and the benefits have accrued
primarily to the middle- and upper-income classes in
the urban areas. There is discontent among some
farmers over the government's support price for wheat.
Those Greeks living on a fixed income have been squeezed
by the slow but steady, increasein 'consumer. prices.,
Opposition parties--particularly EDA--can
be expected to publicize alleged scandals among gov-
ernment leaders and will probably try to revive in-
terest in the charges made last year by a wartime
German official in Greece that certain members of
the present Karamanlis regime collaborated with the
Nazis. Both EDA and the non-Communist opposition
leaders probably will denounce the government's role
in the 1959 settlement of the Cyprus controversy--
although it is questionable that there is much polit-
ical, mileage left in this issue.
The opposition has also complained frequently
in the past of government "repression." The present
caretaker government has proclaimed its intention to
follow a generally impartial policy during the cam-
paign, but subordinate security officials probably
will be more tolerant of ERE activities than of those
of the opposition--particularly EDA.
The recent unification of the non-Communist
opposition into the Center Union is potentially of
great significance. Nationalists who oppose Kara-
manlis now can vote for a non-Communist alternative
which has an outside chance of winning. In the last
elections (1958), many Greeks are believed to have
cast their vote for EDA candidates in protest against
both the government's policies and the failure of
the "center" to unite. The major danger for the
Center Union appears to be the likelihood that the
many able but self-centered politicians in the
party's administrative committee will find it im-
possible to work together, even for the brief period
before elections.
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EDA, which has been the legal front for the
proscribed Communist party since 1950, gained 24 per-
cent of the popular vote in the last elections--more
than double its usual figure--to become the major
opposition party in Parliament. Economic discontent
and--until recently--failure of the non-Communist
opposition to unite had led observers to speculate
that EDA might gain up to 35 percent of the vote in
the next election. While this is possible, EDA has
suffered two setbacks in recent weeks. It has been
unable to create a coalition with the nationalist
parties and thus achieve the respectability among-non-
Communists which such a coalition would have per-
mitted.
In addition, the rapid deterioration in
relations between Greece and the Soviet bloc prob-
ably has hurt EDA's electoral chances. The party,
through its press, has appeared an apologist for
the Bulgarians and Russians. The Bulgarians, who
have launched bitter protests in Athens over Greek
participation in recent NATO military exercises,
are detested by most Greeks, who recall previous
Bulgarian occupations of Greek territory. Premier
Khrushchev's threat in August to destroy the Acrop-
olis in case of war united the non-Communists in
Greece as have few events in recent years. Barring
a rapid improvement in relations between East and
West before 29 October, EDA seems destined to lose
strength because of its position on foreign policy.
EDA officials have already indicated that they will
concentrate on domestic issues.
One other factor which will influence the
outcome is the new electoral law, passed by Parlia-
ment in June. While it was sponsored by the govern-
ment and passed with all opposition parties opposed
or abstaining, it includes significant concessions
made by the government to the other nationalist
parties. The concessions were designed to ensure
the participation of these parties in the election--
they had threatened to abstain--and to preclude
their joining in a "popular front" with EDA.
One effect of the new law, as finally
passed, will be that the government will have to
increase its percentage of the popular vote over
that received in 1958 if it is to win a similar
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parliamentary majority. On the positive side for
the government, the law permits army and civil serv-
ice personnel this time to vote where they are
stationed, and both organizations are expected to
give overwhelming support to the ERE, The law also
provides for use of the last official census in ap-
portioning parliamentary seats among electoral dis-
tricts. As the 1961 census is not yet official, the
census of 1951--and in some cases that of 1940--will
be used. Both of these are believed more favorable
to ERE than is the latest census.
7. Background:
National elections are required every four
years, but since World War II they have normally been
held oftener because of the multiplicity of political
parties and resultant governmental instability. This
trend was reversed in 1952 when the Greek Rally, under
the late Marshal Papagos, assumed power with a large
majority in the Chamber of Deputies. In the election
of February 1956, the newly created National Radical
Union, founded by Constantine Karamanlis and including
most of the Rally, obtained 46 percent of the popular
vote and 165 of the 300 seats. Karamanlis' popular
vote was reduced to 41 percent in the elections of May
1958, but he captured 172 of the seats in Parliament.
Elections are not required before May 1962,
but it became apparent last spring that they would
probably be held this fall. In May the government
introduced a new electoral law based, like the pre-
vious law, on a system of modified proportional repre-
sentation. After several concessions to the opposition,
the bill was passed in June. Opposition leaders were
in frequent contact this summer and on 19 September
the Center Union, composed of most non-Communist oppo-
sition leaders and their followers, was founded. On
the following day Karamanlis submitted his government's
resignation; the King appointed a nonpolitical care-
taker government under the premiership of retired Lt.
Gen. Constantine Dovas and announced that elections
would be held on 29 October.
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8. Informed opinion on outcome:
Most observers believe Karamanlis' ERE will
gain at least a large plurality, and quite possibly
a majority of the seats in Parliament. There also
seems to be general agreement that he will lose votes
on domestic problems and gain others on his handling
of foreign issues. ERE leaders appear confident that
the party will secure a larger percentage of the pop-
ular vote than the 41 percent obtained in 1958. The
US Embassy in Athens reported in July that even should
Karamanlis win only 140 seats--which would be a loss
of 32 from the 1958 figure--he could still form a
government without a coalition.
Should Karamanlis be unable to form a gov-
ernment, he might be able to force new elections.
The present electoral law provides that all elections
after this one be held under a straight majority sys-
tem--unlike the modified proportional representation
system currently in effect. Therefore if no party
obtains a governing majority in the elections, the
King, who is sympathetic to Karamanlis, may call
immediately for new elections. ERE spokesmen are
confident that their party could win an election
held under the majority system, which gives all seats
in a district to the party winning a plurality of the
votes in that district.
9. Significance for US security interests:
Greece is an important part of3NATO'`s'south
eastern flank, bordering Bulgaria and Albania and in
an ideal position to prevent extension of Soviet control
over the eastern Mediterranean. The country also guards
the southern approaches to the Turkish Straits. The
Soviet Union has exerted steady pressure on Greece in
recent months, apparently in the belief that the nation
is a weak link in the Western defense line along the
southern border of the bloc.
Since 1947, Greece has received nearly $3
billion in economic and military aid from the United
States. Washington maintains a Joint US Military
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Advisory Group in Greece. Of the 5,500 US Government
employees and dependents in Greece, over 90 percent
are military personnel and their families.
The National Radical Union is firmly pro-
West and pro-US. Most leaders of the Center Union
are also in favor of maintaining existing close
ties with the United States. While EDA does not
now publicly advocate immediate withdrawal from NATO,
the party is under the direct control of the exiled
Communist party of Greece and would follow a pro-
Soviet policy if it ever achieved power.
As there is little likelihood that the
EDA will win a majority of parliamentary seats in
the forthcoming election, the only danger for US
security interests appears to lie in possible future
instability of the government if Karamanlis fails
to win an absolute majority of seats--or at least
enough seats to form a government without entering
a coalition. Karamanlis and his predecessor have
enjoyed absolute majorities since 1952. Should an
unstable coalition result from this election, Com-
munist-front EDA could, with relatively few members
in the Chamber of Deputies, exercise disproportionate
power over future government decisions.
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Assistant Director
Current Intelligence
Orig:
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