DETAILS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELECTION OF 9 APRIL 1961

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000500020037-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: November 16, 1961
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY M o'(
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
25X1
16 November 1961
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
copy-loo.
SUBJECT: Details on the Conduct of the South Vietnamese
Election of 9 April 1961
1. The conditions under which the April elections were
held in South Vietnam were such that the outcome was never in
doubt.
2. Diem has never permitted a cohesive opposition to de-
velop in South Vietnam and in the April presidential election
he faced no effective challenge. He was opposed by two little
known candidates: rubber plantation owner Nguyen Dinh Quat
and an elderly doctor of Chinese herb medicine, Ho Nhut Tan,
neither of whom was a seasoned politician or had any organized
political backing. The most effective political parties ex-
isting at the time of Vietnam's partition have long since been
weakened or factionalized; many prominent oppositionists now
live in exile abroad and among those still in South Vietnam
there is little unity of purpose or action. The most influen-
tial opposition leaders in Saigon at the time of the abortive
coup d'etat in November 1960 have either fled, been arrested,
or remained under surveillance or suspicion. In at least two
cases, prominent independents seeking public office have been
disqualified on technicalities.
3. In addition, a combination of factors such as Diem's
overwhelming advantages as incumbent, his tight rein on the
government apparatus, and the mechanics of election regulations
offered in themselves controls adequate to assure his re-elec-
tion. The election law provides for secret vote, poll inspec-
tors, and other safeguards, including an election committee,,
on which each candidate is represented, but this was headed by
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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a pro-Diem national assembly member. By committee regula-
tions, each candidate had equal access to government funds
earmarked to finance the campaign but could not use any
private funds; the campaign officially lasted from 15 March
to 8 April and each candidate was allotted an equal but
limited number of press conferences, public meetings, radio
addresses, and campaign literature. All such literature
was screened by the committee to weed out any basic themes
espoused by the Communists--national reunification, reduc-
tion of military strength, supremacy of the proletariat--
and, to preserve national unity, candidates were prohibited
from leveling personal attacks at one another.
4. These restrictions on campaign activity served to
handicap opposition candidates more than Diem who had had
the advantage for years of advertising himself throughout
the land. Diem and his running-mate Vice President Tho were
also able to campaign extensively under the guise of per-
forming government duties. Furthermore, no restrictions
were placed on political party expenditures or activities,
enabling the government's mass organizations to work actively
on Diem's behalf. No restrictions were placed on the govern-
ment-controlled press, which mounted derogatory attacks on
the opposition candidates. Other harrassment was reported
such as the heckling of opposition party meetings and the
alleged government blocking of the private bank account of
candidate Quat on the ground that he owed unpaid taxes. On
the official ballot itself, symbols were used to identify
candidates for the benefit of illiterate voters. Diem the
only nationally known candidate, was represented on the
ballot by his own picture; Quat was identified with the
symbol of a water buffalo and Tan with a lotus flower,
5. In the election, Diem received about 89 percent of
the total vote, which amounted to an estimated 93 percent of
the eligible voters. In Saigon, where opposition to Diem is
most vocal, the level of voter sophistication highest, and
foreign official and press observation greatest, Diem won
only about 62 percent of the.vote. The high rural turnout
reported is difficult to square with the extensive Viet Cong
influence in the countryside. In some areas--voter turnout
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apparently exceeded voter registration; this may be due in
past to the counting of votes of military units there in
the provincial total. There is probably little question
that in some cases local officials, who owe their positions
to Diem, falsified figures reported to Saigon or were
otherwise able to influence the vote. In this connection,
the South Vietnamese air force commander told the US air
attache he was particularly anxious that the air force
should make a strong show of loyalty to Diem. He indicated
that he would make speeches to his troops in support of
Diem and that at Tan Son Nhut air force base there would be
separate ballot boxes for the use of air farce personnel
and their dependents. On the other hand, a district offi-
cial in Quang Ngai rovince, central Vietnam, told a US
consular official that elections should be limited to the
educated in Saigon and Hue because the Vietnamese peasants
"want only to be left alone and would vote for any man in
power until he resigns or dies, be he Diem, Ho Chi Minh
or de Gaulle."
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