BACKGROUND: EVENTS IN THE CONGO SINCE 1 APRIL 1961

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000500030009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: REPORT

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BACKGROUND: Events in the Congo Since 1 April 1961
In the last month, Tshombe, under pressure from the UN,
the Leopoldville government, and factions within his own re-
gime, lost the initiative he gained at Tananarive last March;
he ultimately was put in detention by Leopoldville officials.
He maintained his pre-eminent position until about mid-April;
at that time, however, he was thwarted on several fronts. Be-
ginning about 10 April, the UN command moved to blunt the Ka-
tanga government's offensive against Baluba tribesmen in the
northern part of the province. UN contingents in the area were
reinforced--they now number about 2000--and the UN captured a-
bout half--some thirty--of the "white legion" which had been
spearheading the Katanga attacks. The legionnaires, most of
them South Africans, have been repatriated, and Katanga mili-
tary operations have been ineffective since then.
This military rebuff weakened Tshombe's position in
Elisabethville, and soon the tribalist-dominated legislature
proposed that a prime minister be appointed, with Tshombe rele-
gated to ceremonial presidential duties. This was followed on
17 April by an agreement between Kasavubu and the UN which,
inter alia, reasserted the central government's claim to hegem-
ony over Tshombe and his Belgian advisors.
These checks reportedly enraged Tshombe; however, he seems
to have underestimated the amount of animosity harbored for
him in Leopoldville. He went to the Coquilhatville conference
apparently assuming that his role would be that of a dictator
of terms, as it had been at Tananarive. However, the Leopold-
ville delegation, led by Foreign Minister Bomboko and backed
up by its recent agreement with the UN, took a much stiffer
attitude and refused Tshombe?s demand that the UN agreement
be repudiated and Katanga?s virtual independence recognized.
Tshombe than:ftried to leave Coquilhatville, and it was at this
point that he was put under detention. This seems to have
been ordered by at least some of the Leopoldville delegates;
at any rate, it is fairly clear that for some time Tshombe will
not be active in Congolese politics except on Leopoldville's
terms.
The situation in Katanga following Tshombe?s detention
remains unclear. Extensive opposition to both Tshombe and the
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Belgians has been reported, but so far the scene has been
quiet. Interior Minister Munongo, a conservative tribalist
who was the likeliest candidate for the prime ministership
under the revisions proposed by the legislature, has given
no indication that he intends to take over. Katanga affairs
are now being run by a triumvirate made up of Munongo, Vice-
President Kibwe, and National Assembly President Mutaka, and
it seems unlikely that any Katanga figure will attain the de-
gree of personal rule heretofore enjoyed by Tshombe.
Tshombe?S,lieutenants have been somewhat more concilia-
tory toward the UN than were Tshombe and his advisors. On
2 May they announced that they were willing to discuss with
the UN the implementation of the 21 February Security Council
resolution. Simultaneously, however, they stated that Tshombe
must be released, and their initial disposition to cooperate
with the UN may be reversed if, as seems likely, the UN makes
no effort to intervene on his behalf.
In addition to exerting pressure on Katanga, the Leopold-
ville government apparently is maintaining some kind of contact
with Gizenga's regime in Stanleyville. Early Ain April pre-
liminary negotiations with Gizenga were conducted by Leopold-
ville Provincial President Kamitatu, who is a member of
Gizenga's party but has been cooperating to some extent with
the Kasavubu regime. Kamitatu gave an optimistic estimate of
the possibility of a reconciliation between Leopoldville and
Stanleyville; no further contacts between civil officials
took place, however, apparently as a result of mutual distrust.
Discussions between military representatives of Leopold-
ville and Stanleyville seem to have been somewhat more fruit-
ful. There have been persistent reports that the Orientale
military, possibly including its chief, General Lundula, has
been more disposed toward a reconciliation than have its
civilian superiors. Several contacts which reportedly resulted
in an agreement between Mobutu's and Lundula's representatives
have taken place in northern Equateur Province, and a military
delegation from Stanleyville attended part of the Coquilhatville
conference. Stanleyville and Leopoldville both seem eager for
a reconciliation but are unwilling to make the necessary con-
cessions; military elements, who fear the army would be weakened
either by a fragmentation of the Congo or by a weak confederal
structure, may be able to exert pressure for reunification
on the' basis of a more highly. ce xtralized constitution.
In Stanleyville, Gizenga's regime reportedly increased
in stability during the month. Lundula, who has reestablished
tenuous control over his troops in the area around the city,
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apparently still accepts Gizenga as the head of the govern-
ment and echoes his line that the reconvening of parliament
is a prerequisite for a reconciliation with Leopoldville.
There is a powerful radical faction headed by Interior Min-
ister Gbenye, considered to be a dangerous racist, but it
has not challenged Gizenga's primacy. The Gizenga "central
government" is on bad terms with the moderate Orientale
Provincial regime headed by Jean Foster Manzikala, which re-
gards Gizenga's group as.-interlopers; however, Manzikala
lacks the backing to engage in a test of strength with Gizenga.
The economic situation in Stanleyville continues to 25X1
deteriorate, partly as a result of the failure of Gizenga's
bloc and Afro-Asian supporters to furnish material assistance
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in any quantity.
The supply of arms to Gizenga from his supporters in 25X1
the bloc and Africa remains a possibility, however. At
least one shipload of small arms from the USSR recently arrived
in Ghana,
rums probably is extremely re-
luctant to dissociate himself from the UN operation; however,
the recent slaughter of Ghanaian UN troops in Port Franqui
will make it more difficult for him to resist internal and
external pressure to take a harder line in support of Gizenga
and thus to move away from the nominal neutrality he has so
far maintained.
UN policy in recent weeks has been to work with Leopold-
ville, oppose Elisabethville, and largely to ignore Stanley-
yille. UN relations with the Kasavubu government have steadily
improved from a low point following the Matadi incident in
early March. By a mixture of threats and cajolery, Hammarskjold
has secured Kasavubu's agreement to the presence of a small
Nigerian police force in Matadi. This agreement could still
be upset either by popular opposition or by continued intransi-
gence on the part of Mobutu, but none of the parties seems
willing to make a major issue out of the dispute at present.
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The rapport between Leopoldville and the UN could also
be upset by the return of Rajeshwar Dayal to Leopoldville
as Hammarskjold's representative. Hammarskjold has implied
that his agreements with IKasavubu give him some leeway in
his plans for Dayal; his latest plan is to send Dayal back
for a brief stay and then to replace him with a five-man
commission. Congolese in Leopoldville have threatened new
outbreaks if Da al should return even for a short period;
The UN has secured Kasavubu's cooperation in a strong
stand against Katanga, and it apparently is continuing its
efforts to limit the activities of Elisabethville troops in
northern Katanga. Hammarskjold is maintaining a 3200-man
contingent of Indian troops, who apparently are feared and
disliked by almost all Congolese, as a reserve force on the
UN base at Kamina. Joint pressure is being maintained by
Leopoldville and the UN to remove key Belgian advisors in
Katanga, fora of whom were taken with Tshombe in Coquilhat-
ville and were turned over to the UN.
Belgium's attitude toward the UN and the Congo has been
modified by the incoming Spaak-Lefevre government in Brussels.
Spaak is known to believe that Belgium has been too strong in
its support of Tshombe and has ignored the Leopoldville
regime. He has been more cooperative than his predecessor in
the foreign ministry in;negotiations with the UN, and he re-
portedly plans to bring the African affairs ministry
un er efcontrol o is m n s ry. paa may e a e
to change Belgium s policy to some degree; however, Belgian
public opinion and the country's financial interests will
make difficult a policy of complete cooperation with the UN
or abandonment of Katanga.
5 May 1961
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