'ONE-MAN COMMAND' IN THE NEW SOVIET PARTY PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000500040012-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 31, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release W4NEt199i1TJA6S00&0056Q0Z0
31 July 1961
SUBJECT: "One-man Command" in the New Soviet Party Program
1. The specific reference in the military portion of the draft
Soviet party program to one-man command (yedinonachal iye) as a "most
important principle of the structure of the armed forces" does not
appear to foreshadow any change in the existing command structure.
One-man command has been a leading tenet of Soviet military doctrine
since the days of Lenin. Simply defined, it means that a military
commander has sole command and bears personal responsibility to the
Party and government for the combat readiness of his unit. He is
held accountable for military and political training, indoctrination
and morale.
2. At various points in Soviet history, political officers
assigned to the armed forces have had considerable authority to in-
terfere in the conduct of purely military matters. From the birth
of the Soviet state until 1940, they could (and were in fact required
to) countersign military orders before they were considered valid. The
debacle in Finland in 1940 led to the abandonment of this system.
The power of the political officer again increased following Soviet
defeats in the early days of World War I I, and tapered off as victory
drew near. At none of these points, however, was the doctrine of
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one-man command sacrificed. What has varied has been the authority
of political officers to intervene. It slackened considerably
during the years when Marshal Zhukov was Minister of Defense. Fol-
lowing his ouster in October 1957, however, political officers began
once more to exert their Influence, sometimes to a degree irritating
to line commanders, and in October 1958, the Communist Party
Central Committee issued instructions on one-man command to the
various services. These stated, for example: "The key to the suc-
cessful fulfillment of tasks set before the Navy by the Communist Party
and Soviet government lies in further improving party-political work
and in strengthening one-man command. " At the present tune, the
complete answerabtiity of the military commander for the conduct
of all affairs in his unit is clearly stated in Article 48, Internal
Service Regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces (1960).
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79S00427A000500040012-8