PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMMENTS BY KHRUSHCHEV ON US REPLIES TO THE VIENNA AIDE-MEMOIRE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000500040039-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: August 24, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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State Department review completed
MEMORANDUM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
24 August 1961
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMMENTS BY KHRUSHCHEV ON US
REPLIES TO THE VIENNA AIDE-MEMOIRE
Khrushchev has not commented directly on either of the
US aide memoire replying to the Soviet memoire given to the
US at Vienna. Since that meeting, however, he has covered
the Berlin issue and the possibility of negotiations in private
talks with diplomats in Moscow.
2 July - Conversation with UK Ambassador:
Khrushchev said that the West was now threatening to
cut off trade and even to go to war if the Soviet government
signed a peace treaty. If other countries strengthened their
military forces in Germany the Soviet Union would do the same
and could always have forces in a position to protect the
territory of its ally, the DDR. But, in any case, modern wars
would be fought with nuclear weapons.. .The Soviet Union and
also the USA would no doubt lose tens of millions, but the
Soviet Union would certainly go to war if the Western Allies
tried to force their way through to West Berlin after the
Soviet Union had signed a peace treaty with the DDR. It would,
however, be ridiculous for two hundred million people to die
over two million Berliners.
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Khrushchev agreed (with the Ambassador's statement)
that a negotiation was desirable, but not on the 1959 basis,
which he dismissed categorically as no longer applicable to
the present situation. He regarded sixteen years as too long
a period to maintain a provisional post-war arrangement. The
world must settle down. Only the German question really
divided the Soviets from the Western powers...It was obvious
that neither the UK nor France nor even President Kennedy
wanted a reunified Germany, which would mean war sooner or
later.
Khrushchev continued that what really divided us over
Germany was not so much the issues themselves, on which we
were at heart agreed, as questions of prestige. The Soviet
government (and here Khrushchev appealed to his colleagues
for confirmation), having decided definitely that peace
treaties or a peace treaty must be signed this year, had
given most careful thought to safeguarding Western prestige.
Hence their proposal, which was sincerely meant, that West
Berlin (not, he was careful to add,.the whole of Berlin)
should be a free city, preserving its social and economic
system and its ties with the West, and with guarantees through
the presence of troops of the three Western powers and of the
Soviet Union...It would of course be preferable that the
position should be regularized by general peace treaties;
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but since the West seemed reluctant, the Soviet government
would sign their own treaty with the DDR and no Western
threats would hold them back from this.
Khrushchev said that they did not question our rights
stemming from the wartime and post-war agreements concerning
occupation and access. But these rights were only valid
until the signature of a peace treaty. Once the Soviet
Government had signed a peace treaty with the Government
of the DDR, as they fully intended to do, this would termi-
nate the state of war throughout the whole territory of the
DDR, including of course the land and air corridors to Berlin
and indeed, strictly speaking, in Berlin itself, since this
was within the territory of the DDR. The Soviet Union would
neither impose any blockade upon West Berlin, including the
Western troops there, nor attack them. But in the absence
of any Western signature of a peace treaty or some other
agreed arrangement, access to West Berlin through what would
then be the territory and airspace of the DDR could only be
permitted under normal international law, i.e. by arrange-
ment with the DDR. Any Western attempt to push troops or
aircraft through without DDR agreement would be regarded by
the Soviet Union as an act of war and the.Soviet Government
would support the DDR in resisting any such acts by force.
The Western powers were so preoccupied with their so-called
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obligations and prestige that they failed to see the obvious
fact that any other attitude would constitute an intolerable
blow to Soviet prestige.
Khrushchev asked the Ambassador to assure the Prime
Minister that he had not intended to make any threats, but
only to remove any possible misunderstandings. The Soviet
Government would prefer a settlement by agreement and were
convinced that their proposals did not infringe the interests
or prestige of the Western powers nor the freedom of West
Berlin. It was only if, under West German pressure, we
refused to join in a peace treaty and then resorted to force
to maintain ourselves in Berlin. that the Soviet Union would
meet force with force. However, he remained confident that
the Prime Minister and President Kennedy and General De Gaulle,
all of whom were wise and reasonable men, would join in an
effort to find a solution "by way of reason."
8 July - Conversation with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic:
Yugoslav officials said that during these talks
Khrushchev appeared convinced that "sensible Western states-
men" would not permit the issue of, Berlin to develop into a
conflict. He seemed convinced that current US policy was
being set by Adenauer, and did not represent "real" US in-
terests in Berlin and that US interests were mainly a matter
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of prestige. He also assured Popovic that 31 December was
not a deadline, and that the USSR would be willing to continue
negotiations, provided the talks were not dragged out in-
definitely. Khrushchev remarked that the West apparently
considered that after signature of a separate peace treaty
a major crisis would develop. He stated, however, that when
the West saw there would be no really substantive change in
access procedure "they will swallow it."
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26-27 July - Conversations with John J. McCloy (Moscow cable
version):
Khrushchev raised subject (of Berlin) and expounded the
Sov position essentially in same terms as in Vienna, emphasizing
his determination. to go through with a peace treaty under any
conditions. Deplored talk in US about possibility of war and
stressed Sovs did not want war but if war imposed on them they
had means destroy all Europe. Said.Sovs would match each US
division sent Europe with two of their own. Re German Re-
unifcation, claimed no Western power sincere about it; re-
questing this info be kept confidential, claimed De Gaulle
had told him he wanted preserve two Germanies and had confirmed
this position last week when he received Ambassador Vinogradov.
Stressed German unification not negotiable and strictly in-
ternal matter of Germany. Referred Sov proposal for entering
agreement on Germany and contended Sovs wanted no clashes
with US but rather friendship and good relations. Lancing
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West Berlin boil would clear atmosphere since no disputes
except Germany exist between two countries. At same time
fully realize dangerous moment being approached but peace
treaty would still be signed and nothing could intimidate
him.
Referred to exchange aide-memoires on Berlin and said
Sovs now preparing reply to ours. Compared this exchange
with kicking foot-ball back and forth and said this would
probably continue until peace treaty signed when US might
kick ball different kind and Sovs would do same in return.
However, US as well as UK appear willing negotiate; therefore
situation should not be inflamed and common sense should be
used. Invited West advance its own proposals or peace treaty
and claimed Sovs did not wish impose their own conditions.
Negotiations on peace treaty would be open and each side
could express its views. Expressed agreement with thesis
better have difficult negotiations than war.
Pleaded for understanding Sov position and asked McCloy
convey best wishes to President. Said believed President dis-
playing restraint and dignity in Berlin matter; true he some-
times engages in polemics but always leaving door open for
negotiations. Said if President had proposals.Sovs would be
happy to consider them and perhaps suggest counter proposals.
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Such exchange might take place on confidential basis. Re-
affirmed willingness to guarantee freedom and independence
of West Berlin once peace treaty signed and went so far as
to say he thought any Western proposal for such guarantees
would be accepted.
27 July (President's address): In strong emotional
tone, Khrushchev stated President in effect had declared pre-
liminary war on Sovs because he had presented Sovs with ul-
timatum and had said if ultimatum not accepted that would
mean war. Sovs regretted President took this course, but
accepted challenge and would not change policy directed at
signing peace treaty and solving West Berlin problem on basis
freedom and independence West Berlin. History would judge
US if war should occur and would also determine who would
survive. Said he would talk to General Staff and Defense
Minister and ask them to review situation and strengthen Sov
defenses. Said he would be back Moscow Monday (31 July) and
hear their report. If necessary, would publicly inform Sov
people that US presenting Sovs with ultimatum which tantamount
to war. US actions confirmed his January 6 thesis that when
capitalists and imperialists lost confidence in victory on
basis of peaceful coexistence they would resort to war. Con-
tended war would not be over Berlin but rather war of monopo-
lists and imperialists against socialist countries. US trying
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to assume role international gendarme, something Hitler had
aspired to. Reiterated whole Europe would be destroyed in
war. As to US, USSR would have to compete with it and probably
neither side could wipe out the other. US would survive, but
there would be no wall street any longer because people would
not tolerate system unleashing wars. Said President's in-
tention "mobilize" armed forces and industrial potential might
not be followed by similar action on Sov part because war
bound be thermonuclear and Sovs have enough bombs so no need
take people away from industry. Said modern war would be de-
cided not by infantry but by rockets and nuclear bombs. Kept
emphasizing his rocket commands and implying his great su-
periority in this field. Reiterated would consult with General.
Staff and Sov Govt and draw proper conclusions. Also would
inform people US would start war if peace treaty signed be-
cause people should know about inevitability of war; war seems
inevitable because Sovs will sign peace treaty. Sovs will.
counter any US action and will respond to war with war. Only
a madman can declare war today. President's statement that
there was threat to freedom West Berlin was fallacious be-
cause Sovs proposed guarantee to keep the freedom of that city.
Expressed view President reasonable, young man full of energy
and, wished display that energy. However, if war should occur
he would be last President because no one knows what would
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happen after war. Said he had made all these statements be-
cause it would be strange if, having seen President's speech,
he were simply to talk about Soviet willingness disarm while
President requesting another $3.5 billion for arms. It would
be strange if he should ask McCloy merely convey greetings to
President or if he were to "try jump into President?s throat
without scratching it." Sov prickly and quite difficult to
digest. However, he still believes in President?s reason.
President will have to consult with his Allies and uncertain
whether they would want war. In any event, Sov proposal for
negotiations on peace treaty remains valid and open. Sows
wish resolve this problem peacefully, remove this rotten tooth,
and develop US-USSR relations, but on basis of peace treaty
and not on basis of ultimatum. Said after thunder storms
people cool off, think problems over and resume human shape,
casting away threats.
Re nuclear tests, Khrushchev asserted Sovs not testing
clandestinely and assured McCloy would not do it in future
either. Said strong pressure on him to resume tests because
many inventions and discoveries had accumulated and designers
want to test them. This pressure now stronger in view of
Berlin situation and threat of war if peace'treaty is signed.
Said he had been successful in resisting pressure so far but
if US intensified its threat of war over peace treaty it would
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assist those in Soviet Union who want resumption. Stated
Sov scientists believed 100 megaton bomb would be most eco-
nomical cost wise. Sovs have rocket capable of lifting such
bomb. However, such bomb would require testing. Asserted
he had told his scientists perhaps US would resume testing
and thus help them test their bomb. Conceded no agreement
in Geneva in sight since US would not agree to Troika and
Sovs could not abandon it. Reiterated Sov arguments re
espionage and lessons of Congo events, as well Sov position
that a test ban would not resolve disarmament problem. Like-
wise, recited standard Sov line on French testing. Contended
present Soy position test ban not due Chinese pressure and
claimed no pressure on part anybody possible in socialist
camp. Stated Chinese would of course eventually develop
nuclear bomb but claimed ignorance when that would be. Stated
under general and complete disarmament Troika would be dropped
and would not be acceptable even if US should propose it. No
Troika would exist even in course process of GCD and control
and inspection would not be subject to veto or any restriction.
2-3 August - Discussion with Premier Fanfan!:
Khrushchev asserted that he was not concerned by an
American military buildup, which would be too late, and did
not fear economic reprisals because he believed Europe needed
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its commerce with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev considered
negotiations feasible but only if soon, and directed toward
a peace treaty and a Berlin settlement. According to Italian
officials the only point on which Khrushchev went farther
than in previous statements was that after conclusion of a
separate treaty the Soviets were prepared to use force to
prevent unauthorized air access to Berlin. Khrushchev also
emphasized that any Western attempt to force access to Berlin
would be met immediately by nuclear force, from the outset.
7 August - Remarks to departing Yugoslav Ambassador:
Khrushchev told the departing Yugoslav Ambassador that
no action would be taken regarding Berlin before the German
election.
7 August - Conversation with departing Argentine Ambassador:
Khrushchev spoke at length and harshly on the subject
of Berlin. He insisted "We will sign a peace treaty." He
added, "If this means war to Americans, then there will be
war," but claimed he was confident there would not be war
because Americans do not want war "any more than we do."
11 August - Informal remarks to British Ambassador at Rumanian
Embassy reception:
Khrushchev emphasized hig agreement with President
Kennedy that negotiations on the Berlin situation are necessary.
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He welcomed the President's statement (apparently referring
to the Presidential Press Conference of 10 August).
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