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March 30, 1961
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SECRET Sanitized - A roved For Release : IA-RDP79S00427A000500070002-6 SITUATIONS INVOLVING A POTENTIAL FOR RESORT TO SUSTAINED INTERNAL VIOLENCE 1. This paper seeks to identify and analyze those situations in which the chances for the development of vio- lent internal conflicts similar to those now current in the Congo and in Laos are sufficient to warrant attention for contingency planning: that is, those in which there is a notable potentiality for sustained internal violence, possibly instigated or supported by external interests, within the next few years. Thus we exclude, on the one hand, open warfare between states, and, on the other, the innumerable possibilities for violent demonstrations, such as those which occurred in Tokyo in June 1960, and for rev- olutionary attempts likely to succeed or fail within a matter of hours or days, as in Caracas in January 1958, or in Addis Ababa in December 1960. 2. The conditions prerequisite to sustained violence are, of course: (a) the presence of two or more strongly an- tagonistic elements within the community; (b) an issue or event of sufficient importance to bring them into open violent conflict; (c) an inability on the part of either party to achieve a quick decision by force; and (d) suf- ficient means and determination on the part of each to sus- tain the conflict, perhaps with the support of outside powers. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 .SF['RF.T Sanitized - Approved For ReTeace ` lA-RDP 9SO0427A000500070002-6 25X6 3. Analyses of the situation in 34 selected countries are attached hereto. We summarize below, on a regional basis. b. Eastern Europe: The fate of Budapest in 1956 demonstrated the impracticability of sustaining violent re- sistance in this area. Although disaffection continues to exist, it is unlikely that such resistance will again be attempted for many years. The isolation of Albania, and the conflicting interests of Yug slavia, the USSR, and Communist China in that country make it a possible exception to the among these states are likely to produce violent political change in one or more of them during the next few years. Violence in the area is likely to take the form of urban disorders or sudden coup attempts, but these could lead to sustained violence in some cases. Resort to violence in any of these countries would be likely to have repercussions in others. Sanitized - Approved For Release- CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET ,L ?Sanitized - Ap roved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 d. South Asia: On the northwest frontier of Pak- istan and the northeast frontier of India there are po- tentialities for sustained conflict between the regular forces of those states and elusive tribesman disaffected toward them and accessible to outside support. Conversely, the Communist Chinese have evidently encountered a potenti- ality for sustained resistance in Tibet. e. Southeast Asia: Sustained violence is currently in progress in Laos and South Vietnam, and such potentiali- ties exist in Burma, Malaya-Singapore, and Indonesia. The collapse of Laos would have repercussions throughout the area, but they would probably be of a political rather than a violent nature. f. The Far East: Although potentialities for sub- version and violent urban demonstrations exist in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, we perceive no potentiality for sus- tamed internal violence in those countries. g. Latin America: Social and political tensions are acute throughout Latin America. Sustained violence such as occurred in Mexico, 1910-1920, or in Cuba in 1958, is conceivable with respect to many of the countries of the area, but violent political action is more likely to be of relatively brief duration, as in Venezuela in 1958. h. Africa: Situations of sustained violence now exist in Algeria and the Congo; potentialities for the de- velopment of similar situations exist throughout the continent Sanitized - Approved For Release _; CIA-RDP79500427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET ,Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP799SO0427A000500070002-6 in both the independent states and the remaining colonial territories. In some parts of Africa south of the Sahara-- South Africa, the Rhodesias, Angola, and Mozambique--this is a matter of tension between a settled and dominant white community and the mass of aboriginal Africans. Elsewhere, as in the Congo, it is a matter of regional, tribal, and cultural conflicts among the Africans themselves. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET 5X6 L Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized - approved For Release : CIA-RDP SO0427A000500070002-6 A. 1. Libya Internal conflict in Libya might occur if a power struggle follows the death of 71-year-old King Idriss. The king's nephew,'Hasan al-Rida, is being groomed for the succession but may prove too weak and inexperienced to maintain political equilibrium among Libya's several com- peting groups. In this event, the stands taken by the chiefs of Libya's provincial police forces and the federal army are likely to prove decisive. Hasan's supporters, other claimants to the throne, and Libya's growing anti- monarchical element would probably compete for the sup- port of these internal security forces. Armed clashes might follow, leading to prolonged conflict. A likely re- sult would be the division of Libya, between the pro- monarchical eastern province of Cyrenaica and the more republican western province of Tripolitania. The forces involved in any conflict would include the 3500-man federal army, the two well-equipped, provin- cial police forces of 3,600 each, armed Cyrenaican tribes- Egyptian forces might be invited to enter by the pro-UAR clique in Cyrenaica that opposes Hasan's succession, but 25X6 25X6 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 4RFT ;Sanitized -Approved sECR T For Release : IA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 Nasir is unlikely to risk a British reaction by responding favorably to such a request. Soviet-bloc intervention is Considered even more unlikely and would probably occur only after other non-Libyan forces had been committed. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 .Sanitized - Approved For RS ] TCIA-RDP79.SO0427A000500070002-6 A.2. Sudan General Abboud's military regime in the Sudan is cur- rently facing opposition on two fronts. A group of civilian politicians has, for some time been demanding that the army "go back to the barracks" and return the government to civilian control. In recent months, this opposition group has threatened to stage demonstrations and strikes if the military rulers do not respond with acceptable con- cessions. Such demonstrations might result in sustained violence. A second possible source of civil conflict exists in the Sudan's southern provinces. The Negroid tribes in the south have long resented northern domination. In 1955 southern dissidence resulted in an armed uprising against the central government. The rebellion was suppressed, but the government has since been forced to man the southern garrisons with northern troops. Of the two groups opposed to the government, the ci- vilian politicians present the most immediate danger to the regime. This group could probably count on the support of student and labor organizations, who are opposed to the restrictions placed on their activities by the government. Moreover, the Ansar Moslem Brotherhood--the mainstay of the opposition group--controls over 10,000 primitively armed tribesmen which could be called out in the event of a show- down with the government. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized - Approved For FM.ETCIA-RDP`799SO0427A000500070002-6 The government would probably command the support of the majority of the officers and men in the armed forces. The army, estimated at 10,000 troops, is armed with British World War II equipment, and is believed to be an effective fighting force. However, the Ansar sect has many adherents within the army itself, and their defection would seriously weaken the government's ability to cope with the situation. Although it is difficult to assess the extent of the discontent in the southern provinces at the present time, it appears that the lack of funds and the continuing and rigidly enforced ban on political activity have prevented the organization of any opposition on a major scale. Egyptian meddling in the internal politics of the Sudan appears to have decreased since Abboud's advent to power. Nevertheless, UAR capabilities for supporting dis- sident elements remain high. The USSR's capabilities for direct interference are not particularly good, since it has no direct access to the Sudan. However, should bloc and UAR goals in the Sudan coincide, the bloc's capabili- ties would be enhanced. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized -Approved For Release : CIA-RDP~79oSO0427A000500070002-6 A.3. Yemen The Imam of Yemen has managed to maintain reasonable stability through a combination of cash subsidies to vari- ous tribal elements and harsh suppression of dissidents. It is not likely that his chosen successor, Crown Prince Badr, will display either the subtlety or the determina- tion to continue such a policy successfully. Following the Imam's death--he is nearing 70--Badir's weakness might prove an invitation for contending elements to initiate a struggle leading to limited civil war. The conservative tribesmen, who care little for Badr personally and resent his father's arbitrary choice of a successor, may find themselves another candidate, the most likely being the Imam's brother Hasan, now Yemen's dele- gate to the United Nations. Hasan can probably count on the backing of most of the armed Zaydi tribesmen of northern Yemen, as well as some army elements. Barring outside interference, this combination would stand an excellent chance of overcoming any forces,. including the remnants of a poorly trained army, that Badr might muster. Tra- ditional tribal ascendancy would probably be maintained, with the small--10,000 men--army fragmented in a short struggle. The danger of protracted warfare would probably arise only with the entrance of outside assistance in terms of Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SF_RFT 25X6 25X6 SECRET Sanitized -,4pproved For Release : CIA-RDPZPS00427A000500070002-6 materiel and/or men. 25X6 The Sino-Soviet bloc has little capability for intervening in Yemen. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET 25X6 25X6 L Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A0005 0070002-6 '3O March 196 A.6. Lebanon Lebanon is the most recent example of the potentialities of guerrilla warfare in the Middle East. The 1958 rebellion, for the most part, was a guerrilla action fought over the whole country. The possibility of a recurrence is always present because of the basic incompatibility of the country's religious groupings. While neither the Christians nor the Moslems can be considered a cohesive group--too many sects within each broad grouping--violent and prolonged clashes could break out almost without warning. Lebanon is a country where nearly every office from President down is assigned in proportion to the numerical strength of the various sects. Moslem pressure for greater influence in the govern- ment is rising and increasing tensions. Pressure from the UAR on the Lebanese government and UAR backing of certain extremist Moslem elements add to the normal turmoil. While the Christians are divided in their loyalties to several political leaders--ex-President Chamoun and Pierre Jumayyil, leader of the Christian Phalamge are the most prominent--they have a tendency to bury their dif- ferences in the face of Moslem attacks. Although the Christians are believed to be in the majority, their divi- sion into many sects reduces their effectiveness, especially as rivalries between political leaders grow. The danger of a split along religous lines would likely make the Lebanese army an ineffective force to sup- press guerrilla warfare. It acted more as a referee during Sanitized - Approved For ele : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECa Sanitized - proved For ~ee~aeTCIA-RDP S00427A000500070002-6 the 1958 rebellion than a military force and only the personal prestige of President Shihab (then army commander) held it together. His position as President is the main stabilizing force in the country today. In the event of an outbreak of guerrilla warfare, covert intervention by the UAR from Syria is almost a certainty. Soviet bloc capabilities would be minimal in the event of Christian-Moslem strife--the only type conceivable in Lebanon. In fact, there is a likelihood that any bloc support would be thrown to the Lebanese Communists who are strongly anti-Nasir. Such support probably would con- sist of money and propaganda. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET ?Sanitized - Approved Fcg'feXgqe : CIA-RDP7g500427A000500070002-6 --U;or 1016V 30 March 1961 A.7. Iraq There are strong divisive factors in Iraq. While Sunni (Orthodox) Moslems are in the majority, they are divided among mutually antagonistic Kurdish, Arab, and Turcoman tribes. The 1,250,000 Sunni Arabs inhabit the Western half of the country, while the 800,000 Kurds are concentrated along the Turkish and Iranian borders in generally the same area as the Turcomans who number 80-100,000. Tribal rivalries keep the Kurds in almost constant turmoil. Iraq's approximately 3,800,000 Shia Moslems, located in the south, resent Sunni Arab dominance of the country. They have strong ties with Shia Iran and their theology tends to give them an affinity with the Hashimite royal house of Jordan, as descendants and successors of the Prophet Muhammad. Prior to 1946 Kurdish and Shia tribal rebellions had broken out several times, even with a strong government in Baghdad. A weakening of Baghdad's control in the provinces could permit a recurrence. All of these groups either have arms or access to them. Qasim holds Iraq by default because of the lack of other political rivals of stature and because of fears that his removal would engender civil war. Should Qasim be over- thrown or assassinated, a power struggle would develop which might include extensive fighting of a guerrilla nature--both urban and rural. Tribes in the south and west, with UAR and Jordanian support, would be likely to raid towns and cut Sanitized - Approved For RBI y E~IA-RDP79S00427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79~SO0427A000500070002-6 communications; rebellion among the Kurds and strife between Kurds and Turcomans would almio t=jaertainly,erupt--there is considerable beneath-the-surface fighting between Kurds and Turcomans now. The 72,000 Iraqi army might fragment along religious and ethnic lines, as well as split into pro- and anti-Communist factions. Shia tribes in the south would find common cause with Hashimite Jordan. Iraqi Communists probably have the greatest potential in the Middle East for carrying out terroristic and guerrilla campaigns. They are the best organized group in the country, they have stores of arms, and they can organize the city mob, as well as some peasants, in their behalf. They reportedly have a plan for counter-rebellion in case of Qasim's death. Party membership is in the neighborhood of 5,000. Although the Soviet bloc is not at the present time engaged in anti-regime activities, bloc capabilities for exploiting Iraqi turmoil appear to be good. Such a Soviet effort could be two-pronged--support for local Communists, and backing of anti-regime Kurdish rebels with arms, propaganda, and money. Clandestine flights into Kurdistan would be comparatively simple, since the Iraqi border is only a little over 100 miles from Soviet territory. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 Sanitized - A roved Ba se : CIA-RDP7*00427A000500070002-6 30 March 1961 A.8. Iran There is not, at present, any potentially dissident group in Iran capable of sustained violence. Tribal groups tradi- tionally oppose the central government and frequently have been in rebellion. Many of these have now been pacified. Of the two groups most likely to create problems--the Kurds and the Qashgai--neither is sufficiently well armed to carry on sustained violence. The Iranian peasantry, although in most cases having grievances against the local landlord and local authorities, is unarmed, apathetic and unlikely to resort to violence. Urban unrest especially in Tehran is probably greater than in the countryside; again, however, there seems to be little possibility of any urban group being capable of more than sporadic violence. Assuming a situation in Tehran which would eliminate or greatly weaken the presence of the central government in the provinces, the picture could change markedly. Many tribal groups, especially Kurds, Qashqais and perhaps Bakhtiari would probably be able to exert local autonomy. However, the problem of sustained violence might not arise presentatives of the central government, i.e. army and gendarmerie, would be likely to withdraw without resistance. Under these circumstances the USSR would meet little opposition to any action it chose to undertake. Azerbaijan and Kurdistan would be likely targets and susceptible to the control of any well-organized, cohesive, and well-armed group. Sanitized - Approved For, ': CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET ,Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP O0427A000500070002-6 30 March 1961 B.9. Northwest Frontier of Pakistan Developments in the huge Pushtoon tribal region, which straddles the Afghan-Pakistani border and historically has been a source of insurgent activity against governments on either side, continue to pose the threat of widespread vio- lence. Since 1947 the traditional resistance of the semi- autonomous tribes to any authority outside their own iso- lated areas has been abetted by the efforts of both the Afghan and Pakistani governments to subvert the tribes living within the other's territory. Almost constant friction along the frontier has resulted from the dispute over "Pushtoon- istan," involving Afghan claims that Pushtu-speaking tribes- men living within Pakistan who are racially and linguistically related to the tribes of eastern Afghanistan should be given the right of self-determination. Pakistan contends these tribesmen are Pakistani nationals who have no desire for separate status. In recent months there have been several violent inci- dents, arising chiefly from Kabul's attempts to foment unrest among the Pakistani tribes and Rawalpindi's efforts in response to extend its direct control in the region up to the inter- national boundary (Durand Line). There are nearly 5,000,000 Pushtoons living in Afghan- istan and close to 6,000,000 in Pakistan. The number of adult male tribesmen located in the immediate border zone and who are disposed toward warlike ventures probably is about 500,000. The Afghan Government has about 40,000 regular troops in or Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : w TA-RDPZ&SOO427AOOO5OOO7OOO2-6 near the border region. The number of tribal irregulars it can muster, either in support of its regular forces or as separate guerrilla bands, probably varies from several thou- sand to upwards of 20,000 depending on Kabul's logistic capabilities. The Pakistani Government maintains fewer troops in the immediate vicinity of the frontier but could bring in possibly 60,000 on short notice. These regular forces are greatly superior to Afghan troops. Some tribal irregulars would be available to support Pakistan's regular forces, except in the event of a general uprising of Pushtoon tribes. Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan since 1956 has increased Kabul's capability of controlling the often recal- citrant tribes within its own territory--a primary concern of the royal regime--as well as having strengthened its mili- tary position vis-a-vis Pakistan. Soviet arms have been issued only to regular Afghan forces, although some of the obsolete equipment they have replaced probably has been turned over to tribes invq.ved in the Pushtoonistan campaign. Rumors (emanating from Pakistan) of Soviet infiltration of the tribal areas have never been confirmed. Contacts between Soviet agents and tribal chiefs would not be welcomed by authorities in Kabul. The presence of ethnic minorities in the USSR akin to tribal groups across the frontier provides Moscoi with opportunities for penetration on a limited scale. In the event of a tribal revolt or an Afghan-Pakistani conflict, this asset combined with Moscow's close military and political Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 ecrNnc?r Sanitized - Approved For Release' ETA-RDPWO0427AO00500070002-6 ties with Kabul would greatly facilitate Soviet intervention if it were deemed politically desirable. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDPWO0427A000500070002-6 30 March 1961 B. 10. Northeast Frontier of India The Indian Government has been plagued by an armed insurrection in the Naga Hills/Assam-Burma border region for more than eight years. The problem centers around the demand by several of the more important Naga tribes --now Christianized but in recent history headhunters-- for autonomy in their affairs, from the extremist position of complete independence to the more moderate view of separate statehood within the Indian union. New Delhi has sought in the last few years to build up the moderates so as to isolate the extremists; the latest and most significant step was New Delhi's agreement to establish the state of Nagaland within the Indian union, despite the nonviability of such a state. It is the extremists --the "hostiles" in Indian parlance--who continue the fight with sabotage, ambush, and banditry; although out- numbered by more than 10 to 1 by Indian troops and secu- rity forces, the dissidents live off the country through the use of terrorism, blackmail, intimidation, and tribal loyalties. They are loosely organized in small bands which rarely engage in pitched battles, preferring instead to hit and run. Their weaponry comes largely from caches of small arms of Japanese, British, and American manufacture left Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized -Approved For Release : IA-RDP79S00427A000500070002-6 in the area following World War II; these have been sup- plemented by archaic weaponry indigenous to the area and by captured Indian weapons. The "hostiles"' strength lies in knowledge of the terrain, support they obtain in the countryside, mobiljty, and determination. The government's strength lies in numbers, equipment, staying power, control of the major centers, and in the build-up of moderate elements; a major government handi- cap, however, is the difficulty in providing logistic sup- port to the army in the area, much of which must be air- lifted. Another handicap for the more than 20,000 Indian troops and security forces in the area is the political restraint imposed on them by the government. To date there has been no indication of Sino-Soviet bloc involvement politically, nor have bloc weapons turn- ed up in the Naga arsenal. There is little doubt, how- ever, that the Chinese would seek to. capitalize on this dissidence should Sino-Indian hostilities ever develop. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SF rRFT O0427A000500070002-6 S Sanitized - Approved For ReleasVEILRDP,79 _MW NCFCRN B. 11. Tibet Although virulent hostility exists between the Tibet- ans and Chinese Communists, the present situation in Tibet cannot be characterized as one of "sustained violence." The Tibetan rebellion began in March 1959, but was quickly put down by Peiping which possessed overwhelmingly superior weapons and manpower. While not a threat to the Peiping regime, Tibetan resistance does continue and is a major irritant to the Chinese. The 1959 uprising was the culmination of eight years of Tibetan resentment over Chinese Communist practices and programs which the Tibetans realized would destroy their culture, religion, and way of life. The immediate catalyst sparking the rebellion was the belief that the god-king, the Dalai Lama, was about to be kidnapped from Lhasa by the Chinese authorities. Fighting began in Lhasa, probably to cover the Dalai Lama's escape, and quickly spread throughout the country. The number of Tibetans involved in the fighting has never been known with accuracy; the Chinese Communists put the figure at 20,000, but the number was probably higher. The Tibetan "army", an ill-equipped force of 10,000 men, was involved as well as many of the tribes, including one which had migrated to Tibet a few years earlier after fighting Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SFCRT NoF nitized - Approved For ReId%Cggl 4-RDP7.9SO0427A000500070002-6 the Chinese to the east. Many monasteries also partici- pated. The Chinese Communists had over 50,000 troops stationed in Tibet and quickly doubled their garrisons. Within six weeks the main Tibetan forces were defeated although mopping up operations continued for a year. In the background of the Tibetan rebellion was a long history of anti-Chinese feeling and Chinese Com- munist policies which vacillated between oppression and conciliation. Perhaps of greatest importance was that after eight years of Chinese rule, the majority of Tibet- ans in responsible positions regarded themselves as pa- triots and were identified with an anti-Chinese policy. Despite Peiping's efforts to curb their authority, they continued to dominate Tibetan society and to command the allegiance of the population. Peiping was handicapped in its ability to deal with Tibet by the latter's location at the end of a long and expensive supply line, a short- age of qualified cadres, the dispersed nature of the Tibet- an population, and a very difficult terrain in high alti- tudes. Peiping was also reluctant to offend India and Southeast Asian Buddhist countries by an overly blatant suppression of a neighboring society. Although the Chinese Communists determined to proceed immediately with the "reform" of Tibet after the 1959 up- rising, today they still find it difficult to put their Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET anitized - Approved For Release Rg A-RDP79;SO0427A000500070002-6 .Sanitized R NOFORN policies into practice. Cooperativization of agriculture has recently been postponed for three to five years (1963 to 1965) and tight controls over religious services and private business have been relaxed. It is clear that even today the Chinese are not able to mold the Tibetans to the Communist pattern and that the maintenance of their position there is still an expensive proposition. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 .qRT SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP7 SO0427A000500070002-6 C. 12. Burma In Burma, guerrilla warfare has its roots in both political and ethnic differences and stems from the British decision in 1947 to grant independence to the country as a union of semi-autonomous states established on ethnic lines. The political insurgents are primarily groups of the left--elements which claim some connection with the international Communist movement, but have little in common save opposition to the government. The ethnic insurgents are from the minority communities of Burma who reluctantly accepted the concept of a union government but later revolted against the domination of the Burman majority. They now seek either complete autonomy with- in the union or independence. Although at one time these various insurgent forces threatened to overthrow the gov- ernment and dominated all of Burma except the capital, Rangoon, today they have almost no hope of success and constitute little more than an expensive nuisance to the Burmese government. There are three distinct political insurgent groups --the Communist Party of Burma (CP(B)), the Burma Commu- nist Party (BCP), and the People's Volunteer Organization (PVO) or Peoples' Comrade Party (PCP). The CP(B) is made up of fanatical revolutionists who have never sustained Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET ,Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP7Z9S00427A000500070002-6 territorial control and number about 500. The PVO (or PCP), mainly leftist veterans of the Burma Independence Army, although once numerous have now either accepted government amnesty or are largely merged with the BCP. The BCP, which was the largest and best organized element in the Burmese independence movement, is now down to a strength of 1,200. Although all three of these political insurgent groups have their supporting organizations in the legal political parties, they have little support in the civilian population and have been reduced to relatively ineffectual bandit forces. There are two main ethnic insurgent groups: The Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) and the Shan Independ- ence Army (SIA). Both of these organizations seek either independent states or, at a minimum, autonomy from Burman rule. Holding territorial bases in areas dominated by the Karens and Shans and sustained by the sympathy of these ethnic groups, the KNDO and SIA will be far more difficult for the Burmese army to eliminate than the political in - surgents. Armed KNDOs are estimated at 3,200 and the SIA forces at 1,000 (500 armed). Other incipient insurgent movements among the Kachins, Chins, Mons and Arakanese have no individual significance. They merely underscore the general discontent among Burma's minority groups with Burman domination. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET :Sanitized -Approved For Release : CIA-RDP S00427A000500070002-6 To control these insurgents, the Government has a total force of 116,547 men--an army of 85,000, a Union Constabulary of 25,000, a Navy of 3,468 and an Air Force of 3,079. Although the government forces have been un- able to eliminate these insurgents, their relative ef- fectiveness is indicated by the changed security situa- tion since 1948. In 1948, the government controlled only the capital city. Now the insurgents control only pockets in the countryside. Since 1948 there has been little direct communica- tion between bloc personnel and any of the pro-Communist insurgents. Second and third echelon leaders reportedly have been receiving training in China, but this has had no notable effect. The Communist elements as such appear to have little prospect of increasing their strength. On the other hand, as they have declined in power, they have been more willing to make common cause with the ethnic insurgents and, reportedly, have had 'some success in subverting the Karen insurgents toward Communism. Notwithstanding the influence of the Communists among some Karen units, the prospects of bloc utiliza- tion of the ethnic insurgents is low. The leadership is narrowly nationalistic and deeply conservative. While it might be tempted to accept Communist support, it would do- so only in an attempt to expell Burmans from the ethnic territories. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized -Approved For Release : CIA-RDPS00427A000500070002-6 25X6 C. 13. Malaya - Singapore Malaya Malaya's principal political problem and its most likely cause of civil disorder is the rivalry of its two largest ethnic groups, the Malays and Chinese, who respectively comprise 50 and 37 percent of the population. The out- break of widespread communal strife appears unlikely in the near future. However, violence between the communities might erupt over a trivial incident or could be organized by communal extremists, possibly in collusion with the underground Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The Malay community controls the government and the instruments of violence--the army and police. The Chinese control most of the channels of trade and could paralyze the national economy. Rural Malays, who live in isolated villages, would be vulnerable to attack by Chinese bands. In any conflict Chinese bands would be supported by the guerrilla arm of the MCP. Although reduced to a remnant force of some 500 men, the MCP terrorists who remain in the field are hard core cadres who could train, stiffen and probably supply from hidden caches in the jungle, organized Chinese bands. SECRET SECRET ,Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP ,SO0427A000500070002-6 25X6 Communist China would almost certainly champion the Chinese in Malaya. However, it would be difficult for Peiping to intervene with supplies and advisors. Singapore Singapore's growing Chinese masses, many of whom are emotionally drawn to mainland China, seek radical solutions to the island's pressing social and economic problems and will become susceptible to'exploitation by extremist and pro-Communist leaders who advocate violent tactics if pro- gress is not made in overcoming these problems. The struggle for power in Singapore is between the non- Communist left leadership of the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) and a pro-Communist left-wing of that party. While present Communist policy calls for cooperation with PAP, a show-down might become unavoidable. In the event of a public clash, the extreme leftists could temporarily paralyze the island through its control of the blue-collar trade unions and the militant students of the Chinese middle-schools. The government has available its own well-trained riot police anc6 these units proved incapable of restoring public order The pro-Communists probably regard a policy of violence as counter-productive, especially since it would imperil their objective of a merger with Malaya. The bloc has few assets in Singapore capable of materially affecting the outcome of the situation. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SFrPFT ,Sanitized - Approved For Relegc' ? -RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 NOFORN 30 March 1961 C. 14. Indonesia Indonesian dissident forces are composed of two fairly distinct groups, both anti-Communist: the Federal Republic of Indonesia (PRI) and the Darul Islam (DI). The PRI move- ment, led by local army commanders, originated in Sumatra in 1956 as a protest against Communist influence in Djakarta and against political and economic centralism. The principal military and political strength of the move- ment is in North and Central Sumatra and North Celebes al- though at various times the PRI has had the support of elements in North Moluccas, South Celebes, South Borneo, and South Sumatra. Military activity has been underway since February 1958 but has considerably diminished in recent months as the result of insufficient ammunition and supplies. There is considerable disagreement among the rebels as to whether to continue anti-government opera- tions. Should they succeed in resupplying themselves-- which seems doubtful--guerrilla activity by a significant number of PRI forces would be likely; even under present circumstances, a hard core will probably maintain itself, with the help of local sympathizers, for at least another year or two. The Darul Islam (DI) is a fanatical Moslem organization based in West Java which has sought since 1949 to establish a theocratic state. It has incorporated and maintains Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized -Approved For Release : CIA-RDP7S00427A000500070002-6 NOFORN liaison with Moslem dissident groups in Atjeh (Northernmost Sumatra), South Celebes, and South Borneo, With the PRI movement having lost its momentum, the DI is Indonesia's major existing dissident problem. A serious potential problem, however, is the Indonesian Communist party, now uneasily balanced off by President Sukarno against the anti-Communist army. Overall dissident strength is estimated at 17-20,000, with the PRI accounting for 10-11,000 and the Darul Islam 7-9,000. The Communist party claims a membership of 1,500,000 and could undoubtedly recruit support for guer- rilla activity from labor, veterans, and peasant organiza- tions which have a combined estimated membership of 4- 5,000,000. The Indonesian army numbers 240,000, the police mobile brigade 20,000, the navy 14,000, and the air force 9,500, for a total of 283,500. The Indonesian government, moti- vated partly by a continuing security problem, is expanding its security forces and re-equipping them largely from bloc sources. Although the bloc is not directly exploiting the dis- sident situation, it is deriving good will from its readi- ness to fill Indonesian military requests and from its favorable purchase terms. Long-term political and economic benefits to the bloc are likely to result from bloc train- ing of Indonesian personnel and from the increase in bloc Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SFrRF.T iLRDPJSOO427AOOO5OOO7OOO2-6 Sanitized -Approved For Release : NOFORN trade with Indonesia which will inevitably develop from the latter's large purchases. Bloc involvement in a forceful Communist challenge of the government would be likely. Indonesia's long coastline and inadequate communications with many areas of the archipelago presumably would assist bloc support operations and hamper government counter-efforts. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET ,Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDPJS00427A000500070002-6 30 March 1961 C.15. Netherlands New Guinea Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian) has been claimed by Indonesia since 1949 when the latter won its independ- ence from the Dutch. Djakarta is now conducting a three- pronged program of diplomacy, a bloc-supplied military build-up, and a paramilitary campaign in New Guinea to increase pressure on the Dutch to cede the area. Indonesia has sent at least 14 small infiltration groups to New Guinea since 1952, according to the Dutch. Six of these groups were dispatched in 1960 and one in 1961. Most of their personnel have been captured. Their mission apparently has been intelligence collection, small-scale sabotage, and psychological warfare with a view to inciting local unrest. There is little evidence that Djakarta's paramilitary campaign has had even token success. Force- ful Indonesian action on a larger scale is probable in the foreseeable future. The total number of Indonesian infiltrators reported by the Dutch since 1952 is 180. Indonesia is estimated to have the capability to launch a battalion-size (1,000-man) amphibious assault operation against New Guinea in con- junction with a 500-man airborne assault. Dutch ground strength is approximately 1,800, including 900 marines; naval strength, excluding marines, is 2,100; and air strength approximately 500. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET .Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP779,500427A000500070002-6 An Indonesian military purchasing mission which ne- gotiated a $244,000,000 arms deal in Moscow in January 1961, was justified by Djakarta as necessary to counter the Dutch build-up in New Guinea. This material, plus $277,000,000 in naval purchases negotiated in Moscow last September, will be delivered between 1961 and 1964. The Sino-Soviet bloc has strongly supported Indonesia's claim to New Guinea; Moscow particularly in January 1960 and has reiterated eral occasions since then. Should in New Guinea, the bloc would give support and, within the context of emphasized its support its position on sev- hostilities eventuate Indonesia diplomatic the USSR's supply and training program, might extend other assistance. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET ,Sanitized roved For Release : CIA-RDP79 00427A000500070002-6 D. 16. Dominican Republic Violence may break out at any time in the Dominican Republic since the repressive dictatorship of General Rafael Trujillo has become intolerable for many Dominicans. Trujillo has a large and well equipped military es- tablishment by Latin American standards and some of the 23,000 man ground force recently have received special training in anti-guerrilla operations. He also has an elaborate intelligence apparatus that thus far has severely restricted the ability of his unarmed civilian opponents to organize and plot. The opposition, who are mainly from professional and upper income classes, however, have es- tablished rapport with a few high-ranking army officers who might decide to join with any large non-Communist or non- Cuban supported insurrection group attempting an invasion similar to the Castro-trained group that invaded the Do- minican Republic in June 1959. The dissidents, despite their anti-Castro feelings, probably would attempt simul- taneous harrassing activities against the regime regardless of the invader's political orientation. Any Sino-Soviet bloc attempt to exploit the political situation in the Dominican Republic probably would be channeled through the Cuban regime. Castro has the cap- ability to train and equip a force with modern Soviet bloc arms on short notice, although its size would be Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SFrRFT SECRET Sanitized -Approved For Release : CIA-RDPw;S00427A000500070002-6 restricted to several hundred men due to Cuba's limited air and sea transport capabilities. The group that made the 1959 invasion was limited to about 225 men led by for- mer Cuban Revolutionary Army officers experienced in ir- regular warfare and included a number of exiled Dominican Communists and non-Communists recruited in the US and Latin America. The force was carried from Cuba in two motor launches and a C-46 transport plane. The attacks were poorly coordinated, the sea landings taking place about five days after the air transported group arrived. How- ever, it probably failed as a guerrilla operation primarily because the peasants were unwilling to furnish food and refuge to the insurgents. Potentialities for waging suc- cessful irregular operations have not increasedmuch since the 1959 attempt, when it took the armed forces only a few days to annihilate the guerrillas. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized -Approved For Release : IA-RDP7~9S00427A000500070002-6 30 March 1961 D. 17. Venezuela Venezuela has a tradition of extended rule by mili- tary dictatorship. The present experiment in civilian, elected, constitutional government had its origins as re- cently as January 1958--when Dictator Perez Jimenez was overthrown--and the incumbent Betancourt regime was in- augurated just two years ago. Plotting and coup attempts by rightist civilian and military groups and urban vio- lence promoted by leftist-Communist elements have occurred frequently since 1958, culminating in widespread leftist outbreaks in late 1960--probably the most serious threat to Betancourt thus far. Although both rightist and leftist groups appear to have been weakened during these past three years, Venezuela's serious economic and finan- cial problems could give rise to renewed violence, spread- ing from urban centers to the countryside. Some of Venezuela's 35,000 Communists have long been training for guerrilla warfare, presumably in preparation for this eventuality. The bulk of the country's security forces, which demon- strated their ability to control widespread urban unrest in late 1960, is considered loyal to the incumbent regime. The security components total about 38,700, as follows: army, 14,500; national guard, 6,000; navy, 5,300; air force, 2,875; civil police, estimated 10,000. The national guard Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 crrpr SECRET Sanitized - AV roved For Release : CIA-RDP7799SO0427A000500070002-6 is a well trained component with internal security as a primary mission, but the police force is ineffective. Moreover, some dissension is reported among junior offi- cers of the armed forces. The ability of the security forces to control extensive guerrilla warfare is untested, but they have probably received little specialized train- ing in this type of action. The Sino-Soviet bloc might exploit a civil war in Venezuela by training opposition leaders in guerrilla tactics and also by supplying them financial and propa- ganda support. However, direct bloc aid to opposition factions is more likely to be channeled through the Castro regime in Cuba. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET ,Sanitized Approved For Release : CIA-RDP7799SO0427A000500070002-6 30 March 1961 D. 18. Colombia A combination of banditry and violence in rural areas is the most disruptive force in Colombia and poses a serious threat to government stability. A 13-year old problem which has claimed the lives of over 250,000 persons and displaced approximately 1.5 million peasants, rural violence has im- peded economic development and created serious social problems. The Colombian army in late 1960 estimated there were 1,500- 2,000 active guerrillas. A much larger number of formerly active guerrillas form a potential for increasing and spread- ing rural violence. Primarily a socio-economic problem, other causes of rural unrest include traditional political rivalries and hatreds, Cuban-Communist agitation, family feuds, and wide- spread banditry. Military and police action against rural action has been ineffective, attributable mainly to lack of anti-guerrilla training and equipment and to inadequate sys- tems of communication and transportation. Political orientation of guerrilla units is Liberal, Conservative and Communist. The extent and effect of the latter is unknown; however, it is certain that leftist agi- tators are stirring up peasant feelings on agrarian reform and are distributing propaganda. Murders appear indiscriminate and are often brutal and on a mass scale. Guerrilla activity usually increases during the Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized - Approved For ReIMCRETA-RDPjS00427A000500070002-6 coffee harvest seasons of October-December and April-June, but no distinct pattern is noticeable. An increase in guerrilla activity since last September--the worst of any comparable period in three years--has aroused the nation and brought about an accelerated government drive to solve the problem. Bloc efforts to exploit this situation would probably be channeled through the Castro regime; however, the Czech consulate in Bogota is also a potential channel. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A000500070002-6 Sanitized - 4 proved For Release : CIA-RDP4S00427"0Q?pgQ7QWg-6 D. 19. Ecuador Ecuador has had more than 12 years of relatively stable government by elected constitutional regimes. The military is tending to become apolitical. Both local and national elec- tions in recent years have been unusually fair by Latin American standards and largely free of violence. Depressed conditions of both urban and rural masses and the influence of leftist- Communist-demagogic leaders have given rise to sporadic urban violence as recently as late 1960. In addition, pro-Castro groups are relatively strong. Unrest among the peasant class, provoked in part by Communist agitators, is on the increase and could spread to large areas of the country, which is geo- graphically suited to guerrilla warfare. The security forces, which at present are considered loyal to the Velasco regime, total about 21,000 as follows: army, 13,000; air force, 1,100; navy, 1,800; and national civil police, 5,000. They are believed capable of maintaining internal security, particularly the unrest in urban areas. The army is the best trained and most reliable element for this purpose. Considerable friction exists between the police and the army over responsibility for internal security. There is also evidence of dissatisfaction among the officers over Velasco's leftist drift in both domestic and foreign policy. The ability of the security forces to control extensive guerrilla warfare is untested, but is probably limited. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized -Appproved For l iiceTCIA-RDP7 SO0427A000500070002-6 The bloc conceivably could provide direct support to civilian opposition groups through the Czech legation in Quito, but is more likely to channel such aid through the Castro regime in Cuba. The bloc could also provide financial and propaganda support and training for guerrilla leaders. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 30 March 1961 D. 20. Peru The incumbent regime appears stable and benefit itt..g from improving economic conditions. However, the 1962 national elections could touch off widespread unrest between Peru's ruling classes, including the armed forces, and strong leftist but non-Communist political elements favoring rapid socio-economic reforms. There is growing concern over unrest among Peru's large and depressed Indian population in the sierra regions, agrarian and other labor violence, and the accelerated migration of impoverished peasants to already overcrowded urban centers. An uprising of the peasant popu- lation, particularly in central and southern Peru where Communist influence is strong and may be increasing, is a long-range possibility. Like Ecuador, Peru's geography is admirably suited to the conduct of guerrilla warfare. The security forces, which are considered loyal to the Prado regime, relatively well trained, and believed capable of maintaining internal order, total about 60,250 as follows: army, 30,000; national police, 16,000; republican guard, 2,500; navy, 7,350; and air force, 4,400. The ability-of the forces to control extensive guerrilla warfare has not been tested. Direct bloc aid to an opposition or rebel faction in Peru would probably be channeled through the Castro regime in Cuba. The bloc is capable of providing financial and propaganda support and training of leaders in guerrilla warfare. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP799SO0427A000500070002-6 30 March 1961 D. 21. Bolivia The Bolivian Government has been under the control of the leftist Nationalist Revolutionary Movement since it won power in a sweeping revolution in 1952. Tin mines were nationalized, agrarian reform begun, and the power of the former oligarchy destroyed. Momentum for economic growth has not developed, however, and some Bolivians feel that the revolution has been "betrayed." A failure of the recently initiated plan to reha- bilitate Bolivia's critically important tin mines through aid from the United States, West Germany, and the Inter-American Development Bank could give new impetus to this belief. In this event, or if President Paz should be incapacitated, a breakdown of law and order throughout large parts of the coun- try could occur, particularly because Vice President Lechin .- long the head of Bolivia's national labor federation--apparently does not now command strong support except in some labor groups. Military power is now fragmented within and among the army, national police and the civilian militia. Most of the adult male population belongs to the civilian militia which at least theoretically includes all government party members, union members, and peasants. Virtually every armed unit has men of diverse political orientation, varying generally from mildly leftist to Communist or Trotskyite, although the police and army are more centrist. Many Bolivians lack strong ideo- logy, however, and the political orientation of opposing Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP4- SO0427A000500070002-6 forces would probably vary from area to area with pro-Castro forces attempting to coordinate groups led by individuals sympathetic to them. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized Approved For Release : CIA-RDR OS00427A000500070002-6 E. 22. Algeria The political situation in Algeria, which has already produced a 6 1/2 year war between France and the Algerian nationalists, appears to be evolving toward independence for this north African country. The process of reaching a nego- tiated'settlement, however, will be long and difficult, and even the rebel Provisional Government (PAG) reportedly realizes that a transitional phase, possibly lasting several years, will precede full independence. Meanwhile, the French army, the European settlers, the rebel National Liberation Army (ALN), and the Moslem masses have interests and motivations that could cause prolonged and bloody conflict at any stage. The French forces in Algeria may be withdrawn from action during negotiations or even confined to the larger cities. A few of the "professional" units, such as paratroopers and legionaires, who have done most of the fighting--and incurred most of the hatred--may be transferred to France. But for the foreseeable future significant French forces will remain in Algeria, where their presence will lend vague hope to the die-hard settlers, and irritate large segments of the Moslem population. The European minority--although no longer capable of toppling De Gaulle's government--might in desperation create disorders that would provoke violent Moslem counter- action and create chaos. The French army might then find itself fighting either European settlers or Moslem mobs--in Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SRF_T SECRET ,Sanitized -Approved For Release : CIA-RDPS00427A000500070002-6 addition to the ALN. During the transitional period, or more likely after independence, massive Moslem attacks on Europeans could lead the settlers to fight for their existence, in which case they would almost certainly be aided by whatever French forces remained in the country and perhaps invoke renewed intervention from France. The KILN within Algeria, dispersed into small bands not fully controlled by the PAG, might under- take independent action if it felt the PAG had betrayed its interests by a moderate political settlement. The Moslem population, aware of its power since the December riots, can no longer be counted upon to remain passive or to follow blindly the orders of the PAG. Prolonged clashes between Moslems who have cooperated with the French and remnants of the ALN are particularly likely. Also, as independence ap- proaches, power struggles and realignments within the present rebel leadership will occur--possibly aided and abetted by outside forces, especially the Communist bloc or the UAR-- which could lead to armed clashes or even civil war among Moslems loyal to or manipulated by various factions. Of these various elements the French armed forces, which now number almost 450,000, are the best trained, equipped, and disciplined. There are over a million Europeans, of whom only 400,000 are of "French extraction" and probably no more than 20,000 are landed "colons." Most adult European males are armed, many having served in semi-official militia groups. The ALN has approximately 10,000 men inside Algeria. There Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 4FrPFT , Sanitized -Approved For Rel"ease:CIA-RDRZ9S00427A000500070002-6 ,mow are 15,000 in Tunisia and 6,000 in Morocco, so far-deterred from entering Algeria by the electrified barriers along the borders, who would probably enter even during a transitional phase and become part of an Algerian army. There would prob- ably be much ill-will between these troops and ALN forces who have fought in Algeria--killing Moslems as well as French. Of the 9,000,000 Moslems, some 120,000 are now serving in the French forces, and probably a million others are believed to have cooperated with the French. Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and the UAR have given various degrees of sanctuary to the rebel government and the ALN, and along with Other Arab countries and the Communist bloc have provided financial, diplomatic, and propaganda support, as well as small arms and ammunition to ALN units in Tunisia. and Morocco. So far only a trickle of this materiel has reached ALN units in Algeria because of the electric fences and French air surveillance. During a transitional phase, and certainly after independence, these obstacles would no longer exist. Granted continued transit rights by Tunisia and/ or Morocco, the capability of the Sino-Soviet bloc or other Arab countries to furnish material support to warring factions within Algeria would be excellent. After complete independence shipments could be made directly to Algeria by sea or air. In any of these cases the French navy and air force could inter- vene to prevent large-scale deliveries, but only at the risk of starting a general war. France would be unlikely to take this risk unless the French forces or French civilians in Algeria were gravely threatened. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized -Approved For Release : ~ A-RDR7ASO0427A000500070002-6 25X6 25X6 E. 23. Morocco Divisive forces existing in Morocco were reinforced by the accession to the throne last month of King Hassan II, Although Hassan moved quickly to assure his suc- cession when Mohamed died, he has not yet made any appreci- able concession toward.his opposition, largely centered in the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). This group is a loose coalition of organized labor, young intellectuals, youth groups and former resistance elements which consti- tutes the most dynamic force in Morocco. Because he has been chief of staff of the Royal Armed Forces since their inception, Hassan is presumed to have the support of the army (30,500 men) and the auxiliary forces (totalling 12,500). He commands the allegiance of the con- servative Istiqlal party, which won more than 40 percent of the seats last May when local councils were elected, and the smaller Popular Movement, supported by rural tribal elements, both of which are represented,in his cabinet. The UNFP can be expected to continue to strengthen its organization--which is now largely centered in Casablanca, Rabat and other western Moroccan urban centers-and to move to unseat the king should he attempt to suppress it. Con- trolling most organized labor, the UNFP could paralyze the country's economy. It is known to have been soliciting Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 Sanitized - Approved For Release : 1A-RDR49SO0427A000500070002-6 support of the younger military officers and may have in- stigated a move by young officers to reduce French influence within the Moroccan armed forces. It is also capable of re- sorting to terrorist and guerrilla tactics, The UNFP has been careful to remain in contact with all potential sources of support. UNFP leaders maintain contacts with the leaders of the illegal Moroccan Communist Party, and with many foreign Communist and Socialist political parties. The Soviet bloc, which already has made arms deliveries to Morocco--some destined for the Algerian rebels--could supply potentially dissident elements. Such dissidents might also again enlist the support of the Algerian rebels now in Morocco, and of other Arab and African states. Alger- ian rebels are reported to have contributed-substantially to the success of Moroccan guerrilla activities in north and central Morocco just prior to Moroccan independence in early 1956. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDF S00427A000500070002-6 E. 24. The Western Sahara (Spanish Sahara and Mauritania) Moroccan territorial claims to Spanish Sahara, which is ruled as a province by Spain, and to newly independett Mauritania make probable the outbreak of disorders by marauding tribesmen inspired, directed and equipped by Rabat. Some 650,000 people inhabit the two areas, which comprise about 520,000 square miles. For reasons of pres- tige, Spain is determined to retain Spanish Sahara, and has recently increased its troop strength there to between 8,000 and 10,000. France, by agreement with the Nouakchott government, maintains a small military force in northern Mauritania and, in an emergency, probably would call in the 8,000 to 10,000 French troops stationed at Dakar to sup- port the Mauritanian Government. Morocco is apparently using as instruments of its policy the nomadic Requibat tribesmen, some 20,000 of which inhabit northern Mauritania while others dwell in Spanish Sahara and southern Morocco, and the Mauritanian En Nahda political party. A substantial number of leaders and members of this party were arrested by the Mauritanian government last November after the assassination of the Mayor of Atar, labeled by Moroccan sources as Morocco's greatest enemy in Mauritania. Tribal raids may be augmented by activities of Moroccan irregulars. The targets for Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A000500070002-6 both tribesmen and irregulars are likely to be European mineral and petroleum concessionaires operating through- out the territory. Should Morocco succeed in obtaining.control over northern Mauritania, adjacent areas of Mauritania-may be threatened with annexation by neighboring Mali and perhaps Senegal. Morocco, which has received Soviet bloc and Arab states' support for claims to Mauritania, would probably solicit support for a Moroccan military expedition in Spanish Sahara and Mauritania. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP SO0427A000500070002-6 E. 25. Cameroun The southwestern region of Cameroun has been disturbed by terrorism and guerrilla conflict almost continuously since 1955. Instigated by the Cameroun People's Union (UPC), a Communist-influenced radical nationalist movement, this strife was aimed initially at forcing France to grant early independence. More recently, its goal has been the overthrow of President Ahnadou Ahidjo's moderate regime, which draws its support mainly from the conservative Moslem north and is dependent upon France for military and administrative sup- port. The regime is not generally popular among the Christian and pagan tribesmen of the south who are, however, politically divided. Since 1959 major elements of the UPC have renounced terrorism and returned to constitutional political activity --some even entering Ahidjo's coalition government formed last year. Other UPC adherents, mainly of the Bamileke tribe which accounts for about one-sixth of Cameroun's 3,200,000 people, have continued to foment disorders in areas bordering on the southern sector of the British trust territory of Cameroons. In this they have been supported and to some ex- tent guided by UPC exiles living in Accra, Conakry, and Cairo. These extremists'" activities have also been facilitated by the existence of acute economic and social unrest within the Bamileke tribe and by the presence in British Southern Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release :CIA-RDP799SO0427A000500070002-6 Cameroons of a local branch of the UPC. Under these circumstances the government has been and will continue vitally concerned about strengthening as rapid- ly as possible the embryonic Cameroun armed forces. The core of these is the army numbering about 1,500 men organized in two light infantry battalions. A third battalion now is being formed with French help and a fourth is planned. While some personnel are veterans of French Army service, the Cameroun Army's effectiveness is inhibited by illiteracy and language problems and by a lack of trained Africane'officers. Supple- menting the army is a 3,500-man Gendarmerie and a Civic Guard, a militia of 2,000 Bamileke tribesmen created especially to deal with the security problem in Bamileke-inhabited areas. Although basically loyal to the Ahidjo regime, these farces are not yet capable of maintaining internal security without the aid of some 2,100 French troops, whose services the govern- ment has reluctantly retained. Security operaticaas during the past year have reduced the number and extent of the areas where terrorism and tribal rebellion are rampant. Moreover, the most important leader of the UPC's exiled extremists-.-Felix Moumie-has been elim- inated as has one of the two principal rebel field leaders. Active UPC terrorists now may number less than 1,000 though appreciably larger numbers of non-politically motivated Baonileke tribesmen are still in: rebellion. The outlook now.,is clouded, however, by the recent decision Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET ,Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP`9S00427A000500070002-6 of Southern Cameroons as a UN-supervised plebiscite, to opt for union with Cameroun rather than with Nigeria. The neces- sity of absorbing this British-nurtured area inhabited by tribesmen similar to thosein the southern part of Cameroun, including an additional 300,000 Bamilekes, has created many new problems for Ahidjo who does not have the necessary ad- ministrators or security forces. This situation could lead to a recrudescence of UPC-inspired disorders, especially if 25X6 Any significant new deterioration in the security sit- uation would probably induce Sino-Soviet bloc countries to step up the clandestine support they have long been provid- ing the dissidents. This has apparently mainly taken the form of financial assistance to UPC exiles, although there are reports that some direct training in guerrilla tactics has been provided, notably by Communist China. Anti-Ahidjo radical leaders of the UAR, Ghana, Mali, and especially Guinea, which is accumulating large stocks of bloc arms, might also increase their aid to the UPC extremists. Czech pistols apparently forwarded from Conakry have already turned up in Cameroun. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP7 SO0427A000500070002-6 E. 26. Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea These Portuguese "overseas provinces" are the last significant areas of Africa to remain under European colon- ial rule, but they are now feeling the effects of nascent African nationalism. The white community is sizeable--270,- 000 out of a total population of 11.5 million--especially in Angola where it numbers some five percent of the popula- tion. In all three areas Lisbon has ruled directly, and there are no effective local political institutions to influence Portugal's policies; significant segments of the white commu- nities in Angola and Mozambique oppose the Salazar regime on ideological as well as economic grounds. The economic develop- ment of the three provinces has been neglected, and the African population is generally less advanced than in surrounding areas. Within the past two years there have been nationalist- inspired disorders in all three areas. Last summer Africans, presumably stimulated by propaganda and agitators from Tangan- yika, provoked disturbances in northern Mozambique. Since mid-February 1961 there have been serious disorders in Angola involving terrorist attacks on Europeans and their property as well as on Portuguese military forces. Portuguese Guinea, where there was a brief disturbance in August 1959, is currently the target of an intensified anti-Portuguese propaganda campaign emanating principally from Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET ~SECRE' Sanitized - Approved For Re ease : IA- RDPJS00427A000500070002-6 Conakry, Sekou Toure's regime and Communist agents are pro- viding guidance and other aid to African element bent on "liberating" the neighboring Portuguese province; there are unconfirmed reports that such elements are receiving train- ing in guerrilla warfare tactics. Portugal has recently reinforced its forces in the African provinces to a strength of about 19,400 army troops with Portuguese officers and mostly African enlisted men. In addition, there are 1200 commandos, 500 naval personnel and 3800 police. The Portuguese will use any methods neces- sary to crush disorders and have frequently reiterated their determination to remain in Africa. However, the nationalist movements are expected to increase their activities, par- ticularly in Angola and Portuguese Guinea, and will soon pose a formidable challenge to Portuguese security forces. Groups in Angola have their headquarters in other African capitals and can introduce personnel across the Congo border; nation- alists in Mozambique are now more quiescent but may be stim- ulated by Tanganyika's early independence and by racial and political troubles in South Africa. Communists are known to be influential in one of the anti-Portuguese emigre' organizations--African Revolutionary Front for the National Independence of Portuguese Territories (FRAIN)--which has its headquarters in Conakry. According to a rival nationalist organization, FRAIN is capturing a Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized - proved For Release : CIA-RDP74SO0427A000500070002-6 following among Angolan youth. Any bloc aid would probably, at least initially, be furnished to such emigre organizations in the African states rather than across the Congo border directly. The bloc and African nations generally are showing less awareness of the situation in Mozambique, where the problem of supplying dissident groups would probably be more difficult than in the cases of Angola or Portuguese Guinea. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET ,Sanitized - proved For Release : CIA-RDP ;SO0427A000500070002-6 E. 27. South Africa The racial situation in South Africa is already among the worst in Africa and may soon erupt into armed struggle between a white community of some 3,000,000 and African groups numbering about 10,000,000, the latter aided by another 2,000,000 Asians and racially-mixed persons. Despite storm-signals, the Afrikaner- controlled government is strengthening its oppressive racial program with only protest opposition from the English speaking minority of the European community. International criticism of the government's racial policies has already caused South Africa to withdraw from the Commonwealth and might induce Pretoria at an early date to leave the United Nations. The Europeans control a small but efficient military force. The army, navy, and air force total about 8,000 men--all of them white--and in addition the government can count upon another 80,000 members of the reserves. The police force totals about 22,000 of whom half are non-white, but only the whites possess firearms. The army, in conjunction with the police and the reservists, is believed capable of maintaining internal order ex- cept in the event of country-wide disturbances. Although South Africa manufactures the bulk of its munitions requirement, it is dependent on foreign sources for much of its heavy equipment; the present supply is serviceable but inadequate. Personnel have excellent fighting qualities although the forces suffer from inadequate training and from interference by politicians. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized -Approved For Release : IA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 1 40 *ft;ol The non-Europeans, who are still disunited by racial and tribal ties, do not yet exert pressure commensurate with their numbers. If organized, they could probably bring South African industry to its knees by withholding the labor supply and in- stituting a boycott of manufactured products. So far, non- European organizations have been ruthlessly suppressed by the government. However, coordinated and widespread African violence against Europeans might overtax the Union's security system and force the government to concentrate its forces in certain in- dustrial areas, thereby yielding outlying regions to the non- Europeans. Similarly, hit-and-run tactics against isolated European farmers or urban dwellers at night might overtax the police forces. This could begin a reign of terror--which probably would be countered with white vigilante action. At present the Communist bloc has virtually no influence among the dominant white population, but a few of the Indian and African leaders are Communists and many are sympathetic to Com- munism for its attack on racialism and white domination. Commun- ist influence will probably grow among the non-Europeans whose main direct contact with Moscow will be through African students and representatives in the bloc and trained agitators slipped into the Union. This development will be aided by the clandestine-- and largely white--internal Communist party, the only such party in Africa south of the Sahara. The disunity among non-Europeans hampers effective aid on the part of the bloc and African nations, Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET ,Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP779S00427A000500070002-6 but the plight of the Africans will probably receive increased attention abroad. South Africa's long and poorly defended coast line would probably facilitate smuggling efforts on behalf of the non-Europeans. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A000500070002-6 E. 28. The Rhodesias The recent increase of political and racial tension in the semi-independent Federation reflects the rapid growth of nation- alism among the 7,000,000 Africans and a resultant determination of the dominant European settler minority of 300,000 to maintain their position. The African nationalists have strengthened their organizations and begun to realize their potential for instigating economic disorders. They have largely lost confidence in the settler promises of racial partnership and now look to London to advance their interests. Meanwhile, they are increasing their contacts with nationalist groups elsewhere in Africa and with UAR and Communist bloc representatives. The settlers, for their part, feel increasingly frustrated by Britain's pro-African policies and a significant segment is threatening to proclaim Rhodesian independence if African influence is sharply increased. Of the three power factors in the Rhodesian situation--Brit- ain, the white settlers, and the Africans--the settlers control the greatest local military force. The Royal Rhodesian Army has about 3,600 men with white officers and African troops, but the native units may become undependable. However, the territorial reserves with some 2,800 white officers and men would probably be a mainstay of the government. The police force of 9,700 men-- largely African--would probably sympathize with African nation- alists, particularly in Nyasaland. The small, jet-equipped air Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 RFRFT T SECRglA-RDP79S00427A000500070002-6 Sanitized -Approved For Release : force would be loyal to the Salisbury government. Furthermore, the settlers control important industrial, mining and agricultural resources, possess political and economic experience, and in a crisis can probably expect significant support from the 3,000,000- strong white community in South Africa. 25X6 The Africans have a tremendous population majority but lack significant military strength at this time. However, recent rioting in Southern Rhodesian urban centers and earlier disorders in the Copperbelt area of Northern Rhodesia and in Nyasaland showed a potential to force a breakdown in the Federation's secu- rity. Coordinated but widely separated African attacks could probably seize control of considerable areas and restrict the government's control to selected industrial and urban centers of heavy white population. In addition, a co-ordinated use of the strike and boycott weapons by the Africans could seriously Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized - AApp..proved For Release : CIA-RDP779SO0427A000500070002-6 IqW cripple if not curtail mining and industrial activity and bring commercial farming to a standstill. The Communist bloc has not as yet played a significant role in the Federation although there is growing African interest in the bloc and several leaders would be willing to seek assistance there. Moreover, even presently moderate leaders such as Dr. Banda of Nyasaland have indicated they would seek Communist aid if convinced that Western nations--particularly the UK and US-- will not support the Africans' drive for political and economic independence. The bloc, without a suitable base in tropical Africa, would have difficulties in supplying subversive groups in the Federation comparable to those it now has in the Congo. However, the independent African states will rapidly gain some capability to support dissident elements both within and outside of the Federation and will probably require a less extensive organizational network than the bloc and the UAR. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized -Approved For Release : CIA-RDP799.SO0427A000500070002-6 30 March 1961 E. 29. Ruanda-Urundi The two states of Ruanda and Urundi, administered together by Belgium as a UN trust territory, have been undergoing a social and political revolution which began in early 1959--at about the time that Belgium drastically stepped up the pace of political advance in the Coago. In the northern state of Ruanda the revolu- tion took the form of violent tribal struggles between the hitherto dominant Tutsi minority and the Hutu who form 85 per- cent of the population. As a result, three quarters of the Tutsi are now exiled, and the Hutu are firmly in control of the govern- ment. Tribal feeling in Urundi never led to violent outbreaks; nevertheless, the Hutu have rapidly become dominant in this area as well. The wholesale Tutsi expulsion from Ruanda made numerous apologists for their cause available in international capitals; this facta?, coupled with obvious Belgian assistance to the Hutu, has made the Tutsi appear martyrs, and they are supported by the Soviet bloc and by most African states. Hutu governments in both states have proclaimed their "independence"--a develop- ment which may have been stimulated by local Belgian officials and is likely to be condemned by the UN. Security in the territory is now in the hands of 1,300 Belgian paratroops. Brussels is training an indigenous security force of unknown size; without capable foreign direction, this force is likely to disintegrate as did the Congolese Force Publique. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SCRT SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79 00427A000500070002-6 The Sino-Soviet bloc has thus far not attempted to intervene directly in Ruanda-Urundi internal affairs. However, it has exploited the issue at the UN, assisting in the efforts to establish closer supervision over the Belgian administration. The bloc has also furnished propaganda support to the Tutsi exiles, some of whom probably have been subjected to Communist influence, Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized -Approved For 83 TCIA-RDP779SO0427A000500070002-6 25X6 E. 30. Kenya Kenya is entering the last stage of its transition from British to African rule. Elections in February 1960 gave Africans a majority in the legislature; however, further advance is being hindered by maneuvering among African leaders. The radical Kenya African National Union (KANU), which obtained the largest number of seats, is deeply split into blocs supporting and opposing secretary-general Tom Mboya. It has so far refused to participate in the formation of a government, asserting that any government must be headed by Mau Mau detainee Jomo Kenyatta. KANU's rival, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), has been more moderate on the Kenyatta issue and reportedly has allied itself secretly with the New Kenya party, the political group of moderate Europeans. This coalition would have a strength in the legislature about equal to KANU's. 25X6 Sanitized - Approved For Rel p jh4-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 ,,Sanitized - Ap roved For Release: IA-RDP79 00427A000500070002-6 25X6 In addition, there are 12,000 police, most of them Africans. The African troops and police are well-trained and could maintain order in the event of scattered outbreaks; how- ever, they could not contain a widespread uprising without assistance from the British forces stationed in Kenya. Moreover, they are only partly de-tribalized and might not be dependable in the face of serious tribal disorders. They have the advantage of experience with the MaU,Mau terrorists. There is no Communist party in Kenya, but several Africans, notably KANU vice president Oginga Odinga, have travelled exten- sively within the bloc and have received substantial bloc financial support. Odinga has set up a program of scholarships to Communist countries to compete with Mboya's student airlift to the United States. The bloc as well as the independent African states can be expected to continue to exploit African factionalism--and the continuing tribalism which characterizes the territory's political life--in an effort to discredit the British and their moderate African associates. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET Sanitized - Approved For ReI Sc?I'-RDP7799_SO0427A000500070002-6 E. 31. Ethiopia Political stability has not returned to Ethiopia following the abortive coup attempt last December. The Emperor's refusal to institute reforms, and his recent decision to try to placate the military forces at the expense of civilian elements suggest that his regime will face increasing dissension. Although the December coup attempt was largely an intra-ruling group dispute, it brought to the surface the widespread discontent existing throughout the politically aware elements of the population-- mostly confined to Addis Ababa--and widened the split between the conservative old guard and the younger modernists, largely foreign educated. It may also have rekindled the flames of separatism in several provinces which have chafed under the Amhara-dominated centralized rule in Addis Ababa. The situation is further complicated by deep tribal and religious conflicts which may assume commanding importance when the present Emperor is succeeded by an inexperienced and politically weaker ruler. Northern and eastern Ethiopia contain large Moslem minorities, constituting about 40 percent of the total population, and the Moslem-inhabited Ogaden region Would be likely to seek to join the neighboring Somali Republic. Ethiopia's military and security forces, although fairly well trained and equipped, cannot be relied upon in event of a showdown; army units are currently implicated in anti-regime Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET SECRET Sanitized - proved For Release : CIA-RDP SO0427A000500070002-6 activities and the loyalty of the police is open to question. The army strength totals 30,500 men, trained and equipped by US MAAG; the police 28,500; the small jet-equipped air force 920; and the embryonic navy 400. Within these forces, however, there is considerable tension between modernists and feudalists as well as strong tribal and provincial loyalties. Furthermore, the Ethiopian forces are faced with very difficult logistics problems and would have difficulty in operating against any sizeable force, especially if attacked through the remote Ogaden desert area, most likely to be the scene of any aggression against Ethiopia from outside the country. The Sino-Soviet bloc already has a considerable presence in Ethiopia with some 275 diplomats and commercial personnel in residence, several economic credit agreements in force, and in- creasing cultural contacts. However, the bloc does not now exert a significant influence in the country and there does not now appear to be a sizeable group of Ethiopian Communist sympa- thizers. However, Ethiopia's growing political unrest and the existence of divisive elements in its population are likely to afford the bloc considerable opportunities to interfere in the future. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500070002-6 SECRET