SITUATIONS INVOLVING A POTENTIAL FOR RESORT TO SUSTAINED INTERNAL VIOLENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000500070002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 30, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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SITUATIONS INVOLVING A POTENTIAL FOR RESORT TO
SUSTAINED INTERNAL VIOLENCE
1. This paper seeks to identify and analyze those
situations in which the chances for the development of vio-
lent internal conflicts similar to those now current in
the Congo and in Laos are sufficient to warrant attention
for contingency planning: that is, those in which there
is a notable potentiality for sustained internal violence,
possibly instigated or supported by external interests,
within the next few years. Thus we exclude, on the one
hand, open warfare between states, and, on the other, the
innumerable possibilities for violent demonstrations, such
as those which occurred in Tokyo in June 1960, and for rev-
olutionary attempts likely to succeed or fail within a
matter of hours or days, as in Caracas in January 1958, or
in Addis Ababa in December 1960.
2. The conditions prerequisite to sustained violence
are, of course: (a) the presence of two or more strongly an-
tagonistic elements within the community; (b) an issue or
event of sufficient importance to bring them into open
violent conflict; (c) an inability on the part of either
party to achieve a quick decision by force; and (d) suf-
ficient means and determination on the part of each to sus-
tain the conflict, perhaps with the support of outside powers.
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3. Analyses of the situation in 34 selected countries
are attached hereto. We summarize below, on a regional
basis.
b. Eastern Europe: The fate of Budapest in 1956
demonstrated the impracticability of sustaining violent re-
sistance in this area. Although disaffection continues to
exist, it is unlikely that such resistance will again be
attempted for many years. The isolation of Albania, and the
conflicting interests of Yug
slavia, the USSR, and Communist
China in that country make it a possible exception to the
among these states are likely to produce violent political
change in one or more of them during the next few years.
Violence in the area is likely to take the form of urban
disorders or sudden coup attempts, but these could lead to
sustained violence in some cases. Resort to violence in
any of these countries would be likely to have repercussions
in others.
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d. South Asia: On the northwest frontier of Pak-
istan and the northeast frontier of India there are po-
tentialities for sustained conflict between the regular
forces of those states and elusive tribesman disaffected
toward them and accessible to outside support. Conversely,
the Communist Chinese have evidently encountered a potenti-
ality for sustained resistance in Tibet.
e. Southeast Asia: Sustained violence is currently
in progress in Laos and South Vietnam, and such potentiali-
ties exist in Burma, Malaya-Singapore, and Indonesia. The
collapse of Laos would have repercussions throughout the
area, but they would probably be of a political rather
than a violent nature.
f. The Far East: Although potentialities for sub-
version and violent urban demonstrations exist in Taiwan,
South Korea, and Japan, we perceive no potentiality for sus-
tamed internal violence in those countries.
g. Latin America: Social and political tensions
are acute throughout Latin America. Sustained violence such
as occurred in Mexico, 1910-1920, or in Cuba in 1958, is
conceivable with respect to many of the countries of the
area, but violent political action is more likely to be of
relatively brief duration, as in Venezuela in 1958.
h. Africa: Situations of sustained violence now
exist in Algeria and the Congo; potentialities for the de-
velopment of similar situations exist throughout the continent
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in both the independent states and the remaining colonial
territories. In some parts of Africa south of the Sahara--
South Africa, the Rhodesias, Angola, and Mozambique--this
is a matter of tension between a settled and dominant white
community and the mass of aboriginal Africans. Elsewhere,
as in the Congo, it is a matter of regional, tribal, and
cultural conflicts among the Africans themselves.
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A. 1. Libya
Internal conflict in Libya might occur if a power
struggle follows the death of 71-year-old King Idriss.
The king's nephew,'Hasan al-Rida, is being groomed for the
succession but may prove too weak and inexperienced to
maintain political equilibrium among Libya's several com-
peting groups. In this event, the stands taken by the
chiefs of Libya's provincial police forces and the federal
army are likely to prove decisive. Hasan's supporters,
other claimants to the throne, and Libya's growing anti-
monarchical element would probably compete for the sup-
port of these internal security forces. Armed clashes
might follow, leading to prolonged conflict. A likely re-
sult would be the division of Libya, between the pro-
monarchical eastern province of Cyrenaica and the more
republican western province of Tripolitania.
The forces involved in any conflict would include
the 3500-man federal army, the two well-equipped, provin-
cial police forces of 3,600 each, armed Cyrenaican tribes-
Egyptian forces might be invited to enter by the pro-UAR
clique in Cyrenaica that opposes Hasan's succession, but
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Nasir is unlikely to risk a British reaction by responding
favorably to such a request. Soviet-bloc intervention is
Considered even more unlikely and would probably occur
only after other non-Libyan forces had been committed.
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A.2. Sudan
General Abboud's military regime in the Sudan is cur-
rently facing opposition on two fronts. A group of civilian
politicians has, for some time been demanding that the
army "go back to the barracks" and return the government
to civilian control. In recent months, this opposition
group has threatened to stage demonstrations and strikes
if the military rulers do not respond with acceptable con-
cessions. Such demonstrations might result in sustained
violence.
A second possible source of civil conflict exists in
the Sudan's southern provinces. The Negroid tribes in the
south have long resented northern domination. In 1955
southern dissidence resulted in an armed uprising against
the central government. The rebellion was suppressed, but
the government has since been forced to man the southern
garrisons with northern troops.
Of the two groups opposed to the government, the ci-
vilian politicians present the most immediate danger to the
regime. This group could probably count on the support of
student and labor organizations, who are opposed to the
restrictions placed on their activities by the government.
Moreover, the Ansar Moslem Brotherhood--the mainstay of the
opposition group--controls over 10,000 primitively armed
tribesmen which could be called out in the event of a show-
down with the government.
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The government would probably command the support of
the majority of the officers and men in the armed forces.
The army, estimated at 10,000 troops, is armed with British
World War II equipment, and is believed to be an effective
fighting force. However, the Ansar sect has many adherents
within the army itself, and their defection would seriously
weaken the government's ability to cope with the situation.
Although it is difficult to assess the extent of the
discontent in the southern provinces at the present time,
it appears that the lack of funds and the continuing and
rigidly enforced ban on political activity have prevented
the organization of any opposition on a major scale.
Egyptian meddling in the internal politics of the
Sudan appears to have decreased since Abboud's advent to
power. Nevertheless, UAR capabilities for supporting dis-
sident elements remain high. The USSR's capabilities for
direct interference are not particularly good, since it
has no direct access to the Sudan. However, should bloc
and UAR goals in the Sudan coincide, the bloc's capabili-
ties would be enhanced.
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A.3. Yemen
The Imam of Yemen has managed to maintain reasonable
stability through a combination of cash subsidies to vari-
ous tribal elements and harsh suppression of dissidents.
It is not likely that his chosen successor, Crown Prince
Badr, will display either the subtlety or the determina-
tion to continue such a policy successfully. Following
the Imam's death--he is nearing 70--Badir's weakness might
prove an invitation for contending elements to initiate a
struggle leading to limited civil war.
The conservative tribesmen, who care little for Badr
personally and resent his father's arbitrary choice of a
successor, may find themselves another candidate, the most
likely being the Imam's brother Hasan, now Yemen's dele-
gate to the United Nations. Hasan can probably count on
the backing of most of the armed Zaydi tribesmen of northern
Yemen, as well as some army elements. Barring outside
interference, this combination would stand an excellent
chance of overcoming any forces,. including the remnants
of a poorly trained army, that Badr might muster. Tra-
ditional tribal ascendancy would probably be maintained,
with the small--10,000 men--army fragmented in a short
struggle.
The danger of protracted warfare would probably arise
only with the entrance of outside assistance in terms of
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materiel and/or men.
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The Sino-Soviet bloc has little capability for intervening
in Yemen.
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'3O March 196
A.6. Lebanon
Lebanon is the most recent example of the potentialities
of guerrilla warfare in the Middle East. The 1958 rebellion,
for the most part, was a guerrilla action fought over the
whole country. The possibility of a recurrence is always
present because of the basic incompatibility of the country's
religious groupings. While neither the Christians nor the
Moslems can be considered a cohesive group--too many sects
within each broad grouping--violent and prolonged clashes
could break out almost without warning. Lebanon is a country
where nearly every office from President down is assigned
in proportion to the numerical strength of the various
sects. Moslem pressure for greater influence in the govern-
ment is rising and increasing tensions. Pressure from the
UAR on the Lebanese government and UAR backing of certain
extremist Moslem elements add to the normal turmoil.
While the Christians are divided in their loyalties
to several political leaders--ex-President Chamoun and
Pierre Jumayyil, leader of the Christian Phalamge are the
most prominent--they have a tendency to bury their dif-
ferences in the face of Moslem attacks. Although the
Christians are believed to be in the majority, their divi-
sion into many sects reduces their effectiveness, especially
as rivalries between political leaders grow.
The danger of a split along religous lines would
likely make the Lebanese army an ineffective force to sup-
press guerrilla warfare. It acted more as a referee during
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the 1958 rebellion than a military force and only the
personal prestige of President Shihab (then army commander)
held it together. His position as President is the main
stabilizing force in the country today. In the event of
an outbreak of guerrilla warfare, covert intervention by
the UAR from Syria is almost a certainty.
Soviet bloc capabilities would be minimal in the event
of Christian-Moslem strife--the only type conceivable in
Lebanon. In fact, there is a likelihood that any bloc
support would be thrown to the Lebanese Communists who
are strongly anti-Nasir. Such support probably would con-
sist of money and propaganda.
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A.7. Iraq
There are strong divisive factors in Iraq. While Sunni
(Orthodox) Moslems are in the majority, they are divided
among mutually antagonistic Kurdish, Arab, and Turcoman
tribes. The 1,250,000 Sunni Arabs inhabit the Western half
of the country, while the 800,000 Kurds are concentrated
along the Turkish and Iranian borders in generally the same
area as the Turcomans who number 80-100,000. Tribal
rivalries keep the Kurds in almost constant turmoil. Iraq's
approximately 3,800,000 Shia Moslems, located in the south,
resent Sunni Arab dominance of the country. They have
strong ties with Shia Iran and their theology tends to give
them an affinity with the Hashimite royal house of Jordan,
as descendants and successors of the Prophet Muhammad. Prior
to 1946 Kurdish and Shia tribal rebellions had broken out
several times, even with a strong government in Baghdad.
A weakening of Baghdad's control in the provinces could
permit a recurrence. All of these groups either have arms
or access to them.
Qasim holds Iraq by default because of the lack of other
political rivals of stature and because of fears that his
removal would engender civil war. Should Qasim be over-
thrown or assassinated, a power struggle would develop which
might include extensive fighting of a guerrilla nature--both
urban and rural. Tribes in the south and west, with UAR and
Jordanian support, would be likely to raid towns and cut
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communications; rebellion among the Kurds and strife between
Kurds and Turcomans would almio t=jaertainly,erupt--there is
considerable beneath-the-surface fighting between Kurds
and Turcomans now. The 72,000 Iraqi army might fragment
along religious and ethnic lines, as well as split into
pro- and anti-Communist factions. Shia tribes in the south
would find common cause with Hashimite Jordan.
Iraqi Communists probably have the greatest potential
in the Middle East for carrying out terroristic and guerrilla
campaigns. They are the best organized group in the country,
they have stores of arms, and they can organize the city mob,
as well as some peasants, in their behalf. They reportedly
have a plan for counter-rebellion in case of Qasim's death.
Party membership is in the neighborhood of 5,000.
Although the Soviet bloc is not at the present time
engaged in anti-regime activities, bloc capabilities for
exploiting Iraqi turmoil appear to be good. Such a Soviet
effort could be two-pronged--support for local Communists,
and backing of anti-regime Kurdish rebels with arms,
propaganda, and money. Clandestine flights into Kurdistan
would be comparatively simple, since the Iraqi border is only
a little over 100 miles from Soviet territory.
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A.8. Iran
There is not, at present, any potentially dissident group
in Iran capable of sustained violence. Tribal groups tradi-
tionally oppose the central government and frequently have
been in rebellion. Many of these have now been pacified.
Of the two groups most likely to create problems--the Kurds
and the Qashgai--neither is sufficiently well armed to carry
on sustained violence.
The Iranian peasantry, although in most cases having
grievances against the local landlord and local authorities,
is unarmed, apathetic and unlikely to resort to violence.
Urban unrest especially in Tehran is probably greater than
in the countryside; again, however, there seems to be little
possibility of any urban group being capable of more than
sporadic violence.
Assuming a situation in Tehran which would eliminate
or greatly weaken the presence of the central government in
the provinces, the picture could change markedly. Many
tribal groups, especially Kurds, Qashqais and perhaps
Bakhtiari would probably be able to exert local autonomy.
However, the problem of sustained violence might not arise
presentatives of the central government,
i.e. army and gendarmerie, would be likely to withdraw without
resistance.
Under these circumstances the USSR would meet little
opposition to any action it chose to undertake. Azerbaijan
and Kurdistan would be likely targets and susceptible to the
control of any well-organized, cohesive, and well-armed group.
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B.9. Northwest Frontier of Pakistan
Developments in the huge Pushtoon tribal region, which
straddles the Afghan-Pakistani border and historically has
been a source of insurgent activity against governments on
either side, continue to pose the threat of widespread vio-
lence. Since 1947 the traditional resistance of the semi-
autonomous tribes to any authority outside their own iso-
lated areas has been abetted by the efforts of both the
Afghan and Pakistani governments to subvert the tribes living
within the other's territory. Almost constant friction along
the frontier has resulted from the dispute over "Pushtoon-
istan," involving Afghan claims that Pushtu-speaking tribes-
men living within Pakistan who are racially and linguistically
related to the tribes of eastern Afghanistan should be given
the right of self-determination. Pakistan contends these
tribesmen are Pakistani nationals who have no desire for
separate status.
In recent months there have been several violent inci-
dents, arising chiefly from Kabul's attempts to foment unrest
among the Pakistani tribes and Rawalpindi's efforts in response
to extend its direct control in the region up to the inter-
national boundary (Durand Line).
There are nearly 5,000,000 Pushtoons living in Afghan-
istan and close to 6,000,000 in Pakistan. The number of adult
male tribesmen located in the immediate border zone and who
are disposed toward warlike ventures probably is about 500,000.
The Afghan Government has about 40,000 regular troops in or
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near the border region. The number of tribal irregulars it
can muster, either in support of its regular forces or as
separate guerrilla bands, probably varies from several thou-
sand to upwards of 20,000 depending on Kabul's logistic
capabilities.
The Pakistani Government maintains fewer troops in the
immediate vicinity of the frontier but could bring in possibly
60,000 on short notice. These regular forces are greatly
superior to Afghan troops. Some tribal irregulars would
be available to support Pakistan's regular forces, except
in the event of a general uprising of Pushtoon tribes.
Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan since 1956 has
increased Kabul's capability of controlling the often recal-
citrant tribes within its own territory--a primary concern
of the royal regime--as well as having strengthened its mili-
tary position vis-a-vis Pakistan. Soviet arms have been issued
only to regular Afghan forces, although some of the obsolete
equipment they have replaced probably has been turned over
to tribes invq.ved in the Pushtoonistan campaign. Rumors
(emanating from Pakistan) of Soviet infiltration of the tribal
areas have never been confirmed. Contacts between Soviet
agents and tribal chiefs would not be welcomed by authorities
in Kabul. The presence of ethnic minorities in the USSR akin
to tribal groups across the frontier provides Moscoi with
opportunities for penetration on a limited scale. In the
event of a tribal revolt or an Afghan-Pakistani conflict, this
asset combined with Moscow's close military and political
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ties with Kabul would greatly facilitate Soviet intervention
if it were deemed politically desirable.
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B. 10. Northeast Frontier of India
The Indian Government has been plagued by an armed
insurrection in the Naga Hills/Assam-Burma border region
for more than eight years. The problem centers around
the demand by several of the more important Naga tribes
--now Christianized but in recent history headhunters--
for autonomy in their affairs, from the extremist position
of complete independence to the more moderate view of
separate statehood within the Indian union. New Delhi
has sought in the last few years to build up the moderates
so as to isolate the extremists; the latest and most
significant step was New Delhi's agreement to establish
the state of Nagaland within the Indian union, despite
the nonviability of such a state. It is the extremists
--the "hostiles" in Indian parlance--who continue the
fight with sabotage, ambush, and banditry; although out-
numbered by more than 10 to 1 by Indian troops and secu-
rity forces, the dissidents live off the country through
the use of terrorism, blackmail, intimidation, and tribal
loyalties.
They are loosely organized in small bands which rarely
engage in pitched battles, preferring instead to hit and
run. Their weaponry comes largely from caches of small
arms of Japanese, British, and American manufacture left
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in the area following World War II; these have been sup-
plemented by archaic weaponry indigenous to the area and
by captured Indian weapons. The "hostiles"' strength
lies in knowledge of the terrain, support they obtain in
the countryside, mobiljty, and determination.
The government's strength lies in numbers, equipment,
staying power, control of the major centers, and in the
build-up of moderate elements; a major government handi-
cap, however, is the difficulty in providing logistic sup-
port to the army in the area, much of which must be air-
lifted. Another handicap for the more than 20,000 Indian
troops and security forces in the area is the political
restraint imposed on them by the government.
To date there has been no indication of Sino-Soviet
bloc involvement politically, nor have bloc weapons turn-
ed up in the Naga arsenal. There is little doubt, how-
ever, that the Chinese would seek to. capitalize on this
dissidence should Sino-Indian hostilities ever develop.
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B. 11. Tibet
Although virulent hostility exists between the Tibet-
ans and Chinese Communists, the present situation in Tibet
cannot be characterized as one of "sustained violence."
The Tibetan rebellion began in March 1959, but was quickly
put down by Peiping which possessed overwhelmingly superior
weapons and manpower. While not a threat to the Peiping
regime, Tibetan resistance does continue and is a major
irritant to the Chinese.
The 1959 uprising was the culmination of eight years
of Tibetan resentment over Chinese Communist practices
and programs which the Tibetans realized would destroy
their culture, religion, and way of life. The immediate
catalyst sparking the rebellion was the belief that the
god-king, the Dalai Lama, was about to be kidnapped from
Lhasa by the Chinese authorities.
Fighting began in Lhasa, probably to cover the Dalai
Lama's escape, and quickly spread throughout the country.
The number of Tibetans involved in the fighting has never
been known with accuracy; the Chinese Communists put the
figure at 20,000, but the number was probably higher. The
Tibetan "army", an ill-equipped force of 10,000 men, was
involved as well as many of the tribes, including one which
had migrated to Tibet a few years earlier after fighting
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the Chinese to the east. Many monasteries also partici-
pated. The Chinese Communists had over 50,000 troops
stationed in Tibet and quickly doubled their garrisons.
Within six weeks the main Tibetan forces were defeated
although mopping up operations continued for a year.
In the background of the Tibetan rebellion was a
long history of anti-Chinese feeling and Chinese Com-
munist policies which vacillated between oppression and
conciliation. Perhaps of greatest importance was that
after eight years of Chinese rule, the majority of Tibet-
ans in responsible positions regarded themselves as pa-
triots and were identified with an anti-Chinese policy.
Despite Peiping's efforts to curb their authority, they
continued to dominate Tibetan society and to command the
allegiance of the population. Peiping was handicapped
in its ability to deal with Tibet by the latter's location
at the end of a long and expensive supply line, a short-
age of qualified cadres, the dispersed nature of the Tibet-
an population, and a very difficult terrain in high alti-
tudes. Peiping was also reluctant to offend India and
Southeast Asian Buddhist countries by an overly blatant
suppression of a neighboring society.
Although the Chinese Communists determined to proceed
immediately with the "reform" of Tibet after the 1959 up-
rising, today they still find it difficult to put their
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policies into practice. Cooperativization of agriculture
has recently been postponed for three to five years (1963
to 1965) and tight controls over religious services and
private business have been relaxed. It is clear that even
today the Chinese are not able to mold the Tibetans to
the Communist pattern and that the maintenance of their
position there is still an expensive proposition.
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C. 12. Burma
In Burma, guerrilla warfare has its roots in both
political and ethnic differences and stems from the
British decision in 1947 to grant independence to the
country as a union of semi-autonomous states established
on ethnic lines. The political insurgents are primarily
groups of the left--elements which claim some connection
with the international Communist movement, but have little
in common save opposition to the government. The ethnic
insurgents are from the minority communities of Burma who
reluctantly accepted the concept of a union government
but later revolted against the domination of the Burman
majority. They now seek either complete autonomy with-
in the union or independence. Although at one time these
various insurgent forces threatened to overthrow the gov-
ernment and dominated all of Burma except the capital,
Rangoon, today they have almost no hope of success and
constitute little more than an expensive nuisance to the
Burmese government.
There are three distinct political insurgent groups
--the Communist Party of Burma (CP(B)), the Burma Commu-
nist Party (BCP), and the People's Volunteer Organization
(PVO) or Peoples' Comrade Party (PCP). The CP(B) is made
up of fanatical revolutionists who have never sustained
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territorial control and number about 500. The PVO (or
PCP), mainly leftist veterans of the Burma Independence
Army, although once numerous have now either accepted
government amnesty or are largely merged with the BCP.
The BCP, which was the largest and best organized element
in the Burmese independence movement, is now down to a
strength of 1,200. Although all three of these political
insurgent groups have their supporting organizations in
the legal political parties, they have little support in
the civilian population and have been reduced to relatively
ineffectual bandit forces.
There are two main ethnic insurgent groups: The Karen
National Defense Organization (KNDO) and the Shan Independ-
ence Army (SIA). Both of these organizations seek either
independent states or, at a minimum, autonomy from Burman
rule. Holding territorial bases in areas dominated by
the Karens and Shans and sustained by the sympathy of these
ethnic groups, the KNDO and SIA will be far more difficult
for the Burmese army to eliminate than the political in -
surgents. Armed KNDOs are estimated at 3,200 and the SIA
forces at 1,000 (500 armed). Other incipient insurgent
movements among the Kachins, Chins, Mons and Arakanese
have no individual significance. They merely underscore
the general discontent among Burma's minority groups with
Burman domination.
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To control these insurgents, the Government has a
total force of 116,547 men--an army of 85,000, a Union
Constabulary of 25,000, a Navy of 3,468 and an Air Force
of 3,079. Although the government forces have been un-
able to eliminate these insurgents, their relative ef-
fectiveness is indicated by the changed security situa-
tion since 1948. In 1948, the government controlled only
the capital city. Now the insurgents control only pockets
in the countryside.
Since 1948 there has been little direct communica-
tion between bloc personnel and any of the pro-Communist
insurgents. Second and third echelon leaders reportedly
have been receiving training in China, but this has had
no notable effect. The Communist elements as such appear
to have little prospect of increasing their strength.
On the other hand, as they have declined in power, they
have been more willing to make common cause with the
ethnic insurgents and, reportedly, have had 'some success
in subverting the Karen insurgents toward Communism.
Notwithstanding the influence of the Communists
among some Karen units, the prospects of bloc utiliza-
tion of the ethnic insurgents is low. The leadership is
narrowly nationalistic and deeply conservative. While it
might be tempted to accept Communist support, it would do-
so only in an attempt to expell Burmans from the ethnic
territories.
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C. 13. Malaya - Singapore
Malaya
Malaya's principal political problem and its most likely
cause of civil disorder is the rivalry of its two largest
ethnic groups, the Malays and Chinese, who respectively
comprise 50 and 37 percent of the population. The out-
break of widespread communal strife appears unlikely in
the near future. However, violence between the communities
might erupt over a trivial incident or could be organized
by communal extremists, possibly in collusion with the
underground Malayan Communist Party (MCP).
The Malay community controls the government and the
instruments of violence--the army and police. The Chinese
control most of the channels of trade and could paralyze
the national economy. Rural Malays, who live in isolated
villages, would be vulnerable to attack by Chinese bands.
In any conflict Chinese bands would be supported by the
guerrilla arm of the MCP. Although reduced to a remnant
force of some 500 men, the MCP terrorists who remain in
the field are hard core cadres who could train, stiffen
and probably supply from hidden caches in the jungle,
organized Chinese bands.
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Communist China would almost certainly champion the
Chinese in Malaya. However, it would be difficult for
Peiping to intervene with supplies and advisors.
Singapore
Singapore's growing Chinese masses, many of whom are
emotionally drawn to mainland China, seek radical solutions
to the island's pressing social and economic problems and
will become susceptible to'exploitation by extremist and
pro-Communist leaders who advocate violent tactics if pro-
gress is not made in overcoming these problems.
The struggle for power in Singapore is between the non-
Communist left leadership of the ruling People's Action
Party (PAP) and a pro-Communist left-wing of that party.
While present Communist policy calls for cooperation with
PAP, a show-down might become unavoidable.
In the event of a public clash, the extreme leftists
could temporarily paralyze the island through its control
of the blue-collar trade unions and the militant students
of the Chinese middle-schools. The government has available
its own well-trained riot police anc6 these units proved
incapable of restoring public order
The pro-Communists probably regard a policy of violence as
counter-productive, especially since it would imperil their
objective of a merger with Malaya.
The bloc has few assets in Singapore capable of materially
affecting the outcome of the situation.
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NOFORN 30 March 1961
C. 14. Indonesia
Indonesian dissident forces are composed of two fairly
distinct groups, both anti-Communist: the Federal Republic
of Indonesia (PRI) and the Darul Islam (DI). The PRI move-
ment, led by local army commanders, originated in Sumatra
in 1956 as a protest against Communist influence in
Djakarta and against political and economic centralism.
The principal military and political strength of the move-
ment is in North and Central Sumatra and North Celebes al-
though at various times the PRI has had the support of
elements in North Moluccas, South Celebes, South Borneo,
and South Sumatra. Military activity has been underway
since February 1958 but has considerably diminished in
recent months as the result of insufficient ammunition and
supplies. There is considerable disagreement among the
rebels as to whether to continue anti-government opera-
tions. Should they succeed in resupplying themselves--
which seems doubtful--guerrilla activity by a significant
number of PRI forces would be likely; even under present
circumstances, a hard core will probably maintain itself,
with the help of local sympathizers, for at least another
year or two.
The Darul Islam (DI) is a fanatical Moslem organization
based in West Java which has sought since 1949 to establish
a theocratic state. It has incorporated and maintains
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liaison with Moslem dissident groups in Atjeh (Northernmost
Sumatra), South Celebes, and South Borneo, With the PRI
movement having lost its momentum, the DI is Indonesia's
major existing dissident problem.
A serious potential problem, however, is the Indonesian
Communist party, now uneasily balanced off by President
Sukarno against the anti-Communist army.
Overall dissident strength is estimated at 17-20,000,
with the PRI accounting for 10-11,000 and the Darul Islam
7-9,000. The Communist party claims a membership of
1,500,000 and could undoubtedly recruit support for guer-
rilla activity from labor, veterans, and peasant organiza-
tions which have a combined estimated membership of 4-
5,000,000.
The Indonesian army numbers 240,000, the police mobile
brigade 20,000, the navy 14,000, and the air force 9,500,
for a total of 283,500. The Indonesian government, moti-
vated partly by a continuing security problem, is expanding
its security forces and re-equipping them largely from bloc
sources.
Although the bloc is not directly exploiting the dis-
sident situation, it is deriving good will from its readi-
ness to fill Indonesian military requests and from its
favorable purchase terms. Long-term political and economic
benefits to the bloc are likely to result from bloc train-
ing of Indonesian personnel and from the increase in bloc
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trade with Indonesia which will inevitably develop from the
latter's large purchases.
Bloc involvement in a forceful Communist challenge of
the government would be likely. Indonesia's long coastline
and inadequate communications with many areas of the
archipelago presumably would assist bloc support operations
and hamper government counter-efforts.
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C.15. Netherlands New Guinea
Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian) has been claimed
by Indonesia since 1949 when the latter won its independ-
ence from the Dutch. Djakarta is now conducting a three-
pronged program of diplomacy, a bloc-supplied military
build-up, and a paramilitary campaign in New Guinea to
increase pressure on the Dutch to cede the area.
Indonesia has sent at least 14 small infiltration
groups to New Guinea since 1952, according to the Dutch.
Six of these groups were dispatched in 1960 and one in 1961.
Most of their personnel have been captured. Their mission
apparently has been intelligence collection, small-scale
sabotage, and psychological warfare with a view to inciting
local unrest. There is little evidence that Djakarta's
paramilitary campaign has had even token success. Force-
ful Indonesian action on a larger scale is probable in
the foreseeable future.
The total number of Indonesian infiltrators reported
by the Dutch since 1952 is 180. Indonesia is estimated to
have the capability to launch a battalion-size (1,000-man)
amphibious assault operation against New Guinea in con-
junction with a 500-man airborne assault. Dutch ground
strength is approximately 1,800, including 900 marines;
naval strength, excluding marines, is 2,100; and air
strength approximately 500.
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An Indonesian military purchasing mission which ne-
gotiated a $244,000,000 arms deal in Moscow in January
1961, was justified by Djakarta as necessary to counter
the Dutch build-up in New Guinea. This material, plus
$277,000,000 in naval purchases negotiated in Moscow last
September, will be delivered between 1961 and 1964. The
Sino-Soviet bloc has strongly supported Indonesia's claim
to New Guinea; Moscow particularly
in January 1960 and has reiterated
eral occasions since then. Should
in New Guinea, the bloc would give
support and, within the context of
emphasized its support
its position on sev-
hostilities eventuate
Indonesia diplomatic
the USSR's supply and
training program, might extend other assistance.
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D. 16. Dominican Republic
Violence may break out at any time in the Dominican
Republic since the repressive dictatorship of General
Rafael Trujillo has become intolerable for many Dominicans.
Trujillo has a large and well equipped military es-
tablishment by Latin American standards and some of the
23,000 man ground force recently have received special
training in anti-guerrilla operations. He also has an
elaborate intelligence apparatus that thus far has severely
restricted the ability of his unarmed civilian opponents
to organize and plot. The opposition, who are mainly from
professional and upper income classes, however, have es-
tablished rapport with a few high-ranking army officers who
might decide to join with any large non-Communist or non-
Cuban supported insurrection group attempting an invasion
similar to the Castro-trained group that invaded the Do-
minican Republic in June 1959. The dissidents, despite
their anti-Castro feelings, probably would attempt simul-
taneous harrassing activities against the regime regardless
of the invader's political orientation.
Any Sino-Soviet bloc attempt to exploit the political
situation in the Dominican Republic probably would be
channeled through the Cuban regime. Castro has the cap-
ability to train and equip a force with modern Soviet
bloc arms on short notice, although its size would be
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restricted to several hundred men due to Cuba's limited
air and sea transport capabilities. The group that made
the 1959 invasion was limited to about 225 men led by for-
mer Cuban Revolutionary Army officers experienced in ir-
regular warfare and included a number of exiled Dominican
Communists and non-Communists recruited in the US and Latin
America. The force was carried from Cuba in two motor
launches and a C-46 transport plane. The attacks were
poorly coordinated, the sea landings taking place about
five days after the air transported group arrived. How-
ever, it probably failed as a guerrilla operation primarily
because the peasants were unwilling to furnish food and
refuge to the insurgents. Potentialities for waging suc-
cessful irregular operations have not increasedmuch since
the 1959 attempt, when it took the armed forces only a few
days to annihilate the guerrillas.
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D. 17. Venezuela
Venezuela has a tradition of extended rule by mili-
tary dictatorship. The present experiment in civilian,
elected, constitutional government had its origins as re-
cently as January 1958--when Dictator Perez Jimenez was
overthrown--and the incumbent Betancourt regime was in-
augurated just two years ago. Plotting and coup attempts
by rightist civilian and military groups and urban vio-
lence promoted by leftist-Communist elements have occurred
frequently since 1958, culminating in widespread leftist
outbreaks in late 1960--probably the most serious threat
to Betancourt thus far. Although both rightist and
leftist groups appear to have been weakened during these
past three years, Venezuela's serious economic and finan-
cial problems could give rise to renewed violence, spread-
ing from urban centers to the countryside. Some of
Venezuela's 35,000 Communists have long been training for
guerrilla warfare, presumably in preparation for this
eventuality.
The bulk of the country's security forces, which demon-
strated their ability to control widespread urban unrest in
late 1960, is considered loyal to the incumbent regime.
The security components total about 38,700, as follows:
army, 14,500; national guard, 6,000; navy, 5,300; air force,
2,875; civil police, estimated 10,000. The national guard
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is a well trained component with internal security as a
primary mission, but the police force is ineffective.
Moreover, some dissension is reported among junior offi-
cers of the armed forces. The ability of the security
forces to control extensive guerrilla warfare is untested,
but they have probably received little specialized train-
ing in this type of action.
The Sino-Soviet bloc might exploit a civil war in
Venezuela by training opposition leaders in guerrilla
tactics and also by supplying them financial and propa-
ganda support. However, direct bloc aid to opposition
factions is more likely to be channeled through the Castro
regime in Cuba.
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D. 18. Colombia
A combination of banditry and violence in rural areas
is the most disruptive force in Colombia and poses a serious
threat to government stability. A 13-year old problem which
has claimed the lives of over 250,000 persons and displaced
approximately 1.5 million peasants, rural violence has im-
peded economic development and created serious social problems.
The Colombian army in late 1960 estimated there were 1,500-
2,000 active guerrillas. A much larger number of formerly
active guerrillas form a potential for increasing and spread-
ing rural violence.
Primarily a socio-economic problem, other causes of
rural unrest include traditional political rivalries and
hatreds, Cuban-Communist agitation, family feuds, and wide-
spread banditry. Military and police action against rural
action has been ineffective, attributable mainly to lack of
anti-guerrilla training and equipment and to inadequate sys-
tems of communication and transportation.
Political orientation of guerrilla units is Liberal,
Conservative and Communist. The extent and effect of the
latter is unknown; however, it is certain that leftist agi-
tators are stirring up peasant feelings on agrarian reform and
are distributing propaganda.
Murders appear indiscriminate and are often brutal and on
a mass scale. Guerrilla activity usually increases during the
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coffee harvest seasons of October-December and April-June, but
no distinct pattern is noticeable. An increase in guerrilla
activity since last September--the worst of any comparable
period in three years--has aroused the nation and brought about
an accelerated government drive to solve the problem.
Bloc efforts to exploit this situation would probably
be channeled through the Castro regime; however, the Czech
consulate in Bogota is also a potential channel.
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D. 19. Ecuador
Ecuador has had more than 12 years of relatively stable
government by elected constitutional regimes. The military is
tending to become apolitical. Both local and national elec-
tions in recent years have been unusually fair by Latin American
standards and largely free of violence. Depressed conditions
of both urban and rural masses and the influence of leftist-
Communist-demagogic leaders have given rise to sporadic urban
violence as recently as late 1960. In addition, pro-Castro
groups are relatively strong. Unrest among the peasant class,
provoked in part by Communist agitators, is on the increase
and could spread to large areas of the country, which is geo-
graphically suited to guerrilla warfare.
The security forces, which at present are considered loyal
to the Velasco regime, total about 21,000 as follows: army,
13,000; air force, 1,100; navy, 1,800; and national civil
police, 5,000. They are believed capable of maintaining
internal security, particularly the unrest in urban areas.
The army is the best trained and most reliable element for this
purpose. Considerable friction exists between the police and
the army over responsibility for internal security. There is
also evidence of dissatisfaction among the officers over
Velasco's leftist drift in both domestic and foreign policy.
The ability of the security forces to control extensive
guerrilla warfare is untested, but is probably limited.
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The bloc conceivably could provide direct support to
civilian opposition groups through the Czech legation in
Quito, but is more likely to channel such aid through the
Castro regime in Cuba. The bloc could also provide financial
and propaganda support and training for guerrilla leaders.
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D. 20. Peru
The incumbent regime appears stable and benefit itt..g from
improving economic conditions. However, the 1962 national
elections could touch off widespread unrest between Peru's
ruling classes, including the armed forces, and strong
leftist but non-Communist political elements favoring rapid
socio-economic reforms. There is growing concern over unrest
among Peru's large and depressed Indian population in the
sierra regions, agrarian and other labor violence, and the
accelerated migration of impoverished peasants to already
overcrowded urban centers. An uprising of the peasant popu-
lation, particularly in central and southern Peru where
Communist influence is strong and may be increasing, is a
long-range possibility. Like Ecuador, Peru's geography is
admirably suited to the conduct of guerrilla warfare.
The security forces, which are considered loyal to the
Prado regime, relatively well trained, and believed capable
of maintaining internal order, total about 60,250 as follows:
army, 30,000; national police, 16,000; republican guard, 2,500;
navy, 7,350; and air force, 4,400. The ability-of the forces
to control extensive guerrilla warfare has not been tested.
Direct bloc aid to an opposition or rebel faction in
Peru would probably be channeled through the Castro regime
in Cuba. The bloc is capable of providing financial and
propaganda support and training of leaders in guerrilla warfare.
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D. 21. Bolivia
The Bolivian Government has been under the control of the
leftist Nationalist Revolutionary Movement since it won power
in a sweeping revolution in 1952. Tin mines were nationalized,
agrarian reform begun, and the power of the former oligarchy
destroyed. Momentum for economic growth has not developed,
however, and some Bolivians feel that the revolution has been
"betrayed." A failure of the recently initiated plan to reha-
bilitate Bolivia's critically important tin mines through aid
from the United States, West Germany, and the Inter-American
Development Bank could give new impetus to this belief. In
this event, or if President Paz should be incapacitated, a
breakdown of law and order throughout large parts of the coun-
try could occur, particularly because Vice President Lechin .-
long the head of Bolivia's national labor federation--apparently
does not now command strong support except in some labor groups.
Military power is now fragmented within and among the
army, national police and the civilian militia. Most of the
adult male population belongs to the civilian militia which
at least theoretically includes all government party members,
union members, and peasants. Virtually every armed unit has
men of diverse political orientation, varying generally from
mildly leftist to Communist or Trotskyite, although the police
and army are more centrist. Many Bolivians lack strong ideo-
logy, however, and the political orientation of opposing
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forces would probably vary from area to area with pro-Castro
forces attempting to coordinate groups led by individuals
sympathetic to them.
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E. 22. Algeria
The political situation in Algeria, which has already
produced a 6 1/2 year war between France and the Algerian
nationalists, appears to be evolving toward independence for
this north African country. The process of reaching a nego-
tiated'settlement, however, will be long and difficult, and
even the rebel Provisional Government (PAG) reportedly realizes
that a transitional phase, possibly lasting several years, will
precede full independence. Meanwhile, the French army, the
European settlers, the rebel National Liberation Army (ALN),
and the Moslem masses have interests and motivations that
could cause prolonged and bloody conflict at any stage.
The French forces in Algeria may be withdrawn from action
during negotiations or even confined to the larger cities.
A few of the "professional" units, such as paratroopers and
legionaires, who have done most of the fighting--and incurred
most of the hatred--may be transferred to France. But for the
foreseeable future significant French forces will remain in
Algeria, where their presence will lend vague hope to the
die-hard settlers, and irritate large segments of the Moslem
population. The European minority--although no longer capable
of toppling De Gaulle's government--might in desperation
create disorders that would provoke violent Moslem counter-
action and create chaos. The French army might then find
itself fighting either European settlers or Moslem mobs--in
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addition to the ALN. During the transitional period, or more
likely after independence, massive Moslem attacks on Europeans
could lead the settlers to fight for their existence, in which
case they would almost certainly be aided by whatever French
forces remained in the country and perhaps invoke renewed
intervention from France. The KILN within Algeria, dispersed
into small bands not fully controlled by the PAG, might under-
take independent action if it felt the PAG had betrayed its
interests by a moderate political settlement. The Moslem
population, aware of its power since the December riots, can
no longer be counted upon to remain passive or to follow
blindly the orders of the PAG. Prolonged clashes between
Moslems who have cooperated with the French and remnants of
the ALN are particularly likely. Also, as independence ap-
proaches, power struggles and realignments within the present
rebel leadership will occur--possibly aided and abetted by
outside forces, especially the Communist bloc or the UAR--
which could lead to armed clashes or even civil war among
Moslems loyal to or manipulated by various factions.
Of these various elements the French armed forces, which
now number almost 450,000, are the best trained, equipped, and
disciplined. There are over a million Europeans, of whom only
400,000 are of "French extraction" and probably no more than
20,000 are landed "colons." Most adult European males are
armed, many having served in semi-official militia groups.
The ALN has approximately 10,000 men inside Algeria. There
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are 15,000 in Tunisia and 6,000 in Morocco, so far-deterred
from entering Algeria by the electrified barriers along the
borders, who would probably enter even during a transitional
phase and become part of an Algerian army. There would prob-
ably be much ill-will between these troops and ALN forces who
have fought in Algeria--killing Moslems as well as French. Of
the 9,000,000 Moslems, some 120,000 are now serving in the
French forces, and probably a million others are believed to
have cooperated with the French.
Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and the UAR have given various
degrees of sanctuary to the rebel government and the ALN,
and along with Other Arab countries and the Communist bloc
have provided financial, diplomatic, and propaganda support,
as well as small arms and ammunition to ALN units in Tunisia.
and Morocco. So far only a trickle of this materiel has
reached ALN units in Algeria because of the electric fences
and French air surveillance. During a transitional phase,
and certainly after independence, these obstacles would no
longer exist. Granted continued transit rights by Tunisia and/
or Morocco, the capability of the Sino-Soviet bloc or other
Arab countries to furnish material support to warring factions
within Algeria would be excellent. After complete independence
shipments could be made directly to Algeria by sea or air. In
any of these cases the French navy and air force could inter-
vene to prevent large-scale deliveries, but only at the risk of
starting a general war. France would be unlikely to take this
risk unless the French forces or French civilians in Algeria
were gravely threatened.
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E. 23. Morocco
Divisive forces existing in Morocco were reinforced by
the accession to the throne last month of King Hassan II,
Although Hassan moved quickly to assure his suc-
cession when Mohamed died, he has not yet made any appreci-
able concession toward.his opposition, largely centered in
the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). This group
is a loose coalition of organized labor, young intellectuals,
youth groups and former resistance elements which consti-
tutes the most dynamic force in Morocco.
Because he has been chief of staff of the Royal Armed
Forces since their inception, Hassan is presumed to have
the support of the army (30,500 men) and the auxiliary forces
(totalling 12,500). He commands the allegiance of the con-
servative Istiqlal party, which won more than 40 percent of
the seats last May when local councils were elected, and the
smaller Popular Movement, which.is supported by rural tribal
elements, both of which are represented,in his cabinet.
The UNFP can be expected to continue to strengthen its
organization--which is now largely centered in Casablanca,
Rabat and other western Moroccan urban centers-and to move
to unseat the king should he attempt to suppress it. Con-
trolling most organized labor, the UNFP could paralyze the
country's economy. It is known to have been soliciting
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support of the younger military officers and may have in-
stigated a move by young officers to reduce French influence
within the Moroccan armed forces. It is also capable of re-
sorting to terrorist and guerrilla tactics,
The UNFP has been careful to remain in contact with all
potential sources of support. UNFP leaders maintain contacts
with the leaders of the illegal Moroccan Communist Party,
and with many foreign Communist and Socialist political
parties.
The Soviet bloc, which already has made arms deliveries
to Morocco--some destined for the Algerian rebels--could
supply potentially dissident elements. Such dissidents
might also again enlist the support of the Algerian rebels
now in Morocco, and of other Arab and African states. Alger-
ian rebels are reported to have contributed-substantially
to the success of Moroccan guerrilla activities in north and
central Morocco just prior to Moroccan independence in
early 1956.
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E. 24. The Western Sahara
(Spanish Sahara and Mauritania)
Moroccan territorial claims to Spanish Sahara, which
is ruled as a province by Spain, and to newly independett
Mauritania make probable the outbreak of disorders by
marauding tribesmen inspired, directed and equipped by
Rabat. Some 650,000 people inhabit the two areas, which
comprise about 520,000 square miles. For reasons of pres-
tige, Spain is determined to retain Spanish Sahara, and
has recently increased its troop strength there to between
8,000 and 10,000. France, by agreement with the Nouakchott
government, maintains a small military force in northern
Mauritania and, in an emergency, probably would call in the
8,000 to 10,000 French troops stationed at Dakar to sup-
port the Mauritanian Government.
Morocco is apparently using as instruments of its
policy the nomadic Requibat tribesmen, some 20,000 of which
inhabit northern Mauritania while others dwell in Spanish
Sahara and southern Morocco, and the Mauritanian En Nahda
political party. A substantial number of leaders and
members of this party were arrested by the Mauritanian
government last November after the assassination of the
Mayor of Atar, labeled by Moroccan sources as Morocco's
greatest enemy in Mauritania. Tribal raids may be augmented
by activities of Moroccan irregulars. The targets for
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both tribesmen and irregulars are likely to be European
mineral and petroleum concessionaires operating through-
out the territory.
Should Morocco succeed in obtaining.control over
northern Mauritania, adjacent areas of Mauritania-may be
threatened with annexation by neighboring Mali and perhaps
Senegal.
Morocco, which has received Soviet bloc and Arab
states' support for claims to Mauritania, would probably
solicit support for a Moroccan military expedition in
Spanish Sahara and Mauritania.
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E. 25. Cameroun
The southwestern region of Cameroun has been disturbed
by terrorism and guerrilla conflict almost continuously since
1955. Instigated by the Cameroun People's Union (UPC),
a Communist-influenced radical nationalist movement, this
strife was aimed initially at forcing France to grant early
independence. More recently, its goal has been the overthrow
of President Ahnadou Ahidjo's moderate regime, which draws
its support mainly from the conservative Moslem north and
is dependent upon France for military and administrative sup-
port. The regime is not generally popular among the Christian
and pagan tribesmen of the south who are, however, politically
divided.
Since 1959 major elements of the UPC have renounced
terrorism and returned to constitutional political activity
--some even entering Ahidjo's coalition government formed
last year. Other UPC adherents, mainly of the Bamileke tribe
which accounts for about one-sixth of Cameroun's 3,200,000
people, have continued to foment disorders in areas bordering
on the southern sector of the British trust territory of
Cameroons. In this they have been supported and to some ex-
tent guided by UPC exiles living in Accra, Conakry, and Cairo.
These extremists'" activities have also been facilitated by
the existence of acute economic and social unrest within the
Bamileke tribe and by the presence in British Southern
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Cameroons of a local branch of the UPC.
Under these circumstances the government has been and
will continue vitally concerned about strengthening as rapid-
ly as possible the embryonic Cameroun armed forces. The core
of these is the army numbering about 1,500 men organized in
two light infantry battalions. A third battalion now is being
formed with French help and a fourth is planned. While some
personnel are veterans of French Army service, the Cameroun
Army's effectiveness is inhibited by illiteracy and language
problems and by a lack of trained Africane'officers. Supple-
menting the army is a 3,500-man Gendarmerie and a Civic Guard,
a militia of 2,000 Bamileke tribesmen created especially to
deal with the security problem in Bamileke-inhabited areas.
Although basically loyal to the Ahidjo regime, these farces
are not yet capable of maintaining internal security without
the aid of some 2,100 French troops, whose services the govern-
ment has reluctantly retained.
Security operaticaas during the past year have reduced
the number and extent of the areas where terrorism and tribal
rebellion are rampant. Moreover, the most important leader
of the UPC's exiled extremists-.-Felix Moumie-has been elim-
inated as has one of the two principal rebel field leaders.
Active UPC terrorists now may number less than 1,000 though
appreciably larger numbers of non-politically motivated
Baonileke tribesmen are still in: rebellion.
The outlook now.,is clouded, however, by the recent decision
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of Southern Cameroons as a UN-supervised plebiscite, to opt
for union with Cameroun rather than with Nigeria. The neces-
sity of absorbing this British-nurtured area inhabited by
tribesmen similar to thosein the southern part of Cameroun,
including an additional 300,000 Bamilekes, has created many
new problems for Ahidjo who does not have the necessary ad-
ministrators or security forces. This situation could lead
to a recrudescence of UPC-inspired disorders, especially if
25X6
Any significant new deterioration in the security sit-
uation would probably induce Sino-Soviet bloc countries to
step up the clandestine support they have long been provid-
ing the dissidents. This has apparently mainly taken the
form of financial assistance to UPC exiles, although there
are reports that some direct training in guerrilla tactics
has been provided, notably by Communist China. Anti-Ahidjo
radical leaders of the UAR, Ghana, Mali, and especially
Guinea, which is accumulating large stocks of bloc arms,
might also increase their aid to the UPC extremists. Czech
pistols apparently forwarded from Conakry have already turned
up in Cameroun.
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E. 26. Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea
These Portuguese "overseas provinces" are the last
significant areas of Africa to remain under European colon-
ial rule, but they are now feeling the effects of nascent
African nationalism. The white community is sizeable--270,-
000 out of a total population of 11.5 million--especially
in Angola where it numbers some five percent of the popula-
tion. In all three areas Lisbon has ruled directly, and there
are no effective local political institutions to influence
Portugal's policies; significant segments of the white commu-
nities in Angola and Mozambique oppose the Salazar regime on
ideological as well as economic grounds. The economic develop-
ment of the three provinces has been neglected, and the African
population is generally less advanced than in surrounding
areas. Within the past two years there have been nationalist-
inspired disorders in all three areas. Last summer Africans,
presumably stimulated by propaganda and agitators from Tangan-
yika, provoked disturbances in northern Mozambique. Since
mid-February 1961 there have been serious disorders in Angola
involving terrorist attacks on Europeans and their property
as well as on Portuguese military forces.
Portuguese Guinea, where there was a brief disturbance
in August 1959, is currently the target of an intensified
anti-Portuguese propaganda campaign emanating principally from
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Conakry, Sekou Toure's regime and Communist agents are pro-
viding guidance and other aid to African element bent on
"liberating" the neighboring Portuguese province; there are
unconfirmed reports that such elements are receiving train-
ing in guerrilla warfare tactics.
Portugal has recently reinforced its forces in the
African provinces to a strength of about 19,400 army troops
with Portuguese officers and mostly African enlisted men.
In addition, there are 1200 commandos, 500 naval personnel
and 3800 police. The Portuguese will use any methods neces-
sary to crush disorders and have frequently reiterated their
determination to remain in Africa. However, the nationalist
movements are expected to increase their activities, par-
ticularly in Angola and Portuguese Guinea, and will soon pose
a formidable challenge to Portuguese security forces. Groups
in Angola have their headquarters in other African capitals
and can introduce personnel across the Congo border; nation-
alists in Mozambique are now more quiescent but may be stim-
ulated by Tanganyika's early independence and by racial and
political troubles in South Africa.
Communists are known to be influential in one of the
anti-Portuguese emigre' organizations--African Revolutionary
Front for the National Independence of Portuguese Territories
(FRAIN)--which has its headquarters in Conakry. According to
a rival nationalist organization, FRAIN is capturing a
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following among Angolan youth. Any bloc aid would probably, at
least initially, be furnished to such emigre organizations in the
African states rather than across the Congo border directly. The
bloc and African nations generally are showing less awareness of
the situation in Mozambique, where the problem of supplying
dissident groups would probably be more difficult than in the
cases of Angola or Portuguese Guinea.
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E. 27. South Africa
The racial situation in South Africa is already among the
worst in Africa and may soon erupt into armed struggle between a
white community of some 3,000,000 and African groups numbering
about 10,000,000, the latter aided by another 2,000,000 Asians
and racially-mixed persons. Despite storm-signals, the Afrikaner-
controlled government is strengthening its oppressive racial
program with only protest opposition from the English speaking
minority of the European community. International criticism of
the government's racial policies has already caused South Africa
to withdraw from the Commonwealth and might induce Pretoria at an
early date to leave the United Nations.
The Europeans control a small but efficient military force.
The army, navy, and air force total about 8,000 men--all of them
white--and in addition the government can count upon another
80,000 members of the reserves. The police force totals about
22,000 of whom half are non-white, but only the whites possess
firearms. The army, in conjunction with the police and the
reservists, is believed capable of maintaining internal order ex-
cept in the event of country-wide disturbances. Although South
Africa manufactures the bulk of its munitions requirement, it is
dependent on foreign sources for much of its heavy equipment; the
present supply is serviceable but inadequate. Personnel have
excellent fighting qualities although the forces suffer from
inadequate training and from interference by politicians.
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1
40
*ft;ol
The non-Europeans, who are still disunited by racial and
tribal ties, do not yet exert pressure commensurate with their
numbers. If organized, they could probably bring South African
industry to its knees by withholding the labor supply and in-
stituting a boycott of manufactured products. So far, non-
European organizations have been ruthlessly suppressed by the
government. However, coordinated and widespread African violence
against Europeans might overtax the Union's security system and
force the government to concentrate its forces in certain in-
dustrial areas, thereby yielding outlying regions to the non-
Europeans. Similarly, hit-and-run tactics against isolated
European farmers or urban dwellers at night might overtax the
police forces. This could begin a reign of terror--which probably
would be countered with white vigilante action.
At present the Communist bloc has virtually no influence
among the dominant white population, but a few of the Indian and
African leaders are Communists and many are sympathetic to Com-
munism for its attack on racialism and white domination. Commun-
ist influence will probably grow among the non-Europeans whose
main direct contact with Moscow will be through African students
and representatives in the bloc and trained agitators slipped
into the Union. This development will be aided by the clandestine--
and largely white--internal Communist party, the only such party
in Africa south of the Sahara. The disunity among non-Europeans
hampers effective aid on the part of the bloc and African nations,
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but the plight of the Africans will probably receive increased
attention abroad. South Africa's long and poorly defended coast
line would probably facilitate smuggling efforts on behalf of the
non-Europeans.
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E. 28. The Rhodesias
The recent increase of political and racial tension in the
semi-independent Federation reflects the rapid growth of nation-
alism among the 7,000,000 Africans and a resultant determination
of the dominant European settler minority of 300,000 to maintain
their position. The African nationalists have strengthened their
organizations and begun to realize their potential for instigating
economic disorders. They have largely lost confidence in the
settler promises of racial partnership and now look to London to
advance their interests. Meanwhile, they are increasing their
contacts with nationalist groups elsewhere in Africa and with UAR
and Communist bloc representatives. The settlers, for their part,
feel increasingly frustrated by Britain's pro-African policies
and a significant segment is threatening to proclaim Rhodesian
independence if African influence is sharply increased.
Of the three power factors in the Rhodesian situation--Brit-
ain, the white settlers, and the Africans--the settlers control
the greatest local military force. The Royal Rhodesian Army has
about 3,600 men with white officers and African troops, but the
native units may become undependable. However, the territorial
reserves with some 2,800 white officers and men would probably
be a mainstay of the government. The police force of 9,700 men--
largely African--would probably sympathize with African nation-
alists, particularly in Nyasaland. The small, jet-equipped air
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force would be loyal to the Salisbury government. Furthermore,
the settlers control important industrial, mining and agricultural
resources, possess political and economic experience, and in a
crisis can probably expect significant support from the 3,000,000-
strong white community in South Africa.
25X6
The Africans have a tremendous population majority but lack
significant military strength at this time. However, recent
rioting in Southern Rhodesian urban centers and earlier disorders
in the Copperbelt area of Northern Rhodesia and in Nyasaland
showed a potential to force a breakdown in the Federation's secu-
rity. Coordinated but widely separated African attacks could
probably seize control of considerable areas and restrict the
government's control to selected industrial and urban centers of
heavy white population. In addition, a co-ordinated use of the
strike and boycott weapons by the Africans could seriously
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cripple if not curtail mining and industrial activity and bring
commercial farming to a standstill.
The Communist bloc has not as yet played a significant role
in the Federation although there is growing African interest in
the bloc and several leaders would be willing to seek assistance
there. Moreover, even presently moderate leaders such as Dr.
Banda of Nyasaland have indicated they would seek Communist aid
if convinced that Western nations--particularly the UK and US--
will not support the Africans' drive for political and economic
independence. The bloc, without a suitable base in tropical
Africa, would have difficulties in supplying subversive groups
in the Federation comparable to those it now has in the Congo.
However, the independent African states will rapidly gain some
capability to support dissident elements both within and outside
of the Federation and will probably require a less extensive
organizational network than the bloc and the UAR.
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30 March 1961
E. 29. Ruanda-Urundi
The two states of Ruanda and Urundi, administered together
by Belgium as a UN trust territory, have been undergoing a social
and political revolution which began in early 1959--at about the
time that Belgium drastically stepped up the pace of political
advance in the Coago. In the northern state of Ruanda the revolu-
tion took the form of violent tribal struggles between the
hitherto dominant Tutsi minority and the Hutu who form 85 per-
cent of the population. As a result, three quarters of the Tutsi
are now exiled, and the Hutu are firmly in control of the govern-
ment. Tribal feeling in Urundi never led to violent outbreaks;
nevertheless, the Hutu have rapidly become dominant in this area
as well. The wholesale Tutsi expulsion from Ruanda made numerous
apologists for their cause available in international capitals;
this facta?, coupled with obvious Belgian assistance to the Hutu,
has made the Tutsi appear martyrs, and they are supported by
the Soviet bloc and by most African states. Hutu governments
in both states have proclaimed their "independence"--a develop-
ment which may have been stimulated by local Belgian officials
and is likely to be condemned by the UN.
Security in the territory is now in the hands of 1,300
Belgian paratroops. Brussels is training an indigenous security
force of unknown size; without capable foreign direction, this
force is likely to disintegrate as did the Congolese Force
Publique.
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The Sino-Soviet bloc has thus far not attempted to intervene
directly in Ruanda-Urundi internal affairs. However, it has
exploited the issue at the UN, assisting in the efforts to
establish closer supervision over the Belgian administration.
The bloc has also furnished propaganda support to the Tutsi
exiles, some of whom probably have been subjected to Communist
influence,
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E. 30. Kenya
Kenya is entering the last stage of its transition from
British to African rule. Elections in February 1960 gave
Africans a majority in the legislature; however, further advance
is being hindered by maneuvering among African leaders. The
radical Kenya African National Union (KANU), which obtained the
largest number of seats, is deeply split into blocs supporting
and opposing secretary-general Tom Mboya. It has so far refused
to participate in the formation of a government, asserting that
any government must be headed by Mau Mau detainee Jomo Kenyatta.
KANU's rival, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), has
been more moderate on the Kenyatta issue and reportedly has allied
itself secretly with the New Kenya party, the political group of
moderate Europeans. This coalition would have a strength in
the legislature about equal to KANU's.
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In addition, there are 12,000 police, most of them
Africans. The African troops and police are well-trained and
could maintain order in the event of scattered outbreaks; how-
ever, they could not contain a widespread uprising without
assistance from the British forces stationed in Kenya. Moreover,
they are only partly de-tribalized and might not be dependable
in the face of serious tribal disorders. They have the advantage
of experience with the MaU,Mau terrorists.
There is no Communist party in Kenya, but several Africans,
notably KANU vice president Oginga Odinga, have travelled exten-
sively within the bloc and have received substantial bloc
financial support. Odinga has set up a program of scholarships
to Communist countries to compete with Mboya's student airlift
to the United States. The bloc as well as the independent
African states can be expected to continue to exploit African
factionalism--and the continuing tribalism which characterizes
the territory's political life--in an effort to discredit the
British and their moderate African associates.
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E. 31. Ethiopia
Political stability has not returned to Ethiopia following
the abortive coup attempt last December. The Emperor's refusal
to institute reforms, and his recent decision to try to placate
the military forces at the expense of civilian elements suggest
that his regime will face increasing dissension. Although the
December coup attempt was largely an intra-ruling group dispute,
it brought to the surface the widespread discontent existing
throughout the politically aware elements of the population--
mostly confined to Addis Ababa--and widened the split between
the conservative old guard and the younger modernists, largely
foreign educated. It may also have rekindled the flames of
separatism in several provinces which have chafed under the
Amhara-dominated centralized rule in Addis Ababa. The situation
is further complicated by deep tribal and religious conflicts
which may assume commanding importance when the present Emperor
is succeeded by an inexperienced and politically weaker ruler.
Northern and eastern Ethiopia contain large Moslem minorities,
constituting about 40 percent of the total population, and the
Moslem-inhabited Ogaden region Would be likely to seek to join
the neighboring Somali Republic.
Ethiopia's military and security forces, although fairly
well trained and equipped, cannot be relied upon in event of a
showdown; army units are currently implicated in anti-regime
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activities and the loyalty of the police is open to question.
The army strength totals 30,500 men, trained and equipped by US
MAAG; the police 28,500; the small jet-equipped air force 920;
and the embryonic navy 400. Within these forces, however, there
is considerable tension between modernists and feudalists as well
as strong tribal and provincial loyalties. Furthermore, the
Ethiopian forces are faced with very difficult logistics
problems and would have difficulty in operating against any
sizeable force, especially if attacked through the remote Ogaden
desert area, most likely to be the scene of any aggression against
Ethiopia from outside the country.
The Sino-Soviet bloc already has a considerable presence
in Ethiopia with some 275 diplomats and commercial personnel in
residence, several economic credit agreements in force, and in-
creasing cultural contacts. However, the bloc does not now
exert a significant influence in the country and there does not
now appear to be a sizeable group of Ethiopian Communist sympa-
thizers. However, Ethiopia's growing political unrest and the
existence of divisive elements in its population are likely to
afford the bloc considerable opportunities to interfere in the
future.
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