Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 14, 2005
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 23, 1961
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1.pdf5.85 MB
Approved For Release 20 fMIA-RDP7 1 0?,E 9 '1-1 23 January 1961 OCI No. 0617/61 CopyNo. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY (Its Development from Autumn 1959 to Summer 1960) Off ice of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. Approved For Release 200&E REaiA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 Approved For Release 200 A"E?fA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY (Its Development from Autumn 1959 to Summer 1960) This is a working paper, the third in a series of studies Of the dispute between the Soviet and Chinese Com- munist parties about the strategy and tactics of the world Communist movement. This paper, beginning with the con- frontation of Mao and Khrushchev in Peiping in autumn 1959 and ending with the impasse that followed the Paris "summit" meeting, includes the period of one of the most important developments in world Communism in recent years--the syste- matic and scornful Chinese attacks on Soviet positions in the spring of 1960. The period encompassed by this paper was one primarily of Chinese initiatives and Soviet responses.' Two more. papexx;in this series will treat the period of the Bucharest conference of Communist parties in June 1960 through the Moscow conference of Communist parties in November 1960, a period primarily of a Soviet counter-offensive. ;25X1 Approved For Release 200S~6TEt'71A-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 Approved For Release 2S& I CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 Khrushchev apparently came to Peiping in October 1959 in the mistaken belief that China's dependence on the USSR would force the Chinese party to accommodate to his global strategy--a strategy criticized by the Chinese for almost two years. In Peiping, he publicly rejected the Chinese contention that the Bloc should pursue a more militant and revolutionary strategy all over the world under the pro- tection of Soviet military power; and Suslov endorsed Khrush- chev's positions, perhaps thus disabusing Mao of a belief that the Chinese had support among Soviet leaders. The Chinese intensified their attacks on Khrushchev's positions after his departure. In several speeches in the USSR subsequently, Khrush- chev reaffirmed his belief in the overriding importance of avoiding a general war, and his feeling that Western leaders were coming to the same view. He stated his favor fora long-term accommodation with the West--not in terms of abandon- ing political, economic, and ideological pressure on the West but in terms of avoiding war and/or serious risks of war. Inter alia, he criticized Mao's thinking as Trotskyist and as playing into the hands of the enemy; to Peiping's dismay, he took a conciliatory line on DeGaulle's proposals for ending the Algerian war; he failed to endorse Chinese positions on several Far Eastern issues; he derided Chinese domestic policies; he accused the CCP of conceit; and he warned that opposition to fundamental Soviet policies would not be tolerated. By the end of 1959, Soviet public lecturers were openly referring to difficulties in the Sino-Soviet relationship, probably,in order to prepare the Soviet populace for the possibility of a radical deterioration in relations. Khru- shchev himself suggested at the time that the relationship had deteriorated to a dangerous point. President Eisenhower's State of the Union message on 7 January 1960 was given differing emphases by Moscow and Peiping--the former picking out of the message some of the more hopeful signs (in the Soviet view) that the United States was prepared to ease international tensions, and the latter citing it as an example of the deceitful American practice of talking peace while preparing for war. In the Chinese view, the apparent American interest in detente was nothing more than a maneuver to buy the necessary time to overcome Soviet military superiority. Approved For Release 2Qr/M,I.,CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 Approved For Release 205.- ''IA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 That Mao was proselytizing In the Communist world against Khrushchev and Khrushchev's strategy was. evidenced 1.AU.L J_A15 A.1 ~W V i.~JL 1. Mao told he c isagree wit i soviet po icy on disarmamen China would not sign any disarmament agreement un- z as given its legitimate seat in the United Nations and unless the United States withdrew from Taiwan. Throughout the early part of 1960, there were growing indications of Chinese annoyance with Soviet disarmament policy. The Chinese probably believed that any Soviet-Ameri- can disarmament agreement would tend to freeze Communist China out of the nuclear club, would undermine the Soviet capability to fight local wars, would throw away the Soviet military advantage, and might even be the beginning of an East-West aaccat modat .o.n achieved at China's expense. At the Warsaw Pact conference in February 1960, it is likely that joint Chinese-East German pressure was brought to bear on the Russians for the sharing of nuclear weapons but that this pressure was resisted. On the question of strategy, there was a complete impasse. Moreover, Khrush- chev reportedly criticized Chinese actions against India and Indonesia in strong terms and complained that Peiping had refused to support the USSR's attempts to reduce world tension, had not followed the USSR's lead by demobilizing any part of its armed forces, was too insistent on following its own independent policies, and was harming the cause of Communism. In February, the Chinese in their journals said in ef- fect that the cold war could not be meaningfully abated; that the danger of war would continue to exist and the bloc must prepare for all contingencies; that disarmament negotiations were more or less useless; that the bloc should concentrate not on negotiations with the West but on building its own resources and securing its own strength. In April 1960 the Chinese offered a comprehensive in- dictment of Soviet theory, strategy and tactics In the form of five lengthy and acrimonious doctrinal statements which in effect accused Khrushchev---ain his 20th Congress for- mulaticns--of having revised, emasculated and betrayed Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese rejected Khrushchev's views on the possibility and advisability of seeking a long-range detente with the West and contended that coexistence could mean only an armed truce; they argued that wars, particularly local and colonial wars, were inevitable so long as imperial- ism remained; and they minimized the possibility, of peaceful Approved For Release 2c l6 7tlA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 Approved For Release 2005 / : JQ-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 accession to power in the non-Communist world. In attack- ing Khrushchev's ideological innovations and the strategy which these innovations reflected, the Chinese were not calling for general war, a' thQ.y'may . haw. believed this inevitable. Rather, they were attacking Khrushchev's grad- ualist revolutionary conception and putting forth an al- ternative conception--based on the conviction that the west could be defeated sooner than Khrushchev thought if the USSR and the world Communist movement were more aggressive. In broader terms, the massive Chinese attack on Khru- shchev's positions involved a decision to bring before the entire Communist world the Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership of the bloc, a challenge sustained by one of the most serious charges one Communist party can make against another--the charge of abandonment of revolutionary positions. The question of strategy toward the underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America--the "colonial and semi-colonial" areas--had all along been highly impor- tant in the Sino-Soviet dispute. During the spring of 1960 there were several developments relating to the question of Soviet aid to these areas, the question of support of "liberation" movements, the specific case of the Algerian rebellion, and the growing Chinese interest in African af- fairs. For a variety of reasons, -the Chinese seemed to oppose the Soviet aid program to non-Communist countries--to op- pose, at least, the scale of such aid and the priority It enjoyed in Soviet thinking. The Chinese had already in- dicated their belief that such aid would strengthen non- Communist governments to the detriment of the revolution. They may have believed further that such aid could otherwise be used to support their own economic development and that Soviet aid programs might facilitate the expansion of So:, Viet influence at the expense of Chinese influence. The Chinese took a much stronger line than did the Russians on the need for supporting "liberation" movements which in turn would pursue aggressive policies. The Chi- nese contended that the Communist party in each country that had not attained independence should seek at the earliest opportunity to take over the independence movement rather than to leave leadership of such movements in the hands of genuine nationalist parties; that the Communist party in each country which had attained formal independ- ence must put enough pressure on the nationalist government to get Communists taken into the government or at least 'to achieve a pro-Communist government; and that a policy of Approved For Release 200MffA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 SECRET Approve,For Release 2005/04/26: CIA-RDP79fD0427A000600020001-1 prolonged cooperation with the national bourgeoisie in co- lonial countries--the policy advocated by Moscow--would almost certainly lead to disaster. Perhaps most impor-.: ta,ittly for the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese argued that the Bloc should abandon its cautious policy toward "lib- eration" movements and give them all-out support, even if this entailed a risk of local wars with the West. Differences between Moscow and Peiping over the "co 1oiiial liberation" struggle and the specific issue of sup- port of "liberation" movements, have been illustrated in their respective attitudes toward the Algerian rebellion. In the period discussed in this paper, the Chinese evidently calculated that a continuation of the Algerian war would advance both the interests of the bloc and their own in- terests far more than would a negotiated settlement, and they seemed to view Khrushchev's support--however cautious-- for DeGaulle's proposals to end the war as a betrayal of the "colonial liberation" struggle. In the spring of 1960 the Chinese considerably in- creased their attention to African affairs. The principal Chinese effort was made at the second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference, held in Guinea in April. The Chi- nese made a strong bid to dominate the proceedings and the organization itself. The Soviet and Chinese representa- tives reportedly clashed on the question of strategy. It is unlikely that China was instrumental in the Soviet decision to wreck the summit conference in May 1960. Although the Chinese had long argued that negotiations must not take priority over revolutionary struggle, their public pronouncements on the eve of the summit indicated resigna- tion rather than opposition. Of greater importance, how- ever, the failure of the summit evidently emboldened Mao to press to a new and critical stage his initiative within the world Communist movement against Khrushchev's strategy and tactics. No sooner had the summit collapsed than-Soviet state- ments, including some from Khrushchev himself, indicated that, although the long term struggle with the West would not be abandoned on a political, economic and ideological level, the USSR would still not take serious risks of gen- eral war and would continue to be interested in negotiations with the West--even if it had to wait for years. This re- affirmation of "peaceful coexistence" clashed head-on with intensified Chinese urging for a radical change in Soviet policy. Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET Approved For Release 260 /648 TCIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 I KHRUSHCHEV IN..PEIPIN+G AND AFTER Khrushchev in Peiping, October 1959 At the Washington Press Club on 16 September 1959, an American newsman asked Khrushchev what would be the purpose of his visit to Peiping after his tour of the United States. "That," replied Khrushchev before giving an innocuous reply, "is apparently the most 'difficult' question." As we have seen hrushchev was greeted on arrival in Peiping of articles by CCP leaders which vigorously defended Chinese foreign and domestic poli- cies against Soviet criticism, accused "some people" of "ignorance of Marxism-Leninism," implicitly attacked Soviet policy toward the uncommitted countries, and implicitly warned Khrushchev that the same Russian errors which led to severe losses for the Chinese Communist movement in the 1920's were now being repeated in the colonial areas. In addition to all this, Chinese objections to Khrushchev's negotiation tactics had been spelled out in the CCP's lead- ing party'journal on the very day that Khrushchev had ar- rived in the United States. To add to Mao's discomfiture, there was the fact that Khrushchev was coming to Peiping after his talks with Presi- dent Eisenhower. Mao may have reflected that the President had seen fit to journey to Western Europe to consult with his allies prior to his talks with the Soviet premier. More- over, in response to a specific question on 5 August as to whether Khrushchev intended to consult with his allies prior to his US visit, Khrushchev had cavalierly dismissed the question: We will probably exchange views: with our friends in one way or another, but I do not think that we need all gather for any discussions. The question of ensuring world peace is so clear that it is not a controversial one for the socialist countries. That is why we are sure that all the socialist countries will approve our activity in that direction.... (emphasis supplied) Khrushchev obviously was aware that the question of "en- suring world peace" was not "so clear" to his Chinese allies. That he was ready to wave them off in this manner may have reflected a belief that his Chinese comrades were still vi- tally dependent on the USSR and would have no alternative but to go along with Soviet policies. If this was his belief, he was mistaken. Approved For Release 2 44 2 j CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET Approve#or Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79S427A000600020001-1 In his two public speeches in Peiping, Khrushchev made little effort to meet the objections to Soviet strategy that the Chinese had been voicing for almost two years. In his arrival speech on 30 September he said that "everything must be done to clear the atmosphere and create conditions for friendship among peoples." In his banquet speech the same evening he reasserted his belief that the bloc would defeat the West in peaceful economic competition. He said that President Eisenhower and other Western leaders had begun to show a more realistic understanding of the world situation and that Eisenhower in particular "understands the need to relax international tension." Therefore, he continued, "we on our part must do all we can to exclude war as a means of settling disputed questions." There was "no other way" than that of peaceful coexistence. Then, aiming straight at the heart of the Chinese con- cept that the bloc could pursue more militant policies all over the world under the shield of the Soviet nuclear deter- rent, Khrushchev said: ...we must think realistically and under- stand the contemporary situation correctly. This, of course, does not by any means signify that if we are so strong, then we must test by force the stability of the capitalist system. This would be wrong; the peoples would not understand and would never support those who would think of acting in this way. A few sentences later, he may have been aiming at the Chi- nese exhortations for a more revolutionary line in the un- committed countries: The socialist countries-fire the hearts of men by the force of their example in building socialism and thus lead them to o ow in their footsteps. The question of when this or that country will take the path of socialism is de- cided by its own people. This, for us, in the holy of holies. (emphasis supplied) If Mao had had any hopes of relying on a so-called "China lobby" in the Kremlin allegedly led by Suslov, Sus- lov's speech in Peiping two days earlier cannot have given him much encouragement. Suslov was somewhat less enthusias- tic than Khrushchev about the possibilities for relaxing tension but he nonetheless supported the broad outline of Khrushchev's global strategy. While he spoke of forces in the West interested in keeping up the cold war and of the -2- Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET SECRET Approveel,ror Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SW27A000600020001-1 "projected relaxation" of tension, he insisted that "wars mustbe prevented because in our age--the age of the atom and of rocket technology--they threaten mankind with count- less sufferings and disasters" (emphasis supplied) . This line of reasoning--that the development of military tech- nology threatened civilization and by implication required an adjustment of Soviet strategy--was vigorously rejected by Mao. Suslov also made it clear that he supported Khrushchev's long-range policy of seducing the uncommitted countries by trade, aid and example rather than by the more revolutionary method the Chinese believed necessary for many or most of these countries. He said: The socialist states resolutely support the strivings of the countries of Asia and Africa to develop their national economies. We are extending help, and, as our possibili- ties grow, will extend still more help, to all countries of Asia and Africa. emphasis supplied) Finally, Suslov defended Khrushchev's trip to the US as having been accomplished "with honor, dignity and brilliance... and with Leninist adherence to principle." In effect, he was reminding Mao that he would not support the insinuations in the Chinese press that Khrushchev had watered down Leninist principles in making his trip to the United States. The very fact that Khrushchev allowed Suslov to head the Soviet delegation to Peiping prior to his own arrival and at a time when Sino-Soviet relations were so strained sugg,sts his confidence that Mao would not be able to ex- ploi'whatever differences in the Soviet leadership there may have been over foreign policy. The sending of Suslov may even have been intended as a deliberate demonstration to Mao that the Soviet leadership was united on Khrushchev's foreign policy. Whatever arguments Khrushchev and Suslov used to defend Soviet strategy, the Chinese were cool to them. There was a failure to issue the customary pious joint communique and Khrushchev, in his departure speech, made the remarkable statement that "we Communists of the'Soviet Union consider it our sacred duty, our primary task... to utilize all possi- bilities in order to liquidate the cold war." This suggested that Khrushchev could no longer speak for China on this question. -3- Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 SECRET Approve For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79W427A000600020001-1 Pao personally told I hat the CPSU had handled the+.denigration of Stalin in a very abrupt manner, that Molotov was a valiant party member with a world of experience, and that "peaceful disentanglement"--possibly a reference to prolonged coexistence--was a theory with no In short Mao as evidently lobbying against Khrushchev's tactics. That Mao would have gone to the extreme of praising Molotov must have been regarded by Khrush- chev as unwarran e n rence in the internal affairs of the CPSU, along with Mao's violation of "proletarian inter- nationalism" in challenging Khrushchev's tactics. 25X1 hinese resent- ment at being left out of the summit talks had increased and had been made quite clear to Khrushchev. 25X1C II the Chinese also were annoyed with Khrushchev for not giving pufficient support to Peiping's campaign to take over 25X1 Taiwan. also re- ported that Chinese Communist resentment at being left out of high-level negotiations was one of the motivations behind Peiping's decision to stir up trouble with India over the boundary question. The incident was said to be intended as a reminder to India, the Soviet Union, and the West that there were important areas of the world where settlements could be reached only by direct negotiation with Peiping. Two subsidiary motives for the attack on India were alleged to be Nehru's ouster of the Communist government in Kerala and the belief that the Indians had given too much aid and comfort to Tibetan refugees. Khrushchev's Formal Report to the Supreme Soviet, 31 October Khrushchev's speeches in the USSR after returning from Peiping reaffirmed his belief in the struggle for peace as "the main task of today" and directed oblique remarks to the Chinese Communists for advocating tougher policies to- ward the West. In these speeches, Khrushchev also reaffirmed his apparently genuine fear of a nuclear holocaust. Thus, in Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 SECRET 25X1 25X1 C 25X1 C SECRET Approv ;For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP70960427A000600020001-1 Vladivostok on 6 October, he cautioned that the US and the USSR could not confront each other like "two cocks ready to lay hold and peck each other." He recalled that in his meeting with President Eisenhower, the President had ex- pressed his fear of war and Khrushchev had replied that "only an unreasonable person can be fearless of war in our days." While it was necessary to fight if war was "im- posed upon a people" it was "unreasonable to be eager for war..." Khrushchev also reaffirmed his confidence in the President as a man of peace and "farsightedness." In a speech in Novosibirsk on 10 October, Khrushchev defined his understanding of peaceful coexistence in a way which indicated that Mao had expressed concern to him that the "coexistence" line would retard the revolutionary strug- gle. Peaceful coexistence must be understood correctly. Coexistence means the continuation of the struggle between the two social systems, but of a struggle by peaceful means, without war, without the interference of a state into the domestic affairs of another state. One should not be afraid. We must struggle reso- lutely and consistently for our ideas, for our way of life, for our socialist system. The partisans of capitalism too will not, of course, they abandon their way of life, their ideology; must will fight. We hold that this struggle be economic, political and ideological, but not military. (emphasis supplied) Khrushchev's formal report to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October was his first effort to describe the main di- rection of Soviet policy Eisenhower. This speech was climb toward a "detente." Khrushchev began by contending that "a more sensible understanding of the relation of forces on the international arena is now beginning to prevail in the West." The West was making a "more sober evaluation of the situation." This new Western evaluation was "bound to lead to the conclusion" that the West could not use its military forces against the socialist world. The factors favoring peace were the increas- ing strength of the Bloc, the rise of the newly independent countries, the peace-loving forces in the capitalist coun- tries themselves, and the "many statesmen" in the West who "begin to understand" that war threatens destruction. -5- Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET Approved For Release 200 ~4 EcuIA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 Peaceful coexistence, continued Khrushchev, was not something to be desired or not desired. It was an "objec- tive necessity" proceeding from the "present situation in the world," namely that both sides "possess weapons which would cause perilous consequences if they were put into action." Moreover, said Khrushchev, coexistence was the existing state of affairs: the question was how to coexist "on a reasonable basis." Reasonable coexistence, he continued, presupposed ""mu- ?tual concessions in the interests of peace," a position based on principle but which at the same time was "flexible." Lenin had taught, he went on, that the working class, before as well as after it has gained power, must be able to pursue a flexible pol- icy, compromise and come to agreement whenever life and the interests of the cause demand it. "Mutual concessions," a term which he repeated several times, did not mean that there would be any ideological concessions or compromise on "principles." However, he continued, looking over his shoulder toward Peiping, "we have no reason to fear that the peoples of the socialist countries will be seduced by the capitalist devil and give up socialism. To think' differently means not to believe wholly in the strength of socialism..." A paragraph later, Khrushchev was again pointing di- rectly at Peiping when lie recalled Lenin's "flexible f or- eign policy" during the, period of the Brest peace in 1920: It was during the period of the Brest peace that Vladimir Ilyich Lenin set the task of concluding peace with Germany in order to insure for the young Soviet state the possi- bility for peaceful construction of socialism. Lenin and the party then had to conduct a per- sistent struggle against Trotsky, who came out then with his Pilate's objections and put for- ward his notorious slogan of 'neither peace nor war' by which he played into the hands of the Oman imperialists. It is known that Trots y's adventurist policy was used by German imperialism against the Soviet country... Such were the fruits of adventurism in policy. (emphasis supplied) The very invocation of Trotsky, the arch heretic, is indicative of the seriousness of the charge Khrushchev was here making against Mao Tse-tung, Trotsky is virtually an "unperson" in Soviet media. Despite the fact that some of -6- Approved For Release 2005'/0R'-TIA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 SECRET Approv or Release 2005/04/26: CIA-RDP79WO427A000600020001-1 the policies advocated by some of the "anti-group" in 1957 could have been identified by Khrushchev with Trotskyism, he did not go this far even with his own internal party opponents. Second, Khrushchev was in effect contending that just as Trotsky "played into the hands" of the German imperial- ists, Mao was now playing into the hands of the Western im- perialists. For the West could employ the Mao's "adventur- ist" line against the USSR. In Stalin's Russia, people were not infrequently shot for "objectively" playing into the hands of the enemy.* After thus severely condemning Mao's policy, Khrushchev went on to deny that the USSR was insincere when it spoke of peaceful coexistence or that it was advancing the slogan simply for tactical reasons. This was a distortion, he con- tended; Marxism "has never considered that war among states is necessary for the victory of the working class." Khrushchev then listed the various indications that a thaw was occurrirg in international relations. These included the nuclear test talks, the foreign ministers' conference, the various exchanges of visits--all of which were of "posi- tive significance." He described his visit with President Eisenhower. as a "particularly important and far-reaching step in the direction of radically improving relations be- tween the USSR and the US and generally relaxing inter- national tension." Many outstanding American personalities, he said, "with the President at their head," understood the longing of the American people for peace and wanted to find ways to consolidate peace. Moreover, his visit had con- tributed to a better understanding in the United States of the Soviet desire for peace. Khrushchev then reversed the Soviet attitude on DeGaulle's 16 September proposals for ending the Algerian war. Although these proposals had previously been denounced in the Soviet press as a fraud, Khrushchev now said that DeGaulle's pro- posals "may play an important role in settlement of the Algerian question." It would play this role particularly if it was supported by "realistic steps." He called for "mu- tual coordination of the mutual interests of the parties" * The CCP retorted in December by reiterating their praise of Stalin as having been--unlike some--"an uncompromis- ing enemy of imperialism." Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET SECRET Approv For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79WO427A000600020001-1 and recalled that "historically developed close bonds exist between Algeria and France." Khrushchev thus left the clear impression that he might support a French-FLN settlement which would leave Algeria associated with the French com- munity. He also left the clear impression that he favored serious negotiations to bring the long bloody war to an end. Within a few days of this statement, the French Communist party reversed its previous hostility to DeGaulle's pro- posal with a long mea culpa. The impact of this statement on Peiping--read in the context of Khrushchev's calls for "mutual concessions"--can hardly be exaggerated. For a year, Peiping had been in- sisting that the Algerian rebels were providing a splendid example to national revolutionary movements throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. Only a month before, Chinese spokesmen had publicly called for a more revolutionary line in the uncommitted countries. For Khrushchev to swing closer to the French line on Algeria at such a time--for whatever reasons--must have been vipmed in Peiping as tantamount to betrayal of the revolutio In speaking of Taiwan, Khrushchev gave only a mild en- dorsement of China's rights to the island: "the legal and moral right is on its side." Turning to Korea and Laos-- both areas in which Peiping had for some time been threaten- ing the use of force--Khrushchev cautioned against the use of force. His "impression" was, he said, that the "United States is not seeking a military conflict there (in South Korea)," contrary to Peiping's line then and now that the U.S. was building up for aggression. With regard to Laos, Khrushchev said the USSR was "against the existence of even the smallest source of war in Laos which could give food to the aggressive forces." Given a "sensible approach".there, he said, the "skirmishes taking place could be soon elimi- nated" and the situation could be "normalized." With regard to the Sino-Indian border dispute, Khrush- chev maintained his neutral attitude: he was grieved that casualties occurred on "both sides," he thought the issues could be resolved to the "satisfaction of both sides." In urging a solution to disarmament, Khrushchev, painted a gloomy picture of the consequences of war--consequences not only for the capitalists but for all. A new war, he said,--coming close to Malenkov's heresy of 1954 that civi- lization would be destroyed--would cause mankind "unprece- dented sacrifice, devastation and suffering." 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2 2iTCIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 Khrushchev concluded this remarkably conciliatory speech with a plea for lasting peace. The Soviet Government deems it its duty to our people and to all of mankind to consol- idate the achieved relaxation of tension in international relations, and to adhere firmly to a course leading from relaxation to a com- plete liquidation of international tension, and to turn the achieved relaxation into a lasting peace. In the above speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev put himself on record before the Russian people as favoring a long-range accommodation with the West and as prepared to make as well as to receive concessions in order to achieve the ace ommo datio n. He attributed sincerity to Western leaders, particularly to President Eisenhower, in wanting peace. In effect, he told his audience that having seen. for himself the state of opinion in the United States, he was convinced that a long-term stabilization was possible. This is not to say that Khrushchev had overnight abandoned the "world revolution." He did seem to believe, however, that this revolution would be a long-term affair which could not be promoted aggressively in the nuclear era. For Mao, this speech must have been an abomination. The April 1960 Red Flag and People's Daily articles, in- dicting the who e tge`oretical stri ture of Soviet foreign policy, were in large part directed at this speech. The speech probably marked a new downward turn in the increas- ingly troubled Sino-Soviet relationships. The lines between Khrushchev and Mao were now drawn in classical fashion. Khrushchev was calling Mao an adventurist and Trotskyite who was pushing ahead much too fast both in his domestic programs and in his plans for world revolution. Mao was in effect calling Khrushchev an appeaser and was soon to call him a rev'ionis t for abandoning the traditional Lenin- ist views on imperialism,'war, and peace. Khrushchev's 30 October speech, as indicated earlier, was a statement of the upper limits of Khrushchev's detente policy. The strategy underlying this policy can be gleaned from a confidential "Peace Plan" formulated by Khrushchev and disseminated to Communist parties throughout the world in early October. In this plan, Khrushchev contended that a more or less lengthy period of peace was necessary in order to buy time for the bloc to outstrip the West in economic production and for the revolutionary forces through- out the world to prepare themselves "morally and materially." Approved For Release 2 ,Ail 6l-CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET The prospects began by asserting that the CPSU expected firm support for peace from all the fraternal parties. The CPSU, it continued, had long-range plans for the building of socialism throughout the world. Although there had been a slight improvement in the world situation, the utmost effort was still required so that peace might be prolonged as long as possible. During this peaceful phase, the socialist camp would be in an increasingly good position to give moral as well as material support to the socialist (i.e., Communist) forces of non-Communist countries for the building up of the revo- lutionary movements. In conditions of peace, the "genuine" socialist forces of Asia, Africa and Latin America could build up their revolutionary movements morally and materially. Thus, Khrushchev's two directives to the world Communist movement in October 1959 were: first, be careful to avoid all actions that might lead to war; and, second, continue to build up the party against the day when revolutionary action might be feasible. In another speech--to the Hungarian party congress-- on 1 December, Khrushchev advanced a long step forward in his ideological indictment of Mao's domestic and foreign policies. This time Khrushchev added a warning that such deviation would not be tolerated--a warning which seemed to have little effect on Mao. "Khrushchev began be reviewing the lessons taught by the "mistakes" of the Stalinist Rakosi,; leadership in?_;Hungary-- lessons which, he declared, "other Communist and workers parties cannot but heed." He warned against "armchair leaders" who "order the masses about"; he warned against "disregarding objective conditions" and ruling "by decree" instead of by persuasion; he avowed that although no Com- munist leaders were guaranteed against mistakes in socialist construction, "one must have the courage openly to admit one's mistakes and to correct them in time." In all this, he seemed to be aiming at Mao's headlong economic policies. Turning then to a defense of the 20th Congress and the reevaluation of Stalin, he did not agree with "some people" who contended that the de-Staliftization question should "not have been raised so sharply." The Chinese had already indicated their dislike of Khrushchev's handling of this question at the 20th Congress. Then, in a series of passages that were unmistakably directed at Mao, Khrushchev warned against foolishness and conceit and stressed the need for discipline in the Com- munist movement. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 Approved For Release 200 /" CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 Even now the enemies of socialism do not abandon their plans of smashing the social- ist camp and are, of course, looking for the weak links in it. They want to rout the so- cialist countries one by one. We must bear this danger in mind, because it is real, and we must do everything to deprive our enemies of these hopes. In these sinister plans the only ally of imperialist aspirations and hopes can be our foolishness. If we become conceited, if we commit mis- takes in our leadership, if we distort the teaching of Marxism-Leninism on the building of socialism and Communism, these mistakes can be exploited by the enemies of Communism as'was done in ...our enemies will attempt to pet one socialist country against another in order to weaken the forces of socialism. We must bear in mind that the striving to make the social- ist countries quarrel among themselves, to undermine the relations of friendship and brottherhood between them, is one of the forms of class struggle employed by our enemy. This is why the immutable principles of proletarian internationalism are the supreme, irrevocable law of the internationa Communist movement... We must make sensible use of the great ad- vantages of the socialist system and strengthen the world socialist camp in every war-... We must be masters of Leninism. We must not fall be- hind or go tdofar ahead. :;: We amust, figuratively speaking, synchronize our watches. If the leader- ship of this or that country becomes conceited, this can only play into the hands of the enemy. In this case, the socialist countries themselves, the leadership itself, will help the enemy to fight socialism, to fight Communism, and this cannot be allowed. (emphasis supplied) In these passages, Khrushchev was conceding that Sino- Soviet relations had deteriorated to the point that they were in serious danger of being "undermined." Mao's domes- tic policies, he implied, might lead to insurrection as did .Rakosi's in Hungary. Mao's foreign policy, he warned again, was playing into the hands of the imperialist enemy. Finally, he warned Mao that he must obey the "supreme irrevocable" law Approved For Release 200 4f GTIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET ApprovedoFor Release 2005/04/26: CIA-RDP79100427A000600020001-1 of proletarian internationalism--that is, submission to So- viet policy3-and that independent courses would not be tol- erated. A few passages later, Khrushchev was back again re- futing Mao's position on peace and war. "No Communist party anywhere, if it really is Communist," he said, "has ever said that it hopes to achieve its aims through war. Nor in- deed, could it say so." Although this was a distortion of the Chinese position, it was a rebuke to Mao's view that armed struggle should be encouraged and supported in many areas of the world. Returning to the theme of his Supreme Soviet speech, Khrushchev contended that the fight for a "stable and durable peace" was one of the principal tasks of the Communist move- ment. The importance of this struggle, he said, was "hard to overestimate." Public Criticism of Peiping in USSR By December 1959, the Sino-Soviet relationship had deteri- orated to'such a point that Soviet spokesmen began to crit- icize their Chinese allies in public. 25X1 a Soviet speaker at a pub- lic lecture at Moscow University had referred to difficul- ties in the Sino-Soviet relationship. He specifically men- tioned the Sino-Indian border dispute and the "cold and in- correct reception" given Khrushchev on his visit to Peiping in October. On 11 December, another Soviet public speaker in Moscow criticized the Chinese commune program as a "mess," and asserted that the Chinese Communists.' cultural timetable was off by 20 to 30 years, in view of the country's backward- ness and poverty. On 18 December, a Soviet diplomat in Geneva, talking to-newsmen as a Soviet official who could be so quoted but not identified by name, reportedly lamented Communist China's activity in connection with the Sino-Indian border dispute as "more than untimely" and as a development that would be "inopportune at any time." On 21 December, the eightieth anniversary of Stalin's birthday, Pravda and People's Daily presented diverging in- terpretations of Stalin which highlighted the strategic and doctrinal differences between the two parties. Pravda gave a balanced presentation of Stalin's achievements and failures and avoided his views on war and foreign policy; People's Daily, on the other hand, attended almost exclusive Ty to Stalin's virtues and, in what was clearly a criticism of Khrushchev's detente line, remindedits:readers thatStalin hadiurged the need for a "high degree of vigilance against -12- Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET SECRET Approve4For Release 2005/04/26: CIA-RDP796 0427A000600020001-1 imperialism." The Chinese editorial quoted a 1951 statement by Stalin in which he warned that "should the warmongers re- sort to lies to trap and deceive the people in order to drag them into another war, such a war would become inevitable a statement ignored in recent years by Soviet media and in striking contrast to Khrushchev's current emphasis on the possibility of excluding war from human life forever. The editorial also praised highly the Moscow declaration of the Communist parties in November 1957--anticipating an exchange of charges between the Soviet and Chinese parties that the other had departed from the declaration. In sum, Khrushchev apparently came to Peiping in the mistaken belief that China's dependence on the USSR would force the Chinese party to accommodate to his global strategy. In Peiping, he publicly rejected the Chinese contention that the Bloc should pursue more militant and revolutionary strat- egy all over the world under the protection of Soviet military power; and Suslov endorsed Khrushchev's positions, perhaps thus disabusing Mao of a belief that Mao had supporters among Soviet leaders. The Chinese intensified their attacks on Khrushchev's positions after his departure. In several speeches in the USSR subsequently, Khrushchev reaffirmed his belief in the overriding importance of avoid- ing a general war, and his feeling that Western leaders were coming to the same view. He stated his favor for a long-term accommodation with the West (i.e., an avoidance of war or provo- cation that might lead to war) ;based on mutual concessions. Inter alia, he criticized Mao's thinking as Trotskyist, and as playing into the hands of the enemy; to Peiping's dismay, he took a conciliatory line on DeGaulle's proposals for ending the Algerian war; he failed to endorse Chinese positions on several Far Eastern issues; he derided Chinese domestic poli- cies; he accused the CCP of conceit; and he warned that opposi- tion to fundamental Soviet policies would not be tolerated. By the end of 1959, Soviet public lecturers were openly re- ferring to difficulties in the Sino-Soviet relationship and, as Khrushchev himself suggested at the time, the relationship had deteriorated to a dangerous point. Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET Approved For Release 20 .' lA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 II. THE WORSENING OF THE DISPUTE In the first two months of 1960 there was abundant evi- dence that the Sino-Soviet dispute on strategy was not only not being resolved but was becoming more bitter. This was apparent in divergent reactions to President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message, in the Red Flag editorial on New Year's Day, in the Chinese response toKhrushchev's im- portant 14 January speech, in Sino-Soviet clashes in Com- munist front organizations in January and February, and in a sharp division between them at the Warsaw pact conference in February. The President's State of the Union Message: The sharp contrast between Soviet and Chinese views on the possibility and desirability of achieving a detente with the United States was well illustrated in the divergent re- actions to President Eisenhower's 7 January State of the Union message. Moscow, in its limited comment, did not crit- icize the President personally., picked out of the message some of the more hopeful signs (in the Soviet view) that the United States was prepared to ease international tensions, and was in general quite restrained in whatever criticism it offered. The Chinese, on the other hand, were unreservedly critical both of the President personally and what they char- acterized as deceitful- effort to talk peace while preparing for war. The TASS summary of Eisenhower's message began by stat- ing that the President emphasized in the message that in his final year at the White House he is deter- mined to throw every ounce of his energy into in- suring world peace... TAS.S further quoted the President as being "always ready to participate with the Soviet Union in serious discussion of these subjects (nuclear testing) or any other subjects that may lead to peace with justice." It went on to qualify this, however, by pointing to the President's stress also on the need to maintain "a high degree" of military effectiveness. In a routine commentary on 9 January, Moscow radio's North American service outlined some of the proposals in the Presi- dent's speech and commented that "we in the USSR can fully agree with the general trend of the President's suggestions." On the same day, Moscow's European service called attention to the fact that many sections of the American press had in- terpreted Eisenhower's speech as further evidence of his de- sire for a further relaxation of international tension. Approved For Release 20g RE.7ClA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET The Chinese views on the President's message were set forth in more authoritative media and in much more bellicose terms. The People's Daily editorial of 21 January began its frontal assault y cont~ entering that the message was "most convincing evidence of the imperialist nature of the United States." In going through the text of the message, it con- tinued, it was not possible to detect "even a trace" of any concrete steps the United States would take towards relaxing tension; nor did Eisenhower make "any proposal" favorable to peace. From the State of the Union Message, said People's Daily, "only one conclusion could be drawn"--there was no change whatever in the "fundamental policy of arms expansion and war preparations which the United States has long pursued." The Chinese editorial pointed out that the United States 1) was speeding up its programs for the development of inter- continental missiles; 2) was speeding up the construction of two IRBM bases in Italy; 3) was continuing to prepare for war in the Far East; e.g. its recently concluded military alliance with Japan, its continued arming of Chinese national- ist forces, its repeated boasts that it would defend the off- shore islands, and its expansion of missile bases in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; 4) was threatening to resume nuclear tests at any time; 5) had mapped out in the NATO Council in December 1959 a ten year program for strengthening NATO and giving it the power to carry on large scale nuclear warfare as well as greater flexibility to conduct local warfare; 6) was stepping up the armament of West Germany with nuclear arms and missiles, In the Chinese view, the essence of America's two-faced strategy of talking peace while preparing for war was that it was a maneuver designed to "win time to regain military superiority." To support this view, People's Daily cited a report by an American research group to the of eect that the major problem facing the U.S. in the early 1960's was the need to eliminate the missile gap. Since this task could not be achieved rapidly, according to the report, even if a shock plan were instituted, gaining time was of the utmost importance. In sum, the Chinese interpretation of American detente tactics was that they were nothing more than a maneuver to buy the necessary time to overcome Soviet military superiority. By implication, this meant that those people, such as Khru- shchev, who thought that any meaningful detente could be achieved even for a limited period, were in fact playing into the hands of the West. For while the bloc was making uni- lateral arms cuts and while bloc vigilance was being under- mined by the phony "spirit of Camp David," the West would be -15= SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 Approved For Release 2009EEq?A-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 stealthily trying to gain the missile lead and to strengthen its military position. In a final show of exasperation, People's Daily contended that this American double-dealing was Being recognized for what it was by "more andrare people from`East to West" and "though it still may deceive some people at present, it cannot fool them for long." In short, even Khrushchev would soon awaken. In the first 1960 issue of Red Flag, Yu Chao-li re- asserted in terms similar to those ci #e about the Chinese argumentagainst a detente. The U.S. was pursuing a two- faced strategy of putting out a smokescreen of peace while continuing to suppress the national liberation movements and to build up its military position throughout the world. To strengthen peace it was necessary to continue to strengthen the struggle against U.S. imperialism; all viewpoints which overestimated the strength of the enemy and underestimated the strength of the people were wrong. An article in another Chinese journal on 3 January put the warning even more blatantly. If the bloc took the Western desire for peace at face value and failed to see that the West was really interested in gaining time to re- coup its strength, it would be led to disaster: We are wrong if we fail to see the 'two hands' of the imperialists. It will be even worse /!or us7 if we should mistake their secondary policy /seeking a relaxation,i6f tension7 for their main policy /regaining their strength?. 25X1 Approved For Release 200$/&TIA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 Approved For Release 2005gVeh: CLA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 25X1 Differences Over Disarmament In his long speech to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960, Khrushchev sketched. the outlines of a comprehensive military strategic doctrine, bringing together the ideas abCut modern war he had been propounding publicly since mid-1957. in essence, this doctrine is based on the domi- nant role of strategic nuclear weapons in modern war. In contrast to the old battlefield-oriented concept of war prevalent in past Soviet military doctrine, Khrushchev con- tended that in the future war "there wou,1d'be little to resemble previous wars," that war would "begin in the heart of the warring countries" and that every strategic area would be subjected to attack during the "first minutes" of ware Against the background of this latest step in the sera.-;- egic revolution in Soviet military thinking that had been going on in the USSR since 1955, Khrushchev proposed a one- third cut in the Soviet armed forces from 346 to 2,4 million men--contending that this troop reduction would save 16 to 17 billion rubles a year for the Soviet economy and that it would not in the least diminish Soviet fire power or reduce the effectiveness of its deterrent. Khrushchev further offered the "hope" that "other countries" would follow the road to curtailment of their armed forces, expressed the view that disarmament "paves the way for stable peace and economic development for all countries and all people," and contended that the money saved could be useTo aid all the economically underdeveloped countries. On 2 June, after the collapse of the summit, the USSR offered a new disarmament program in which several of the above-mentioned Khrushchev statements were reiterated. Whether or not Khrushchev was seriously interested-in reaching a disarmament agreement, it was apparent that the Chinese Communists doubted the wisdom both of the Soviet troop cut and of the disarmament program. Two days after Khrushchev?s Supreme Soviet speech, a 16 January People?s Daily editorial applauded the disarmament aspects of the speech as a manifestation of the Soviet desire for peace and as an example of Soviet confidence in its own strength. At the same time, the Chinese paper contended that the U.S. was building up its military strength in order to facilitate its capabilities for both total and limited war, noted that West Germany would soon expand its own troops by Approved For Release 200 26JC IA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 SECRET 'Iftw one-third and suggested that the United States was not eager for disarmament but only for an "arms drive in prep- aration for war." To skip ahead for a moment, Chinese objections to Sov- iet disarmament policy were to become even more explicit in June. On 7 June, two days after the new Soviet disarmament proposals had been presented to the West, a People's Daily editorial insisted polemically that the bloc must "strengthen" rather than reduce its armed forces. o. in the face of the armed-to-the-teeth, ambitious imperialist bloc headed by U.S. im- perialism, it is entirely necessary for the socialist countries to maintain a high degree of vigilance and strengthen their armed forces in order to defen their socialist homelands and preserve world peace. (emphasis supplied) One day later, on 8 June, the Chinese delegate to the WFTU Meeting in Peiping, Liu Chang-sheng, a member of the central committee, all but openly criticized the Soviet troop cut and Soviet disarmament policy in general. Liu went so far as to extract specific quotations from Khrush- chev's 14 January speech and the subsequent Soviet disarma- ment proposal for purposes of refutation and ridicule. He began his remarks on the Soviet disarmament proposals by claiming that "people" who took those proposals seriously were suffering from an "unrealistic illusion." The purpose of putting forward such a pro- posal is to arouse the people throughout the world to unite and oppose the imperialist scheme for arms drives and war preparations, to unmask the aggressive and bellicose nature of imperialism.... But there are people who believe that such a proposal can be realized while imperialism still exists and that the danger of war can be eliminated by relying on such a proposal, This is an unrealistic il- lusion. Elsewhere in his speech, Liu quoted without attribution and rejected Khrushchev's view that arms funds could be used for "'assisting underdeveloped countries"'--a "downright whitewash" of imperialism, Nor could one say--and again he was paraphrasing Khrushchev's 14 January speech--that dis- armament could"'bring general progress to people as a whole."' A world without armament, said Liu, was possible only "when the socialist revolution is victorious throughout the world." Approved For Release 2005/4726ECIA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 SECRET Approveor Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79427A000600020001-1 A still further indication that the Chinese were an- noyed by Soviet disarmament policy was Liu's insistence that "the Soviet,Union and the other socialist countries should continue to develop their lead in the sphere of atomic energy"-- the implication being that a disarmament agreement, paricu- larly a test ban, would inhibit that lead from being maintained and developed and would particularly inhibit China from be- coming a nuclear power. Final,y, Liu implied that any disarma- ment agreement was worthless because even after its conclusion "imperialism can still tear it to pieces." Why should Peiping have objected to unilateral Soviet troop cuts and Soviet disarmament proposals? Khrushchev him- self provided one possible answer in his 14 January speech when he asked--for purposes of refutation--whether or not the troop cut would "undermine" the Soviet deterrent. Khrush- chev claimed that it would not, because, as he had stated many times before, the West was deterred both from all-out and local war by Soviet strategic weapons. Mao, on the other :hahd;, had been contending for some years that although the West was deterred for the time being from general war, it was not deterred from local wars. Mao may well have been concerned that the Soviet troop cut would undermine the Sov- iet capability to fight precisely the kind of war that Mao regarded as "inevitable"--local wars. Mao may also have been concerned with the long range drift of Soviet disarmament policy. Although it is generally assumed in the West that Khrushchev is not seriously in- terested in a disarmament agreement, it is difficult to rec- oncile this view with the very obvious concern expressed in Liu Chang-sheng's remarks on 8 June about "people" who think that the danger of war can be eliminated by "relying" on disarmament proposals. Even if Mao exaggerated the serious- ness of Soviet disarmament proposals, there seemed to be a serious Chinese concern that the USSR might be jeopardizing its military superiority. Last and certainly not least, Pei- ping may well have feared that the signing of a test ban with the West would obliterate its own chances to become a nuclear power. Just one week after Khrushchev's 14 January speech, Peiping--in its first statement in more than two years on disarmament--flatly proclaimed that it would not be bound by any disarmament agreements to which it was not a party and signatory. Another point made by Khrushchev in his Supreme Soviet speech that must have been read with great interest, if not dismay, in Peiping was about the relative military strength of the two,camps. In a key passage, Khrushchev stated that "impregnability is a rather relative concept," that is, that _l9_ Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET 25X1 C Approved For Release 2(6bi6 TCIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 NOW11 NW the USSR's enemies "will not be marking time /and7 can make good their temporary lagging /in nuclear weapansT...and may, sooner or later, draw even with us." KhrushcheV watered down this possibility a paragraph later when he contended that meanwhile the USSR would not"sit with arms folded," but he nonetheless left open the possibility that the West would reach a state of nuclear parity with the USSR in the near future, perhaps five years. Peiping was presumably not pleased by such an admission inasmuch as the Chinese had been contending since 1957 that the West could never catch up if the USSR did not fall victim to the spirit of detente and reduce its military program. Differences in the Front Organizations During the first two months of 1960, Moscow and Peiping clashed in two Communist front organizations--the World Peace Council, meeting in January, and the International Union of Students' executive council, meeting in February. In Jan- uary, at the WPC executive committee meetin in Rome, the differences between Moscow and Peiping werel 25X10 so acute that the Chinese member o He ex- ecutive committee boycotted the two-day discussion on the international situation. The main rapporteurl (reportedly spoke at length about no- 25X1 vivendi" with the Americans 25X1 Soviet ail erence re girding the concentration of propaganda efforts on the European situation (as the Russians wanted) or on support of the colonial struggle (as the Chinese wanted). The Soviet delegate intervened in the discussion to reject the Chinese "accusation" that the USSR wanted to isolate Pei- ping and was following a policy aimed at reaching a "modus The discussion reportedly went on or more than two hours without reaching "even a minimum of clarification" primarily because there was a general tendency to acquiesce to the Soviets. In February 1960, at the IUS executive committee meet- ing in Tunis, there were Sino-Soviet differences over the question of cooperation with Western student groups. Accord- ing to Belgrade radio, the Chinese offered formal amendments to dilute the Soviet-sponsored resolution calling for the ex- ploration of the possibility of greater cooperation with the Western student organization. Moreover, the Chinese abstained on several of the 11 resolutions adopted. According to Bel- grade, the IUS executive adopted a broad program of practical cooperation with Western and Yugoslav students groups which was carried with only one dissenting vote, that of the Chinese delegation. Approved For Release 204E CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 Approved For Release 2Oc E4:1A-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 r The Warsaw Pact Conference: February, 1960 The conference of the political consultative committee of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty in early February was called by the Russians to coordinate bloc strategy for the forthcoming summit meeting but, of equal importance, to discuss the pressing issues of global strategy that divided Moscow from Peiping and threatened to divide the bloc as a whole. fforts at conciliation failed, a conclusion supported by the outbreak of violent polemics from the Chinese just two months later. Before going into the details of the conflict that de- veloped at the meeting itself, it might be instructive to examine some of the evidence that joint Chinese-East German pressure for nuclear weapons sharing was brought to bear on the Russians on the very eve of the conference. On 28 Jan- uary, Ulbricht announced in a strongly worded warning to the West Germans that the East German government would request its allies to put rocket weapons at its disposal in order t cope with the threat of West German atomic armament.I in the Soviet and Chinese reaction to this East German threat was striking. Moscow repeated it a few times in foreign language broadcasts to Germany, but it offered no authorita- tive comment either approving Ulbricht's suggestion or in- dicating that it might comply. If the Ulbricht threat had been a maneuver conducted beforehand with the Russians to intimidate the West Germans and to discourage West Germany from seeking nuclear weapons, it is hard to understand why the Russians did not seize on the Ulbricht initiative to dramatize the threat. In contrast to Moscow's marked restraint on the issue, a People's Daily editorial on 4 February--on the very eve of tHe Pact conference--said that the request was "not only fully justified but necessary." This Chinese support for the proposal can be compared with the 5 February declara- tion of the Warsaw Treaty states which took an optimistic view of the "definite change for the better" in the inter- national situation and made no mention of the possibility that Moscow might transfer rocket weapons to East Germany. In fact, the declaration referred once again to the possi- bility of a nuclear free zone in Europe which would include the GDR. While it might seem improbable that Ulbricht should have been trying, with Chinese support, to force the Soviet hand on the matter, the opposite assumption, that the Russians may have decided to proceed with the atomic armament of East Approved For Release 20@W CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 Approved For Release 20Qgp& 'pIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 Germany at this moment, six weeks before the 10-power disarma- ment conference and three months before the summit, looks even more unlikely, And, if the gambit were a joint GDR-Soviet one, it is difficult, as already indicated, to understand why Mos- cow did not join in more enthusiastically. If the Chinese did encourage such an East German initia- tive, it is not hard to see the reason. The Chinese may have well have believed that if the Russians could be pressed into granting a nuclear capability--however limited and restricted-- to the East Germans, the case against such a nuclear capabil- ity for China would be drastically weakened. Continuing Soviet resistance to pressures for nuclear- weapons sharing was suggested the very next month in an un- dated letter addressed by Khrushchev to the European Federa- tion Against Atomic Armament, made public by TASS on 18 March. Released about six weeks after President Eisenhower had inti- mated, at his press conference of 3 February, the possibility that the United States would share nuclear weapons with its European allies, the letter was clearly calculated to warn that such a step would force the USSR to follow suit. Khrush- chev stressed the "undesirability of expansion of the so- called atomic club" and cautioned that U.S. action to supply nuclear weapons to its allies would set off "a kind of chain reaction in the dissemination of nuclear weapons all over the world." It is of interest, in this connection, that Soviet news reports on the President's press conference stressed the unlikelihood that Congress would amend the law in order to permit nuclear-weapons diffusion while Chinese news re- ports concentrated on the likelihood that such nuclear diffu- sion would take place. To turn to the conference itself, the 4 February report of the Chinese delegate, or "observer" Kang Sheng, an al- ternate member of the CCP Politburo, was clearly a minority report.* It differed notably, both in tone and in substance, from the much milder Declaration issued by the Warsaw Treaty members on 5 February. Kang acknowledged" that "certain procedural agreements had been reached" on disarmament, but he attributed this not to the good will of the West but rather to the "repeated struggles" by socialist forces and national revolutionary forces throughout the world. He reiterated the now-standard Chinese line that American talk about "peace" was merely a stratagem to lull the bloc. He added the sig- nificant new charge that this stratagem was also designed to "dismember the socialist camp," i.e., was deliberately de- signed to produce Sino-Soviet tensions. Moreover, said Kang, CCp' is` dredibly reported to have protested later:that Kang's role was restricted and his views ignored. -22- Approved For Release 20 TIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET ApprovqjFor Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79600427A000600020001-1 25X1 C the American "peace" strategem was designed to encourage a "peaceful evolution" in the socialist countries, an indica- tion of Chinese fears that a Soviet-American rapprochement would lead to the growth of revisionism and other centrifugal forces in the individual communist states. Kang was most emphatic The his burden veiled of his u argument niwas the Soviet disarmament policy. that the U.S. would never agree to any real disarmament plan. At the same time, indicating China's own refusal to disarm, he falsely alleged that existing Chinese forces were less than half their original size and reiterated.the position taken by his government on 21 January that the CPR would not be bound by any disarmament agreement in which it did not participate. In contrast, the Warsaw Pact declaration said that the "Warsaw Treaty countries," of which China is not one, "arrived at the conclusion that the situation is now more favorable than ever before for fruitful disarmament talks." After detailing American military threats and provoca-. tions, Kang went on to implicitly rebuke the USSR for its failure to support China in its disputes with India and Indo- nesia. The CCP, he said, had always "regarded an attack against any socialist country by the imperialists and re- actionaries as an attack against China." The impasse that must have developed between the Chinese and the Russians at the Warsaw meeting is suggested further by the fact that Kang Sheng's speech was not reported nor even mentioned by any bloc media except those of China. On 6 February, a People's Daily editorial reviewing .the Warsaw meeting struck hard at Soviet policy. "It is impossi- ble not to see," it began polemically, that the West had in fact stepped up its arms drive--the clear implication being that this was no time for talk of disarmament. The American peace strategem, it warned, was designed to "subvert, corrupt, split and destroy the socialist camp." It was a "vicious and sinister strategem." of s-ino-Soviet discord 25X1 C Soviet con lict at e 25X1 the USSR, supported by the East European satellites, alleged that West Germany was the greatest immediate threat to the socialist camp and that the best policy to follow in such conditions would be to lessen world tensions and to reach a rapprochement with the West, particularly the United States, so that the German problem could be solved. The Asian Bloc, led by the Chinese, argued that the United: States was the only -23- Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET SECRET Approv g,For Release 2005/04/26: CIA-RDP796&0427A000600020001-1 enemy of Communism, first, last and always, and that o one of should deal with it only from an uncompromising position strengths It may be recalled that Khrushchev in his 14 Jan- uary speech asserted that only "madmen" could contemplate a general war under current conditions; and he went on to in- dicate that the nearest thing to a madman then in view was, not any American leader, but Chancellor Adenauer, who was de- nounced at great length, The Soviet desire to concentrate its fire for the moment on West Germany rather than the United States is an example of the kind of flexible differentiation tactics used. by Khrushchev to probe differences in the Western alliance--tactics disapproved by Peiping on the apparent grounds that Khrushchev was overestimating his ability to split the Western allies and that, in any case, fire should be concentrated on the main enemy, the United-States. 25X1C Khrushchev made the main speech at the c n recent Chinese actions (i.e., the border dispute with India and the overseas Chi- nese dispute with Indonesia) in strong terms. Khrushchev said that these actions had compromised the Bloc's policy of friendship with the non-Communist countries and had thus for- feited much support for the Communist cause. Khrushchev also reportedly criticized the severe attitude adopted by the Chi- nese towards Yugoslavia, on the similar grounds that the per- sistent Chinese attacks created disunity among the bloc coun- tries. Khrushchev also complained that the Chinese had re- fused to support the USSR's attempts to reduce world tension. China, he said, had not followed the USSR's lead by demobiliz- ing any part of its armed forces and had failed to support Soviet disarmament policies and the banning of atomic weap- ons. Khrushchev further reportedly alleged that the Chinese party was too insistent on following its own independent pol- icies, and that China's refusal to associate itself more closely with economic and political policies adopted by the other socialist countries towards the rest of the world was harming the cause of Communism. This general attack on the Chinese, delivered before representatives of the entire bloc, illustrated the gravity of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Khrushchev probably hoped that his harsh criticism would make Peiping reconsider its course; he also probably hoped to forestall any influence that China's independent views might have on the actions of other satel- lite regimes. He evidently failed, however, to forestall the Asian satellites from supporting Peiping, and he may not have completely obliterated sympathy for Peiping in East Germany, Albania and Czechoslovakia--each of which had in the past demonstrated considerable antipathy to Khrushchev's co- existence tactics. Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET Approve or Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79 427A000600020001-1 C v it 1. i" a. i- y , a~i J %F -_ _ _ strengthen itself, by means short of war, to a point--possi- bly in or around 1970--from which the world revolution could advance rapidly to a final triumph, still without a general war. In the meantime, the Soviet party seemed anxious to prevent the international situation from deteriorating to a point where one side or the other might undertake a surprise attack. It was precisely on this question of acceptable risk that Peiping most emphatically disagreed. War and Peace On 16 February, the periodical China Youth published a series of 13 questions and answers ont awe subject of war and peace which represent one of the frankest and most enlighten- ing Chinese discussions of the question ever published in open media. A close examination of these questions and answers is helpful to an understanding of the fine points of the Chinese view on the likelihood of war, and on the possibility and means of averting it. The 13 theses may be summarized as follows: 1) it is increasingly difficult for imperialism to provoke a world war, owing to the growing strength of the bloc, its neutralist friends and the forces of peace; 2) the principal reason why the U.S. dares not strike is that the USSR has superiority in missiles; 3) despite the Soviet military lead and despite the fact that time is on the bloc's side, it is impossible to say that war will not break out, because as long as imperial- ism exists there remains the danger of war; 4) by using peace as a camouflage, the West is trying to gain 5ti a to strug- expand its armaments and close the missile gap; gle for disarmament is a long and complex one and "no results are possible immediately" because imperialism cannot do away with armaments; for this reason, to rest the hope of lasting peace on the possibility of reaching a disarmament agreement is to-indulge in a dream; 6) war is inseparable from class struggle and aggression, andwars are the necessary fruits.df imperialism; 7) it is possible to strive for a fairly long period of peace but, at the same time, we need "to strengthen our own resources, hold fast to Marxist-Leninist policies, Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET SECRET Approvejor Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SW427A000600020001-1 expose ceaselessly imperialist schemes, arouse the fighting spirit of the worlds people and maintain a lasting strug- gleao.;" 8) a "warless world" can be brought about only by the abolition of the imperialism; 9) we seek peace but never beg it from the imperialists; 10) we must support all ."just revolutionary wars" in order to weaken imperialism and secure peace; 11) we cannot seek peace by compromise; 12) there is no foundation to the view that war can never again be the means of settling international disputes because we can never be sure that imperialism will relinquish war; 13) we oppose war but we do not fear it The implications of these theses--all of which have been reiterated--for bloc policy are evident: the cold war cannot be abated; the danger of war will continue to exist and the bloc must prepare for all contingencies; disarmament negotiations are more or less useless; the bloc should con- centrate first of all not on negotiations with the West but on building its own resources and securing its own strength; and the bloc must actively support all "just" wars. Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600020001-1 SECRET SECRET ApproveUor Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SQQ427A000600020001-1 III. THE LENIN ANNIVERSARY POLEMICS The Chinese Communist indictment of Soviet strategy, which had begun in a low key in the fall of 1957 and had become increasingly shrill in the period shortly before Khrushc hev's trip to the United States, reached a new pitch in spring 1960. Using the 22 April anniversary of Lenin's birth as a peg, the Chinese offered a comprehensive indict- ment of Soviet theory, strategy, and tactics in the form of five lengthy and acrimonious doctrinal statements, two in Red Flag (1 and 19 April), two in People's Daily (22 and 25 Wail) nd a speech on the anniversary a Politburo member Lu Ting-i. The initial Soviet reply came in Polit- buro member Kuusinen's anniversary address on 22 April, sub- sequently in articles in Pravda and Soviet Russia in June, and finally from Khrushchev himself at the Rumanian Party Congress the same month. Until the publication of the Lenin anniversary articles, the Chinese Communist attacks on Soviet strategy--and the doctrine which reflected that strategy--had generally been cryptic and moderate. The Chinese Lenin anniversary articles were of such a far-reaching and fundamental nature that they could only be compared in importance to such water-sheds in the post-Stalin era as Khrushchev's secret speech of February 1956. With copious documentation from Lenin and Marx and pointed references to the ideas of some of Communism's most notorious heretics such as Bernstein, Kautsky and Tito, the Chinese in effect accused Khrushchev of "revising, emasculat- ing and betraying" the most fundamental and sacred tenets of Leninism. Such an attack could not but have the effect of calling into question Khrushchev's leadership of the Com- munist movement. The three principal targets of the Chinese fire were the very three basic ideological innovations which Khrushchev personally had presented to the 20th party congress and which provided the doctrinal rationalization for his more flexible post-Stalin global strategy. These were Khrushchev's new doctrine on peaceful coexistence, on the non-inevitability of war, and on the possibility of peaceful accession to power in non-Communist countries. The Chinese. articles rejected all three of Khrushchev's innovations: they advocated a much narrower definition of coexistence which in effect meant the continuation of the cold war; they contended that wars,partic- ularly local and colonial wars, were inevitable so long as imperialism remained; and they minimized the possibility of peaceful roads to power in the non-Communist world. Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600020001-1 SECRET SECRET Approvee{.For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79W427A000600020001-1 In attacking Khrushchev's ideological innovations and the new strategy which these innovations reflected, the Chinese were not calling for general war or contending that general war was inevitable, althotgh.Lythey,'may have-thought. it ihevitable.They were attacking Khrushchev's gradualist rev- olutionary conception and putting forth an alternative con- ception based on the conviction that the West could be de- feated sooner than Khrushchev thought if the USSR and the world Communist movement were more aggressive. The Chinese had sanquine estimates of the revolutionary potential in many areas, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They believed that the Soviet deterrent could be invoked to under- write revolutionary action in many of these areas with only a minimal risk of global war. They feared that Soviet grad- ualism would unnecessarily delay the revolution in the short run and perhaps lead to stagnation in the long run. Inter- twined with this fear, presumably, was the belief that Khrush- chev's gradualism was much too confining for Chinese aspira- tions towards Taiwan and for its role as the self-appointed leader of the revolutionary movement in the underdeveloped areas. Before going into the details of the polemics, three observations might be offered. The first is that the Chi- nese attack on Soviet strategy--while allowing for the ob- vious oversimplifications and misrepresentation of that strategy--cannot be understood outside the context of the shift in Soviet strategy in recent years. The Soviet pro- fessed desire for detente is generally put in quotation marks in the West. Such skepticism is undoubtedly warranted if its is meant to apply to the view that Khrushchev is in- terested in detente for detente's sake or in achieving lasting peace in terms of the present status quo. He be- lieves and'indeed has said that he can use a detente to extend the Soviet sphere of influence and to undermine the Western alliance system. Yet he appears to believe that he can achieve these goals without resorting to the actual use of Soviet armed force and with a minimum of armed violence on the part of Communist parties throughout the world. The second observation is that the Chinese anniversary attack was probably not a direct attempt to sabotage the summit meeting scheduled for May. Khrushchev's summit di1 ploma