THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE (THE 6 DECEMBER DECLARATION, AND SOVIET AND CHINESE PRESENTATIONS OF IT)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000600050001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 17, 1961
• Content Type: STUDY

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OCI No. 1095/61
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF-STUDY
THE -SING-SOVIET DISPUTE
(The 6 December Declaration, and
Soviet and Chinese Presentations of It)
(Reference Title:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
25X1A
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
(The 6 December Declaration, and
Soviet and Chinese Presentations of It)
This is a working paper. It discusses the declaration
of 6 December 1960, produced by the November conference of
the 81 Communist parties, and subsequent Soviet and Chinese
presentations of the declaration.
25X1A
25X1A This paper, would be expected to follow
rather than precede which is concerned with
developments at the Moscow conference prior to the issuance
of the 6 December declaration. However, information on
25X1A those developments is still so fragmentary that we have
preferred to hold in the hope that additional
information will permit us to offer a solid account. Mean-
while, we offer this preliminary assessment of the results
of the Moscow conference.
We have had profitable discussion, on several of the
matters taken up in this paper, with other analysts of OCI,
with analysts of ONE and - and with analysts of the STATSPEC
DDP. The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome further
comment, addressed to the acting coordinator of the group
at Ext. 8221.
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The Moscow declaration of 6 December 1960 was a complex
document, purporting to set forth a program for the world Com-
munist movement but in fact consisting for the most part of
a lumpy mixture of the positions of the Soviet and Chinese
parties as to what the strategy of the movement should be and
as to the discipline of the movement itself. A judgment as
to whether the declaration represented a Soviet "victory" or
a Chinese "victory" depends on one's assumptions--namely,
whether the statements of the substantive issues in dispute,
or the provisions for the procedures of the movement itself,
are of greater importance. If the former, then the declara-
tion represented a Soviet victory, because Soviet proposi-
tions were given the greater weight, and appeared at greater
length. But if one regards the basic issue as that of whether
there is to be a univel,sally acknowledged leader and arbiter
of the world Communist movement, and assumes the Soviet party
to wish to play that role, then the declaration, in explicitly
denying such a role to any party, represented a victory for
the Chinese party and for every other party desiring greater
autonomy in the movement.
As for substantive issues, on the most important of them,
the definition of the epoch (including the assessment of the
balance of power), the declaration represented a substantial
Soviet victory, in that it reproduced the Soviet propositions
that the epoch is marked basically by a transition from capi-
talism to socialism, that the bloc is becoming a decisive factor
in world affairs and can deter the West from military forms
of action, and that long-range economic competition will be
decisive; it reflected less strongly the Chinese emphasis on
the "struggle" of the two systems. In the declaration's fur-
ther discussion of the bloc, Soviet positions also prevailed,
in that the USSR was conceded to be far out in front in build-
ing Communism, and the declaration endorsed Soviet economic
principles and the Soviet call (contrary to the Chinese aim
of autarky) for better coordination of bloc economies.
As for questions of war, the declaration represented an-
other substantial Soviet victory. It reaffirmed the Soviet
position on the dreadful consequences of nuclear war and on
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the importance of avoiding such a war, and it also reaffirmed
the Soviet thesis that war is not inevitable, although it
restricted this (as the Chinese consistently have) to world
war. It was equivocal on local wars, asserting both the Chi-
nese position that Western-initiated local wars are likely and
the Soviet position that the bloc will usually be able to
deter them or to quench them at an early stage.
The declaration represented a comically equivocal draw
on the concept of "peaceful coexistence." Communists were
instructed not to "underestimate" either the possibility of
coexistence or the possibility of war; and it was contended
simultaneously that coexistence favors the struggle and the
struggle contributes to coexistence. The declaration endorsed
negotiated settlements of international problems (a Soviet
emphasis) but it did so in a very brief and slighting way (a
Chinese point). It reflected Moscow on the importance of dis-
armament, but reflected Peiping primarily on the difficulties
of achieving any degree of it.
The declaration's discussion of the colonial areas repre-
sented another draw. Soviet positions were represented in the
emphasis on successes to date and on the importance of non-
military means of gaining independence, and in the omission
of a pledge of greater support specifically to "liberation"
wars. Chinese positions were represented in the recognition
of "fierce encounters" in the successes to date and the recog-
nition too,.of the importance of "armed struggle" and of "lib-
eration" wars. The declaration was evasive on the question
of whether to be patient (the Soviet emphasis) or impatient
(the Chinese emphasis) with the national bourgeoisie.
The discussion of policy toward newly-independent coun-
tries represented a narrow Soviet victory. The objectives
for united fronts in such countries were stated primarily in
Soviet formulations, being similar to those put forward by
Moscow for Communists in developed Western countries, although
there was a concession to the Chinese on the unreliability of
the bourgeoisie. The declaration set forth the Soviet concept
of "national democracy" (a state like Cuba) as the transitional
form to socialism in the newly-independent countries. The Com-
munist parties, on the road to "national democracy," were given
evasive instructions on the question of the degree of their
support for governments led by the national bourgeoisie.
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As for the question of peaceful accession to power and
the tactics of Communist parties in the West, the discussion
represented another narrow Soviet victory. The formulations
on peaceful accession reflected both the Soviet emphasis on
the desirability and possibility of peaceful accession, and
the Chinese emphasis on the possibility of violence and the
likelihood of resistance by the ruling class. The declara-
tion affirmed the Soviet program for Communist parties in
the West, a gradualist program aiming primarily at the "monopo-
lies" and setting "democratic" goals at this time.
The Chinese did very well in the highly important conclud-
ing section on the discipline of the world Communist movement.
The discussion leaned to the Soviets in treating the "cult of
the individual," in effect an endorsement of deStalinization,
and in asserting the "fundamental significance" of Soviet experi-
ence. The discussion. stated positions that the two parties
could appeal to equally in treating revisionism (the Chinese
charge against Moscow), and dogmatism and sectarianism (the
Soviet charges against Peiping); in calling for adherence to
assessments worked out "jointly" at these world Communist con-
ferences; in setting out principles for the internal policies
of the parties; in holding the parties responsible to the en-
tire Communist movement; and in providing for further confer-
ences and, in the'interim, bilateral talks. However, the ef-
fect of those provisions on "joint" positions, conferences,
and bilateral talks was to reduce the stature of the Soviet
party in the movement. Moreover, the discussion reflected an
impressive Chinese victory on the most important question of
the conference, in failing to establish the Soviet-exhorted
principle of majority rule (once the operating prindiple of the
Comintern) and in omitting any reference to "factionalism" in
the movement.
The declaration seemed to indicate a Sino-Soviet agree-
ment to refrain for a time from polemics about bloc strategy,
but it also gave additional force to certain pressures on
Khrushchev which the Chinese had been exerting--to take a hard
line in any negotiations with the West, to intervene in any
Western-initiated local wars, to give more substance to pro-
fessions of sympathy and support for "liberation" wars, to
move faster toward making pro-Communist regimes of the inde-
pendent countries, and so on. Whether or not Moscow could
withstand these pressures, Moscow did increase them by giving
them recognition in a public document which was stated to be
the program of the world Communist movement.
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The most significant development of the conference seemed
to be the success with which the Chinese Communists challenged
Soviet leadership of the movement, in that the conference pro-
vided an official procedure (world Communist conferences to work
out "joint" positions, and bilateral talks in the interim) for
the challenge to continue. Given the lack of clarity in the
6 December declaration, the number of positions susceptible to
varying interpretations, the probable Soviet and Chinese per-
sistence in different interpretations, the existence of parties
and of factions within parties sympathetic to Chinese rather
than to Soviet interpretations, it seemed quite likely that
there would be a Sino-Soviet contest for leadership of some of
the parties, especially in the Asian countries of the bloc and
in the,underdeveloped areas. These could also develop a move-
ment--if not general, at least among some parties--toward in-
dependence of both Moscow and Peiping.
Moscow's acceptance of restrictions on Soviet leadership
was perhaps not entirely, however, recognition of a disagree-
able necessity. The Soviets might reasonably have concluded
that, in subsequent world Communist conferences, they would
retain a substantial majority. They may also have told them-
selves, although perhaps without much confidence, that the
discipline of the world Communist movement would eventually
be restored.
Presentations of the Declaration
Soviet and Chinese media began to offer tendentious in-
terpretations of the 6 December declaration within 24 hours
of its publication. By late January both Moscow and Peiping,
without resorting to polemics, had reaffirmed their positions
on virtually all of the issues which had been in dispute prior
to the Moscow conference. The principal role in reaffirming,
amplifying, and clarifying Soviet positions was played by Khru-
shchev himself, in his 6 January report, while Chinese positions
were reaffirmed in a number of editorials and articles in People's
Daily and Red Flag.
With respect to matters of world Communist strategy, Moscow
and Peiping continued to disagree on the basic "definition of
the epoch," in particular on the hard question (within that
definition) of the balance of power. Moscow made clear its
view that the West is still very strong, while Peiping declined
to concede this.
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As for questions of war, Moscow and Peiping agreed that
world war was not inevitable, but Moscow reaffirmed that the
West was increasingly deterred from world war, and, emphasiz-
ing the consequences of world war, reaffirmed that the bloc
should not accept serious risks of world war*; while Peiping
emphasized Western preparations for world war and the pos-
sibility of world war, and, minimizing the consequences of
world war for the bloc, continued to exhort a program en-
tailing greater risks of world war.
Further, Moscow reaffirmed that the West was increasingly
deterred from local wars as well, and, emphasizing the danger
of expansion of local wars, contended that the bloc should
avoid engagement in local wars if possible, although it would
fight if necessary for a "just" cause such as defending a
newly-independent country against Western military action;
while Peiping contended that the West was, if anything, in-
creasingly attracted to local wars, and, minimizing the danger
of expansion of local wars, implied again, that the bloc should
welcome the opportunity to engage in such wars. Similarly,
Moscow affirmed that the bloc would support "liberation" wars
in colonial areas and "popular uprisings" anywhere (in the non-
Communist world), and implied that the bloc would intervene
to match Western intervention, but it also implied that the
bloc as well as the West should be wary of actions risking in-
tervention by the other; while Peiping urged strong support of
"liberation" wars and emphasized the importance of these wars
as a contribution to "peace."
With regard to "peaceful coexistence," Moscow reaffirmed
this concept as the basis of Soviet policy, and, although tak-
ing a generally militant view of coexistence, did not accept
certain extreme Chinese formulations about the "struggle" with-
in the terms of coexistence; while Peiping, although continu-
ing nominally to endorse coexistence, continued to exhort a
maximum struggle by all revolutionary forces and by all means
short of world war, and with greater risks of world war.
Further, Moscow reaffirmed its interest in complete or partial
disarmament and in negotiations with the West and personal con-
tacts with Western leaders; while Peiping minimized the pros-
pects for even limited disarmament and continued to speak scorn-
fully of Western leaders and of the prospects of negotiations
with them.
*ft sou be understood that this summary of stated
Soviet positions is not an estimate of Soviet intentions.
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With regard to the "national liberation movement" in
general, Moscow emphasized the successes of bloc strategy to
date and implied that Chinese advice was not needed, while
Peiping presented the 6 December declaration as having adopted
the more militant Chinese view. As for the colonial areas,
Moscow contended that "armed struggle" was a less important
means of attaining independence than were other forms of
action, and, while reaffirming that "liberation" wars were
inevitable and would be supported, left open the kind and
degree of support, and called for Communist parties to make
"maximum use" of the national bourgeoisie in the effort for
independence; while Peiping emphasized the importance of armed
struggle and the advantages of supporting "liberation" wars,
and called for strong support of such wars and for Communist
seizure of leadership in the early stages of the revolution.
As for the newly-independent countries, Moscow reaffirmed the
importance of bloc aid (as well as the pledge to defend them)
in ensuring the neutrality and eventual seduction of these
countries, held up "national democracy" as the middle-run
objective, and contended that protracted cooperation with the
national bourgeoisie was advisable; while Peiping emphasized
the inevitability of Western intervention in such countries
to restore the old order, ignored the concept of "national
democracy," and seemed to be calling for less cooperation with
and more pressure on bourgeois nationalist leaders than Moscow
thought feasible. As for Communist parties'in the West, Moscow
continued to emphasize the difficulties facing them and the
need for pursuit of "democratic" goals, while Peiping ignored
these difficulties and spoke only of "socialist" goals.
With regard to the underlying question of the discipline
of the world Communist movement, Moscow prepared the ground for
turning the Chinese charge of Soviet "revisionism" into a Soviet
charge of Chinese "nationalism," and affirmed that dogmatism
and sectarianism are present dangers to the movement;. while the
Chinese continued to present revisionism as the principal threat,
ignored the danger of nationalism, and showed no disposition
to admit dogmatism and sectarianism in their own behavior.
Further, Moscow continued to argue that the world Communist
movement should operate by majority rule, and implied that
majority (Soviet) positions should be supported by all other
parties and that those parties should discipline elements
which opposed majority (Soviet) positions; while Peiping ignored
the Soviet position on majority rule and instead put heavy em-
phasis on the declaration's commitment to achieve "common"
positions and to undertake "joint" actions. Finally, Moscow
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appeared to take the view that world Communist conferences
would have a limited usefulness in lining up Soviet support-
ers in a clear majority and in subduing if not converting
the dissenters; while Peiping seemed clearly to expect that
such conferences, in which the Soviet party would not always
be assured of a majority, would result in a diminution of
Soviet authority and an increase in Chinese influence.
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? J. THE 6 DECEMBER DECLARATION
The Moscow declaration of 6 December 1960 is a complex
document, purporting to set forth a program for the world
Communist movement but in fact consisting for the most part
of a lumpy mixture of the views of the two principal parties--
the Soviet and Chinese--as to what the strategy of the move-
ment should be and as to the discipline of the movement it-
self.* Even well-informed observers have disagreed sharply
as to whether the declaration represents a Soviet "victory"
or a Chinese "victory." This disagreement has generally re-
flected a difference in assumptions--namely, whether the sub-
stantive issues in dispute, or the procedures of the movement
,itself, are of greater importance. If the former, then the
declaration represents a Soviet victory, because Soviet propo-
sitions are given the greater weight, and appear at greater
length. But if one regards the basic issue as that of whether
there is to be a universally acknowledged leader and arbiter
of the world Communist movement, and further, assumes the So-
viet party to wish to play that role, then the declaration
(like the entire conference), in explicitly denying any party
such a role, represents a Chinese victory, indeed a victory
for every party desiring a greater degree of autonomy in the
movement.
The declaration begins with the obviously false conten-
tion that the conference demonstrated the "identity of views"
of the participants. It them affirms the fidelity of all the
parties to the Moscow Declaration of November 1957 which the
Soviet and Chinese parties had interpreted very differently
and had accused each other at the tops of their voices of vio-
lating. It then recites various articles of faith of the
world Communist movement, some of which all the parties seem
genuinely to believe and which therefore are important cohe-
sive factors in the movement (the growth in strength and in-
fluence of the bloc, the disintegration of colonialism, the
decline of world capitalism, the eventual global triumph of
Communism), others of which are probably recognized as ex-
treme (the current "crisis" in the West), and others of which
STATSPEC
*There have been several perceptive analyses of the 6 De-
cember declaration, among them the 178 of 21 December
1960, "The Moscow Conference:.,,,CPSU Achieves Nominal Agreement
at Cost of Doctrinal Ambiguity." study is drawn on,
STATSPEC
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probably some believe and some do not (that the West is ac-
tively preparing for a "new world war").
Definition of the Epoch
The declaration turns quickly to the definition of the
epoch. It observes at once that the epoch is "marked basic-
ally by the transition from capitalism to socialism"--a So-
viet-emphasized formulation. For the Chinese, it refrains
from positing a "'new" epoch; this is still an era of "strug-
gle" between two systems, of "socialist revolutions and
national liberation movements," an era of the "overthrow
of imperialism," and so on. For the Soviets, it has a "new,
distinctive feature," namely that the bloc is "being otrans-
formed into a ""decisive factor" in world affairs,
is able to deter the imperialists from impeding the forces of
history by military means. It is not implied (as the Chinese
imply) that the bloc now possesses a decisive strategic su-
periority over the West, but neither is it stated as (Khru-A
shchev has often stated) that the West is still very strong.
The Soviets gain a point here, however, in reaffirming their
position that long-range economic competition with the West
(added to military parity or superiority) will be decisive.
In this same section, the declaration makes a number of
statements about the crisis of capitalism, conflicts between
productive forces and production relations, exacerbations of
the class struggle, and so on. Whereas the 1957 declaration
described U.S. "aggressive circles"" as "enemies of the people""
in the 6 Dec6iiber declaration the U. S. itself becomes the
""enemy of the peoples of the entire world" (the Chinese would
have said "main enemy," but this is close enough), and this
phrase was almost certainly a concession to the Chinese.
The declaration then discusses a number of other "imperi-
alist" pewbrs and reviews anti-imperialist developments in a
number of countries-=Cuba, Iraq, Japan, France, the U.S.,
Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, India, Britain, Canada, Belgium,
Colombia, Venezuela, South Korea, Turkey, Laos, and others--
*The locution "is being transformed" is perhaps of some
importance, in that the definition of the epoch is an assess-
imply that
ment has me the of power. If it were decisive factor, this might asserted
bloc belief
blhas bec~me the in decisive strategic superiority.
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which both Moscow and Peiping have cited in support,.of,.
differing , emphases ('See how well things are going without
our getting involved in war,' versus 'See how the world sit-
uation is unprecedently favorable for revolutions'.) Indeed,
these differing emphases appear together at the end of this
discussion of the non-Communist world. It is noted that these
developments took place in a time of general peace, but during
"an upsurge of the struggle."
The declaration then discusses the bloc, and in this dis-
cussion Soviet positions prevail. The USSR is said to have
underway the "comprehensive construction of a Communist society,"
while other bloc states are merely "laying the foundations of
socialism" (the Soviet view of China) or have "entered into the
period of construction of a developed socialist society" '(the
Chinese view of China). The USSR is the "most vivid example"
for the people of the whole world, while the Chinese revolution
gave a "new and powerful impetus to the national liberation
movement,...especially (in)...Asia, Africa, and Latin America."
Further, the "large cooperative socialist farm," the "Len-
inist cooperative plan," is endorsed as the correct path; the
commune is in effect scorned. The declaration endorses both
"steadfast adherence to the Leninist principle of material in-
centive" (a Soviet emphasis) and the "development of moral
stimuli" (a Chinese emphasis). The declaration also affirms
the Soviet emphasis on the need for coordination of bloc econ-
omies, and it reaffirms the Soviet view that the "transition
to Communism" cannot be effected without a high level of indus-
trialization and an abundance of consumer goods.
The rest of the discussion of intrabloc affairs affirms
propositions the Soviets and Chinese can continue to appeal
to equally: "socialist internationalism" as the principle
governing intrabloc relations; the "universal truth of Marx-
ism-Leninism," but the need for "creative application" of it;
the offenses of "nationalism and chauvinism"*; "'unity" as the
source of strength; and so on.
*
There is much more discussion of "nationalism" (also
called "national narrowmindedness") in this declaration than
in the 1957 declaration, possibly, presaging a Soviet effort
to make more of this particular charge against the Chinese.
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Questions of War
The next substantial section deals with questions of war
and peace, one of the incomplete portions of the draft produced
by the preparatory conference. The section begins with two
Soviet points: the description of the "problem" of war and
peace as the "most burning problem of our time," and the strong
emphasis on the consequences of general war. The treatment of
this latter point, which perhaps in the Soviet view permitted
Moscow to make certain concessions earlier on the definition
of the epoch without really retreating on the question of the
balance of power, is entirely in Soviet terms: The "monstrous
means" existing for "mass destruction and annihilation",'the
capabilities of "unprecedented destruction to entire coun-
tries," of the ruin of "large centers of world production and
world culture," of the death of "hundreds of millions." These
passages reflect a serious defeat for the Chinese.
The Chinese gain a point immediately thereafter, how-
ever, in the statement that today "as never before, particul-
arly sharp vigilance is demanded...," and particularly against
"US imperialism." American threats to peace are then reviewed
in terms both Moscow and Peiping employ (the "occupation,, of
Taiwan is one item in the list), and itis stated (a Chinese
emphasis) that "the military threat has increased."
The declaration then affirms the Chinese-emphasized point
that the nature of imperialism has not changed, but then af-
firms the more important Soviet proposition that war is not
inevitable, that the time has passed when the imperialists
could decide whether there is to be war; this latter formula-
tion denies a Chinese contention often stated in the form of
"we are not the imperialists' general staff." Although the
above formulation follows the Soviet practice of not specify-
ing what kinds of wars are not inevitable and thus implies
that no type of war is inevitable, the declaration immediate-
ly concedes that there have been certain "local wars" in re-
cent years (including some wars usually described as "libera-
tion" wars) and it then restricts the noninevitability of wars
to "world war."
As for the prospect of And response to local wars, the
declaration twists and turns on itself in a most unhappy way,
clearly reflecting a failure to agree. First, it notes that
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the imperialists have launched several local wars in re-
cent years, and it implies the Soviet point about the danger
of expansion of local wars by observing that these had "put
mankind on the brink of a world catastrophe." However, the
distinction between Western-initiated local wars and the
more complex matter of "liberation" wars, a distinction
which Khrushchev was to make in his 6 January report, is
not offered in this part of the declaration; the Western in-
tervention in Egypt which the bloc "put an end to," the
planned invasions of Syria, Iraq and other unspecified coun-
tries which were "averted," the "heroic struggle" of the Al-
gerian people, and the "rebuff to...the imperialists" in the
Congo and Laos, are here all put in the same basket. Fol-
lowing this, the declaration offers this equivocal proposi-
tion:
Experience confirms that it is possible to
struggle effectively against local wars unleashed
by the imperialists and to successfully liquidate
the hotbeds of these wars.
The declaration seems to be asserting simultaneously
(a) that the West will probably "unleash" other local wars
(as the Chinese contend) and (b) that the bloc will usually
be able to deter the initiation of such wars or to quench
them at an early stage (as the Soviets declare to be the
case).* The Chinese have contended that these local wars
(not only "liberation" wars) should sometimes be welcomed
and engaged in, and that such wars can be "contained" in
the.area even if bloc and Western forces come into con-
flict, whereas the Soviets have been explicitly wary of
any kind of war that threatens to involve bloc and Western
gees; i.e., they wish to halt the war without intervening.
If the above passages on local wars were intended also
to state the position on "liberation" wars (not mentioned in
these passages), it would represent a defeat for the Chinese,
who have exhorted not the "liquidation" of such wars but their
encouragement and strong support. However, there is a later
treatment of "liberation" wars in the declaration, and it seems
likely that the above passages are meant to refer only to
Western-initiated local wars.
*The phrase "struggle effectively" might be interpreted
very differently by Moscow and Peiping, as might the atrocious
final phrase; cf. Yu Chao-li in the 31 December Red Flag.
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After reaffirming the non-inevitability of world war
(noted above), the declaration returns to the theme of the
importance of avoiding such a war; it observes that a "cer-
tain part" of the bourgeoisie in the West wishes to keep
the peace, although it does not adopt the Soviet formula
that certain Western leaders wish to. It then states strong-
ly the Soviet proposition at there is no "more urgent task"
than to deliver mankind from "worldwide thermonuclear catas-
trophe," which it follows with a Chinese emphasis on "strug-
gle" and "vigilance." In its only reference to world Commu-
nist fronts, it leans to the Soviet position in describing
the width and variety of the movement aimed at preventing
"new wars."* It does the same thing near the end of this
section in statkg that the Communist parties regard the strug-
gle for peace--not the anti-imperialist struggle, as the Chi-
nese would say--as "their primary task," but it concludes
this section with the statement (explicitly praised by the
Chinese) that a new world war would result in the destruction
of capitalism.
"Peaceful Coexistence"
The next section deals with "peaceful coexistence," which
is declared (as in 1957) to be the "unshakable basis" of bloc
foreign policy, rather than--in the stronger expression the
Soviets had preferred--the "general line" of the bloc.** Ear-
ly in this discussion, the declaration states the Soviet party's
21st congress thesis that a "real opportunity will arise" to
exclude _world.. war even prior to the world-wide triumph of
socialism--a formulation which is hardly an advance on the
proposition that world war is not inevitable, but is important
here because the Chinese had resisted it. On the other hand,
the declaration notes immediately, as the Chinese had emphasized
-*As part o t e "peace"effort, however, the declaration
makes clear, as the Chinese wished, that the bloc is to main-
STATSPECtain and enhance its military strength.
**- analysis has noted--we think correctly--that
acceptance of this line by the CCP might imply acknowledgement
of a Soviet right to impose directives on the world Communist
movement.
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more than the Russians, that only the global triumph of so-
cialism can eliminate the "reasons" for "any wars."*
As for the prospects for peaceful coexistence," the dec-
laration at this point is at its most comically equivocal:
Communists must ... prevent underestimation of
the possibility of peaceful coexistence and, at the
same time... underestimation of the danger of war.
.The declaration then reaffirms the Soviet argument that there
is no third (Chinese) way in addition to coexistence or "des-
tructive war," and that the movement rejects (the Chinese do
not) "cold war" and brinksmanship." This paragraph affirms
support for the "solution of controversial international
questions by means of negotiations," which is a Soviet posi-
tion, but this very brief and slighting treatment of a tac-
tic so highly regarded by Moscow is in effect a point for
the Chinese.
The declaration goes on to make the Soviet point that
peace is the ally of the bloc, as time is working against the
West, but it describes coexistence only as "a"' form of class
struggle, not in Soviet terms as a "higher" form (which the
Chinese bad objected to), and it is evasive on the ways in
which the "struggle" is to be waged within the concept of
"peaceful coexistence." It is contended simultaneously that
':'peaceful: coexistence'.". favors the struggle in the non-Com-
munist world (a Soviet point)and that successes in this
struggle contribute to the "consolidation" of' peaceful coex-
istence (a Chinese euphemism).
In the sub-section on disarmament, the declaration re-
flects the Soviet position on the importance of complete dis-
armament and the joint position on the difficulties of realiz-
ing that. The declaration leans to Moscow in describing
disarmament as an "urgent historic necessity," and reflects
It s ou be understood that "peaceful coexistence" bars
only general war, not local wars, "liberation" wars, and civil
wars--although there are differences between Moscow and Pei-
ping on the proper response to the latter three types of war.
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Peiping primarily in holding that the imperialists must be
"forced" to meet this demand.*
The National Liberation Movement
The section on the national liberation movement, which
may or may not have been completed by the preparatory com-
mittee, begins by celebrating the emergence of "about 40"
new states in Asia and Africa since World War II and Castro's
victory in Cuba as an inspiration to Latin America, and by
observing that the disintegration of colonialism is of an
importance second only to the formation of the bloc. The
declaration notes that the world Communist movement is giv-
ing "great support" to the liberation movement, without
specifying the kinds of support or their relative importance.
As for the colonial areas, the declaration notes that
peoples of these areas have won independence in "fierce en-
counters" with imperialism (a Chinese emphasis), that Com-
munists recognize "the progressive, revolutionary importance
of national liberation wars" (a Chinese emphasis), and that
the existence of the bloc enhances the prospects of oppressed
peoples for gaining independence (a common position). Colonial
peoples are now gaining their independence, the declaration
continues, both by means of "armed struggle" (a Chinese em-
phasis) and by "non-military means" (a Soviet emphasis); the
document leans a bit to the Chinese here --y :goingcon i.-to note
that colonial powers do not voluntarily leave. A bit later,
the declaration describes the working class and peasantry as
the most important forces in winning independence (a common
position), and it is evasive on the question of the degree
of participation of the national bourgeoisie in the struggle
for independence (it depends on "concrete conditions"). Also
later, returning to the question of "support" for peoples
struggling for independence, the declaration expressed "warm
sympathy and support" for the Algerian rebels and goes on to
observe that the world Communist movement will render "every
moral and material support to peoples struggling for their
liberation." This formulation falls short of the reported
*Peiping announced in the early months of 1960 that it
would not be bound by any disarmament agreement in which it
did not participate..
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Chinese demand for a pledge of greater support specifically
to national liberation wars, although it is not a major de-
feat, as it would have been if liberation wars had been in-
cluded in the "local" wars which were to be liquidated.
As for the newly-independent countries, they are said to
be under heavy. pressure from the imperialist states anxious
to maintain "colonial exploitation" by economic manipulation,
military treaties and bases, and support of a susceptible part
of the bourgeoisie (i.e., maintenance of indirect control,
giving the country a "semi-colonial" status, although this
phrase is not used here). The "national revival" of these coun-
tries can "only" be accomplished by a "resolute struggle"
through a united front (armed struggle is not mentioned). The
declaration then states a set of objectives for the united
fronts which seem to represent Soviet formulations, in that
most are analagous to those put forward by the Soviets for
Communists in developed Western countries: strengthening poli-
tical independence, carrying out agrarian reform, liquidating
feudalism, expelling foreign enterprise, developing a national
industry, pursuing a neutralist foreign policy, and so on.
There is an apparent concession to the Chinese in the emphasis
on the unreliability of the bourgeoisie in this phase of the
revolution.
The declaration then sets forth the Soviet concept of
"national democracy" as the state which may arise from the
pursuit of the above-cited objectives--in other words, a
transitional form on the way to socialism for the independent
countries, a form analogous to the "democracy of a new type"
envisaged in developed Western countries.* Such a state would
actively oppose the West, reject military treaties with the
West, eliminate Western military bases, keep out Western
capital, and give its domest-ic Communists complete freedom
to infiltrate the government and built up their forces for
*The concept o "national democracy" differs from Mao
Tse-tung's "new democracy" in a critical respect: in Mao's
concept, as when the Peiping regime was proclaimed, the
Communists are already in complete control although not
frankly so, whereas the Soviet "national democracy" is ap-
parently to be headed by bourgeois nationalist figures who
are amenable to Communist influence.
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the eventual (perhaps early) takeover. Communist spokesmen
have since specified that there already ;;e i t ~ at,: le,ast'done
"national democratic state"--Castro's Cuba.
The Communist parties, on the road to "national demo-
cracy," are instructed to support the actions of national
governments (led by the national bourgeoisie) which lead to
the consolidation of achieved gains and which "undermine the
positions of imperialism." This formulation seems to leave
Moscow free to urge protracted Communist cooperation with or
subordination to bourgeois nationalist governments, and Pei-
ping free to argue that the goals of the local Communist par-
ties and of bloc foreign policy are not being advanced suf-
ficiently to warrant continued cooperation or restraint, or
for Moscow to hold that "national democracy" is not a prospect
for this or that country until (say)-1965 and Peiping to con-
tend that it could be achieved much more rapidly by internal
and external pressure.
The declaration at this point notes the importance of
bloc economic aid (loans, technicians, training) to the new-
ly independent countries. The emphasis on this point is So-
viet. As for the peoples not yet independent, it is at this
point that they are promised "every support," that sympathy
and support is expressed for the Algerian rebels, and that
the world Communist movement is pledged to render "every
moral and material support to peoples struggling for their
liberation."
The next section deals with the prospects for peaceful
accession to power by Communist parties, in effect restrict-
ing this to the question of tactics within developed Western
countries. This section begins with the Soviet point that
the Communist parties are the best judges of tactics in their
countries, nods to the Chinese by observing that the parties
"will increasingly take the offensive" and will prepare for
"decisive battles to overthrow capitalism," and then sets
forth the Soviet program formulated in 1959 and reaffirmed
in 1960. The "main blow" is to be aimed at the "monopolies,"
or, in some countries, jointly at American imperialism,
monopoly capital, and other forces of "internal reaction."
Communists are to struggle for "democratic" goals--including
peace,* national independence, nationalization of the principal
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sectors of the economy, "radical",agrarian reforms, and so
on--comparable to the goals set forth in November 1959 (by
the West European parties) which had been assailed by Pei-
ping as "opportunist."* The declaration goes on to observe
that the struggle for "democracy" is a part of the struggle
for socialism, and that this program differs from that of
the "reformists" who deny the need for revolution.
As for peaceful accession to power, the discussion is
equivocal throughout, drawing heavily on the 1957 declaration.
It rejects the view that social revolutions "necessarily"
develop from wars. It denies any wish to "export revolu-
tion" and calls for struggle against "imperialist export of
counter-revolution," without stating how the "rebuff" to the
latter is to be effected. It notes that the development of
the revolution depends on a.number of factors, including the
degree of resistance of the ruling classes. Communist par-
ties "seek" to carry out the revolution by non-violent means,
as is desirable (a Soviet emphasis), and in "a number of
countries" they have this opportunity (another SOzietr_poirit),
but where the "exploiting classes use violence" then violence
must be employed (a Chinese emphasis), and it is a fact of
history that the ruling classes do not surrender voluntarily
(another Chinese point).
Discipline of the Movement
of at least equal importance to the sections considered
above--i.e., those concerned with questions of strategy--is
the concluding section, dealing with the discipline of the
world Communist movement, a section which had been left un-
completed in critical respects by the preparatory committee.
It begins with a statement of the movement's increasing
strength, including the specification of 87 Communist par-
ties with a total membership of 36 million.
*Peiping clearly retreated in this discussion, presum-
ably in the belief tbAt Communist tactics in the West are of
less importance than tactics in the underdeveloped countries,
but without changing its mind; a People's Daily editoriallon
the declaration the next day ignored ese" mocratic" goals
and their prospects.
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It then observes that one factor in the good health of
the movement has been the "overcoming of the harmful conse-
quences of the cult of the individual," and it soon there-
after, in discussing the "norms of party life," specifies
the duty of preventing the emergence of such a cult. This
formulation is largely a Soviet victory, as it is in effect
an endorsement of the deStalinization campaign. If applied
to Khrushchev and Mao, however, the declaration on this point
is a draw rather than a Soviet victory, because the Chinese
have objected to Khrushchev's personal leadership every bit
as much as the Soviets have objected to Mao's.
This section then discusses "revisionism" and "dogmatism."
The Soviet party scores sharply in the formulation that the
movement has (already) "routed" the revisionists and in con-
fining the discussion of revisionism largely to the "Yugoslav
revisionists." The Chinese party scores a''point in the con-
cluding paragraph on revisionism, which, without declaring
revisionism to be exclusively a Yugoslav phenomenon, makes
the charges against the revisionists that the Chinese had
made against Moscow (revisionism "reflects bourgeois ideology,"
"paralyzes revolutionary will," "disarms and demobilizes the
workers and masses," etc.). The Soviet party scores in the
same way, however, in the discussion of "dogmatism and sec-
tarianism," in that the passage (longer than in the 1957
declaration) reflects charges made by Moscow against the
Chinese (these offenses prevent the creative development
of Marxism-Leninism, isolate the Communists, condemn the
parties to passive temporizing or leftist adventurism, etc.)
The declaration falls back on the November 1957 formulation
that revisionism is the "main danger" (a Chinese point) and
that dogmatism and sectarianism "can become" the main danger
(a less sharp Soviet point) to individual parties.
The declaration then makes some solemn remarks about the
importance of unity in the movement, arguing that its strength
is as the strength of ten when it is unified. It then as-
serts, in what may become the most belabored sentence in the
history of the world Communist movement:
The interests of the Communist movement demand
that every Communist party display solidarity by
observing assessments and conclusions jointly
worked out by the fraternal parties at their con-
ferences....
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The formulation would seem to permit the Soviets to return to
the argument that the minority should be bound by assessments
reached "jointly" by the majority, and the Chinese to contend
that they will not be bound because they were not among those
who "jointly" reached the assessment.
As for the policies not worked out in conferences, all
the parties "independently and equally" (truly a joint Sino-
Soviet formulation) are to work out their policies on the
basis of the specific conditions in their countries, ":guided
by the principles of Marxism-Leninism"--another formulation
which permits one party to assert that another party has
violated those principles and the latter party to deny it.
Further, each party is to be "responsible" to the entire
world Communist movement--which may be a Soviet proposition,
i.e., an indirect way of calling for minorities to submit
to majorities, but which falls short of imposing that prin-
ciple and is a two-edged weapon anyway. Further, the par-
ties are to hold additional conferences of this type to work
out "unified views,"* and, in interim periods, when disputes
arise, are to hold bilateral talks--in other words, there are
to be more conferences of the type which had in fact just
failed to work out "unified views," and more bilateral talks
of the type which had repeatedly failed to resolve Sino-
Soviet disputes. The burden of the passage seems to be this:
that it is better to have a lot of meetings, and to avoid or
at least to postpone a showdown, than it is to have an open
split in the movement.
Reflecting Khrushchev's reported abjuration of formal
Soviet party ' leadership of the movement (an abjuration in
effect forced on him by Peiping's treatment of the concept
of Soviet leadership), the declaration describes the Soviet
party not as the leader but as the "generally acknowledged
vanguard" of the movement, the "most experienced and tem-
pered unit." The Soviet party then scores a point in the
assertion that Soviet experience is of "fundamental
same problem arises here as with assessments reached
"jointly." The Soviets can maintain that these are the "uni-
fied" views of the majority, just as they have sometimes used
the phrase "by the unanimous opinion of the majority," where-
as the Chinese can maintain that they do not share these
views and they are therefore not "unified."
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significance" for the entire movement. It scores another
point immediately in the assertion that "the historic deci-
sions of the 20th CPSU congress..started a new stage in the
world Communist movement and contributed to its further de-
velopment on the basis of Marxism-Leninism"--as the Chinese
had been very cool toward the theses of the 20th and 21st
congresses. However, the Chinese scored in omitting any
reference to the 21st congress in this context; there is an
earlier reference in a passage about contributions made by
various parties, contributions which might equally include
some of the militant articles from Red Flag.
Shortly thereafter, the declaration asserts that "Marxism-
Leninism is the sole great revolutionary teaching." This rep-
resents another draw, as both sides of course had based their
positions on Marxism-Leninism; the Soviets had been inter-
ested in denying Mao as another such source, and the Chinese
in denying Khrushchev. There is another pious affirmation
that only on the basis of Marxism-Leninism can the world Com-
munist movement "solve successfully" all its tasks--as dis-
tinct, presumably, from solving unsuccessfully its tasks, a
better description of the Moscow conference.*
It should be observed that this concluding section of
the declaration does not establish the principle of majority
rule, and it makes no reference to "factionalism'."
It does not seem an idle exercise to attempt to tally
the declaration in terms of its final statements of long-
disputed propositions, because the Soviet and Chinese par-
ties took each of these questions seriously and did their
best to make their positions prevail, working the proposi-
tions out line by line and word by word. Certain of the
rict in his 18 December report stated: "Somebody
has raised the question as to who is the one who determines
what is truth, and what complies with the principles of
Marxist-Leninist doctrine." He answered that such confer-
ences arrive at the truth, and went on to emphasize that,
while the concept of "leader" is no longer employed, "there
is no doubt ...that the CPSU is the center" of the movement.
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formulations can be regarded as a clear Soviet victory, others
as a clear Chinese victory, others as a Soviet edge or a Chi-
nese edge, and many others as so equivocal, so evasive, or so
susceptible to appeal equally as to represent a draw. It
would be a mistake, however, to regard the scoring of the
declaration as an evaluation of the entire affair of the
conference.
Although the declaration discusses questions of strategy
in four categories (nature of the epoch, war and peace, na-
tional liberation movement, peaceful accession to power),
there are really at least six substantive categories: the
blanc of power, questions of war, "peaceful coexistence,"
policy toward colonial areas, policy toward newly independent
countries, and tactics for Communists in the West. The Soviet
party did not 'lose' any of these six substantive battles"
it won two by a substantial margin (the first and second);
it won two by a narrow margin (the fifth and sixth); and two
were draws (the third and fourth).
As for the first, the balance of power: the description
of the epoch represents a draw; the assessment of the balance
of power, a Soviet edge; the significance of recent develop-
ments, a draw; the treatment of long-term economic competi-
tion, a clear Soviet victory; and problems of building Com-
munism, a clear Soviet victory. In sum: a Soviet victory
by a substantial margin.
As for the second, questions relating to war: the con-
sequences of general war, a clear Soviet victory; the need
to avoid general war, a clear Soviet victory, the prospect
of general war, a Soviet edge; the need for vigilance,
a Chinese edge; the prospect of local wars, a Chinese edge;
the response to local wars, a Soviet edge. In sum: another
substantial Soviet victory.
As for the third, "peaceful coexistence": the importance
of peaceful coexistence, a Soviet edge; the possibility of
peaceful coexistence, a draw; the relationship of "peace"
and the "struggle;" a draw; negotiations with the West, a
Chinese edge; disarmament, a draw. In sum: a draw.
As for the fourth, policy in colonial areas: the treat-
ment of successes to date, a draw; the importance of armed
struggle versus other forms of action, a draw; the importance
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and necessity of "liberation" wars, a Chinese edge; the
question of bloc "support" of "liberation" wars, a Soviet
edge; attitudes toward the national bourgeoisie, a draw. In
sum: a draw.
As for the fifth, policy toward newly-independent coun-
tries; objectives for united fronts, a Soviet edge; attitude
toward the national bourgeoisie, a Chinese edge; the concept
of "national democracy," a Soviet edge; tactics of the Com-
munist parties, a draw; the importance of bloc economic aid
to independent countries, a Soviet edge. In sum: a narrow
Soviet victory.
As for the sixth, tactics of Communist parties in the
West: the prospects of accession to power by non-violent
means, a draw; programs for the parties, a clear Soviet
victory. In sum: a Soviet edge.
As for that portion of the declaration concerned with
the world Communist movement, regarded here as at least as
important as all the other sections combined: the -treatment
of the "cult of the individual," a Soviet edge; revisionism
versus dogmatism and sectarianism, a draw; adherence to as-
sessments worked out "jointly," a Chinese edge, because it
depresses the Soviet party to the level of others; internal
policies of the parties, a draw; the responsibility of the
parties to the entire movement, a draw; the mechanism (in-
ternational and bilateral) for resolving disputes, a Chinese
edge, again because it reduces the Soviet party's stature;
the position of the Soviet party in the movement, a draw; the
failure to establish the principle of majority riylie, .1-1d tile
omission of any reference to "factionalism," a resounding
Chinese victory.* In sum: a substantial Chinese victory.
There were various attempts at the time to assess the
significance of the 6 December declaration for Soviet for-
eign policy and Chinese Communist foreign policy, but ob-
viously the declaration itself was of less value in that re-
gard than would be subsequent Soviet and Chinese interpreta-
tions and presentations of the document. It was contended,
for example, that the declaration expressed Chinese acceptance
*Another OCI analyst has discovered in the Comintern
statutes of 1920 that the Comintern operated on the principle
of majority rule, with proportional representation based on
the party's numerical strength and "real influence."
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of Khrushchev's intention to seek summit talks with the
new US administration, but actually both the Chinese atti-
tude and ':hrushchev's intention had to be deduced from
other materials. Similarly, it was argued that the declara-
tion presaged a more vigorous Soviet policy in the underde-
veloped areas, but actually a Soviet decision of this kind
had been indicated after the abortive summit meeting of May
1960 and was clearly apparent in Khrushchev's performance
at the UN General Assembly before the Moscow conference
opened.* The most that could be said, on the basis of the
declaration itself, was that the two parties apparently had
agreed to refrain for a time from polemics about bloc strategy
and that the declaration seemed to give additional force to
certain types of pressure on the Soviet party's foreign pol-
icy which were already being exerted by the Chinese. That
is, the declaration, at a minimum, committed the Soviets
to hold further world Communist conferences to defend their
policies. On matters of strategy, it put additional pres-
sure on Khrushchev to take a hard line'in any negotiations
with the West; to intervene in any Western-initiated local
wars; to give more substance to Soviet professions of sympathy
and support for liberation wars; to move faster toward mak-
ing "national democracies" of the now independent countries;
and so on. Whether or not the Soviets could withstand any
or all of these pressures, Moscow did increase the pressure
on itself by recognizing them in a public document which
was stated to be the program of the world Communist movement.
Surely the most significant development of the Moscow
conference was the success with which the Chinese Communists
challenged Soviet party leadership of the world Communist
movement, in the sense that the conference formalized and
legitimized that challenge. That is (as other observers have
noted), the Chinese had challenged the policies formulated
by the leader and had challenged the exercise of that lead-
ership, and the 6 December declaration, rather than estab-
lishing the Soviet-exhorted principle of majority rule, pro-
vifided a procedure for the challenge to continue. This seemed
virtually certain to affect the "unity" of the world Commu-
nist movement. Given the lack of clarity in the 6 December
*It is impossible to judge to what degree this Soviet
decision was affected by a wish to pre-empt the Chinese.
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declaration, the number of positions susceptible to varying
interpretations, the probable Soviet and Chinese persistence
in different interpretations, the existence of parties and
factions within parties whose temperaments and situations
made them sympathetic to Chinese rather than Soviet inter-
pretations, it seemed quite likely that there would be a
Sino-Soviet contest for dominant influence over some of the
parties, especially in the Asian countries of the bloc and
and in the underdeveloped areas.* There could also develop
a movement--if not general, at least among some parties--to-
ward independence of both Moscow and Peiping.
Moscow's acceptance of restrictions on Soviet leadership
perhaps should not be interpreted entirely, however, as rec-
ognition of a disagreeable necessity. The Soviets might rea-
sonably have told themselves that, in subsequent world Com-
munist conferences, they would retain a substantial majority.
Beyond this, it may be that the Soviet party, just as
appeared to be confident that the world will eventually succumb
to Soviet successes and the Soviet example, told itself too
that sooner or later the discipline of the world Communist
movement would be restored. This kind of confidence had
actually been expressed, on behalf of the Soviet party, in
December 1956, after the highpoint of the Soviet troubles
in Eastern Europe, and by (of all people) a Chinese, Peng
Chen:
And_if younger brother does not want to listen
to him /.the Soviet party7, well, let him do as he
thinks l5est. Sooner or later he will learn to ap-
preciate the elder brother's advice and be grateful
to him.
*T a ec ara ion itself gives the Chinese party (and
others) an opening for disputing Soviet policies in talks
with other parties, despite the Soviet condemnation of
"factionalism." The declaration notes: "When this or
that party raises questions about the activity of another
fraternal party, its leadership turns to the leadership
of the party in question, and, when necessary, meetings
and consultations are held." The "activity"
may well be in implementation of a Soviet policy.
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II. SOVIET AND CHINESE PRESENTATIONS OF THE DECLARATION
Early Soviet Comment
The day following the publication of the 6 December dec-
laration, Pravda, like People's Daily, was on the streets
with a tendentious interpre a io omit. Pravda gave a fit-
fully accurate summary of the document butler alia, re-
turned to the concept of a "new era," did not mention that
the threat of war had increased, took no note of local wars,
emphasized the importance of "peaceful coexistence," did not
refer to the "armed struggles" of colonial peoples, and
failed to remark the instability of the national bourgeoisie
in newly independent countries. As for the discipline of the
movement, Pravda played straight the final section of the dec-
laration, although adding several paragraphs of comment on
the "immense importance" of Sino-Soviet solidarity.
The report of First Secretary Ulbricht to the East Ger-
man party on 18 December--in effect another Soviet comment
on the conference, as the CPSU had almost certainly approved
Ulbricht's report--made public a number of the disputes which
had arisen during the Moscow conference and made clear that
disagreement persisted beyond the conference. Attributing
the dissident views to "some comrades" or simply "people,"
but clearly referring to the Chinese and their supporters
(Albania was named), Ulbricht criticized those who hold an
"obsolete" view of the character of the epoch, who are guilty
of "nationalism" in building Communism, who wish to "conceal"
the consequences of nuclear war, who do not believe that world
war can be abolished so long as capitalism exists, who reject
any "general line" and in consequence make errors in "compli-
cated situations, such as in border problems," who believe
that "peaceful coexistence" will weaken the movement, who pre-
sent the "great danger" of dogmatism and sectarianism, who
believe in such a concept as "Chinese" Marxism-Leninism, and
so on. The censure of Albania introduced a new device for
bloc criticism of Peiping, much as Peiping had long used
Yugoslavia to attack the Soviet party.
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On 19 December, Frol Kozlov reported on the November con-
ference to Soviet party functionaries in Moscow. Moscow's
brief account of the speech indicated that Kozlov emphasized
such Soviet propositions as the bloc':?Ybecomung. the "decisive
factor" in world affairs, the non-inevitability of war, the
avoidance of war as the most urgent task, and so on, although
he apparently gave some attention as well to portions of the
document which the Chinese had pressed for. Between 23 De-
cember and 3 January, every full member of the Soviet party
presidium except Khrushchev was appearing in provincial cen-
ters throughout the Soviet Union to talk with local party of-
ficials about the results of the Moscow conference. This is
said to have been the most ambitious briefing effort under-
taken by Soviet leaders since early 1957, following the Hun-
garian revolution.
Khrushchev's 6 January Report
It remained for Khrushchev himself, in a 6 January re-
port to a Soviet party audience in Moscow (a report not pub-
lished or broadcast in full until 18-19 January) to offer
the definitive Soviet interpretation of the 6 December dec-
laration. The report, longer than the declaration itself,
was a strong reaffirmation of Soviet positions in the dis-
pute with Peiping, as well as a clarification of Soviet views.
The original report (as given on 6 January, not as pub-
lished later) is said to have contained much criticism of the
Chinese. Khrushchev is reported have said, for example, that
the Chinese leaders were "stupid" but it was necessary to
reach "agreement" with them.
Opening with the assertion that the declaration was a
"militant Marxist-Leninist document," Khrushchev went on
in effect to notify the rank-and-file of the world Communist
movement that the Chinese party had not forced him to be any
more militant than he cared to be. Asserting further that
the declaration would serve as a "true compass" for the move-
ment, he went on to construct another compass which, rather
than swinging wildly from one direction to another like the
6 December declaration, would point more steadily to Soviet
positions.
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Taking up the question of the definition of the epoch,
Khrushchev reiterated that this was by no means a "narrow
theoretical question" but the basic estimate underlying world
Communist strategy and tactics. He gave virtually verbatim
the definition given in the 6 December declaration, expatiated
on that, observed that the "balance of forces" in the world
had undergone "a radical change in favor of socialism, reiter-
ated (as had the declaration) that the bloc "is becoming the
decisive factor," and then stated very clearly the other half
of his position, the half the Chinese minimize, on the bal-
ance of power:
This does not mean that imperialism represents
an infinitesimal quantity which can be disregarded.
Not at all. Imperialism still possesses great
strength. It possesses a strong military machine....
The declaration had said nothing about Western strength, it
has simply rejoiced in Western weakness.
Still discussing the balance of power, Khrushchev did
not content himself with the declaration's vague formula-
tion that imperialism was being halted in its attempt to re-
tard history by "military means." He specified (like the
declaration) that the balance of power deterred the West
from initiating a "world war," but he declared also (:where the
declaration fudged) that Western "attempts to unleash local
wars are being cut short."
As had the declaration, Khrushchev in this section re-
viewed the "depening crisis" of world capitalism, in par-
ticular of the United States. He did not repeat, however,
the declaration's (Chinese) description of the US as the
main enemy of the peoples of the world. Neither did he speak,
as the declaration had spoken, of world revolutionary forces
merging to "destroy" the world imperialist system.
Following the organization of the declaration, Khrushcev
turned to bloc internal affairs. He gave considerably more
detail (several pages) than had the declaration td the USSR's
accomplishments, failed to mention the declaration's citation
of Communist China as an inspiration to the underdeveloped
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r.r
countries, reaffirmed Soviet confidence in surpassing the
United States in per capita production in or about 1970,
and remarked "To win time in the economic contest with
capitalism is now the main thing."
Khrushchev also gave much more attention than had the
declaration to the principles of building Communism. He was
very harsh on the (Chinese) "levelling and weakening of the
principle of material incentive-the concentration of em-
phasis on enthusiasm...on social and moral forms of incen-
tive ...." Like the declaration, but contrary to the ex-
pressed Chinese aim of autarky, Khrushchev spoke of the need
for "coordination of national economic plans" among bloc
countries, implying again that the degree of Soviet aid to
China would depend on Peiping's accommodation to this policy.
Questions of War
Khrushchev then turned to questions of war and peace,
which he said were "the center of attention" at the confer-
ence.* In this long section of his report, he improved con-
siderably on the discussion in the 6 December declaration,**
although there remained certain ambiguous formulations.
Khrushchev distinguished, much more clearly than had the
6 December declaration, four types of war: world war, local
wars, liberation wars, and popular uprisings. Communists are
"determined opponents" of world wars, he said, and are "gen-
erally opponents of wars among states" mantra-imperialist wars?7.
Khrushchev at this point declared forthrightly that "we can
forestall the outbreak of a world war," and he returned to
the pre-conference position that the "unleashing of wars" (of
any kind) had become more difficult for the West. Apparently
restricting the category of "local wars" to Western-initiated
wars against other states, he conceded that such wars "may occur
again in the future," but he reiterated the long-standing position
*This part of-Khrushchev's report is discussed, along
much the same lines as in this paper, in the FBIS Bloc Sur-
vey of 26 January 1961.
**It is curious that certain of these clarifications did
not appear in the declaration itself, as the Chinese would
have welcomed some of them.
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that Western opportunities for initiating them "are becoming
fewer and fewer." He reiterated the Soviet position that a
local war may become a world war, and therefore that local
wars as well as world wars must be opposed.*
Khrushchev then spoke of "national liberation" wars,
giving the examples of the Indochina war (up to the 1954
truce, apparently) and the current Algerian war. Liberation
wars, he said, "will continue to exist as long as imperialism
exists, as long as colonialism exists," and are "not only
admissible but inevitable." Colonial peoples, he continued,
could attain their freedom and independence "only by strug-
gle, including armed struggle," a formulation which seemed
to put armed struggle in a subordinate position, whereas the
declaration had put it first.**
Khrushchev then posed the question of why the "USim-
perialists," while wishing to help the "French colonialists"
in the Indochina war, had "decided against direct interven-
tion" there? The reason, he said, was that American inter-
vention would lead to "relevant aid" (presumably intervention)
by China, the USSR and other bloc countries, which "could
lead to world war." In other words, the United States, like
the USSR itself, was sensible of the danger of expansion of
local wars.
Whereas the declaration had failed to describe libera-
tion wars as "just" wars and had gone on to state that Com-
munists recognize the "importance" of national liberation wars
but had not pledged any support to them, Khrushchev specified
the Algerian war as a "sacred" war, stated that Communists
"recognize" such wars, and asserted that "we help and will
help peoples striving for their independence." He evaded the
question, however, of how far bloc aid was to extend--an omis-
sion which, in the light of his earlier remarks, suggested
*The-1m-P-1T-c`a`t1--n remains, however, that the USSR will
intervene in certain kinds of local war, e.g. to defend a
newly-independent country against Western military action;
Zhukov's 5 January Pravda article on colonialism implies the
same, more clearly.
**Zhukov's 5 January article makes clear that the Soviet
party does indeed regard "armed struggle" as less important,
owing to various other forms of pressure on the colonial
powers.
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a wariness about assisting "liberation" wars to a degree which
would risk the commitment of American forces.*
Khrushchev then gave the "war" in Cuba as an example of
a "popular uprising," i.e. a civil war. Just as the "libera-
tion" war in Indochina had not become a local war (between
states) because American forces had not intervened,** so in
Cuba the United States "did not intervene-directly with its
armed forces," and again, as in Indochina, the "people" won.
Such national uprisings are to be expected, Khrushchev went
on, and Communists take a "most positive" attitude toward
them. While these wars "must not be identified with wars
among states"--i.e., presumably, must not be permitted to be-
come local wars through intervention, risking counter-inter-
vention and possible expansion to world war--Communists "fully
support such just wars."
Khrushchev then returned, as the declaration had returned,
to the theme of the need to avert a world war. He gave much
more detail than had the declaration on the consequences of
general war, inter alia citing a Western estimate that up'to
750 million people could die in a 60-day war. He followed
the declaration in affirming that imperialism would be "wiped
out" in a new world war, but he then made the Soviet point
that in the event of war it would be the "working people" all
over the world who would "suffer most." Bearing down hard
for the benefit of the Chinese, he said:
A sober appraisal of the inevitable (sic) conse-
quences of nuclear war is the indispensable condition
for a persistent pursuit of a policy of preventing war
and of mobilizing the masses for the achievement of
this task.
*Zhukovys January article makes a somewhat stronger
statement of support for both newly-independent countries and
"liberation" movements, but still evades the question of degree:
"...in whatever form a national-liberation revolution devel-
ops--whether peaceful or non-peaceful--it is correct in count-
ing on the fact that any attempt at imperialist intervention
with the aim of suppressing such a revolution will meet time-
ly, decisive and powerful opposition."
**Colonial forces present from the start, in Indochina,
Algeria, or wherever, apparently do not count as intervention-
ist.
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"Peaceful Coexistence"
Taking up "peacful coexistence," Khrushchev returned to
the formulation that this concept was the "general line" of
his foreign policy--i.e., the Soviet party's policy, because
the Chinese had rejected any "general line." He went on to
reaffirm the Soviet argument (reflected in the declaration)
that peaceful coexistence is to the advantage of the bloc.
He reiterated, again for the benefit of the Chinese, that the
USSR would "do everything"'to increase its military capabili-
ties and would continue to "rebuff" aggression by the im-
perialists, but
We always seek to direct the development of
events in such a way as to ensure that, while defend-
ing the interests of the socialist camp, we do not
provide the imperialist provocateurs with a chance
to unleash a new world war.
After reaffirming his intention to conclude a German
peace treaty, Khrushchev passed to disarmament and reiterated
the Soviet position that the Soviet effort toward disarmament
"is not a tactical move. We sincerely want disarmament." (He
went on to imply that partial disarmament was better than
none.) He again put forward the slogan--which Peiping had
emphatically rejected--of a world "without weapons and with-
out war." The "slogan" of the struggle for peace, he went
on, was not inconsistent with the struggle for Communism,
and here he reaffirmed the Soviet view of the proper tactics
for the world Communist fronts by pointing to the "movement
of peace partisans" as the "broadest movement of modern times."
As for negotiations with the West, Khrushchev returned to
the pre-conference Soviet position that Western policy had
"militant-aggressive" and "moderate-sober" elements, and he
cited Lenin on the need for contact with "prudent representa-
tives of the bourgeoisie." Reiterating that Western "ruling
circles" included both adventurist forces and others which
"understand the danger of a new war to capitalism itself,"
Khrushchev reaffirmed that bloc states "strive for negotia-
tions and agreements" with the West and "endeavor to develop
personal contacts" with the Western leaders.
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The National Liberation Movement
Khrushchev then turned to the national liberation move-
ment, beginning, as did the declaration, with a review of
recent progress--the implication being, as it had been in
Khrushchev's speeches at the Moscow conference, that the Chi-
nese could hardly complain about results like these. Citing
the great experience of the bloc in applying Marxism-Leninsim
to bloc countries themselves, Khrushchev again implied that
the Communist parties of the underdeveloped countries of to-
day did not need to-look to Peiping as a special..authority in
this area:
The correct application of this experience,
the correct determination of which policy should
be pursued, naturally can be done only by actual
party functioning in the given country.
As for the colonial areas, Khrushchev cut through the
discussion of "armed struggles" for independence and of "lib-
eration" wars which had appeared at this point in the 6 Decem-
ber declaration, evidently having said all he cared to say on
this point in his earlier treatment of types of war--namely,
that armed struggle was an admissible (although secondary)
means of gaining national independence, and that Communists
recognize the importance of "liberation" wars and would sup-
port them (although evading the questions of the kind and
degree of support). As for the tasks of the Communist par-
ties and their attitude toward the national bourgeoisie in
the struggle for independence, he let stand the evasive
formulations of the 6 December declaration. He did, however,
imply a more tolerant Soviet attitude than Peiping's toward
the national bourgoisie in noting immediately that the statement
directs maximum use of the revolutionary capabil-
ities of the various classes and social strata, draw-
ing into the struggle against imperialism all allies,
even those who are inconsistent, wavering, and un-
steady. Communists are revolutionaries, and it would
be a bad thing if they did not take advantage of new
opportunities which arose....*
*Zhukov in his 5 January article gives more attention to
the limitations of the bourgeois role in revolution, but he
still falls well short of the Chinese emphasis.
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Unlike the declaration, Khrushchev spoke of the Soviet-initia-
tive at the UN General Assembly in October on the granting of
independence to colonial peoples, remarking the importance of
this initiative in isolating the colonial powers and their
American supporters. Khrushchev reaffirmed his intention to
stay on the offensive in the colonial areas.*
As for the newly-independent countries, Khrushchev, while
referring his audience back to the 6 December declaration on
the tasks of the Communist parties and their attitudes toward
various classes and groups, made the point noted above about
making "maximum use" of all classes and groups (a formulation
apparently meant to apply to the newly-independent as well as
colonial countries), and he went on to observe that "particular
note should be taken of the (Soviet) concept of "national dem-
ocracy" for the underdeveloped countries. He went on, in more
conciliatory language than that of the declaration, to say
that Communists "generally support democratic measures" taken
by the present governments of underdeveloped countries, while
at the same time they "explain to the masses that these meas-
ures are not socialist measures." He reaffirmed the importance
(as had the declaration) of bloc economic aid to these coun-
tries, and he added the (Soviet) point that this aid would in-
fluence the development of these countries in a direction fa-
vorable to the bloc.
Turning to the question of peaceful accession to power
by Communist parties, Khrushchev admitted that there had been
disagreements on this concept. He reaffirmed (more clearly
than had the declaration) the Soviet position that peaceful
accession was desirable and increasingly possible as the bloc
grew in strength, and that parliamentary action to this end
was a good thing.
Khrushchev pointed out the "special significance" of the
passages in the 6 December declaration which denied any inten-
tion to "export revolution" but which also called for struggle
against "imperialist export of counter-revolution." Like the
declaration, however, he was evasive on the question of how
this latter struggle was to be conducted.
Khrushchev in this report gave only a few paragraphs to
the question of the tactics of Communist parties in developed
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Western countries, whereas the 6 December declaration had de-
voted several pages to it. He presumably believed that the
clear Soviet victory on the question, in the formulations of
the declaration, made it unnecessary for him to reaffirm
Soviet positions at great length. He contented himself with
observing that the local parties were the best judges of tac-
tics (again implying that Chinese advice was not needed),
noted the importance of work among young people, described
the working class in developed Western countries as an "im-
mense revolutionary force," and closed with the Soviet point
(not mentioned in the declaration) that Communist parties in
these countries faced great difficulties.
Discipline of the Movement
Khrushchev devoted the final section of his report, as
had the declaration, to questions of the discipline of the
world Communist movement. He gave these questions about six
pages of discussion as against four-and-a-half in the declara-
tion.
Khrushchev did not take up, as the declaration had, the
question of the "cult of the individual." He began instead
with a discussion of revisionism, dogmatism, and .sectarian-
ism. Enlarging on the discussion in the declaration, he
noted that it was "three years ago" that the revisionists
were most active in the world Communist movement, and they
had been "unmasked and thrown out." Since then, the parties
had all condemned the "Yugoslav variety of contemporary re-
visionism," implying other varieties (e.g. Chinese).
Implicitly relating, through Yugoslavia, the two offenses
of revisionism and "nationalism," Khrushchev craftily, went
on to discuss briefly the question of "nationalism" in the
world Communist movement. He was wary of provoking the Chi-
nese to polemics on this point; he observed merely that Lenin
had stated "with his usual perspicacity" that "the struggle
with the evil of nationalism, with the most deep-rooted na-
tional petty bourgeois prejudices, moves more and more ur-
gently into the foreground" as the bloc grows.*
rus c ev seemed . to be preparing the ground for fu-
ture efforts to turn the offense of "revisionism" into the of-
fense of (Chinese) "nationalism." Ulbricht's report had implied
this also.
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Taking up another topic closer to his heart than revi-
sionism, Khrushchev observed that "at the present time"
dogmatism and sectarianism "can do great harm to our cause,"
cited Lenin as being "uncompromising toward dogmatism," and
reiterated the charges made in the declaration against both
dogmatism and sectarianism, Ile concluded with the standard
formulation (since 1.957) that revisionism was the "main dan-
ger" but dogmatism and sectarianism could become so.*'
Khrushchev then addressed himself to the most important
topic of his report, the "solidarity" of the movement, this
being the "principal condition" for the eventual triumph of
Communism. This solidarity was to be based on the "prin-
ciples" of Marxism-Leninism and "proletarian international-
ism"--the latter a longtime euphemism for adherence to the
decisions of the Soviet party. The 6 December declaration
at this point had specified that solidarity was to be ex-
pressed by "observing assessments and conclusions jointly
worked out by the fraternal parties at their conference...."
Khrushchev in his 6 January report went a bit beyond this.
The "essence of Leninism itself," Khrushchev said, demanded
that every party must prevent actions, "both within its own
ranks and in the international Communist movement," which
could "undermine" the solidarity of the movement. As it
stood, Khrushchev's formulation could be interpreted simply
as another way of saying that agreed formulations should be
adhered to, which at that would leave the Chinese free to
argue that solidarity is maintained by adhering to the for-
mulations as they interpret them, not as the Russians do.
However ?the implication in Khrushchev's remarks went beyond
the question of statements adopted at conferences; Khrushchev
seemed to be calling again for support of majority positions
and to be suggesting that other parties discipline or purge
those opposed to,such positions--in other words, a return to
the position on majority rule and "factionalism" which the
Chinese party had repeatedly refused to accept.**
-.....w...., *The Russians have never been able to answer successfully
the Chinese question as to how, if the Soviet party is willing
to concede revisionism to be the present "main danger," it can
maintain at the same time that revisionism has already been
"routed. " 'It, has been noted that this..:is Milton''s -view' of Satan.
**Red Star later explicitly reaffirmed the principle of ma-
jority positions being binding on the minority, The Chinese could
interpret Khrushchev's formulation, but not Red Star's, otherwise.
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Khrushchev then pointed out, as the declaration had not,
that the Soviet party itself had rejected the concept of the
Soviet party as the "head" of the movement.* He reiterated
the provisions of the declaration that the parties are "equal
and independent," responsible to the entire Communist move-
ment. Noting that the CPSU remained the "universally acknowl-
edged vanguard," he denied that leadership of the movement
"from any center at all" is either "possible or necessary."
Referring 4gain to the practice of calling the Soviet party
the "head" (or "leader," glava meaning either), he posed the
question of whether the omission of this description of the
Soviet party (as "head") would not weaken solidarity, and he
then denied this, observing that "there is no statute (ustav)
which cotld regulate relations among parties," and that
solidarity would be maintained by "loyalty" to the common
Marxist-Leninst ideology. (The declaration : at'this". print' bad
spoken of the practice of holding world Communist conferences
to work out "unified" views and, in interim periods, holding
bilateral talks. Again Khrushchev failed to mention this.)
Khrushchev:?gave only a paragraph in this section of his
report to the internal policies of the parties. He did not
mention,.aS the declaration had, the "fundamental significance"
of Soviet experience, but he made the same point in observing
that there was "no need to exaggerate the significance" of
national "peculiarities," i.e. to fail to see that the main
lines had been laid down by Marx and Lenin.
As for the over-all significance of the Moscow confer-
ence, it was this--that, "as comrades figuratively stated,"
the parties had "synchronized their watches." This phrase
gives the show away. The comrade who had used this figure
was Khrushchev himself, at the Bucharest conference, and he
used it precisely to indicate the necessity of lining up be-
hind the Soviet parv in support of Soviet propositions in the
dispute and in condemnation of Chinese misbehavior. He went
on to indicate that this would be expected of future confer-
ences as well:
U r c t n his report had noted that the Soviet
party'=had voluntarily renounced the title-of leader, and
he then made clear at once that he and all other right-
thinking Communists continued to regard the Soviet party
as the leader.
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Indeed, the socialist countries and Communist
parties must synchronize their watches. When some-
one's clock is fast or slow, it is regulated to show
the correct time. Similarly, it is necessary to check
the time of the Communist movement, so that our power-
ful army keeps in step and makes confident strides
toward Communism. If it is possible to use such a
figure of speech, Marxism-Leninism and the jointly
worked-out documents of international Communist
conferences serve us as chimes, striking the hour.
After all, the Communist and workers' parties attend-
ing the conference unanimously worked out their de-
cisions. Every party will adhere to these decisions
in a strict and sacred manner, in all its activities.
What, had happened at the conference, of course, was that the
Soviet party had said it was four o'clock, the Chinese party
had insisted it was eleven o'clock, and the 6 December declara-
tion had said that it was either both or about six-thirty.
But the conference had at least made clear to everyone that
the Soviet party thought it was four o'clock and that the
great majority of the parties were willing to agree; and
the entire burden of Khrushchev's 6 January report was that
the Soviet party still thought it was four o'clock, no
matter what the declaration said. Khrushchev could have
had no illusions about the success of world Communist con-
ferences in achieving "unified" views, but the conferences
might serve at least to deter the Chinese from marching
about the world beating a gong for the imminent world revolu-
tion.
Khrushchev then rather pointedly addressed two paragraphs
to the Soviet party's "invariable endeavor to strengthen the
bonds of fraternal friendship" with the Chinese party and peo-
ple. He repeated some remarks to other ; 'aud.:iences to
the effect that Sino-Soviet solidarity was "exceptionally
important" in the common struggle. He was constrained to
point out that with the Chinese dommunists, as with all oth-
er Communists, the Soviet party shared the goal of safeguard-
ing peace and building communism, the interests of the well-
being of the working people, and the principles of Marxism-
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Leninism.* Khrushchev promised that the Soviet party would
"do everything," to ensure Sino-Soviet unity, and he then
closed his report with an expression of confidence in Com-
munism as the "invincible force" of the century.
Khrushchev in Sum
To recapitulate, Khrushchev reaffirmed those of his pre-
conference positions which had been qualified in the 6 Decem-
ber declaration, and amplified or clarified others. As re-
gards the balance of power, the balance is shifting to the bloc,
but the West is still very strong. As for war, the West ap-
pears to be deterred from general war, and the bloc will not
accept serious risks of general war; the West is increasingly
deterred from local wars as well, and the'-.bloc will avoid
local wars if it can, owing to the danger of their expansion,
although it will fight if necessary for a "just" cause such
as defending a newly-independent country; the bloc will support
'tliberation" wars in colonial areas, and it might intervene
to match Western intervention, but the'bibc as well as
the West should be wary of actions risking counter-intervention;
"popular uprisings" are possible in almost every part of the
non-Communist world, and both sides should refrain from in-
tervening militarily in these. As for "peaceful coexistence,"
this is the basis of Soviet policy, and Moscow will decide
how sharp a struggle to wage within that concept; the USSR is
interested in complete or partial disarmament; there are some
sober leaders in the West, so negotiations and personal con-
tacts are worth while. As for the "national liberation move-
ment," things are going well and Chinese advice is not needed;
as regards the newly-independent countries, Soviet aid is an
important factor (as is the promise to defend them) in ensur-
ing their neutrality and their eventual attraction to Com-
munism, "national democracy" is to be the middle-run
t ese our things Khrushchev cited as shared with
the Chinese, the Chinese see none the same way: i.e., the..
Chinese concept of "safeguarding peace" is to press the
struggle against imperialism more militantly; the Chinese
are "building Communism" in a manner offensive in important
respects to Moscow; the Chinese are willing to subordinate
the well-being of the workers to a much greater degree than
the USSR (now) is; and the Chinese interpret the "common"
doctrine very differently at some points.
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objective, and the national bourgeoisie still have a lot of
mileage left in them; in the colonial areas, "liberation"
wars are inevitable and will be supported '(by unspecified
means), colonial people will attain independence by both
violent and (primarily) non-violent means, Communist parties
should make "maximum use" of the national bourgeoisie in the
struggle, and the USSR will retain the initiative in the
colonial areas. As for Communist parties in developed West-
ern countries, these face formidable difficulties. As for
the discipline of the world Communist movement, Khrushchev
prepared the ground for turning the Chinese charge of Soviet
"revisionism" into a Soviet charge of Chinese "nationalism,"
and he reaffirmed that dogmatism and sectarianism are present
dangers; he implied also that Soviet positions should be sup-
ported by other parties, that those parties should discipline
elements which oppose Soviet positions, and that world Com-
munist conferences have a limited usefulness in lining up
Soviet supporters in a clear majority and in subduing if not
converting the dissenters.
Neither Suslov's 18 January report on the Moscow con-
ference nor the CPSU central committee resolution of the
same date added significantly to Khrushchev's account of
the postconference Soviet position. On 13 January, however,
Red Star spelled out the implication in Khrushchev's 6 Jan-
uary report that the Soviet party had not retreated from its
position that majority positions are to be binding on the
minority. Discussing the Moscow conference, and emphasizing
the need for unity in the movement, Red Star quoted Lenin
to this effect:
To discuss a question, to speak and hear various
opinions, to learn the view of the majority of or-
ganized Marxists /the parties7, to express this view
in a decision taken in their absence, and to carry
out this decision in good faith--that is what is
called unity everywhere in the world among all rea-
sonable men.
The point of the phrase "in their absence" in the original
was presumably that the Soviet party would sometimes have
to make decisions, reflecting the majority will, without be-
ing able to consult the parties further. The main point of
the entire passage, both originally and on 13 January, was
of course that majority positions are to be binding on all
parties--the operating principle of the Comintern.
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Chinese Comment
The Chinese equivalent of Khrushchev's report of 6 Jan-
uary, Teng Hsiao-ping's report given in mid-January, was with-
held from publication, presumably in the interest of bloc
"unity." However, Chinese comment in official party organs
(People's Daily, Red Flag) within a few weeks had amounted al-
most o a publishes equivalent to Khrushchev's report.
The first People's Daily comment (7 December) was just
as tendentious as Pravda's had been on the same day. It chose
to emphasize Western preparations for war, the immutable na-
ture of imperialism, the United States as the main enemy of
peoples, the danger of war and the need for unprecedented
vigilance; it agreed that general war was not inevitable, but
it expressed no confidence in deterring local wars. It af-
firmed the policy of "peaceful coexistence," defined simply
as attempting to prevent a general war, and observed further
that, if deterrence should fail, capitalism would be wiped
out (this latter statement was made in the declaration too,
but in another context). The declaration's discussion of the
national liberation movement was described as a call "to rise
and fight," as a "fighting program," and the "democratic"
goals of Communist parties in the West were not mentioned.
The editorial summarized the section on the discipline
of the 'world Communist movement fairly accurately, but did
not mention the "cult of the individual." It devoted several
paragraphs to the theme of the Chinese and Soviet
parties (in that order, in People's Daily) being the largest
parties and therefore having special responsibilities (i.e.,
as Peiping sees it, all parties are equal but some parties
are more equal than others). The strongest emphasis in the
entire editorial was reserved for the final section, which was
concerned with the provisions in the declaration for reaching
"common" views and taking "joint" actions. The need for and
prospect of "joint" actions, efforts, and struggles, on the
basis.of "joint" positions, was cited seven times in 17 lines.
Red Flag on 15 December was more brazen. Expressing
pleasure in the declaration, it spoke of the Chinese record
of fidelity to such declarations, and pledged equal fidelity
to this one. As an earnest of this pledge, in treating the
basic substantive question, the definition of the epoch
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(which it postponed to late in the article), it omitted the
principal Soviet point in the definition, namely that the
transition from capitalism to socialism basically marked the
epoch. It emphasized the imperialist "plan" to initiate a
general war, and, with an eye to Khrushchev's continued over-
tures for summit talks with the new US administration, it
observed sourly that the United States was attempting to de-
lude the world with "empty talk about peace." It contended
further that peace could be "safeguarded" only by a "revolu-
tionary struggle against imperialism," and in this connection
it cited the most dangerous and costly of local wars, the
Korean war, as engaged in "precisely for realizing peace."
As for "peaceful coexistence," Peiping's faith in this
policy was founded on the success of "anti-imperialist strug-
gles." In this connection, even partial disarmament would
be hard to achieve.
Further discussing the balance of power, Red Flag re-
turned to the objectionable formulation of Mao's that the
East Wind was prevailing; indeed, the article pointed out,
it was Mao who in 1957 "attested to" the possibility of pre-
venting a new world war (not, as some may, have ignorantly
believed, Stalin or Khrushchev some time earlier). The
article did not express much confidence in Mao's discovery,
however; it went on to emphasize the possibility, of general
war, again observing cheerfully that such a war would bury
capitalism.
Going on to discuss the national liberation movement,
Red Flag cited Liu Shao-chi as having discovered that the
success of the national liberation movement was a develop-
ment second in importance only to the formation of the bloc.
The article clearly distorted the declaration at one point
by contending that it had pledged support to the "armed
struggles" of the suppressed peoples in colonial areas,
struggles which were a part of the struggle for peace. With
respect to the newly-independent countries, it did not men-
tion the Soviet concept of "national democracy," which Khru-
shcheve had asked be particularly noted. In discussing Com-
munist tactics in the West, again it failed to mention
"democratic" goals, speaking only of "struggle for socialism."
With respect to intrabloc relations, the editorial did not
mention the need, emphasized by Moscow, f+or better coordina-
tion of bloc economies; it observed merely that the more
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developed the economies of the individual countries, the
greater the role played by these countries, and it reaffirmed
the Chinese aim of becoming a "truly great socialist power."
With respect to the discipline of the movement, it did not
mention the Soviet role as "vanguard" or the significance of
Soviet experience, remarking merely that the CCP would con-
tinu6 to regard the "safeguarding" of Sino-Soviet "unity" as
an "important international duty."
The 31 December Red Flag was noteworthy for the reap-
appearance of "Yu Chao Ii, for more than two years a spokes-
man for Mao's positions (and against Soviet positions) on
matters of world Communist strategy. Much of Yu's article,
which surveyed the prospects of the global struggle, was
unusually conciliatory in tone, with its insistence on Sino-
Soviet unity, its specification of the "struggle for world
peace" even before that of "promoting the development and
victory of the revolutionary struggle" as the twin goals of
the movement, its endorsement of "peaceful coexistence" with-
out snarling at the same time, its praise of Khrushchev's
initiative at the UN General Assembly in October 1960 on
ending colonialism, its expressed favor for easing interna-
tional tension, and so on.
After that, however, in discussing the national libera-
tion movement, Yu began to sound like his old self, praising
the Algerian rebels for persisting in military struggle rather
than accepting a political settlement, and citing developments
in the Congo as evidence that imperialist nations inevitably
attempt to restore the pre-liberation condition of servitude.
Later, Yu seemed to be reaffirming the full range of the Chinese
positions on both local wars and "liberation" wars. Western-
initiated local wars ("brush-fire wars") were said to be the
principal instrument of imperialism in "present-day conditions."
Yu went on to declare:
We Communists resolutely oppose not only imperi-
alist preparations to launch a world war but also
such local wars of aggression by imperialism. We are
of the opinion that should imperialism be permitted
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to unleash local wars of aggression and obtain what
it wants in these wars, it is likely that a world
war would result. We Communists have consistently
maintained an extremely clear-cut attitude toward
a series of local wars that have broken out in the
world. We firmly support just revolutionary wars
waged by all opposed nations and peoples, and are
resolutely opposed to and are prepared to put a halt
to unjust counterrevolutionary wars launched by im-
perialism and reactionaries. It is for this very
reason that we firmly believe a world war can be
averted, and we have no doubt that, under present
conditions, it is possible to prevent counterrevolu-
tionary local wars from turning into a world war, and
it is possible to make victories gained in the revolu-
tionary wars of various countries contribute to the
growth of world forces of peace and to the weakening
of imperialist forces of war.
In other words, contrary to the Soviet emphasis on all counts,
the West is increasingly attracted to local wars, the danger
of expansion of local wars becomes operative only if the West
is permitted to win such wars, and such wars can be contained
within the geographical area in which they are fought. In the
last four lines quoted above, in the generalization about
"revolutionary" wars, which does not distinguish between local
wars and "liberation" wars, Yu seems to be reaffirming the
Chinese position that the bloc can make positive gains from
engaging its forces with the West in Western-initiated local
wars and that it therefore should welcome the opportunity, as
well as the Chinese position that the bloc should give maximum
support (including military intervention if necessary) to
"liberation" wars.
Yu went on to remark that "we Communists" advocate the
settlement of international disputes by negotiations, but
"we never pin our hopes for world peace primarily on these
negotiations." US imperialism, Yu went on, was as "vicious
and truculent" as ever. Affirming his faith that develop-
ments would continue to favor the bloc, the libera-
tion movement, and world forces of peace, Yu concluded
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with the contention that in 1961 the East Wind would continue
to prevail over the West Wind.*
In the same issue of Red Flag (31 December), a long
article addressed nominally to the two stages of the Chinese
revolution reaffirmed some Chinese positions which in effect
were a partial dissent from the formulations in the 6 Decem-
ber declaration on the tasks of Communist parties in the
newly-independent countries, in particular the task of co-
operating with bourgeois nationalist leaders on the road to
"national democracy." Although the article cautioned against
"left" as well as "right" deviations from Mao's position
(Mao alone is always correct), thus permitting Peiping to
maintain in any given case that Mao's position had been mis-
understood, the burden of the article was the need for Com-
munist seizure of the leadership of the revolution at the
earliest possible stage. The formula was "unity and struggle"
*The Chinese seem to use this phrase, relating to the
balance of power, in two ways, both of which are objection-
able to the Soviet party. Sometimes it is used to imply a
decisive strategic superiority, in a military sense, of the
bloc over the West, a degree of superiority which Moscow has
not asserted and evidently does not care to see asserted on
its behalf. Sometimes (as above) it is used to suggest the
superiority, in a general way (partly moral), and in part as
a potential rather than a realized force, of the assets of
socialism all over the world, much in the same sense that the
Soviet party itself estimates a "preponderance of the forces
of socialism over the forces of imperialism, of the forces
of peace over the forces of war," etc. Used in this sense,
the Chinese have often defined the concept of "East" to in-
clude the bloc and the underdeveloped countries of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. However, the Soviets have objected
to the East Wind - West Wind formulation of this concept too,
on the=grounds that a large part of these assets are physical-
ly located in the West, some of them (elements of classes)
actually in developed Western countries, so that Mao's formula-
tion is misleading; moreover, the Soviets have pointed out,
the formulation permits the enemies of the world Communist
movement to put the matter in terms of defending the West
against revolution exported from the East (something like
the 'Yellow Peril' argument).
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with the national bourgeoisie, with the emphasis on struggle,
on the need for establishing the "strong hegemony" of the
Communist party during the "democratic" phase of the revolu-
tion, thus permitting a "smooth transformation of the demo-
cratic revolution into the socialist revolution." The
process of establishing "hegemony" would, of course, entail
a harsh interpretation of specific policies pursued in the
"democratic*"phase, such as "agrarian reform," in order to
destroy the competitor's base of support.
Also in the 31 December Red Flag, the Chinese party re-
affirmed its intention to persst in marching under the "red
banners" of the general line, the "leap forward," and the
people's communes, although actually continuing to modify the
practical programs. In effect commenting on the 6 December
declaration's and Khrushchev's assertion of the fundamental
significance of Soviet experience, the editorial affirmed
that Peiping would learn from the "advanced experiences" of
other bloc members, but "should take into first considera-
tion the actual conditions of our country" and should be
guided by Mao's thinking.
On 18 January, at about the same time Khrushchev's 6
January report was being published, Peiping published the
Chinese party central committee's comparatively formal and
polite resolution on the 6 December declaration. The resolu-
tion expressed "satisfaction" with the work of the Chinese
delegation to the Moscow conference, and it pledged the party
to "defend" the declaration "just as it has defended the Mos-
cow declaration of 1957," As for substantive issues, it mis-
represented the definition of the epoch and then derided "all
modern revisionist" definitions; reviewed the "upsurge of the
struggle" everywhere; denounced the United States (the Soviet
revolution did not); declared the party's favor for peace,
peaceful coexistence, and peaceful competition;* emphasized
US preparations for world war, the possibility of such a war,
and the need for unprecedented vigilance; declared that peace
could be safeguarded "provided there is reliance on the strug-
gle of the masses;" and abjured war, and advocated negotiations
*Peiping has often endorsed these concepts and proposals
in this fashion, i.e. simply as items on a list. When the
Chinese discuss these and other matters, however, they make
clear that they see them rather differently.
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and disarmament.* As for the discipline of the movement, it
spoke of the importance of solidarity, and summarized the
provisions for Communist conferences to "work out common
views ...and coordinate joint action"; reviewed the stric-
tures against revisionism, dogmatism, and sectarianism;
spoke of the special importance of Sino-Soviet "unity";
noted the "vanguard" role of the Soviet party (but gave less
attention to this than did the Soviet resolution); and called
on the Chinese people to hold aloft the banners of the 1957
declaration and this latest one. In snm.;, this central com-
mittee resolution was, as might have been expected of a party
pronouncement at this level, the least tendentious of the
Chinese pronouncements on the Moscow conference.
A People's Daily editorial on 22 January, by which time
the Chinese a cainly read Khrushchev's 6 January report,
was more pointed than was the central committee resolution.
While affirming the non-inevitability of world war and ex-
pressing Peiping's long-time favor for "peaceful coexistence,"
it cited the Western press as having correctly interpreted
the declaration to foretell an intensification of efforts to-
ward the world revolution (especially in underdeveloped areas),
and, identifying the forces of world revolution (the bloc, the
national liberation movement) and the Communist parties every-
where), it contended that the declaration had "pointed out
that the strengthening of these revolutionary forces is com-
pletely identical with the interests of safeguarding world
peace."
The editorial summed up the declaration this way:
We are particularly glad that the fundamental
principles and revolutionary spirit of Marxism-
Leninism, in which the Chinese Communists (under-
lining added) and Communists in other countries
have for many years persisted, are clearly reflected
in the Moscow statement.
Peiping has o ten endorsed these concepts and proposals
tool. simply , t,; iteins on a list.
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In sum, by the last week of January, i . e . , by the time
Khrushchev had publicly reaffirmed the pre-conference Soviet
positions, the Chinese party had publicly reaffirmed most of
its pre-conference positions and had not withdrawn from any
of them. As for matters considered in the definition of the
epoch, the Chinese were misrepresenting the definition given
in the declaration, did not follow Khrushchev in conceding
that the West was still strong, and had returned to their of-
fensive formulation of the East Wind prevailing; and as for
the related question of building Communism, the Chinese were
reaffirming (in principle if not in practice) the correctness
of their internal programs and the primacy of their own experi-
ence and Mao's thought, and they ignored Moscow's call for
better coordination of bloc economies. Wtih regard to wars,
the Chinese agreed (at least publicly, as they had before the
conference) that world war was not inevitable, but their emphasis
remained on Wostern preparations for general war, the possi-
bility of general war, and the far more serious consequences
of general war for the West than for the bloc; further, they
retained their views on local wars, contending that the West
was not increasingly (was, if anything, decreasingly) deterred
from initiating such wars and that there was little or no dan-
ger of expansion of these wars, and again implying that the
bloc should welcome the opportunity to engage in such wars;
and that the bloc had committed itself to support of "libera-
tion" wars (which Khrushchev had indeed done, but with a sug-
gestion of wariness not matched by the Chinese). With regard
to "peaceful coexistence," the Chinese nominally endorsed
this concept (as they had before the conference), but continued
to exhort a maximum struggle by all revolutionary forces and
by all means short of general war, and with greater risks of
general war; they continued to minimize the prospects for even
limited disarmament; and they continued to deride Soviet over-
tures for negotiations and personal contacts with Western
(particularly American) leaders. With regard to the "national
liberation movement," the Chinese were presenting the declara-
tion in general terms as having adopted the militant Chinese
view, as setting forth a "fighting program," as asserting that
revolutionary struggle in the underdeveloped areas was identi-
cal with struggling for peace, and so on; and Peiping was also
reaffirming certain specific positions which the declaration
did not state. With respect to colonial areas, the Chinese
emphasized the importance of "armed struggle," called for
bloc support specifically for "armed struggle" in colonial
areas (misrepresenting the declaration as having promised
that), emphasized the advantages and minimized the
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dangers of supporting revolutionary wars against counter-
revolutionary wars, and were calling again for Communist
seizure of leadership in the early stages of the revolution.
With respect to newly-independent countries, the Chinese
again contended that imperialist nations invariably inter-
vene to restore the old conditions, argued that the bloc
should seize its opportunities to prevent this, failed to
mention the Soviet concept of "national democracy" that
Khrushchev had particularly called attention' to, and ap-
peared to call for less cooperation with and more pressure
on bourgeois nationalist leaders than indicated in the dec-
laration.* As for Communist parties in the West, the Chi-
nese continued to fail to recognize the difficulties con-
fronting them, and continued to ignore their "democratic"
goals and to speak only of their "socialist" goals.
As for the discipline of the world Communist movement,
the Chinese ignored the declaration'.s treatment of the "cult
of the individual," made no mention of Khrushchev's point on
the danger of nationalism, and continued to treat the ques-
tions of revisionism, dogmatism and sectarianism as they had
before'the conference; they ignored Soviet statements and im-
plications in support of the principle of majority rule, and
they instead put heavy emphasis on the declaration's commit-
ment to "common" positions and "joint" actions, to be achieved
through further conferences--a mechanism through which they
clearly expected Soviet authority to diminish and their own
influence to increase.
25X1A
*Subsequent papers will discuss the capabilities
and intentions of the Chinese party with respect to both
cooperation and competition with the Soviet effort in the
underdeveloped areas.
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