COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES IN THE KOREAN AREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000100020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 27, 1951
• Content Type: SE

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CIA/SIC/N - 2M/51
Dissemination Authorized
Assistant Director/CI
SIC No. 9124
No. Pages 13
Copy No.,..b
NSA review completed
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES IN THE KOREAN AREA
Number 2
Published 27 April 1951
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Toint Staff par-
ticipated in the preparation of this estimate. All members
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 24 April.
ARMY review
completed
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COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES IN THK KOREAN AREA
CONCLUSIONS
.1. The Chinese Communists and North Koreans have avail-
able sufficient manpower to sustain large-scale operations
in Korea for an extended period. Communist capabilities have
been limited, however, by critical materiel and logistic defi'*?
ciencies and a shortage of technically skilled personnel.
2. In order to sustain extended large scale offensive operations,
Communist forces heretofore identified in Korea require sub-
stantially greater materiel and logistic support from the Soviet
Union than they have obtained in the past. Even should they re
ceive new equipment, however, we believe that such operations
would require Soviet assistance in the form of large numbers
of skilled personnel, including ground combat specialists such
as tank crews, who would necessarily come in contact with UN
forces. However, there is a possibility that other units of the
Chinese Communist army have been re-equipped and trained
with Soviet equipment in Manchuria and that these units will
appear in combat in Korea at any time,
3. The present estimated strength of 860 combat aircraft of
the' Communist Air Force in Korea, Manchuria, and China'repre-
sents a considerable recent expansion,. but it is still inadequate
for the effective protection of lines of communication and for the
sustained support of ground forces. We believe that unless this
Air Force received substantial additional modern Soviet aircraft,
supplies, and. technical assistance, its combat effectiveness would
be reduced. to a very low order in about a week of sustained op
erations.
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4, Despite numerous reports, there is no acceptable evidence
that a Soviet-bloc "volunteer9.9 army is being formed to fight
in Korea. Nor-is-there any evidence that-any regular units of
the.Soviet Army in.the Far East -(estimated at 32 line divisions
and 5 brigades) will be committed to Korea f n. the immediate.
.future. Although there- are indications that. the USSR may pro-
vide token units of Soviet or other. "volunteers" as a gesture to
the Chinese Communists, it is more probable that the Soviets
will provide rna power, in .the form of sorely-needed specialists
such as radio and radar operators, tank trews, and ordnance
.technicians. Nonetheless the possible commitment of major,
well-equipped "volunteers' units composed of Soviet-bloc na-
tionals or Japanese cannot be overlooked.
5. There are indications that the Communist air effort in Korea
will continue to be enlarged. The current build-up points to the
probability of a considerable expansionbeyond the 860 aircraft
now available to, the Chinese Communists. It appears, likely
that for the immediate future at least, the USSR will continue to
augment the strength of the Communist air units in Manchuria
and,Korea rather than to -commit organized elements from the
Soviet Far Eastern Air Force. In any event, it must be expected
that the full weight of the air strength available to the Chinese
Communists may be committed at any time.
6a Communist ability to gain air superiority over North Korea
would depend primarily on. the number of jet fighters. which
-could be brought to bear against UN air power. A substantial
augmentation. of the present 260 jet aircraft estimated to be
available to the Chinese Communists would constitute a serious
threat to, UN air superiority over Northern Korea. Provided
that the Communists continued to enjoy an air sanctuary, a
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serious challenge to LIST air superiority in the entire Korean
theater would develop if, in addition, major elements of the
existing, Soviet Far Eastern air force were deployed to the
Korean. theater a
.7. Although there are at present no indications of the future
employment of Communist naval forces in. the Korean war,
elements of the Soviet Far Eastern submarine fleet could be
employed against UN vessels. at any time with little warning
and mining operations could be expanded.
DISCUSSION
8o The manpower resources which the Chinese Communists
and North Koreans have available are suff icient, ;despite re-
quirements for agriculture, sustain- large-scale operations
in Korea.. for an extended period, Among the critical factors
,thus far limiting Communist capabilities in Korea have been
logistic deficiencies (particularly of food, POL, vehicles, and
heavy armament) and the shortage of personnel able to operate
the more complicated weapons of modern warfare.
9, As a result of movements during the past few months, Com-
munist ground troops available for operations in Korea are now
at an all-time high. An estimated 675,000 Chinese and North
Korean troops are presently in. Korea.. In addition, the Chinese
;Communists have an estimated 365,000 field troops, and 370,000
military district troops in Manchuria. There is also in Man-
churia a: partially-trained. manpower pool of 560,000 militia
which the Communists have been using to furnish replacements
.for those military district troops drawn into the regular field
forces.
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.1O The Chinese Communists' and North Koreans are now largely
dependent on, -the Soviet Union for logistic and technical support.
Until recently, logistical support to- the- Chinese Communists
appears to have been. limited to motor vehicles, food,-. PQL, and
ammunition. In order to sustain extended large-scale offensive
operations, Communist forces in Korea require substantially
greater' logistic-and technical support from the. Soviet Union than
they have received for their previous offensive operations. Con-
tinued UN attacks on lines of communications and 'failure of the
Soviets to deliver supplies adequate... to keep pace with combat
attrition have in. the past been. largely responsible: for the Commu-
nist logistic. deficiencies in.Korea.
.110 The Chinese Communist forces which have heretofore been
identified in Korea have apparently lacked the skilled personnel
required to operate modern arms and equipment. Thus, even
should the Chinese Communists and North Koreans receive large
amounts of new equipment, their forces would require extensive
reorganization and retraining. We believe that the Chinese Comm
muhists heretofore identified in Korea will nut be capable of 'ab-
sorbing substantial amounts of modern equipment without Soviet
assistance in, the form of large numbers of skilled personnel,
even including 'combat personnel, such as tank crews, who would
necessarily come in contact with UN forces.
.120 However, there have been reports that "major units" of
the Chinese Communist Army have been undergoing reorgani ?
.tion and training in Manchuria with Soviet equipment. Although
.these reports, have not been confirmed, a serious possibility
exists. that substantial units of Chinese Communists using modern
equipment may be committed at any time.
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13. Communist air capabilities have been greatly increased by
the influx of additional jet aircraft into the area- adjacent to the
Korea,.border, and by-the intensive training of air crews in
Manchuria. The Chinese Communist Air Force is estimated to
have available approximately 860 aircraft, including some 115
aircraft of the North Korean Air Forte and approximately 380
Soviet-controlled aircraft operating with, but not organic to, the
Chinese Communist Air Forced This aggregate air strength
consists of the-following aircraft types. 260 jet fighters; 210
piston fighters; 175 ground attack aircraft- 140 light bombers,;
and 75 transports. The jet fighters are apparently Soviet-con-
trolled, and, in some cases at least, appear to be flown and directed
by Soviet personnel. Of the total 860 aircraft, it is estimated that
.700 (including 220 jet fighters) are currently based in Manchuria,
and_ the remaining 160 in China.
-14. At the present time, UN air superiority largely precludes
.the sustained use of airfields in North Korea by the Communists
and. therefore the effective range of their aircraft is limited.
The Communists have been making continued efforts to maintain
these airfields in operable condition in the face of counteraction.
by UN Iaircraaft. The Communists have 30 airfields available in
North Korea which are usable, or could easily be made usable.
Seven of these airfields have been recently .constructed, The
majority of these airfields are suitable only for piston-enginned
planes but some might be used for very limited jet operations.
For the most party the airfields in North Korea have been located
in places close to rail communications. Due to UN air interdic-
tion, logistical support has presented many serious difficulties
and as long as UN air superiority is maintained, it will severely
limit the Communist Air Force capabilities for offensive and de-
fensive operations from these airfields. There are, however,
adequate airfields in the Manchurian sanctuary from which the
.Communists can launch air attacks on UN forces (see map).
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Operating from the Antung -area- even the'jet`fighters could
range well behind UST lines. However, this- extended range
seriously limits the sortie rate and time over target.
15. The present Chinese Communist Air Force is estimated
to have, the capability of launching from. bases in Manchuria
and China, during an initial 24 -hour period, the following:
19115 fighter sorties.; 415 ground attack sorties:,- 330 light
bomber sorties; and the airlift for 4,000 droops. However,
the effectiveness of such an assault would be hampered by
such factors as combat attrition and maintenance problems
in addition, to the range limitations discussed above. Further m
more, the relative low level of Chinese pilot proficiency and,
with the exception of the jet fighers, the inferior performance
characteristics of the aircraft would be a major limitation.
.Thus, unless the Chinese Communist Air Peirce receives sub-
stantial additional Soviet aircraft, supplies, and technical.
assistance, its combat effectiveness would be reduced to a
very low order in about a week of sustained operations. -
Soviet or Soviet-Sponsored Military Forces Which Could
Be Used in Korea
16. Soviet Line Divisions. The strength of the Soviet Army
In. the Far East is estimated to be 32 line divisions and five
brigades. Of this total, it is considered that a force of 14 to
18 divisions could readily be made available for operations,
,in the Korean war. These divisions include an airborne: corps
of 3 divisions and up to 6 tank and mechanized divisions with
adequate supporting forces. This force could be moved to
Korea and committed to combat within. 30 to 60 days after a
decision had been made to employ it and. it might appear in or
near the combat zone without being detected:. Soviet Far East-
ern stockpiles are sufficient to supply and existing lines of
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communications are adequate to transport the necessary lo-
gistic support. Augmentation of this force by drawing on Soviet
.line divisions in the western USSR or after partial mobilization
would require a considerable period of time and would be influenced by Soviet strategic and tactical requirements elsewhere
in the world.
17. "Volunteer" Forces. It has been reported frequently
that an international 66 liberation" or "volunteer" army is being
formed in the Far East. There is, however a no evidence to sug-
gest that this is actually being accompli.shed.. Details concerning
the supposed composition and location of this "army" have varied
considerably. In addition to Koreans, Chinese, and Japanese, such
an '91army99 could draw upon Mongol-type personnel as well as
Soviet and Eastern European "volunteer" units. Of the 80,000
Mongol types now serving in the Soviet Army, virtually all are
technically unskilled basic riflemen. There are more than
.1,000,000 men of military age in Outer and Inner Mongolia and
Sinkiang. Some tens of thousands of the Outer Mongolians have
served in their own or the Soviet Armed Forces. The present
Outer Mongolian Army, which includes some small mechanized
elements, could be expanded rapidly to 100,000 men and readily
be equipped by the Soviets. "Volunteer" units could be formed
from the existing armies of the USSR. and the European Satellites
at any time Such forces could significantly improve the techni-
cal proficiency of existing Chinese and North Korean forces, but
could be easily identified as Soviet-bloc nationals if they came in
contact with UN forces o
18. Air Forces. The Soviet Far Eastern air forces have an
estimated authorized strength of 5,300 aircraft of World War II
type. Beyond the 260 jet fighters estimated to be in China and
Manchuria under Soviet control, there are no other jet fighters
known to be in. the Far East, although jet operations are reported
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to have been conducted by both the Soviet Navy and Air Force
.in t ,e Dairen area. It is possible that jets may have been in.
troduced without having been detected by intelligence, and we
,believe that the Soviets have the capability of deploying jet units
to the Far East in a relatively short time.
19. There are 131 airfields in, the Sino-Soviet Far East within
500 miles of the 38th Parallel in Korea, or the Japanese Islands
of Honshu and Kyushu. The Soviets probably could deploy their
entire Far Eastern air strength on.these 131 fields. Of the 30
airfields in North Korea, some are capable of supporting very
limited jet operations.
2.0. There, is ample evidence that the Soviets have been stock
piling POL products,. including jet fuel, in the Far East in sub-
stantial quantities. Providing no effective UN action were taken
.to- disrupt Communist supply lines outside Korea, it is believed
that the Sind-Soviets could support logistically a major air
effort in, the Korean. theater.
21. If the Soviet Far Eastern air forces were deployed to
bases adjacent. to Korea, range. factors would still prevent of
fective operations by Soviet light bomber and fighter aircraft
against targets or UN aircraft in. the extreme south of Korea.
Air attacks could be directed against UN naval forces and sup-
port shipping in Korean waters. Night bombing attacks of limited
effectiveness could be delivered to any point in Korea., or against
UN bases in Japan. Saturation-type day bomber operations could
also be launched throughout most.of Korea. if the Soviets were
willing to pay a high price in. losses, or if they were to succeed
in gaining air superiority over Korea. If., however, Soviet medium
bombers were deployed to bases ion the Far East, they would con-
siderably increase Soviet aircapabilies and expose UN military
installations in South Korea and Japan to the danger of atomic
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air attacks. Although there are no known medium .bombers in. the
Far East, an unconfirmed report states that 14 T. U-4's have been
,.transferred from European USSR to Manchuria
22,. The bases from which jet operationsin Korea could be eon-
ducted are located in the Port Arthur/Dairen, Mukden, Antung,
and Vladivostok areas (see map). Using wing, tanks, Antung.based
jets could operate as far as Seoul- Port Arthur/Dairen and Mukden-
based. jets could operate generally as far as. the line Uhinnampo
Wonsan; and Vladivostok-based jets could operate effectively only
against a small portion of northeast Korea.
.21. Communist ability to gain air superiority over North Korea
would depend primarily on the number of jet fighters which could
be brought to bear. against UN air power. A substantial augmenta-
tion of.the, present 26? jet aircraft estimated to be available to
the Chinese Communists would constitute a serious threat to UN
air superiority over Northern Korea. Provided that the Comrnue
nists continued . to enjoy an air sanctuary, a serious challenge to
UN air superiority in the entire Korean theater would develop if,
in addition, major elements of the existing Soviet Far Eastern
air force were deployed to the Korean. theater. Despite reduction
of effectiveness due to range limitations if operations were re-
stricted to bases outside of Korea, the introduction of elements
of the Soviet Far' Eastern Air Force could be effective, through
sheer weight of. numbers.
24. Naval For-cm Soviet Far Eastern Naval Forces consist
of the Fifth.. Fleet with headquarters at Vladivostok and the Se-
venth Fleet with headquarters at Sovetskaya Cavan. The surface
forces of these fleets consist. of two cruisers, two destroyer
leaders, 26 destroyers, eight destroyer escorts, and 397 mis-
cellaneous vessels including minesweepers, subachasers, mine
layers, landing craft, and motor, torpedo boats. The, submarine
fleet has a strength. of 81 submarines including 16. ocean patrol
types, 37 medium-range types, and 28 coastal types.
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Indications of Probable Scale and Nature of Soviet Assistance
In the Immediate Future
25. Ground Force Assistance. Additional .basic manpower is
not required by Communist forces in the' Korean area, but there
are indications that the USSR may provide token units of Soviet
or other "volunteers" as a gesture to the Cheese Communists
who are assuming the major burden-for prosec ting.the ward
More probably, however, additional Soviet assistance will be in
the farm of sorely-needed technicians such as radio and radar
operators, tank crews, and ordnance specialists. Personnel
such as ground combat troops likely to come in direct contact
with. UN forces may be of Asiatic appearance and be supplied
with Chinese Communist uniforms. It is not likely that large
Soviet Mongol units will be employed. There are no acceptable
indications that combat "volunteer" units for Korea are being
recruited in any of the. countries. of Eastern. Europe or that
Soviet. line divisions will be employed in the immediate future.
There is no evidence that any combat units have been withdrawn
from the Satellite armies for service in Korea.
.26 It is estimated that at least 10,000 Soviet army advisers
are assisting the Chinese and that
n additional 3,000 (including
1,000 security police) are with the North Korean army. The
Soviets. have supplied virtually all. the heavy North Korean com-
Oat equipment, electronic equipment and antiaircraft guns in
China, Manchuria, and North Korea and virtually all POL.sup-
plies as well as some food, vehicles, and ammunition for the
Korean operations. The USSR will probably supply tanks, ar m
?tillery, motor vehicles, POL, rations, and ammunition to both
the Chinese and North Korean forces. Numerous reports sug-
gest that fairly large-scale re-equipment of Chinese divisions
in Manchuria with Soviet weapons may be expected. Indications
of actual and potential increases in logistic support from the
-10-
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USSR include eviden of 4 steady flow materiel Into Man-
churia and of increasing efforts to mo Materiel from
Manchuria into the forward combat zone . ]Kor ea, In addition,
the can lruction,of a direct rail line from. "ladivoatok vii:
Kraskino to Nora iKorea is being rushed to completion.. Sick-
piling'-activities in. the Soviet Far East have recently been in-
:tenslfied, and industrial output in t Irkutsk area has.been
Increased and is being diverted to the east.
2' a. Air Assistance. The Soviets have supplied most of the
planes i. thesnnmt aii? fordo Cornet ,t t tighter . .
strength has been, steadily increased and a considerable step-up
in jet trsdi g h i obs e~i: in the n
aria 01 ranch ia6 Coincident Wft the iWld,av
Jet f h ?
strength In 14 anchuria, tl-r e, been. an Increase in the number
of MLG-159s engaging.TJ'N aircraft in the S uiju area.4
28. Organizational changes.increased act .ty of long-range
air armies the establishment of spacial defense fighter coin
d
wan
s Zia, vos k and Dairen are
early increase in Communist air operations the
Korean Area. Finally, there have been subataatial .shipments,
on an urgent basis, of jet fuel from Soviet refineries. to. o
h
tc
urja.a
294 Naval Assistance.., Indications point t. ? aadp ce of
viet technical and advisory naval assistance. ice` both sac
end submarine warfare to the Chlixese .ommunists andto a
lesser extent, to the North Koreans. In, addition, virally all
mines thus far encountered in the Korean waters have been of
.Soviet man actur,e,, and it is known, that large shipments of
.Soviet mires and torpedoes have been made Far as rn
m
Com
unist bases.
-11 -
ceptor network
North. Korea er evidence of a
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d t Concerning Probable -EmpI 'neat +c o il3t
ro ces in. the immediate Eut 6.
30. Military In&Cationa point to a employme a .aaU,l._
We North $ orean. and- Chinese cum st my its: In
ofe ve.roper .o as, soon as. Uw~qO armies y received
thw eves ry supplies, equipment, arA training- AMIDW~h
there are, no acceptable military i, adica .ons. that. combat wit
of the Soviet ac, will:. committed in, the I,naas } ediate future
there are numerous reliable. indlc4ttow that diet-bl tech
niclans wIll s. t Com t d )orth Kore Army
amitsa
31 o Pres.t Comm t dispositions is ?ea a?e faToraie r
~}d ease~1i depth or for l u ch
fo 'Miter q niag a sustained.
T"'^g an qff ensiveP gvm st a e WhhBi:::~ *St AM#9X7 trnt al
sectors is far greater than. would. d .1 r ulr even, for a deter
m3,ned'def ense0
32 ,Ero n considerationof the. contr. 9I and avbat,,~ntlal W(-
and creasy in Communist air s en th tip (. ' 171
the bold-up in. jet fight rs, logistic. su rtq. ?fi ld r
an4. construction), we believe. that. the C . s will: pa res?.
sive#.y s.",their air efforts.. o r :$ W4-up po
,to t prof -i ty of f urtner and nsidera le a ion beyond:
the 860 aircraft row. available to the Chinese Communists. fir
of phased .b ld p could Iii extend
pr gressively to the,
. rna ar_ po do a of - i t{far. J tern
alo ere am no
~p'or.s ruii~teersa' or +therise~. ins
dtcations that they int*nd to. do so,. Th, . Co me. h e
may be expected to b$ ft, to t iu:U I t 6d
craft o Ail 3: * Chinqge, C fists - wi e v r
jitwe.er s It l a eo Thy empbasis
airfield r tt' tloa re aatr .. ,adsv that a Aupport
I? Yn
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Communist ground troops and attacks .on UN lines of com.mu ni m
cations should be ' expected. All these indications suggest that
the viets will -continue to en1 rge their air effort by stages
geared to t!eir assessment of. V8 and reactions tQ each for
ward move, and the degree of supcess achieved by the. Communist
air. forces.
33. There are at present no indications of the probable future
employment of Communist naval f+prces inn the Korean war, ,1-
thought mining and submarine act0vity remain a constant threat.
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