(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000400010007-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Relea 000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO101 0040001~f (7fYl`8
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State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Problem: To estimate Soviet and satellite reaction to the
inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO. (Only Soviet re-
action is considered here; it is taken for granted that the
satellites will be guided in their attitudes by that of
Moscow).
Conclusions:
(1) If the USSR were on the verge of unleashing a general war,
the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) might provide the final impetus that would impel
Moscow to take this action. Similarly, if the Kremlin has already made
a decision to resort to general war, it might treat the inclusion of
Greece and Turkey in NATO as an excuse for embarking on this course.
(2) Assuming that neither of the foregoing possibilities re-
presents the Kremlints approach to the problem, we believe that the
more act of including Greece and Turkey in NATO, while it would pro-
bably be made the occasion for intense propaganda agitation, expressions
of concern, and threatening gestures on the part of the USSR, would not
be regarded by Moscow as fundamentally altering the current world power
situation. Hence, it would probably not be regarded as a genuine
casus belli.
(3) The fusion of Greece and Turkey into a "Mediterranean Bloc"
with countries that are either members of NATO or otherwise) but even
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Approved For Release 2000/08/2p c , pP79S01011A000` 1p00 8
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SOlO 000400010007-8
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(4) The Soviet reaction to tangible security arrangements
(i.e., a specific military build-UP) including Greece and Turkey, whether
or not NATO were also involved, would depend on the scope and imw
plena ntation of the arrangements. So long as Moscow did not regard them
as of sufficient magnitude to pose a serious threat to Soviet security,
we believe that these arrangements alone would not cause the USSR to
resort to preventive war. However, we also believe that once the
Kremlin became convinced that military developments in the Eastern
Mediterranean area were of such magnitude as to threaten Soviet security
immediately and directly, the USSR would probably take whatever motion
it deemed necessary to prevent their further fruition regardless of
the consequent risks of general ware
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000400010007-8