THE MALIK STATEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000400020003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 26, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Roriew of this docuiiiflt,by 01R las
Approved For Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79SO
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Intelligence Division
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*Army and State dept.
reviews completed*
THE MALIK STATEMENT
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Authorityl HR 70.2
41t conta othing of CIA I sty
oriower
The well-publicized "armistice" statement recently made by Jacob
A. Malik, Soviet Chief Delegate to the United Nations, is not an indica-
tion of change in Soviet foreign policy objectives. It represents a subtle
continuation of efforts to attain the current major objective of averting or
delaying Western defensive preparations and weakening Western determi-
nation to resist Communist aggression.
Malik devoted the greater part of his statement to familiar diatribes
against the United States and Western European cooperation for defense.
Western foreign policy was characterized as "profoundly vicious", with
specific criticism of the following: (1) Conclusion of NATO (allegedly a
military alliance directed against the Soviet orbit); (2) establishment of
United States military bases abroad; (3) remilitarization of Western Ger-
many and the creation of West German armed forces; (4) revival of Japanese
militarism; (5) the "mad armaments race" and the expansion of NATO
armed forces, especially those of the United States; (6) "illegal" United
Nations Intervention in Korea; (7) "seizure" of Formosa and bombing of
Chinese territory - these indicating a United States endeavor to extend
the war in the Far East; (8) United Nations branding of Communist China
as an aggressor and the "Illegal" embargo against China; and (9) delay of
Communist China's representation in. the United Nations.
Thus, the statement's emphatic criticism of Western policies included
all the issues raised in previous discussions. It was unnecessary to include
the specific conditions previously demanded as essential to a "peaceful"
Korean settlement: (1) Chinese Communist participation in the discussions;
(2) withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Korea; and (3) cessation of United
States ''occupation" of Formosa. Th?se conditions were implied in the body
of the statement and almost certainly would be raised, in typical Soviet man-
ner, as stumbling blocks early in discussions.
The Korean cease-fire proposal was expressed in the ' brief Concluding
remarks.. phrased in alluring noncontroversial terms, which Malik charac-
teristically failed to clarify. This technique indicates that the Soviets raised
the cease-fire issue at this time merely as another tactic in pursuance of
their current general objective to weaken Western resistance to Communist
expansion, and specifically to forestall the presently ,avorable cou~rse,Qa=
Communist military developments in Korea. The statte i ant thps"may rave
been designed to open negotiations and discussions to gain time to allow an=.,`ars
improvement in the Communists @ military position in Korea and td. pe nal. ' A
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the u haaipe d completion of organization, training, and equipment of
Chinese Communist forces not yet committed to action. This tactic Is
not a new one, and indeed was used by the Chinese Communists them-
selves in 1946. On that occasion they gained a very real advantage by
the simple device of determined and repetitive violation of the terms of
the cease-fire. Nationalist Chinese strongly suspected violation, but
inspection teams were frustrated in their efforts to determine the facts
of troop movement and other military preparation -yet the Nationalists
could not bring themselves to the decision to abrogate the cease-fire,
even in view of Communist cupidity and bad faith.
. Finally, the proposal for discussions is a continuation of the tac-
tics employed in calling for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers
(CFM) on the German question and also on a Japanese Peace Treaty.
All these previous proposals were clearly Intended to cause delay, in-
decision, and dissension over the Western military preparedness program.
The main factors affecting the timing of the Malik proposal appear
to be: (1) The course of military events in Korea, currently unfavorable
to the Communists; (2) the propaganda opportunity presented by the anni-
versary of the Korean War; and (3) the break-up of the Paris CFM agenda
conference and the Soviet desire to create a basis for further "peace"
discussions calculated to delay Western programs. Also possibly con-
tributing to the timing may have been the desire to disrupt President
Truman's address scheduled for 25 June, and to take advantage of the
absence of United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie, who is vacation-
ing in Oslo and is out of immediate touch with rapidly developing situations.
For the last two years, Soviet- propaganda has been devoted primar-
ily to the "Peace Campaign", in which the U, S. S. R. has been portrayed as
.the principal proponent for the "preservation of peace", in contrast to
Western "aggressive Intentions". The Malik statement is another gambit
in this campaign to retain the initiative in "peace" discussions. In this
latest propaganda move the Soviets undoubtedly expected a favorable reac-
tion, which has already appeared, from the wide sectors of world opinion
which hope that a peaceful settlement with the Communists can be achieved
without the effort, expense, and risks of military preparedness and deter-
mined action. This latest expression of Soviet "peace" propaganda is
alluring and promises to affect large groups in both Western Europe and
the United States. Its undoubted purpose Is to cause a relaxation In the
Western preparedness program.
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CON " uL'' 7 L
The Soviets may well consider that a temporary cessation of the
Korean War would be an inexpensive means to attain their other major
objectives, including a planned development of the Chinese Communist
Armed Forces. They might thus conceivably put off some of their pre-
vious basic demands to -obtain a cease-fire. Feigned concessions in
Korea would be advantageous to the Communists now because: (1) The
Korean, economy is virtually destroyed; (2) Communist agents undoubt-
tedly have established their networks in Korean areas under United
Nations control; (3) responsibility for any resumption of hostilities
could be placed on non-Communist forces; and (4) time will aid the
Communists to build up their strength safely, inside and outside Korea.
In summary, the Malik statement does not represent any change
in Soviet Far Eastern and global objectives, but rather is an extension
of the familiar tactic of proposing negotiations when direct Communist
action has failed. Briefly, the Communists have "nothing to lose and
everything to gain" by making such a proposal, and by "negotiations"
if their proposal is accepted.
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