D/I, USAF ASSESSMENT OF MALIK STATEMENT 23, JUNE 1951
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79S01011A000400020004-0
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 10, 2000
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 26, 1961
Content Type:
SUMMARY
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79S01011A000400020004-0.pdf | 209.33 KB |
Body:
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PZI, USAF ASSESS.SENT OF ni4LIK STATEaiSHT
23, JUNE 1951
CONCLUSIONS
1. An examination of the Malik speech in the light of existing
intelligence loads to the following oonolusionsa
ao 'The. speech was an opportunistic exploitation of an appro-
priate oooasion to reiterate the,standard Soviet propaganda line,
branding the Western powers as aggressors and disassociating the Soviet
Union from the Korean war
ba An obvious objective of the speech was to create dissension
and disunity sraong the ::astern powers over the value of continued
military operations in Korea, and to generate a false sense of security
which would weaken the YYesteru resolve to mobilize for defense.
co In addition to the purely propaganda aspects of the speechr,
it probably reflects an actual desire to effect~a disengagement in
Korea for reasons of Soviet expediency and on terms and at a time
advantageous to the Kremlin*
do The speech may also serve as a cover for further Communist
aggressions in Korea or elsewhere.
Itevlew of this dooament by CIA has
determined that
^ CIA has no obiactIon to declass
^ it contains information of CIA
Interest that mast remain
classified at TS S C
Authority, HR 70.2 .
^ ff Contains nothing of CIA interest
Ditto --------- Reviewer
*USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File*
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2. On 23 June, the chief Soviet delegate to the United Nations,
Jacob A. Malik- made a statement on the UN radio broadcast, "The Price
.of Peace", which concluded with a suggestion that discussions be started
between the belligerents in Korea for a cease-fire and an armistice
providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel,
as a first step for peaceful settlement of the Korean questions This
suggestion, while no doubt authorized by the Kremlin, is not an official
proposal and does not oblige the Soviet Union to pursue it actively to
its conclusion, nor does it associate the Soviet Union with the Korean
conflict in any way save as a "peace-maker"..
3, The speech follows the current Soviet propaganda line and says
nothing really new. The major portion of the speech was devoted to the
usual denunciation of the West and to-reamed 4nsiatenoe upon the inclusion
of the Chinese Communist regime among the five great powers, However, favor-
able reference to the"peace" statement in Peiping broadcasts lends credence
to it as something more than a pure propaganda mn veo
4o This convenient and timely use of the'Ut sounding board came
on the eve of the first anniversary of the Kbrean--,'confliot and. immediately
preceding an anticipated release of the announcement of a carefully
planned US peace proposal. It also closely followed the recent US
Congressional passage of the Kem Amendment "putting teeth" in the embargo
on shipment of war materials to the Soviet Union and its satellites,
including Communist China.
5.. An obvious propaganda objective of the speech is that of creating
dissension among the Weptern powers as to the vale of continued military
operations in Korea. Another logiost objective is the generation of an
illusion of peace and 4'false sense of security, leading to the weakening
of NATO, and of Western resolve to mobilize for defense*-, In addition,
Malik's speech may be a cover for'further Communist aggression in Korea
or elsewheroo
6. Although the speech probably was intended primarily as a vehicle
for the spreading of Soviet propagaanda, it may reflect an actual desire
for a cessation of hostilities, or a disengagement. The Soviet Union
could have several valid reasons for wanting to bring the Korean campaign
to a halt. Among those that might be to-the Soviet advantage a res
ae To avoid the risk of general war implicit in more overt
military assistance to Communist Chinae
ba To prevent the Korean war from spreading into a Chinese
Communist-UN major war, which would imperil the Chinese Communist
regime.
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ae To terminate the costly Korean campaign, which has causeds
(1) devastation in N. Koren,
(2) a drain of every kind on China's marginal war potentials,
(3) at least a limited logistical drain on the Soviet Union,
(4) obstruction to Communist expansion, particularly in Asiao
do Prevent the full implementation of Western economic measures
directed against the Soviet system.
ee To extricate their Chinese ally from futile pursuit of the
Korean campaign or alternatively to permit a breathing spell for the re-
generation and concentration of those forces, including the ever growing
air threat*
f. To permit consolidation of Communist control in China..
g. To permit the development and deployment of the Chinese
Communist capability toward other areas in Asiao
h. To permit the regeneration of the North Korean military,
forces ahead of the South Korean forces.
7. Considerations which affect in some degree, at least, the above
apparent advantages, include the followings
a, Defensive preparations in the non-Communist world have already
achieved considerable momentum and a Communist peace move in Korea after
a year of sustained aggression might not be accepted as sufficient basis
for a substantial relaxation of the anti-Communist defense program.
b. Present attrition of UN forces in being would be suspended for
the duration of the cease fire*
o. Increments of UN military strength would be made available
for bolstering the defenses of other areas on the Soviet peripheryo
do A renewal of Communist aggression in Korea or elsewhere after
a temporary cessation of Korean hostilities might, in the Soviet view
incur a greater risk of immediate global war than if the Korean il?stil#s
ties were permitted to continue indefinitely.
e? A soviet initiated cease fire might suggest Communist
military weakness and cause a lose of Communist prestigo that smsld not
be fully offset by the Soviet role of "peace sponsor".
g
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f. If a possible permanent partition of Korea should result
it might create a security threat to the Soviet Far East on the Asian
mainland,
. 8o On bs.lahoe, however,'the possible advantages accruing to the
Soviets as a result of a disenpgemst of Oommunist forces in Korea
are believed to offset the risks the Soviets would incur, particularly
since* in their present role, they appareiitty need not pursue arq
peace proposals if agreement is not reached on terms favorable to the
KreIIlin. Mearahila the Soviets will retain in large measure the
initiative for local aggression elsewhere on their perimeter whether
or not they effect a disengagement in Korea.
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