WHY DID MALIK MAKE PROPOSALS ON KOREA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000400020005-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 24, 1951
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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From EG Discussion
QW= June 24, 1951
Why did Malik make proposals on Korea?
1. Is it merely a propaganda device?
A. There is an argument for this supposition:
1, Conceivably the USSR might subsequently introduce so many
complications as to nullify negotiations and facilitate their tak-
ing stronger military action in a short time. However,,., this would
be hazardous, since we now have the initiative, and progress de-
pends on our responses.
Be The arguments against are overwhelming:
1. The USSR has handed to us a clear opening for initiative
which could cause most harmful backfire propaganda rise.
2. The USSR faces a Communist military position in Korea
which requires increasing Russian support with consequent increas-
ing risk of counteraction in Manchuria and general war.
3. The circumstances of the speech:
(a) Selection of the date some time ago;
(b) Use of UN world network for presentation;
(c) Instant publication of text in USSR, showing full
policy control.
4. The statement is a fully new twist in the absence of col-
lateral conditions,
5. The statement in itself has an element of concession in
recognizing the possibility of forgoing Korean objective.
(Beyond this point there can be no equivalent assurance of conclusions,
pending further evidence and reactions, notably from Peiping.)
II. Is it designed to secure a brief and local breathing spell?
A. For this possibility: the Chinese need time for training and
build-u
p.
B. Against this possibility:
1. Renewal of military action would be
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Communist initiative (we discount any USSR reliance on crazy action
by Rhee).
2. Renewal of military action would involve greater risk of
3. Propaganda consequences of I and a would be deleterious.
III, Is it designed to secure a longer-term respite from risk of war?
A. For this possibility:
1. The USSR cry push its military and political build-up.
2. The West and the US would experience great pressure to-
wards delay or reversal Of mobilization.
B. Against the possibility:
1. The USSR may consider US *ruling circles' so bent on war
as not to be deterred by this development.
Co Further argument depends upon an over-all estimate of USSR
capabilities and intentions beyond our present scope.
IVo Is it a cutting of losses?
A. For this possibility;
le The USSR may have come to regard the Korean affair as a
venture that has become unprofitable unless it is pushed into
general war.
2. The USSR may feel the need to insure against any Chinese
Communist defection under pressure of mounting Korean war strain.,
and against a possible US overture for a peace settlement that re-
quires China to break with Russia.
3. By moving from military to political action the USSR
may reckon on advantages from lessened cohesiveness of the Western
front and slowing or reversal of our mobilization,
4. There is considerable analogy to the Berlin blockade action,
B, Against this possibility: arguments would dative only from
over-all USSR intentions.
V. Is it a first step towards an over-all detente? (This would imply
an intention to avoid general war indefinitely, but. to continue with
political action.)
No evidence is available to support this point, which can be
brought up only as a remote and conceivable logical deduction from this step.
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