(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000500020002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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S~R~.E'1t 5tren~tl ?
The So~.et bloc will, still mairata~.n a considerable lead in comp,
veational military power paver the ~~est in mid-1953e Unless rnarlcsd
progress in NATd dev~-lopment of new ~7eapons ahtauld retirolutionize the
military situation., the USSR and its Satellites will probably still be
+abl? to carry out almotst a].a. of the offensive operations asf which they
are presently considered oapable~
2m Western Strength.
Qn the other ha~ad9 assctmiYag a continued high :level of US and
N1~T0 rearmaanent? the Western powers will xaarrow somewhat by midpl.953
the present gap between NATO and Sotriet s$rength,??in.~e~.nga
ao Esooept ~ ,ease of a murkod decline in US aid or a radical
shift. i.n So~riet policies, a ~bstant~.al impro~nemant i.n ~Testerri Eu.x~per~n
military strength and morale seems likely by ra~.dp19~34 ~rth~ar progress
towmrd achieving MTDP goals' continued expansion of the European
? econom~s amore unified and effiaienr~ N~AT~ and continental, effortp and
the probable integration of Z~'est . Qerm~ ixa~s ?tlie Atlantic Comma~nity
will, be contributory faotors, Ne~nerttaeleee$ such obstacles a13 economic
ettresaes and social dilscomtent~ political wea~,nsss, and rt3sistance to
:State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Document No.
T0~ S~ Review o1 this document b
determined that y C1A has
^ CPA has no olabecfion fo declass
,~ It contains infor:r~tion of CIA
interest tiaat -nns.t remain
classifiod at 7'S S
Authority: HR
^ It contains o 70.2
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further sacrifices w3.ll. prevent full attainment of px~+esent P~}P goals
and gill, continue to hamper achievement of US ob3ectiveeo
bm In the Far East, the growing strc-~ngth of Com~n3st China
may, to some extent, be offset by the revi~ral of a prn-~ntestern Ja~pa~
There will, however, be a continuing danger in both the Near and
Far East of serion,a deterioration of the Wasters position, mast likely
either through further manifestations of violent nationa'Lism, as in
Iran, or thraagh continued t~inese Communist penetration, as Tara
Southeast Asiaa
3~ Alternati~res f~vn to the USSR.
Faced Yaith the aituatian in which its still subst+~xatial militarlr
lead is be~.ng threatened by Western m~.l.itary programs, the USSR mar}rs
aq Contixsate its present aggressive sold mar policies.
b? Seek,, through.a tactic of apparent conciliation, to lull the
~+test into a sense of false secur3.tg and undermine its defensive efforto
The success of such a policy would, ho~~ever, be lim'.ted~, in the ab~
Bence of mare basic concessions than we consider the ixa is
likely to grant?
a? Confider the rising cure of t~Testern stxength, and particu-
larly incipient Gexman and Japanese rearmament, sa serienas a threat
as to require a resort to force at the time whop Sov3,et comparative
strength is greatest, iac~,, before m3.d~?1953a The risk of such action
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will be far more acute during the next two years thaan at ~ time s3.gnce
World t~tar TI, aiace the IISSR will recognize that its military super
3ority 3s progressively declining vis-a?vis the Westes~ por~ners~, of
whose t~l.timately hostile intentions it is probably firm] cornrincedo
Whether it adopted course (a) or (c) $ th9a+~a is ,~ e~igazifia ent
possibilifi~y that the USSR would undertake tli~rther lacal military ag?
gression during this pr~~riod, particularly in the Far East or Yugo~-
sl.avia, to w~aaken the Western power position or to improve the strategic
position of the USSRo
Probable outcomes
We are unable to estimate which of the above major alternative courses
of action will be;followed by the USSR during the period under review@
Very tentatively, however, we consider that their relative prolbability
may be that indicated by the order of their listing in?paragraph 3p
These courses of action are not, of course, necessarily mutually
exc3uaive~ The USSR might, for exaanple, continue to wage an ~gressirone,
cold war for a while longer, and then conclude that this course was
yielding diminigh~g ~~~, and seek to secure a relation of tensions
through a tactic of apparent conciliation, Finding that it could not thus
substantia.7.]~r retard the West?s military programs urlthout genuine eon-
cessionas it might then resort to force to prevent-the completion of these..
programs? Or -- less deliberately -- it might, in the vigorous-prosecution
of the cold war, inadvertently place itself in a position from which it
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could.not~e~scape war without a significant if locaX retrettt, and decide,
against than background of a belief iai the unaveidability of e~url~r East-
West h?stilities, aiot to kept that r+etra3ato
In arm event, the USSR s choices will Px''e~~' be heavily ins
~I.uez~ced by its o~+rr~ estimate of pra3sent and future Western and ~viet
capabilities. It ~Y vez~r weL1 be detera^ed from c~l3.bermtely initiating
general ~rar dur3,ng the periad cova:red ~r this paper by its estimate of tI8
capabilities .ire fihe field of uncoarventia~nal weapons and by a confidasnt
appraisal, of its abi.~ity~ to weaken the West further ~ means short of war.
5. Threat to U.So 3ecurityo
We believe, in view of the estitnatee cited above than
as O.u the basis of presently pro,~ascted US securl~r programs,
the power position of the US and its allies vie-a-vie the 8ovist orbit
should bas somerahat improved by mid-1953. It canrmt be overemphasized,
hox+sver, haw mach even this 3~nprovement, which will amt be dgciaive,
will depend upon the paoe of US rearmament and a contisaied high level
of exteraal US aid and leadership, if not a substantial isaai^~eaae in
US aid,
b? Probable continued, aggressitre Comaaenist cold war pressures
during the xbext two years may anise the irfr~st to suffer some sigiaifieant
local losses, particularly in the Far East, and may hamper the growth
of Western strength ana3 consolidationo These losses, howsvasr, may
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r~e71. be aeatwoaighedS as i~t the past thre? years by tYse over?s17.
stit+a~ats to Wasters countermeasures end increased Erse r~orld
awareness of the Soviet threat resealting from Soviet b~aaviorQ
Soviet effort during thin period to Dense a general relmxation of
tensions would probably attain Daly limited resra~t~s atn~.ess it taere
supported by concessions of a greater scope than we ?st3mate would
prbbably be forthcoming from the USSR, .
c o Despite, and to some extent bec~atse of, the prospecti~
improvement. in the over~ala. Western paver positi~ata over the next
two years the threat of Soviet preventive military action duxd.ng
this periad z~i.~.I. be greatp There wig, also be seri~rits risk of ilzrther
overt Comr+aanist 1oca1 aggressian' which migrtt either seriausly weaken
the Western power positian or lead by accident or raisc~.culatian to
genera, w'aro This scbstnnti.al. possibility of general war will, cot~ttitute
thretagh mir~1953 to have far more critical implicatiatt~s for US socurity'
theta ~" prospective impxa~ement iu the aver~al7. power balau~ce of the
Western Por~era visa@vis .the Soviet bla~ a This pericsd of scats danger
xill, ~ indicateei .in P1SC 11tt~ last until the US and its allies achierre
an adequate positiaa of strength,.
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