STAFF PLANNING PROJECT NO. 26: EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000500020028-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2000
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: August 22, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

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Office Mernorawdum ? UNITED STATE GOVERNMENT
LoAlHya 0/1111 CI Qr'111"'[ t A L
TO DATE: 22 Aug. 1951
SUBJECT: Staff { lan ins- Project No. 26: Eastern European Satellites
1. Control and Stability
Soviet Russian control over the Eastern European Satellites
is virtually complete already and should he perfected by rid-1953.
The Satellite ,noveinii ent ; and CorT-.tunist Parties are now all
controlled by men loyal first to the Soviet Union. The political
and cultural opposition in each state has been ruthlessly broken
and its economic foundations destroyed. The economy of each
country operates for the benefit of Soviet economic and military
po rer, and through institutions such as CEijA Kremlin authority over
the total economy of the area has been made complete.
Soviet occupation troops and air forces, Soviet training of end
penetration into the local secret police and external security forces,
Soviet missions and representatives throughout the military estab-
lishments, the adoption of standard Soviet weapons and reliance
upon the Soviet Union for supplies and items such as tanks and
aircraft, and mutual aid treaties (with the exception of Albania) --
all assure continued and increasing Soviet control and ability to
use the strengths of the Satellites.
It is very likely that there will continue to be trials and
purges, excursions and alaaums throughout the Eastern European
Satellites, but these will strengthen rather than weaken the Soviet
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. No opnosition forces or restive elements have or will have
the poorer and organization to constitute more than a minor
irritation or nuisance aga..nst security forces with the shill and
rre^olve of t'lose now in potter.
It is a l rmost certain that Cnrmmr_j-ni_St ideology and political and
cccnnm_-ic necessity Trill lead to an intensification of the drive for
collectivization throughout Eastern Europe by mid-1953. Soviet
e7perionce and skill in this operation should light the difficulties
this operation will inevitably entail and should -prevent the
isoontents from develonin~ into serious threats to order and
Cocurity. It is possible, however, that collectivization could
cause troubles of sufficiently serious character as to limit
temporarily the military capabilities for offense of the Satellite
~ lnin?`i e s .
i i i tar r strength
The n-aies of the Eastern 11uropean Satellites increased in
size approximately 30% from January, 1950 through mid-1951, and
it is believed that they will increase an additional 60'5' by mid-1953.
These armies now contain 862,000 men, organized into 65 divisions,
of which 2, are armor and 9 nechani_zed. by fall, 1053, they will
total about 1,4;50,000, or 117 divisions, of which 11 will he
armored and 1` mechanized. These armies by mid-1953 will be
reliable instruments for the Soviets and will be capable of
independent military action, provided the Soviet Union is willing
to provide logistical support and to risk a general war. Soviet
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domination of these armies and Soviet cleansing and training
of them should he so complete by mid-1953 t'Zat the Kremlin could rely
confidently upon them for joint offensive operations with the Soviet
armies a(ainst the West. Their loyalty would probably be shaken
severely only should the Soviet Union suffer a series of reverses
in a general war.
Econor?iic trennth
The Eastern European Satellites constitutes a very valuable
increment to the economy of the Soviet Union. They produce 2/3
of the uranium ores and concentrates of the Soviet orbit; they are
large producers for the Soviet Union of POL, coal, and chemicals
for fertilizers and explosives; they contribute large quantities
of heavy engineering and transportation equipment to the Soviet
Union; they provide electronic equipment and technical knowledge.
At the salve time, the Eastern European Satellites, especially Poland,
are exporters of coal and foodstuffs needed by Western European
countries and are therefore avenues by which the Soviet Union has
been able to acquire from the Jest materials vital for its war
oconomy, such as rubber, tin, ball bearings, machine tools and parts,
and precision instruments?
These atellites have added strains and wealmesses also to
he soviet economy, although these are far outweighed by the
a vantages ,g mined. The Satellites require for their continued hasty
industrialization many crucial raw materials and some binds of
equipment which are in short supply in the Orbit in general and
Mich it is increasin:;ly,.difficult to obtain from the 'est. Ajthough.
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COIVFI~ENTIAL
complete Soviet power to control the allocation of critical
iaterials and equipment should limit the impact these shortages
will have, it is obvious that an effective continued Western
restriction on exports to the Orbit will seriously delay completion
the present industrialization programs and flatten out the
r'_sinr, curve of atellite industrial production.
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CONFIDENTIAL