PP NO. 26 (GREECE, TURKEY, IRAN, ARAB STATES, ISRAEL)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000500020031-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2000
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: August 21, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

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To: 21 August 191
From:
Subject: APP No. 26 (Greece, Turkey, Iran, Arab States, Israel)
1. Greece and Turkey will be integrated into a Western defense
system, and a Western command structure for the Eastern
I. Conclusions
The US position in the Near Fast will probably be slightly
better in 1953 than it is at present. This estimate is based on the
following considerations:
Mediterranean regior~ will be in being.
2. Turkey's military strengtk~ is being will increase substantially
and Greece's to a lesser extent.
3. Western strategic air-base and stock-piling programs in
the area will be far advanced.
Iran, while possibly subject to greater Soviet influence
than at present, will not be much more vulnerable to Soviet
a~?gression than at present.
Although the British position in the Arab states will probably
be further undermined, the area will be no more vulnerable
to Soviet aggression than at present. ~~ w'?~ ~"" (~~' ~~
5.
6. In the event of a relaxation of tension iri the East-~^Test
neutralism will increase in Iran and the Arab
struggle
,
States. However,
pro-Soviet and will continue to suppress indigenous Cor~umznism.
If, ~on the other hand, the threat of Corimunist aggression
in the Near East increases, some of the Arab states might
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even be induced to ,join a Western defense system. US
assumption of greater responsibility in the defense of the
area, together with increased US economic and military aid
to these states, would increase their inclination to
contribute to a Western- defense system.
II. Major trends and developments
During the next two years the follot~.ng trends and developments
in the Near East can be predicted with a fair degree of certainty:
1. Greece and Turkey will be firmly integrated into a Western
defense system, either through membership in NATO or as a
result of the establishment of a Mediterranean Pact which
will be closely tied in with NATO.
2. Turkeyts military potential will constantly increase; its
present critical deficiencies in NCO~s, stock-piles, logistical
planning, communications, aircraft, and airfields will have been.
overcame to a considerable extent in two years. Its armed
forces will probably continue to increase in manpower, and it
will have an airforce of exclusively jet combat aircraft. The
continued expansion of Turkeyis forces will place a continuing
strain on the country's economy. Asa result, US economic
assistance will have to continue at a high level, even though
direct military assistance may be greatly reduced. Assuming
such assistance, as well as close integration of Turkey and
Greece in a western defense system, Turkey will increase the
strength of the western coalition to a significant degree.
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3. The Western-program of strategic air bases and stock-piling
thereon will be further implemented,. In two years, eastern
Mediterranean or Near East strategic air bases in the following
areas will be ready for use in the event of war: Libra, Crete,
Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and possibly Egypt and Iraq. Arab
nationalism in Libya and.-the Enosis movement on Cyprus wi11
raise problems in connection with. the air base programs but
are unlikely seriously to interfer with them.
~treme nationalism and anti-monism will continue to prevent
the effective integration of the Arab states (with the passible
exception of Saudi Arabia) into a Western defense system far
the Near East.. There is almost no likelihood of a significant
improvement in Arab-Israeli relations during this period.
? Nationalism will continue to undermine the traditional bases
of British. strengt~i in the area and may compel the British
to withdraw their military forces from Egypt, Iraq, and Jardan,
If they do not withdraw, they ~..ll constitute a constant irritant
to Arab-Western relations.
5. There is a slight possibility that the Arab states and Iran
might be induced to cooperate with, the Western powers in
building up Near Eastern defenses against the threat of Soviet
aggression. This possibility rests on three extremely
problematical contingencies:
a. Acceptance by the US of major responsibility in
organizing and developing the defenses of the Near East.
=3-
'~'
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This would aost a lot of money.
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c. Greatly increased Communist acti.Vity in the Near East
and Soviet activities directed towards the Near East, Ara3~
leaders would be more inclined to cooperate with the West
if the threat of Soviet aggression weremore imminalt and
acute. Near pastern neutralism can be attributed to a
very great extent to comparative inactivity and lark of
initiative of the Soviets in the area. However, unless
there is a significant improvement in Arab-Western relations,
it is unlikely that the USSR will make any greater effort
to subvert the area.
h. The US program of economic and token military aid on a slightly
expanding scale will have the effect of partially off-setting
the instability induced by Arab-Israeli assi~osity and the anti-
L7 I ~ ,
Western induced by Arab nationalism and the Palestine issue.
No great material benefits will derive from this program during
this period. The Arab refugees will continue to need support
in 1953 and the standard Qf living is general will be little,
if at all, improved.
7. The pattern of Communist activity and Soviet pressure is unlikely
to change during the next two years. Propaganda and diplomatic
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pressure on Greece and Turkey will probably remain?at a
high level. The firmness of Turkey's pro=+~estern ali.gn-
meet may occasionally be probed by a Soviet offer to com-
elude anon-aggression pact or same such gambit. It is
unlikely that 'thy USSR would accomplish anything by such
tactics. Tn the Arab Statesathe USSR will continue to
exploit and foster ar~y developments which have the effect
of undex~nining ti"~`estern influence in the axea. Communist
activity is unlikely to play a leading role in such develop-
ments, and it is unlikely that the Communists wil..l be able
to gain control of the nationalist movements.
$. The situation i~ Tian is unique in that '~iestern influence
is in a fair tivay to being completely eliminated. However,
in view of the highly independent attitude of the Iranians
toward the USSR, as we71 as toward the ~~est, it is unlikely
that the USSR (at least during the next two years) can gain
control of-the country except by aimed force. As a result of
the oil controversy with the UK, Iran may conceivably be com-
gelled to submit to increasing Soviet pressures. However,
even if the Tudeh Party came to power, which is extremely
unlikely, Iran would not be very much more vulnerable to Soviet
aggression than it is at present ~ ~- ~ (G~
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SIT. Continuing ~~~ajor Threats ~ ~,, ,, ~ ,,,,~,e~ ~,,,~ ,,,~,~
v~tx~,
The fore;oing estimate of trends and developments is based on
the assumption that the USSti will not t c t
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precipitating a global conflict, during; the ne~~t tyro years. If the USSR
does in .fact attack the area, it will probably be able to overrun it (with
the exception of Crreece and `I~skey) as easily in 1953 as it can in 1951.
In addition to this primary threat to the US, the f ollowing
possible devel pments may be considered major threats:
1. Iran and the UK may be unable to come to terms in the oil
controversy, If Iran cannot obtsin Western assistance. in
running its oil industry, it may turn to the USSR for such
assistance and thereby give the USSR an opportunity to in-
crease its influence in the country. E~ren if Iran does not
turn ?to the USSR for assistance, the non-operation of Iran's
oil industry for a long period would contribute to greater
political and economic instability, which might give the
Tudeh Party an opportunity to take over the government.
2. UK-.Arab relations may become so embittered as to undermine
a7J_ Arab r~estern relations. "'he development of this threat
will depend to a vex~,~ great extent on the degree to which the
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3, Arab-Israel's hostilities may be renewed. Such a developrent
~rauYii~ ?prevent the development of closer Arab--~'~estern relations
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what troops are going to be available for the
~~~
defense of Egypt? British~US troops will be
tied up in Etaerope; Bominion troops wonst leave
home,
2, For a long time, therefore, defense of Near East
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and undercut urestern efforts to increase the defensi~-ility
of the area against aoviet aggression.
~.. The Communists may launch a netiv guerrilla offensive in
Greece. At present such a development appears unlikely
unless as a part of overt Communist a~Pgressian ~.n the area..
Bases are not much use unless you can deploy
troops in the area. In the event of global war,
will depend an air and naval forces.
Even if British are nat in Egypt, LJestern Powers could
presumably establish defenses in Egypt by that time,
even if some "persuasion's were necessary,
These can be
based as 4Tell in ^luskey, Greece, Cyprus, Israel,
Saudi Arabia, Aden~and Libya as in Egypt,
In any event, whether the British are in Egypt or
not, Soviets can get to Aleppo area by D .~ 1~0 and
cannot launch offensive against Suez until about D ~ 26?.
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