SUPPLEMENT TO TAB 'A' OF SE-20

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: December 29, 1951
• Content Type: MF

25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010012-0
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010012-0
 Approved Fo 2 WR i.:, L ~
29 December 1951
SUBJECT: Supplement to TAB "A" of Si-20
1. The attached text,, approved by the Bowe pureuent
to a consideration of it by the IAC representatives on 29
Deazmber, is urgently required for delivery to the NSC first
thing Wednesday, 2 January,
call
2. Your cooperation in telephoning your concurrence by
10":00 Monday, 31 December will be greatly appreciated,, (Please
3. If concurrences have not been received by all nembers
of the IAC by 11:00, it is planned to convene the IAC at 2:30
In order to discuss divergent-points of view.
Eeout ve Secretary
4%
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SUPPLEMENT TO TAB "A" OF SE-20
I. Communist Chinaea Seaborne Trade during 1951.
1. Estimates based on the recorded exports of non-Communist
countries to Communist China indicate that Communist Chinads
seaborne imports from non-Communist countries reached a record
high of US $360 million in the first half of 1951 and then fell
sharply in the third quarters
An increasing amount of non-Communist exports was
transshipped to Communist China through Communist bloc ports or
through non-Communist ports that did not report such shipments,,,
This conclusion is supported by figures on shipping in the China
trade. Total merchant ship traffic in trade with Communist China
generally increased during the first seven months of 1951 and then
declined only slightly. Factors which enter into the decline of the
seaborne trade of Communist China with non-Communist countries area
Western export controls, increased imports from the Soviet Bloc, in-
stitution of a system of selective buying by the Chinese Communists,,,
a shortage of foreign exehange.resulting from heavy imports in
1950 and the first half of 1951, and the sharp fall in Chinese
Communist exports to non-Communist countries in 1951,
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2, Most of the goods imported by Communist China from non,
Communist countries are commodities important to war-making
capabilities. Rubber,, chemicals (including pharmaceuticals), and
minerals and metals and their manufactures, accounted for two-
thirds of total imports through Hong Kong (including Hong Kong.
Macao trade) both in the second half of 1950 and the first half
of 1951. Hong Kong's trade pattern is significant because during
the first half of 1951 Hong Kong handled two-thirds to three-fourth*
of China's trade with the West. Although Macao and other ports
have assumed increasing importance as transshipment points for
goods destined to Communist China since expanded trade controls
were introduced in Hong Kong in June 1951, Hong Kong continues as
the single most important source of Communist China's total seaborne
imports.
3o Most of the goods imported into Communist China from non.
Communist states originate in Western Europe and are transported
in ships of Western European registry, India and Pakistan are im-
portant secondary sources of supply and transshipment points.
Malaga has reduced its trade with. China considerably since further
controls were added in May 1951,
ISO Communist China's exports of raw materials of animal and
vegetable origin - such as soybeans, rice, wheat, oils accounted
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for two-thirds of its total exports to non-Communist countries
in the first half of 1951. Textiles accounted for 10% more.
Communist China prohibited exports of strategic items such as
tungsten and tin to the West in 1950. Comnmanist China0e exports
to non-Communist countries in the first half of 1951 fell nearly
50% from the high reached in the preceding period.
5. A large portion, probably %by value, of Communist
China's trade with the Soviet Bloc is seaborne. Most of the
military equipment for Korea is transported overland.
6. of the total foreign trade of Communist China, probably
two-thirds by value is seaborne In terms of tonnages apProxi?
mately of the total trade is seaborne. Nearly all of Comimunist
Chinan0e seaborne trade is carried in Vestern-registored ships.
Probably less than 3.0% by tonnage is carried in Soviet and Polish
vessels. This amount is now increasing due to augmentation of
Soviet Bloc shipping by purchases from the West.
II. Communist Chinas a Trade with the USSR
~fl Communist China?s trade with the USSR has increased
steadily since the spring of 1,950 with the sharpest rise in the
second and third quarters of 1951.
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is estimated that Soviet exports to Communist China during the
first three quarters of 1951 totalled approximately
8, The comradity categories of Soviet exports to China in-
a. Military goods
b, Industrial raw and semi-
finished materials
c o Petroleum products
do Chemicals, drugs and metals
e, Machinery and machine tools
fo Transportation and communications
equipment
go Lumber
Textiles
io Consumer goods
3o Electrical equipment
ko Agricultural products
1950 1951
June Dec. Jan.'ept?
9o It is estimated that to the first three quarters of 1951
the USSR, provided Communist China with at least 700,000 tons of POL
products, of which an estimated minimum of 500b000 tons represents
distillate fuels (aviation and motor gasoline, jet fuel, naptha,.
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kerosene, etc.) Petroleum shipments to Communist China rose
sharply during the summer of 1951 and apparently continued at a
high level, to the end of the year.
III. Communist China's Overland Trade
10. Communist China's overland trade is at present almost
entirely with or through the USSR*
the Burma Road has been used ommin
during 1951 for the transport of strategic commodities but the
volume of trade moving by this route is small and transport is
costly.
1.1. About 80% by value of Soviet exports to Communist China
is carried on the Trans-Siberian RR and passes through the border
transshipment points at Otpor-Manchouli (NW corner Manchuria) and
Grodekovo-Suifenho (Manchurian border north of Vladivostok). A
relatively small; volume of Soviet exports to Communist China moves
via the Amur and Sungari rivers or by truck and caravan through
Mongolia and Sinkiang. While most Satellite exports to Communist
China move by sea, some shipments are made overland via the Trans-
Siberian Railroad.
IV. Communist Ability to Circumvent an F4nbargo on Shipping Or
Exports or a Naval Blockade@
ago The Chinese Communist ability to continue seaborne trade
in the face of an embargo on shipping and exports-would vary with
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the extent of enforcement. As indicated in section I most of
Communist Chinams seaborne imports originate in non-Communist
states and are carried in non-Communist shipping. It is doubt
ful if the Communist bloc could from its own resources replace
more than a fraction of the goods and shipping now supplied to
the Conn unist China trade by non-Communist states. However, it
is probable that a substantial quafitiity of goods originating in
the west would be available for purchase by the Chinese Communists
,in non-cooperating countries and that non-cooperating states would
be able to buy or charter ships for use in trade with Comnaanist
China,
13. It is estimated that Communist China imported a mini-
mum of 20,000 tons a day by ship during 1951. If shipping were
interdicted it would be impossible for Communist China to import
more than a very small part of this tonnage by overland routes,
The major overland route into China from the west is the Trans-
Siberian railroad, with an estimated daily eastbound capacity
of 229500 tons. The paralleling BAN railroad is not yet completed,
The Trans-Siberian railroad is already operating near capacity.
It is unlikely that traffic to Communist China on this railway
could be increased by more than a few thousand tons daily. The
railroad lines in Manchuria leading to Harbin from Suifenho and
Hanchouli have 'a combined capacity of about 1119000 tons a daffy.
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These lines might be able to absorb the few thousand tons of addi.
tional traffic which the Trans-Siberian might be able to deliver
to them daily, although only at the expense of the civilian
econoir of the region. Track and caravan routes through Mongolia
could probably handle about 200 tons a day. Truck and caravan
routes from Rae:aian Turkestan through the Kansu corridor have an
estimated capacity of about 300 tons a day. The Burma road could
not carry over 500 tons per day and probably would carry much
less. Routes from Indo-China could probably not be utilized.
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010012-0
SECRET
NON-COMMUNIST SHIPPING IN THE EAST-WEST
TRADE TH CHINA (lM
JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH
APRIL
ps ra
so Ton, Ships
rm^r
r. on,
Gr,Ton S EBo Gr.Ton.
Ship
. Ton.
. ^ ^
wm ^
r. a
TOTAL KNOWN NON=COMMUNIST
SHIPPING IN CHINA TRADE
133
719,130
3.47
639,335 206
931,999
19.5
910,570
241
1,281,131
PATS EST, CORRECTION FOR
UNKNOWN TONNAGES (i)
80,000
60,ooo
105,000.
80,000
50,000
EST, TOTAL NON-COMMUNIST
SHIPPING IN CHINA TRADE
(133)
799,130
(147)
699,335 (206)1,
036,999
(195)
990,570
(241)
1,331,131
LESS SHIPPING INVOLVED IN
CHINESE COASTAL TRADE
62
195,385
59
186,269 55
170,130
50
152,312
46
133,760
TOTAL SHIPPING INVOLVED IN
EAST-TEST TRADE WITH CHINA
71
603,745
88
513,066 151
866,869
145
838,258
195
1,197,371
NOTESs
among Kong, Macao, Dairen and Port Arthur are considered Chinese ports."
2, Only ships of 1,(X30 tons and greater are considered.
3. Estimated increases are based on average gross tonnage of 5,000 tons,
4, Ships identified but actual tonnage not published in shipping manuals. This
is the best estimate available.
SECRET,
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/066: CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010012-0
SRET
NON-C0fiMUNIST SHIPPING IN THE EAST-WEST
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST '
SEPTEMBER
Ships Gr.Ton.
ips Gr.Ton,
Shia
r0Ton,
ip
r.Ton.
SHIPPI M C INORO
jST
256
1,274,124
266
1,312,425
233 1,
211,070
259
-192133,273
PUTS EST. CORRECTION FOR
UNKNOWN TONNAGES (4)
100,000
120,000
90,000
130,000
EST. TOTAL NONaCOMMUNIST
SHIPPING IN CHINA TRADE
(256)
1,374,124 (
266)
1,1332,1325
(233) 1,
301,070
(259)
1,373,273
LESS SHIPPING INVOLVED IN
CHINESE COASTAL TRADE ,
42
122,694
37
108,293
35
110,884
130
126,073
TOTAL SHIPPING INVOLVED IN
EAST WEST TRADE WITH CHINA
2113
1,251,430
229
1,324,132
198 1,
190,186
219
1,247,200
NOTES:
1.
Hong Kong, Macao, Dairen and P
ort Arthur a
re co
nsidered Chinese po
rts.,
2.
Only ships of 1,000 tons and g
reater are c
onsid
ered.
3?
Estimated increases are based
on average
gross
tonnage of 5,000 t
ons.
hi
4.
Ships identified but actual to
nnage not p
ublish
ed in shipping manu
s
als. T
is the best estimate available
.
(2nd page of chart)
SECRET
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GROSS TONNAGE OF NON-COMMUNIST MERCHANT VESSELS IN CHINESE WATERS * (1951)
(By Nationality of Registry)
SECRET
*Includes ships entering Hong
Kong, Macao, Dairen, and
Chinese Communist ports.
TOTAL
I
~?
s
I
I
BRITAIN
40P~
+
x~x
-" x'x
i
x
.
OTHER
x
.. ?-??
?.~
.?
PANAMA
/
?
NORWAY
JAN
GR 1118 12-51
MAY
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/