SUPPLEMENT TO TAB A TO SE -20

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010014-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: December 31, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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31 December
SUPPLEMENT TO TAB "A" OF SE -20
I. Communist. China's Seaborne Trade during 1951.
1. Estimates based on the recorded exports of non-
Communist countries to Communist China indicate that
Communist China's. seaborne imports from non-Communist
countries reached a record high of US $360 million in the
first half of 1951 and then fell sharply in the third. quarter.
An increasing amount of non-Communist--
exports was transshipped through Communist bloc ports
or through other ports that did not report such shipments. .
This conclusion is supported by figures on shipping in the
China trade.. Total merchant ship traffic -- Communist
and non-Communist -- in trade with Communist China
generally increased during the first seven months of 1951
and then declined only slightly,
3. Factors which enter into the decline of the sea-
borne trade of Communist China with non-Communist
countries are: Western export controls, increased imports
The Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force,
and the joint Intelligence Group participated with the Central
Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All
members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred on
31 December 1951.
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from the Soviet Bloc, institution of a system of selective
buying by the Chinese Communists, -a shortage of foreign
exchange resulting from heavy imports in 1950 and the
first half of 1951, and the sharp fain in Chinese Communist
exports to non-Communist countries in 1951.
4. Most of the goods imported by Communist China
from non-Communist countries are commodities important
to war-making capabilities a Rubber, chemicals (including
pharmaceuticals), and minerals and metals (including products
manufactured from them), accounted for two-thirds of total
imports through Hong Kong (including Hong Kong-Macao
trade) both in the second half of 1950 and the first half of
1951. Hong Kong's trade pattern is significant because during
the first half of 19?1 Hong Kong handled two-thirds to three-
fourths of Communist China's trade with the West. Although
Macao and other ports have assumed increasing importance
as transshipment points for goods destined to Communist
China since more restrictive trade controls were introduced
in Hong Kong in June 1951, Hong Kong continues as the single
most important source of Communist China's total seaborne
imports.
5. Most of the goods imported into Communist China
from non-Communist states originate in Western Europe and
are transported in ships of Western Ewrope ?n registry. India
and Pakistan are important secondary sources of supply and
transshipment points, Malaya has reduced its trade~with
China considerably since further controls were added in
May 1951.
6. Communist China's exports of raw materials of
animal and vegetable origin -such as soybeans, rice,
wheat, oils accounted for two-thirds of its total exports to
non-Communist countries in the first half of 1951. Textiles
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accounted for 10 percent more. Communist China pro-
hibited exports of strategic items such as tungsten and
tin to the West in 1950. Communist China's exports to
non-Communist countries in the first half of 1951 fell
nearly 50 percent from the high reached in the preceding
period,
7. A large portion, probably 40 percent by value,
of Communist China's trade with the Soviet Bloc is sea--
borne. Most of the military equipment for Korea is
transported overland.
8. Of the total foreign trade of Communist China,
probably two-thirds by value is seaborne. In terms of
tonnage, approximately 80 percent of the total trade is
seaborne. Nearly all of Communist Chirp's overseas trade
is carried iu Western-registered ships. Probably less than
10 percent by tonnage is carried in Soviet and Polish vessels.
This amount is now increasing due to augmentation of Soviet
Bloc shipping by purchase of ships from the West.
II. Communist China's Trade with the USSR
9. Communist China's trade with the USSR has in-
creased steadily since the spring; of 1950 with the sharpest
rise in the second and third quarters of 1951,
It is estimated that Soviet
_3
exports. to Communist China during the first three quarters of
1951 totalled approximatel
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10. The commodity categories of these estimated
Soviet exports to China include-
1950
a. Military goods
b. Industrial raw and semi-
.finished materials
ce Petroleum products
d. Chemicals, drugs and metals
e. Machinery and machine
tools
f. Transportation and com-
munications equipment
g. Lumber
h. Textiles
i, Consumer goods
Electrical equipment
k. Agricultural products
19.51
June - Dec. Jan. Sept.
(7 mos) (9 mos)
11. It is estimated that in the first three quarters of
1951 the USSR provided Communist China with at least
600,000 to 700,000 tons of POL- products, of which an
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estimated minimum of 400,000 to 500,000 tons represents
distillate fuels (principally aviation and motor gasoline,
jet fuel, naphtha,- kerosene). Petroleum shipments to
Communist China rose sharply during the summer of
1951 and apparently continued at a high level to the end
.of the year.
M. Communist China's Overland Trade.
12. Communist China"s overland trade is at present
almost entirely with or th ough the USSR.
the Burma Road as been
use ~y
Communist-China during .1951 for the transport of strategic
commodities but the volume of trade moving by this route
is small and transport is costly.
13, About 80 percent by value of Soviet exports to
Communist. China is carried on the Trans-Siberian RR and
passes through the border transshipment. points at Otpor-
Manchouli (NW corner Manchuria) and Grodekovo-Suifenho
(Manchurian border north of Vladivostok). A relatively
small volume of Soviet, exports to Communist China moves
via the Amur and Sungari rivers or by truck and caravan
through Mongolia and Sinkiang. While most Satellite exports
to Communist. China move by sea, some shipments are made
overland via the TransSiberian. Railroad.
IV. Commu ist Ability Circumvent an Embargo on
Shipping or Exports or. a Naval Blockade.
14. The Chinese Communist ability to continue sea-
borne trade in the face of an embargo on shipping and exports
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would vary with the extent of enforcement. As indicated
in section I most of Communist China's seaborne imports
originate in non-Communist states and are carried in non-
Communist shipping. It is doubtful if the Communist bloc
could from its own resources replace more than a fraction
of the goods and shipping now supplied to the Communist
China trade by non-Communist states. However, it is prob.-
able that a substantial quantity of goods originating in the
West would be available for purchase by the Chinese Com-
munists in non.-cooperating countries and that non-cooperating
states would be able to buy or charter ships for use in trade
with Communist China.
150 It is estimated 'tliat Communist China imported
a minimum of 20,000 tons a day by ship during 1951. If
shipping were interdicted it would be impossible for Com-
munist China to import more than. a very small part of this
tonnage by overland routes. The major overland route into
China from the West is the Trans-Siberian railroad, with
an estimated daily eastbound capacity of 22,500 tons. This
railroad is already operating near capacity. It is unlikely
that traffic to Communist China on this railway could be
increased by more than a few thousand tons daily. The
paralleling Baikal-Amur railroad is not yet completed. The
railroad lines in Manchuria leading to Harbin from Suifenho
and Manchurli have a combined capacity of about 14,000 tons
a day. These lines might be able to absorb the few thousand
tons of additional traffic which the Trans-Siberian might be
able to deliver to them daily, although only at the expense of
the civilian economy' of the region. Truck and caravan routes
through Mongolia could probably handle about 200 tons a day.
Truck and caravan routes from Russian Turkestan through
the Kansu corridor have an estimated capacity of about 300
tons a day. The Burma road could not carry over 500 tons per,
day and probably would carry much less. Routes from Indochina
could probably not be utilized.
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GROSS TONNAGE OF NON-COMMUNIST MERCHANT VESSELS IN CHINESE WATERS * (1951)
(By Nationality of Registry) 25X1
SECRET
*
Includes ships entering Hong
Kong
Macao
Dairen
and
,
,
,
Chinese Communist ports.
TOTAL
do*
-----
i
BRITAIN
ft.
40 00
/+
X X
Xr~X
00
OTHER
?-??
??
?.
PANAMA
,...........
................
NORWAY
'
U.S.
? .. ...
..............
.?????
JAN FEB
GR 1118 12-51
MAY
SECRET
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ION OMMUJNIST SHIPPING IN THE EAST-WEST
TRADE WIYH CHINA
JANUART
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
S ps
r
S ps
r Tones
3r0Ton
.
i
. ar.To,,.
Shim Gr. Ton,
.
e
n
eo srra
TOTAL KNOWN NON=COMMUNIST
SHIPPING IN CHINA TRADE
133
719,130
147
639.9335
206 931,999
195
910,570
241
192819131
P]f.D S EST, CORRXTION FOR
UNKNOWN TONNAGES (EOTE 4)
80,000-
60,000
105,000
80,000
50,000
EST, TOTAL NON-COPMUNIST
SHIPPING IN CHINA TRADE
(133)
799,130.
(147)
699,335
(206)1,036,999
(195)
990,570
(241)
1x331,171
LESS SHIPPING INVOLVED IN
CHINESE COASTAL TRADE
62
195,385
59
186,269
55 170,130
50
152,312
46
133,160
TOTAL SHIPPING INVOLVED IN
EAST WEST TRADE WITH CHINA
71,
603,745
88
513,066
151 866,869
145
838,258
195
1,197,373
NOTES:
ong Kong, Macao, Dairen and Port Arthur are considered Chinese ports.
2. Only ships of 1,000 tons and greater are considered,
3. Estimated increases are based on average gross tonnage of 5,000 tone.
lt. Ships identified but actual tonnage not published in shipping manuals. This
is the best estimate available.
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NON-COMMUNIST SHIPPING IN THE EAST-WEST
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DINE JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER
ShIps Gr.Ton,, SHIps- Gr.Ton0 roTon0 S ps r.Tono
IIO
256 102749124 266 1,312,425 233 1,211,070 259 192439273
IOMST
PAS EST, CORRECTION FOR
UNKNOWN TONNAGES (NOTE 100,000 120,000 90,000 130,000
EST, TOTAL NON-COMMUNIST
SHIPPING IN CHINA TRADE (256) 1,374,124 (266) 1,432,425 (233) 1,301,070 (259) 18373,273
LESS SHIPPING INVOLVED IN
CHINESE COASTAL TRADE 42 122,694 37 108,293 35 110,684 40 1268073
TOTAL SHIPPING INVOLVED IN -
EAST LEST TRADE WITH CHINA 214 1,251,430 229 1,324,132 198 1,190,186 219 1,247,200
1. Hong Kong, Macao, Dairen and Port Arthur are considered Chinese ports.
2. Only ships of 1,000 tons and greater are considered.
3? Estimated increases are based on average gross tonnage of 5,000 tons.
.. Ships identified but actual tonnage not published in shipping manuals. This
is the best estimate available.
(2nd page of chart)
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State,
he Departments of/the Army, the Navy, the
Air Force and the Joi-it Intelligence Group
participated with the Central Intelligence
Agency in the preparation of this estimate.
All members of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee concurred on 31 December 1951.
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