COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010029-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 1999
• Sequence Number: 29
• Content Type: REPORT

proved For Release 2Q I08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO101lA000600OW29-2
53817=p
COM^RUNIST CHINAVS FOREIGN TRADE
During the last half of 1950 Communist China's seaborne
imports reached record levels, These imports consisted primarily
of raw cotton, chemicals, crude rubber, petroleum products,, steel
and steel products, metal manufactures, and pharmaceuticals. At
least three-fourths of these imports passed through Hong Kong and
practically all were carried in non-Communist registered shipping,
Seaborne imports into Communist China reached.even higher levels
during the first half of 1951 and the composition of these imports
did not change significantly.
. 20 During the latter half of 1951 there has been a decline
both in seaborne imports into Communist China and in the tonnage
of non-Communist registered shipping engaged in trade with Communist
China, There are several possible reasons for the decline in the
seaborne trade of Communist China- Among these aret Western
export controls, increased imports from the Soviet Bloc, institution
of a system of selective buying by the Chinese Communistsand a
shortage of foreign exchange resulting from heavy imports in 1950
and the first half of 1951, Information now available-does not
p6rmit even an approximate estimate of the relative importance of
these factors,
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDg7,aQQ1 ' --&000600010029-2
 Approved For Release 208/29: 61A-RDP79SO1011A00060001UW9-2
3o A part of the decline in the tonnage of non-Communist
registered shipping involved in trade with Communist China has
been offset by the diversion of Communist Bloc shipping to
carrying Comrmxnist Chinabs foreign trade0. States of the Soviet
Bloc are buying or chartering additional ships for use in this
tra{aea
. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010029-2
 Approved For Release 208/29: CIA-RDP79SO1011A00060001,( +29-2
COMMUNIST AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IN MANCHURIA
to Present Chinese Communist air defense capabilities are
dine directly to Soviet assistance in terms of equipments, operational
procedures, training, and, in many casess, the active participation
of Soviet personnel, In assessing such capabilities.. the following
factors are pertinent:
(a) Fighter Aircraft. Approximately 525 first-line jet
fighters of the MIG.15 type are located in the Mukden-Antung area
of southern Manchurian Approximately 225 additional firsts line
jet fighterrs, which are now located in the Peiping-Tientsin,
Tsingtao, Shanghai, and Canton areas, could be deployed for operations
in the ;tukden'Antung areao.
(b) Early Warning A radar defense system has been
installed and set in operation, with the assistance of Soviet radar
engineers, technicians, and advisers, which is believed to give
practically continuous early-warning coverage from the Manchuria
border south to Canton, A visual system supplements the electronic
early=warning system,
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010029-2
 Approved For Release 2008/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A00060001,QX9-2
(c) Antiaircraft Artillery. Manchurian air defenses
include a substantial number of antiaircraft artillery pieces as
well as large numbers of automatic weapons. The majority of these
are Soviet manufactured 85 mm., 37 mm., and 12.7 mm,, pieces. Reports
continue to indicate that the total AAA strength is being increased
by shipments of Soviet equipment. Heaviest concentrations are
located in the Mukden area, Shanghai, and in the vicinity of Canton.
AAA defenses appear to be employed for the protection of the indus-
trial area, harbor facilities, airfields, and major junctions in
the communications and supply systems. Reports indicate that the
AAA defenses include gun-laying radar.
(d) Aircraft Controls The Communist air defense system
in Manchuria has the capability for limited grountcontrolled inter-
ception.
24 Communist air defense capabilities in Manchuria are
estimated to be as followst
(a) In the Dairen-Mukden-Antung-Harbin area of southern
and eastern Manchuria, the Chinese Communists possess & ,major air
defense capability against daylight bombing missions. At night
their air defense capabilities would be considerably less.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010029-2
 Approved For Release 20 08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO101lA000600011029-2
(b) Cownunist air defense capabilities in southern and
eastern Manchuria are such that considerable losses of US aircraft
could be expected, at least initially, daring a campaign of
systematic air attacks. Under conditions of prolonged air attack'
the ability of the Chinese ConmUnists to maintain effectiveness
would"be in direct proportion to the amount of support which the
USSR would rendero
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010029-2
 Approved For Release 20QQ/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A00060001'Q 29-2
1. The Chinese Nationalist Army has a strength of 1i55,000
personnel organized into 38 infantry divisions, 4 armored groups,
1 paratroop group,,3 fort commands, 5 independent regiments, and
2 independent battalions, The bulk of these forces is disposed on
Formosa; some combat elements are located on Matsu, 'Quemoy, and
the Pescadores Islands, The Nationalist Army has no significant
number of trained reserves, and under present circumstances its.
mobilization capacity is negligible. The mass induction of
Formosan youths would not be feasible unless the US greatly expanded
its proposed IADAP, Even in this event, the dependability and
effectiveness of Formosan troops would be questionable. At the
present time, the Nationalist Army is short of some types of annmmi-
tion, arms, and other equipments, and the materiel that is available
is heterogeneous and poorly maintained. Because of these materiel
deficiencies, the lack of reserve manpower, and the poor command
structure (including the lack of interservice coordination), the
combat effectiveness of the Nationalist Army is poor,
2, The Chinese Nationalist Air Force consists of 8 combats
groups possessing 381L tactical aircraft. Of this total, hover,
only 121 aircraft are serviceable for combat. These consist of 35 light
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010029-2
 Approved For Release 2008/29: CIA-RDP79SO101lA00060001 99-2
bombers and 86 piston fighters predominantly of World Dar II design,
Because of the lack of spare parts and improper maintenance
facilities, the combat effectiveness of this force is very poor,
Under conditions of sustained combat, particularly if opposed by
-jet aircraft, its capabilities would be reduced to a negligible factor
in a day or two, In spite of these difficulties, the Chinese Nationalist
Air Force is believed to have the organizations. structure and
necessary personnel to absorb and utilize the additional equipment,
including jet aircraft, necessary to make it an effective force,
3o The Chinese Nationalist Navy consists of approximately
1S0 miscellaneous crafts, the largest of which are 7 destroyer type
vessels, Under optimum conditions and provided that there were
no air or naval opposition, the Nationalists would be capable of
transporting up to two divisions in assault by means of orthodox
landing craft and following up with five or. six divisions lifted by
other shipping, While the Nationalist Navy could not, by itself,
effectively blockade the Chinese mainland, it could give limited
support to a blockaded
to The Chinese Nationalist Forces could not be effectively
used for offensive action against the Chinese Communist mainland
unless the present US program for equipping and training these
-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010029-2
 Approved For Release 2(00,08/29.: CIA-RDP79SO1011A000600OW9-2
forces were greatly expanded, and unless the US were willing to
provide not only logistic support for an invasion but substantial
air and naval support as well, Even so.. Chinese Nationalist ground
forces could hardly be ready for an invasion operation before mid..
1952, and Chinese Nationalist forces as a whole are not likely
to be ready in sufficient strength for a large-scale invasion
operation before 1953, However? certain small units of the Chinese
Nationalist Army are already capable of effective employment in
small-scale hit-and-run landing operations.
5, In a relatively short time certain selected divisions of
the Chinese Nationalist Army could be made effective for rotational
service on the Korean peninsula. The Chinese Nationalist Army as
a whole could be employed effectively in Korea after a lesser amount
of preparation than would be required for a large?.scale invasion
operation of the Chinese mainland.
..8.?
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010029-2
 Approved For Release 20W8/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A00060001J29-2
ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT STREWTH AND CAPABILITIES
OF ANTI-CQI-,% KIST GUERRILLAS IN CHINA
A, Their Strength and Location
to The maximum total number of effective guerrillas throughout
all China which can with any certainty be said to exist at the present
time is approximately 175,OO0Q Dormant or potential guerrillas
exist in unknown numbers, but the utility of this category is and
probably will remain small pending all-out war or revolution in
China,
24 Active guerrilla forces are located for the most part in
inaccessible areas -- mountainous regions and: on Nationalist held
offshore islands, Principal. regions of activity continue to be the
Pearl River and Canton area, the K*angtunggFukien border, the Kwangsi..
Kweichow border, Szechwan, the Chekiang coast, southwestern Yunnan, and
scattered areas in the Mongol and L;oslem northwest,
Ba Their Physical Composition and Condition
3o The term "guerrillas" is an elastic one since these resistance
forces are heterogeneous in nature and vary greatly in composition from
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDA000600010029-2
 Approved For Release 20W08/29: CIA-RDP79SO1011A0006000' QK9-2
one unit to anothero, Generally speaking, guerrillas fall into the
following categories: (a) exNationalist forces., some of whom profess.
aalegiance, but most of whom owe no allegiance, to Taiwan; (b) dis-
contented landlords and peasants; (c) bandits; (d) members of
traditional secret societies, and (e) minority racial and religious
groups, The most active and effective units are those in categories
(a) and (e).
Lo Guerrilla forces suffer from a lack of central direction
and coordination, from a relative lack of organization, quite often
from lack of knowledge of proper guerrilla warfare tactics, from
serious deficiencies in arms and ammunition,, ands perhaps most
importantly, from an almost total lack of communication facilities.
In additions guerrilla forces suffer from a lack of adequate foods
clothing, and medical supplies.
Ca Their Liotiviation and Allegiance
5o No single political program unites or inspires the
guerrillas economic considerations. generally outweigh political,
and the basic motivating force behind guerrilla activity at the
present time is the struggle for existence and self-preservation'.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29_: CIA RDP79S01.01lA000600010029-2
 Approved For Release 20 08/29: CIA-RDP79SO1011A000600OW9-2
b0 Despite Nationalist and independent claims, the Chinese
guerrillas are likely for the most part to follow whatever leader
and whatever political group can support and maintain them.
To Such organization and centralized direction as does exist
is primarily that now being exercised by Taiwan. The Chinese
Nationalist guerrilla effort, however, remains largely ineffectual
because of the hindrances of internal Chinese Nationalist politica0
80 Independent elements continue to claim a substantial
guerrilla potential in KwangBi and Kwangtung0 It is believed that
the claims of one of these elements to sizeable guerrilla assets
in being are valid, but this group does not have the resources to
maintain itself without outside supports
Do Their Continues Decline in Strength and Effectiveness
90
Chinese Communist countermeasures against dissident elements
have been most successful; and, with the further consolidation of
control by Peiping and the forming by Peiping of an effective anti-
guerrilla militia throughout China, ;guerrilla strength and activity
under present circumstances will probably continue to declined
100 The perhaps surprisingly low 'figure of only 175,000
guerrillas should not be ascribed wholly to the successes of the
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010029-2
 Approved For Release 2008/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A0.0060001D9-2
Chinese Communist anti-guerrilla program. This low figure also
reflects more accurate US knowledge concerning anti-Communist
resistance in Chana than was available when earlier estimates
were prepared.
Their Present Capabilities
11. Anti-Communist guerrillas have at the present time the
capability for:
(a) Sporadic raids;
(b) Occasional sabotage operations;
(c) Raids feintss and diversions against the mainland
from the Nationalist-held offshore islands;
(d) Providing intelligence concerning Communist China; and,
(e) Providing a potential nucleus for a resistance movement in
mainland China.
12. The guerrillas at the present time do not have the capability
(a) Delay or disrupt the movement from one front to another
of the Chinese Communist armies;
(b) Seriously interdict Chinese Communist lines of
communications or logistic support;
12
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010029-2
 Approved For Release 2(08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A0006000'W9-2
(c) Attract to their ranks substantial numbers of
defectors from the Communists;
(d) Significantly aid military operations should a
Nationalist invasion be launched in the near futureo
ll3a Guerrilla capabilities are unlikely to increase without
sizeable outside support and a revitalization of the Chinese
Nationalists*
_13_
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S0101lA000600010029-2