CHINESE NATIONALIST ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010036-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 1999
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: January 9, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release
SECURITY INFORMATION,
1011 A000600010036-4
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1. The Chinese Nationalist Army has a strength of 151,000 personnel
organized into 38. infantry divisions, 4 armored groups, 1 paratroop group,
3 fort commands, 5 independent regiments and two independent battalions.
The bulk of these forces is disposed on Formosa; some combat elements are
located on Matsu,, Quemoy, and the Pescadores Islands. The Nationalist
Army has no significant number of trained reserves and under present cir-
cumstances its mobilization capacity is negligible. The mass induction
of Formosan youths would not be feasible unless the US' greatly expanded
its proposed MDAP. Even in this event, the dependability and effective-
ness of Formosan troops would be questionable. At the present time, the
Nationalist Army is short of some types of ammunition, arms and other
equipment and the materiel that is available is heterogeneous and poorly
maintained. Because of these materiel deficiencies, the lack of reserve
manpower, and the poor command structure (including the lack of Anteraervice
coordination) the combat effectiveness of the Nationalist Army is poor.
After receipt of the proposed US materiel aid and after training in its
use, its effectiveness will be substantially improved.
2. The Chinese Nationalist Air Force consists of 8 combat groups
possessing 3814 tactical aircraft. However, of this total, only 121 air-
craft are serviceable for combat. These consist of 35 light bombers and
86 piston fighters predominantly of World War tI design. Because of the lack,
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of spare parts and improper maintenance facilities, the combat effective-
ness of this force is very poor. Under conditions of sustained combat,
particularly if opposed by jet aircraft, its capabilities would be reduced
to a negligible factor in a day or two. In spite of these difficulties,
the Chinese Nationalist Air Force is believed to have the organizational
structure and necessary personnel to absorb and utilize the additional
equipment necessary to make it an effective force. However, the present
US aid program is not expected to improve the Nationalist Air Force or
even maintain its present capabilities.
3. The Chinese Nationalist Navy consists of approximately 150 mis-
cellaneous crar't, the largest of which are seven destroyer type 'Vessels.
Under optimum conditions and provided that there were no air or naval oppo-
sition, the Nationalists would be capable of transporting up to two divi.
sions in assault by means of orthodox landing craft and following up with five
or six water-lifted divisions. No amount of logistic surport could immed=
iately effect a great increase in the effectiveness of the Nationalist
Navy. Training in large-scale operations, command reorganization, the removal
of political intrigues, and other slowly achieved changes are prerequisites
to any major improvement.
4. It is evident that the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist
Armed Forces are extremely limited. It is estimated that the Chinese
Nationalists are at present incapable, by themselves, of defending Taiwan
against an all-out assault by the Chinese Communist Forces. On the offence
sivre-side, the Chinese Nationalists could not at present establish a lo:dge~-
ment on the mainland without the full participation of US forces, including
CONFIDENTIAL
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US ground forces. After receipt of proposed U. S. materiel aid and after
training in its use, the Nationalist Army could provide 10 infantry divi-
sions for an assault on the mainland, if the U. S. continued logistic
support to the invasion force. However, since the presently proposed aid
will not improve Nationalist air and. naval capabilities, an attempted
assault on the mainland still would have no hope of success unless the US
provided powerful air and sea operational support.
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